Evening Star Newspaper, September 20, 1892, Page 12

THE EVENIN STAR: WASHINGTON, D. C, f, aad attacked form ps in only 4 sing! aud finally thet o wih made at mightfail to t zeinvan's error. The action series of sie: red Magrader, and easily mainta! every attack. continued enemy sign Aud he only 50) or GOO na windy nr ral loss at 3.000. and ci them throughout the action. | however, that Sumner gained his object. which was unmolested retirement across White Oak son's division bringin: It is to be noted, k and wounded and their medi left to fail into the enemy ep in the cha “ re the rel ‘ be trated Gen. Lee found b same position of Mctleliat Pair Osks and nes’ Mill affairs -bis army on both sides of the rivsr. the wrong side, impotent the critical tin As PMleosizn sue p je Oak swamp. and by the neighborhood front. This was 1 | it been mu a have been wn to the new federal Had le Craperi service to Magrae srome daa eaamp rouds atter Sai found the bridses over the creck destroyed are 1 infhet- Bat all his at- frnstrated by whe persistently held the line of ite ‘The iow was snail oo son bivouacked om @ presage apd rear of the federal tines at Gle frontine Longstreet and Hill and cov tween Jack Longstreet anit wth. developed the Loug br: 1 Holmes by the Now Market | fond. farther south. Hearing the boom of Jackson's artillery bat- tle im the swamp. aml mi K some firing to the south for Hugers advanc t pressed forward to a general attack Se, _He etruck the corpe of Sumner and Ha a geiman aud MeCail’s division. the latter posted somewhat out of position. 1 forward a!te MeCail the exultant coufederates were ratrox. | * and Hooker's | repulse. | eu beth Maui troupe apd met The ndale w very severe pnd if every way ered table to i the purpose of the stand the: fally accomphehed. thuuzh in two ‘1 was exactly similar to all of Motte! vision of the army was permitted to be fesence of thousand f troop. Prevented it. and the com vehief Was coaxpicw by his ab- the fel: Otherwise Gleadal complete Uw: ory. Sumner remaining m pour field at nightfall, from i the enemy wes ‘23 killed and Sogude i amt 1.190 captared and missing. The opts derace les int! last by ot the con- Their total lows was 3.500 After dark Sumuer snd completed the con: 1 army avout daylight | ‘t of the con- | this conec defeated y brid; Whit: Oak «wamp in the bloody bat- all these ae- t with «nperior nu feren'er loss, and there a why more shoud | Bet bare Geen accompli-be| than merely peiling the enemy. protecting the retreat of their Ws oo tras to the James aud thea se- uring the. own alety. 2EVERS WELL. ‘The culminating event of this series of Operations was the battle of Malvern, July 1 © Phe comiederaie troops engaged in the stack 4 every effor hen | on the foderals were the divisions of Whitin ¢ | federal ine was advauced about 800 yards, and | Stonewall Jackson's \ D. TH. Hill, pert of Ewell’s—of Jackson’ command—and Magruder and Huger. Lon; reet. A. P. Hill, Jnckeon's old divi Ewell’s were held in reserve. the Union position from the north, on their joined on Whiting’s right, wit troops prolonging the confeders The line here tre D. HH. Hill's » line further ded around ader's divisio eround the feder: carrying their line perhaps two ‘miles to move over open cont, a distance vary 4 quarter to three-fourths of a mil could reach the federals, who: ug with artillery, rniy was i battle array with the north and around to th ow, swampy land, dif in. Gen, “Keves held the Peck's division, 1 \was not ext on his left, toward the west, klin's two divisions; then two divisions intach of Keyts’ connectin: eiman, Here Morell nus were in front, wi isiony in support. ft. down in the vaile nmond. All MeCall's di de was on t erve artillery, mostly heavy gaus, was posted on this line, the attack being antici- pated from this direction. But batteries owned upon the enemy ail along the heights. position was practically impregnable, About 10 a, m, the enemy began to feel along the Union front for positions from which to About 3p.m. a heavy artillery fire rom Cyuch's men, who the confederate poured in a destructi secured better ground. The range for the Union artillery wus magnificent, and its play was very effective. After this thet e wae a lull for two hours. but about 6 p.m. the enemy infantry, w! charged at a ru: tremendous art of Union musk ery fire and the ste ere desper: a komme places the conte: y repeated time and again, and tes for a time held d close up to the Union Ines, but in no | fnstance did they make any imupression. on | ing battle was the sound of the cannon, toward . It was a series of bloody repulscs Morell’s and Coneh’s front, part of een relieved Sickles’ and vies, until durkness set in, ¥ gradi low until % fierce charges The conte king 1 were D. H. Hill's, projec Couch. and those of Magruder and Huger at Lee claims ries were forced ther it seem and sure work for y much such a battle to Jerais, only Shere were not so long of the federal Gen, jericksburg. The con- between the lines, ¢ confederate