Evening Star Newspaper, September 20, 1892, Page 11

THE EVENING STAR: WASHINGTON. D. ©. TUESDAY. SEPTEMBER 20, 1892—PART TWO. [Copyrieht, 1892. by Lealio J. Perry.} GEN. M’CLELLAN’S ADVANCE. Yorktown, Williamsburz and Fair Oaks— The Change of Base. ‘HE APPALLING catastrophe at Bull Run momentarily cow- ed the Washington government. But al-{ though it was at first filled with great appre- nsion jt was not stampeded. There were hasty and excited con- many ings. but soon it reeived that the confederates did not once, whereupon governmental nerves re- sumed their brium. Its first steps were to bring Gen. Geo. jan from West Virginia and place him in command of th Fetomac army, and to abandon temporarily the offensive agaist Richmond. Pull Run fell like a wet blanket upon the on-to-Richmond whoopers, The government entered system- atically and determinedly upon the task of putting down the rebellion. ‘The new general could not have been called to the com:nand at a more auspicious time for himself. His email victory at Rich Mountain, West Virginia, was now magnified intoa second Austerlitz by contrast with McDowell's Bull , and MeCleilai ¢ assumed comma 1861, only six to at once and unquestioned assume a: eticent patron- and superiority toward both the military J civil authorities about Washington. The of great advantage for ‘the purpose he had in view, to gain time without inter! F quarter to organize. His euceess as one of this or any effort winning and retaining the youn aation was one or achievement ¢ © of his officers and soldiers beyond that of avy other soldier of his generation. M'CLELLAN'S PLANS. Mec was to avoid all collision th the his purpose was accom- Piished. And Joe Johnston did not interfere. Daring the fail and winter of 1 2 nothing as don: he Vire Rew troops from th into brits or two Dali's § to receive no! like Dranesvill e the winter in Virg Ltary events 7 had accumn- In the | A his policy of and sil ite | » have no tatention | ® to mu his thia prot the Premdent himeelf, ever sex popular preasure, wae diwsatiotied sare, about the m ally pushed | kun and Manassas, Joe Johnston tamense force enly to fod et pot fas ne gathering ront, and as soon as he detected indications of an advance southward ho immediately withdrew behind the Rappa- Bannock, not caring to risk a ith that | MeCicilan’s | Williamsburg. wi narrow front gave his superior numbers in- creased advantages, and that he had a safo water base near at hand, It will be noted that he soon complained of being outuumbered; that the enemy bad all the advantages of jonition and that the roads were impassable. Favtact everything tarped out to be exactly the roverse of his representations to the Washing- ton authorities. " For our purpose itis not necessary to dis- caw the advantages or disadvantages of the peninsular linc. Suffice it to say, the Army of the Potomac was deburked at Fortress Monroe about the let of April, 1862, and began its march on Richmond on the 4th. In the vicinity of Yorktown this penineula between the Yor! and Jamos rivers is less than six ailes across. The enemy, under J. Bankhead Magruder, an old army officer of # certain kind of ability. proceedad to fortify this uarrow neck of land from river to river. ‘The rebel irouclad Merri- mae prevented the advance of the Union navy up t and Magrader's batterivs at Yorktowa stopped its passage up the York. THE SIRGK OF YOLRTOWN. Oa the Sth the federal advance was stopped. It fs entirely probabie a prompt end energetic attack would havo secured Yorktown aad! driven Magruder from his entire line, as hia | force at first was very small, not more than 11,008 at this date. It was not made. McClellan sent for heavy guns and mortars, and entered upon regular siege operations. Meantime, as soon as the object of the federal change of | base was understood at Richmond, and that | there was to be no advance from the direction of Washington, the entire confederate army under Gen. Johusten was transferred to McCielian’s front. The “siege” of Yorktown lasted precisely one month, the enemy evacuating on the nigat of May 3, retiring up the peninsula, a rear guard | holding another line of defenses in front of Williamsburg. This withdrawal occurred just | abont the time MeClel «i completed prepa. rations and got ition toxttack, 1 there was no h the part of the enem ‘Their only reason in the beginuing for ma! taining a line on the peninsula was to gain time for prep: ms to defend Richmond nearer the ci mobilize new regiments, and to bring down from the Rappahannock to | Magruder’s support Joe Jobnston’s army. All this was accomplished in the mouth guined at Yorktown, between Aprii 4 and May 4. HE BATTLE OF WILLIAMsnURG, It was no part of Johnston's scheme to linger on the peninsula fora fight atter the Yorktown line was abandoned; it was then evi- dently policy to retreat as “rapidly as possible, a fed the federal fleet to swiftly pass ops up York river and land them far to the rear of the marching confederates, endanger- their eseape up the narrow neck. But tho | federal advance under Suraner, after their retreat was discovered, followed 0 rapidly on | bebind. ON THE CHICKAHOMINY. Evening dlar by Leslie J. Perry of the Gar Records Board. Z ments of n more tangidle character, an import ant victory might have beon achieved. Tho general made dispositions for more simulta- neous work the next morning, but on the éth it was found that the confederates had continued their retreat through Williamsburg toward Richmond, leaving soff® of their wounded The town of Williamsburg, near where these events occurred, was for noarly @ hundred yeara the czpital of the colony of Virginia, being first settled in 1632. William and Mary College was founded here in 1692, just 200 rears ago. It is a historic town, for a century the center of colonial society and colonial poli- tical ambition and intrigue. It lost the caj n 1779, which wont to Richmond. Its popula- sion in 1860 was 1,111. ALONG THE CHICKAHOMISY. After Williamsburg Gen. Johnston leisurely carried into effect his original plan of faliing back behind the Chickahominy, which, by the way, was against Jeff Davis’ judgment, Thero was practically no pursuit on the part of the Union army, for it was not until about the 20th, two weeks later, that it had concentrated along the Chickahominy, bad roads wholly unknown, together doubtless with’ timid leadership, im- peding a more vigorous advance, White House is the point where the Rich- mond and York River railroad crosses tho Vamunkey, one of the upper branches of York river; it is'on navigable water, and McClellan here ‘established his secondary base for the accumulation of supplies, ani ‘actual opera- tions against the confederate capital—about jstant from tho federal front—may be said to have uow begun, On May 20, 1863, McClellan Lad 102,236 effective men present, equipped for duty, HANOVER COURT morse, ‘The first operation after the ar on the Chickahominy was the brillia: ment of Fitz John Porter, one of McClelia favorite officers, against the Virginia Central railroad at Henover Court House, to tho north of Richmond. It was undertaken with 12,090 men to drive away a rebel force under Gens. Branch and Anderson, and to thus open the rowl for Gen, McDowell's advance from tho direction of Fredericksburg. who had been ordered by the President to join