Ituneous, the sign aul one—was not he Ss as tullows: rr inw stablished to rake the enemy's oxen, a# is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire. has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the It is haraly proba ve been broken under tances, but it might readily 1 temporarily exe . as weil icles. mot cuite so hun Gaines’ Mal after the fight was over, th orzanized body existed in his command. ‘The real battle lasted ouly wounded, and approximating from minut reports the coi ate loss foots up abot nearly all killed and wounded. Gen. lian's total loss for the week. including 725 missing; total, 3.214. E all the b . was only 15,819—1,734 kilied, $.062 wounded and ptured or missing. The coufedernte losses during the same period wounded and ar losses in killed and TO MAREISON’S LANDING, The night following Malvern McCiellane re- treated still further down the river to Harri- «landing, whieh he had previously ed upon as fis future base of ope: i com the James, m Here he was not attacked, After observing him for about six weeks, Lee turned his tention to Poy ‘Thus ended the battle of whi the federais won vie- euemy double their after every victory The federal troops were evidently right. One does not have to searca tar to find the cause of failure in thi exmpaign. Had Gen, MeClellan but repaid army with the contideace and implicit faith that army placed in him. all would have been weil, his name would now be shining on the pages of histor ty hero, In his official report. written long after the nts, and also in his testimony before th mittee on the conduct of the war, MeClel- lan put forth the positive claim that if Me- Dowell, with his 30,000 men, had been pe mit join him he would lave taken Rich- mond. Yet he never figured the rebel force in his frout at less than his own, and from that Mill, tories, inflicting on the own loss, and yet retre t were a defeat, ev up to 200,000, Itie hard to conceive how he expected to capture Richmond with such a force defending it when with a relative strength in his favor far greater he had failed to break Magruler's lines at Yorktown or de- cisively beat Johnston st Fair Oaks, coe = THE SECOND BULL RUN. rrow Escape—Gen. Pepe's Movements. 7 3! Wenig OPERA- tions in the vicinity of Washington early in 1862 had been charac- terized by such feeble cross purposes under the disunited com- mands of Fremont, Banks and McDowell as to make the consol- idation of their forees under one head a vital necessity. There were approximately 50,000 men in the Shenandoah valley and in front of Washington, the farthest command hardly more than seventy-five miles from the capital, yet in three distinct military departments, totaliy independent of each other. Consequently, on the 26th of June, 1962, these various commands were consolidated into one. designated the Army of Virginia, and Major General Joha Pope placed in command. Pope had distinguished himself in the west at New Madrid, Isiand No. Ten, and before Co- rinth under Halleck. He was a military figure and fully enjoyed the confidence of the public and the Washington authorities, and make such diversions as were warranted i aid of the important operations in progress against Richwond. But as a matter of fact there was to be an early and unexpected modifi- cation of his original plans, caused by Me- Cleilan’s disasters on the peninsula, which be- gan the very day of Pope's assignment, After McClellan's retreat and essential collapse at Harrison's Landing, pursaed by tho under Gen. Ri. E. Leo, Pope a aud | Whiting | courage npon his perilon« undertaking. With of an address to his army on | 1@ left, then a brigade of Ewetl’s | taking the fell, somewhat bombastic in tone, ust Morell. Magruder made several des- | te mpts to stor hillat Crew's aked by a hundred 3 nature of their attacks, | for — mo-! behind Bull Run and the ovject was accom- pounce upon and destroy it. TAKING THE comMAXD. The new commender entered with zeal an “th | which aroused adverse criticism ay | wary unneces. McClellan, he boldly advanced with about 35, portant railway junction of Gordonsville, Pope's activity soon compelled Leo to detact Ston | front, himself following with the balance o} | the confederate army a woek lator. THE RAPPAHANNOCK. superior numbers gave him the ultimate ad. vantage, thongh the furious and somewhat un. expected attack of Banks confederates for a tim {insted an hour and a baif. | Cedar Mountain Banks lost 1 | and wounded and 6 infantry brigades and th artillery actually en. was fairly killed and wounded, y brigades participating. anks, in an excess of ill-judged zeal, y sent these charging columns | had prematurely brought on this action before Teeling back to the woods, But their efforts | the other divisions were in supporting dis- of his inten- ‘The latter's first knowledge of a pend- | | tance, tions. nd without notifying Poy which he marched rapidly with re ments, ‘The contederat and the converging columns of the Umoz | compelled him to eventually retreat across the Rapidaa two days later, AUMY Apr Pope held the line of th Bine Ridge until the 18th, when bi aware that Leo's entire army was agsc Rs. Rapidan to the be ame own army before the victorious Lee could | Pope's preliminary steps were th. with two bricades of Magers |S promising and marked with ability. ths | caes lay rtying helt line | forees wero rapidly concentrated, With the to the southwest, | primary purpose of drawing Leo away from | 000 men to the Rapidan, threatening the im- | ‘wall Jackson with 25,000 men to this new UNION AND OOSFEDERATE PICKETS MEETING IN As usual with Jackson, his operations were of the most vigorous character; he crossed the river, and on the th of August had « collision with Banks’ corps at Cedar Mountain, in which te at liv ly for the ‘The main action only At the battle of men killed missing from the five gaged. except 163 in the cavalry and from Ricketts’ infantry, which arrived after Banks worsted, Jackson, mostly on the by a small foree, with all its immense necuma- lation of military stores. An attempt the next moruing to retuke it by Brig. Gen. Geo. W. ‘Taylor {with a brigade of New Jersey troops, advancing from Alexandzia, wax casily re- muised, as both Hiil and ‘Taliaferro’s divisions aud come Gen, Taylor was mortally wounded, ‘isis brigade continued its retreat | to Alexandria. | The reports of his generals along the upper | Rappahannock hod partially informed Pope of the confederate movement behind the moun- tains toward the norta, but he failed to com- prebend its meaning. ‘Aw Inte as the night of | the 26ta, when Jackson was actually in pos- sion of his road, Pope was still taking measures to learn positively if the enemy in force had passed Thoroughfare. At 8 p.m. of that day he informed McDowell of his be- lef that “our battle” would probably be jfought at Warrenton, although aboat that f time Jackson was atticking. Manassas, fully twonty miles east of Warrenton. all tle-e were 18,000 other troops lying | idle within cannonshot of the ficld, ‘The «tubborn courage of the foderals made a deep impression upon the confederate leaders, Jackson reported that the conflict was “fierce and sanguiuary,” and that the northern troop a b and “greatly superior fores.” but correctly reported itas “one of the most territic con- flicts that can be concsived of.” He says that “for two hours and « half both lines stood un- moved, neither advancing and neither broken or yielding.” These noble troops could ask for no higher praise. The Iron brigade lost $94 men in this action, which they cail the battle of Gainesville, Tho confederate loss cannot bo exactly stated, but | it was probably somewhat heavier. Gen. Ewell his leg and ‘Taliaferro was also severely wounded. Col, Edgar O'Connor of the second and Major May. of the nineteenth wore killed; Col, Cutler of the sixth, Col, Robinson, Lieut. Col, Hamilton and Major Dill of the sevouth and Major Allen of the second were wounded, Several colonels and other confederate ficld officers were killed and wounded. It was, in- deed, a bloody encounter. Even as late as Gibbon's fight, with encr- getic action, there still remained time to inter- pose between Lonsstreet and Jackson. The ike at Gaineaville toward Groveton could ave been occupied by the divisions of King, Hicketts, Reynolds, Sykes, Morell, Schenck, Schurz and perhaps 6,000 of Banks’ men dur- ing the night. At daylight on the 29th at Ienst 40,000 men could have been huried upon Jacksou's exposed right flank eight hours be- fore Longstreet’s arrival on the scene, with Pope approaching his loft flank from Center- ut while Jackson did his work at Manassas. “Fighting Joe” seems to have bad the best of this little fight, Ewell retiring slowly on the main confederate force, feeding and burning at the Junction. |The loss was only about 200 on each side, and the fighting was not at all heavy. ‘This affarr was due warning to Jack- sou that the fe wore on his trail, And Pope discovered that, something serious had happened. JACKSON'S MOVEMENTS, ‘That night Jackson retreated from Manassas, after destroying thonsands of barrels of flour, pork, beef and other supplies, His aim now was to get back upon the Warrenton turnpike, to the north of the junction some six miles, ihe | brigade and another of Senure’s d.vision held TUESDAY, smPrEN BER 20, 1892-PART. TWO. : : ——_ pa ‘ea Sykes’ division and two brigades of Reynolds’ | the federal army was to defend Baltimore and division, THE RATTLE OVER. After the most desperate fizhting Long- street's efforts to curry the Bald Hill aka Heary House Hiikwore @nally repulsed by the fed- erais ‘about nightfall, and before he could make new dispositions for a renewal of the at- tack darkness set in, and the second battle of Ball'Run was over. ‘The heaviest fishtingvn this front occurred near the Henry house. on ground where the confederates Lee and Bartow were killed on st of July. 1881. Gen, Tron this point until two ure after aight, while the balance of the army wns withdrawipg across Ball run to Centerville, Pope's retreat was made in measurably good order. One day later, September 1, Lee moved ne ; pring n | Pope supposed his road bad been cut by a poveg conde ile gents Mee oy the Little | attack along the main road from that town, | raiding party of cavalry only. He promptly 5 ¢ Washington. 3 haw filed gfe tin artl | The saine day the sixth corps, under Frans tin | took measures. to reop munication with mao Ahi seat Cle oe Hat, cereated at the | moved via Darnestow onsiile aud Alexandria, The first ‘red on ate of Oe or Ox Hill, some two ‘mile Barnesville on k cover ne road | the railrond at Kettls Gen, | , O2% JOHN GINVON OF THE 1noN BuIOADE. | northeast of Centerville: where Jackson's ad- | Barnesville on J —ae a | Hooker: iivanch g from the southwosttoward | “maintained their ground with obstinate de- | vance was stopped by the divisions of Kearny | {70 the iar saikees ton age | tho jan the supposed “eay- | termination.” Gen, Taliaferro was mistaken | and Stevens, Both t is were kalled | ™. * ma MMGA onbced tee ane | airy,” and Gen. Eweil’s division, holding that | @ *apposing the federals to be in “immense” | in the action. The U was then with- | e wl rawn to the defenses in front of Washington 1d Pope was relieved from command, being superseded by McClellan. ope’s loss 2 are officially re ad wounded and 4,263 pri It is difficult to arriv at 1.747 killed, 5.452 oners-—total, 14.462. curately at the confed- erate loss, Surgeon Guild states their killed and wounded en “Manassas plai at 7,244. but Longstreet reported his loss in killed and | fromeporast 16 to September divided among the eleven in- forces ce was stopped ling | Ball ran : MONUMENT TO PATRIOTIC DEAD, ‘d away, but | forees, which largely outuuinbered Ja sson, | in am cligible position for defe nse or to re- treat still further, and to connect quickly with Longstrect, who was pushing by forced marches to reinforce him via Thoroughfare Gop. Fill moved n ckburn's ford Ewell bivous not be situatin moment ng Ric Gap. t about e ville with .0.000 more. have been doubtful. wisely sent dnring the’ day ‘The result could not ANOTHER MISTAKE. But for the third great mistake of this short campaign which now occurred Gen, Pope can- held responsible. In the absence of McDowell, who had begun to understand the | n more clearly and was at this very t consulting with Pope on the necessity of holding the pike about Gainesville, the | sabordinate generals concluded that their po- sition was critical, although Gibbon had held | tis ground, avd oward Bristoc and Manassas junction, inelud- withdrew after midnigut kets’ division, which McDowell had to Thoroughfare hus retarding Longstreet’s advance ‘ighteon hours. This withdrawal opened th» road for Longstrect to. join Jackson about Fs pe pik nocn on the 29th, though the Pope-Porter con- in his front. Gen. Lee in peeson arzived at | Pike 10 near Stone. Scasens ah eect ane | ice ricis Was caused a wcekx Glipute ad 3) iordonsville on the 15th. In fact, th in | next morning at Blackburn's, striking ‘across | €Xuet hour of Longstrcet’s urrival on the field. object of the campaign bad been attsined— | the country onthe S'toward the west, | _ Pope's opportunity to fight with decisive a | Lee, perceiving the innocuous condition of | reaching the e south | vantaxes Paced tl am Es Ad cert er ra a joa army on the James, ret a tomsed rete tiefield. to which point | to bis opponent's blundering se: Fortress Monro dito get ri 0 formi able a foe in the close vicinity of Richmond on | the latter had mare fore by the Sudi i direct! y Springs road, th might be- 7 bined c: Pope could now only expect t meet the com- ntrate behind onfederate corps or coi such easy terms, aud preferring to fight 45.-| These two divisions, drawn back from the | Bull en Seats Dhl cred repre at 000 mon rather than 0,000, had turned his | pike, extended weil toward Groveton—paraliel | attack. But with nr doggedness he sti ole attention to Tope. and MeCiellan was | With the pike and facing south—-within three | believed Jackson could be aug poset st iets ato. od Gtully board his tana, | Hles of the p re Longstreet’s road ported. : dat daylight on the 29th coer ig oo og a es is wane” | entered it at from. the direction of | Reynolds moved to attack him, not = oS =: eel E22 | Thorougbtare. A. W's division remaimed | ¥antage ground near Gainesville held the concentration and subsequent north of Bull run, t ford, until . When it crossed and took night b efore. with the help of King and Rick- its, but alone, and along the intrenched posi- with McClellan's situation and necessities in 9 , pat alone, and along, the intrenchied pos nat oe east St Jackson's line, which | tion of the old railroad ‘cut They failed to rniaes wae Cobcaine tin ant otk ca | an oid railroad eut from Sudiey | 5 armen bet on. Itis proper to re niom armies be fo conll concentrate f cart eee bis ow Way ais battle setae | on made no other move- handed aud ale “§ ver. CONFEDERATE CAMP | _ Itis apparent fr | Pope au t this ob as advanced ground as pos: ond, and me commnnieation ordonsville and Charlottesville. gn as a whoie cannot be fairly judged at rememberifg this fact. Haileck telegraphe the Rappahannock till I can help you. hard and aid will come.” On th "s troops fram North hs | toward erate lines of eamp oly in the direction Carol leck # assurance 1iGen. Pope had to do was simply to retire | plished. Bat Lincoln evidentiy had contide | tion could be safely ei | the southward, if. tim | maneuvering, and hence | tenacity with which Pop | the Rapidan and then the Rappahannock, And | while he doubtless would have succeeded had | McClellan's troops been pushed forward more | rapidiy, it is perfectly clear to the world now | that nothing wax to be gained by it, and that after a reasonable resistance on the Rappahan- nock he should have drawn back behind Bull run, or perbaps toward Fredericksburg, to meet the Army of the Potomac. 9. ON THE RAPPAMAN: tired behind the Rappahannock without loss, Stanton and Halleck ce that the concentra- fed much farther to could be gained by on their advice the By the evening of August 19 Pope hi | Bim along that river. crossing in fo ing along the éntire Lee’ battle of Bull Kun. Jackson on a flank movement to Po pushing after him two days later wi | ance of his army. 's rear, | that Pope was confidently dependi leck’s atrarance of the advanee of ta troops from Alexandria, and expeeti in couforinity to his own ordere, to def tion. Under the have been on Pope's part a re tion that his communications ntire ari hue. Yet | for his rear. the divisions of Ewell. Hill and Taliafe nambering about 25,000 men—cronsed the Rappabannock at Hinson's Mill, and & through Orleans nt not only desired to ject, but at the same ng the confed- Pope's On the isth to Pope to “stand firm on Fight 14th 8.000 of had if mere concentration was the sole object, ppe held the lines first of and on the 20th Lee's forces were confronting Pope's energetic resist- ance prevented for a whole week a confederate ‘There was constant skirmish- er front, ,And now was evolved the brilliant military Operation on part which led immediately tothe second Gen. Lee, unable to furce the line of the Rappahannock, as the only alternative started the bal This dangerous game was , made the more easy of success from the fact 2 on Hal-| icClellan's Manassas junction and his lines of communica- ircumstunces Limes Fad ble ox 2 jould be safe. Gen, Pope's task was to defend Washington | being duly assured that reinforcements of an were coming forward along that had warned him to look out Stonewall Jackson, with Stuart's cavalry and ng on the old a he knew so well, . with "30,000 men, were neing along the very sane turn- m the west, directly toward his posi- © morning of the 28th, Union soldiers of the isolated rps of McDowell road between Jackson i columns, but ail aware of the former's whereabouts, It looked chilly for Jackson, with Longstreet cightec zd no wonder Pope ex- | uited ° pro of bagging or'at least | badly whipping him before Lec could come up. GEN. rork’s oProRTUNITY. Had Pope been as well informed of the enemy's movements as he should have been, he would undoubtedly have marched on Gainesville, the key of the situation, with all his forces, and by 10 o'clock of the 28th at- tacked the right flank of Eweil and Talia- | ferro—Hill was not yet up—with overwhelm- ing numbers and driven thom off the field, or captured thom,twenty-four hours before Long- street's arrival, But he did nothing of the GEN. SCUENCK. Pope in fact missed the greatest opportunity of his life. Unfortunately, from the very outset, as is now perfectly clear from the records, he misapprehended the meaning of Jackson's movements, and his first step was a dreadful mistake. Pope was a fighter, and ho instinctively be- lieved the enemy intended to stand and fight at the fuuction. “On this wrong assumption he ordered forward on the morning of the 28th not only all the troops along the railroad, but also MeDowell and Sigel, who wero to leave the turupike and march on Manasaas, ‘The re- sult of this order is obvious—it was abaadoniny his commanding position botween the separated wings of the coafederate army and was fatal to his hopes of crushing Jackson, for. as we have seen, that able chicftain wus retiring from the juuction at the very moment Pope was making these fauty dispositions, Then, finding Jackson gone, Pope a second time misconceived his proper course, entirely overlooking Taliaferro’s march by the Sudley Springs road. Observing only the movement of Hill and Ewell across Buil run, apparently foward Centerville, qbout noon of the 28th, Pope pushed for that pout, with Heintzelman and Reno, to be supported by McDowell and Sigel, who were to return to the turnpike and resume their enstward march, So by accident, as it were. on the evening of that day McDowell and Sigel once again found themselves in tho right position to fight Jackson and prevent Longatreet's advance. These various moves con- sumed nearly the entire day of the 26th. After a loss of nearly twenty-four vital hours this last movement of McDowell's finally unrav- eled the mystery of Jackson's position. In fact Jackson himself had beon misled by Po erratic movements, first to Manassas and the! toward Centerville, and convinced that the federals were now in full out and Bull run, But he struck » smail snag. ‘THE FIGHT OF THE IRON BRIGADE. As King’s division was moving along the pike east of Gainesville about sundown of the 28th, Gibbon’s brigade—composed of the seo- ond, sixth and seventh Wisconsin and nine- teenth Indiana regiments, and battery B, fourth artillery—known as the “Iron brigade” of the west, was astonished but not thrown into disorder by a sudden and unexpected attack by Taliaferro's and Ewell’s troops, advancing from north of the pike, supported by a rattling artillery fire, Gibbon—a fighting general of conspicuous ability —faced his splendid brigade tothe front and advanced in line from the center ported soldiers RUINS AT MANASSAS JUNCTION. Heintzelman and Reno got across Bull run from Centerville toward noon, Pope had or. dered McDowell back from Manassas, ter to come in on the rebel right near Grov: tou, and there was a lull until late in the afte noon awaiting their orrival, About 4p. m.,in | anticipation of their advance, Pope ordered Heintzelman to attack in front of Jackson's Por- and left. Grover's brigade actually broke the confederate center, going over the railroad cut in fine style. but not being sup- were soon driven back, Kearny’ di- vision struck the extreme left of Hull's line and began to roll it up, and it was only by the most desperate fighting was able to repulse the federal onset, MeDowell arrived with King’s divi ith fresh troops that Hill At last n, now lellan’s army was under Hatch. At this time it was supposed quia ‘and Alexandria. He was Jackson was retreating and Hatch was sent in aliy enconraged by these facts and Hal- ursuit toward Groveton, Instead of a retreat- ing enemy he met some of Longstreet’s fresh advancing to the attack, ard after a magnificent battle of an hour Hatch was forced back, but in good order, This ended the fighting of the 29th, w! somewhi of a disjointed, THE END OF THE FInsT DAY. h, at like that of the first Bull Run, was desultory character. But the Union soldiers behaved splendidly, giving fair indication of different result had the army son was chargi broke Pre turnpike ‘eared, been concentrated and all fought at once, or of what Jackson’: previous, The advantage was somewhat on the Union side, but although the enemy had been roughly handled and driven nothing really important was accomplished. Fitz John Porter with h the ficld this day; Although Pope knew now that at least part of Longstrect’s force was up, he imagined as Inte ns noon of the 30th that Jackson was re- treating. again deceived by the readjustment backward of the confederate lines, fate would have been the day two divisions did not get upon either did Ricketts. But Jack- awaiting him behind the same old em- bankment, The federals found @ battle on their hands, instead of a pursuit, when they advance pretty much a repet tic and it finally settled down into tition of the previous day's but with the marked ference that Pope was making a better sustained effort with two-thirds of his army to break Jackson, Meanwhile Longstreet had swung into line south of the pike, well around the Union left flank, his artillery enflading tho ground on entire mt. Success must have entually crowned the attack of McDowell, Heintzelman and Porter, but for the tre- mondous flunk artillery fire poured w mm their lines by Longstreet, which at last em at a time when Jackson, hard had sent to Lee for help. plan was to drive the federals off the their line of retreat, to the north, and Longstreet,in a vort of left-whoeling opera~ tion, pressed forward about 4 p. m. for this parpowe, while the bulk of 1 ita braine out against Jackson's em. Jackson stated his own 12, nearly 2.000 more than ild’s figures, “The difference is accounted for by men who did not get into the hospitals for treatment. The killed and wounded of the Union army exceeded the confederate loss only ae cee ek 1 YADES MARYLAND. The Battle of Antietam Sends Him Back THE SECOND Bull Run campaign, which ended with the batt eral army under Gen, John Pope retired into the fortifications on the squth bank of the Po- tomae, whereupon he was relieved from the command and sent to the department of the northwest. At the time the general public thought Pope was a misused man, ‘This movement reunited the two federal ar- mies that under separate heads had for five months been impotently operating from differ- ent basos on exterior lines against a common enemy. By superior generalship, on inner and shorter lines, Gen. Lee had easily concentrated on first one and'then the other and defeated both, A change of policy was an absolute necessity to federal success. By direction of President Lincoln Gen, McClellan, who still retained the enthusiastic confidence of the army, was‘gn September 2 again assigned to the command of the federal forces. There feeling in Washington that McClellan had not been acting in good faith toward Pope, and his reassignment was bitterly opposed by many in high place, but in the state of the army, with the enemy at the doors of the cap- ital, the President wisely thought he was the Proper man for the occasion, Gen. Lee, emboldened by his successes, de- termined to cross the Potomac, His object is officially stated "to have been to transfer the war from the interior of Virginia to the fronticr, where it was hoped to detain the enemy until winter should render another advance toward Richmond impracticable, and to afford the people of Maryland an opportunity | to “recover their liberties.” So, after making demonstrations as if meditating a direct attack on Washington, his columns were headed for the river fords above the capital, Gen. D. H. Hill. whose division and that of Gen, Lafayette MeLaws had joined the rebel army after the last battle, led the advance, crossing the Potomac at the mouth of the Monocaey on the 5th of September, and marching straight on Frederick, A. P. Hill was crossed at White's on the same day, followed by the other divisions of Jackson's corps. ‘The divisions of Longstreet's corps marched by way of Dranesville and Leesburg, across the Potomac at White's, to Frederick, where the entire confederate army was concentrated by September 7. THE PRY HOUSE, M'CLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS. ‘This movement had placed the confederate forces between the Army of the Potomac and the federal garrisons in the Shenandoah valley. Lee purposed to occupy western Maryland and open communication with Richmond by way of the Shenandoah valley, and supposed his advance to Frederick would canse the immedi- ate evacuation of Harper's Ferry. Gen. Mc- Clellan‘laims that he urged upon the Wash- ington authorities the necessity of withdrawing those troops in ample soason to effect that object, but that personally ke was not given command of that post until the 12th, too late to save it, LEE'S PLANS AGAINST HARPER'S FERRY. Lee immediately took measures tu capture Harper's Ferry. On the 10th he issued written instructions a8 follows: Jacksou, who had been watching the line of the Monecacy toward Washington, was to move on the Maryland side through Middletown and Boonsboro’, recross the Potomac above Harper's Ferry in the vicmity of Williamsport, advance on Martins- burg. drive in whatever force was there and attack Harper's Ferry from the direction of the valley. Gen. J. G. Walker's division of corps was to recross the federal army on the shorter Bat nothing of the Kind was bearing of the canpon at Har- | mites, with the 1 tween, | Washington, to prevent the invasion of Pen: sylvania aud to dri land. As soon ns Lee crosze’ the Potomac and he became convinced it was not a feint te cover attack from the south on the capital Me | Cleflan ordered bis columns in pirsait, His j tines | per's ranklin went 14:b in Pleassnt valley, quietly remaining there throuchent the 15th and 16th. On the evening of the 16h he received orders from McClellan sim, dispositions fur the sdvance were admirable | em — and the morale of the troops began te por Juin, ron oomnoay mt oy | ceptibly improve. On the Sth the firstand n'nth corps, com- manded respectively by Hooker and Reno, os the right wi Afterward Couch was recalled tm the saime di- reetton, : No | °" E under Sam- ner and Williams, I via Teualiytown, Rockville, Middlebrook and Urbana on’ Pred: jeriek, in order to cover Wa: fro wore all ping the eueray's ido's advance did not cuter Frederick th, when the rebel movement on Harper's Ferry was well under w the | 18th he cleared the passage throw: h Catoctin | mountain. His advas by Stuart's pushed the enen & most remarka McClellan, A copy of Lee of the 10th addressed to making dispositions for the atta: nding Le ty this a ve boen inspired ated davis! thas learning plans, McClellan seems tack and crush the 1D. Mad on Harr Ferry was Dy which the federal | SFst, and afterward mas nave of of Har commande: y aware of his cacay’s | Pers Ferry ou bis part recklessly 4 4 to four detachments, strad- plans, This was a stroke of luck ae nh once in a century of wars, Lee's PLAYS, how utter | Lee's plans im this campa disregard of the thost oby 3 of war or | a perfect contempt for his adversary ‘The event proves th estimated the character and capac McClelian. With now a full and rel ledge of Lee's objects ments he went wrong at the very outset, Instead of pus his whole army through Crampton’s Gap to relief of Harper's Ferry--now —he contented himseif with send single corps in that enough for the purpo: support of Burnside at Tu: to the north, with the othe Meanwhile, Jackson had m deral ¢ my m detail, reas the confederate was ptely saccessfui in all bis calculations u th tt federsis bad reached South wm nat Turner's Gap, where lat the afternoon Hooker and Reno ran up againat Who d:fended the pass tenacious junbers, though strongly poste on the righ: did mort brilliant fights ! | stopped their ad g the co OF YS. | stone fences, aud when mi ade the march | erais were stilt derates up bill from behind t closed the fed- below the main prescribed by Lee, drove Gen. White and | pasa, Gen. Keno was killed jast before dark. 2,000 federais out of Mertinsburg into Harper's | Meanwbil reet had been burried back Ferry, and by the evening of the 13th ciosed | from Hager to the assistance of Hill, enue of escape from that town toward | arriving at t he was unable to the ‘south and Gen, Waiker had r \e 1 er. Loe had crossed the Potomac at P arily expecting . pushed up to t! of th of Harpers Ridge, climbed the mounta: without At night between 12 and 1 o'clock, position planted his cannon on Loudo oF Heights, overlec This was hkewis i the town from the east, on the 13th, Gen, MeLaws | Toms TOVIL LE LEES ARMY ON MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 15, 1862. several miles to the south at Grampton’s while the battle of South mountat ‘The federal loss wat 3: had marched into Pleasant valley, between the South mountain and Elk Ridge (Maryland Heights), to cut off egress from Harper’ to the site shore. Gen. Kershaw on the | and 85 missing; total, 12th wasdctached to occupy Maryland Heights, | corps’ share was 925 and the ninth's 889. ‘There He ascended the ridge some three miles to the | is no official statoment of the confederate north, deployed and moved down toward the | loss bat Gen. Hill's rey indicates that it was fully equal to that of the federals in bilied and wounded, besides which he lost a good many prisouers, ON ANTIETAM CREEK. On the 15th, finding the pass open. McClel+ Jan, much encouraged, pushed forward as rap- idly as possible, The advy was considerably impeded by the rebel c&valry. ly 10 o'clock the enemy was discovered beyond the Antic tam, ostentationsly deployed in fall sight in front of Sharpsburg. The creek flows from north to south, entering the Potomac above river ‘along the ridge, skirmishing’ with the pickets of the Union force the heights, The next morning, the first uitack was repulsed, but he Gnally routed the federal advance. and by night was well up against the main force. ‘That night Col. Ford spiked his cannon and withdrew. over the pontoon bridge into! Harper's Ferry, abandoning Maryland Heights to the rebels and with them the last hope of the garrison. Kershaw at once occupied the heights. Thus was rounded up all the outly- ing federal detachments—some 12,900 meu— into this untenable town of Harper's Ferry, and on the morning of September 14 we find it completely invested by six divisions of the confederate army, with batteries frowning dowh upon it fromevery mountain height ‘The batteric3 of Walker from Loudoun Heights —east of the Shenandoah—and of McLaws' from Maryland Heights—north of the Poto- mac—sent their shot and shell plunging into the streets of the town, and Jackson's infantry was deployed to the attack from the south, OFPOSING FRANKLIN'S ADVANCE. But precarious as was the condition of Har- per’s Ferry the danger was not all on one side. McLaws felt his position to be critical with McCieilan’s whole army not ten miles away in his rear, and the Potomac with the Harper's Ferry garrison behind it in his front. To euard against an attack from the north he sent Gen. Howell Cobb's brigade to defend to the last Crampton pass against Gen, Franklin's advance, On the morning of the 1th Franklin had hed toward the pass with the sixth cos aie 3p. m. ‘attacked the rebei force holding it, The attack was made by Slocum’s division on the right, and Brooke's brigade of Smith's on the left. Cobb's lines were speedily carried, and he was pressed over the mountain into Pleasant valley. The federal loss wus 113 Killed, 418 wounded and two missing, out of fifteen regiments of infantry. The rebel loss | was 62 killed, 208 wounded and 479 captared all out of fire regiments engaged. Besides the ers one cannon, 700 smallarms aud colors were captured, : Mooker estimated that 20 00 confederates were in sight, but there was Probably not to excced 20,000, The display stopped the federal advance on the east side of the Antietam aud nothing further was done at day Harper's Ferry had not vot surrendered and | Lee must guy: time. He did it by a bold bluff, | The method adopted.though a risky one.proved to be effective. His tnmbers were greatly ex- aggerated by McCiellan, ever prone to unduly | magnify every opposing obstacle, He here lost wo days of precious time in fruiticss b: fore Had be prom; mountain, aud tue two ones of Hood aud Jones. ‘Not a promising illustration of energy on the and his alversary's coufidential order of epera- tions in his pocket! MeOtellan states that bis orders were to attack as soon as the enemy's posit.on was developed, bat on riding front he found only two divimons: JACKSON'S MEX WADING THE PoTOMAC. This victory to Gen, Franklin the road dows! upon Mclaws' rear. five miles away. Pleasant ad no wonder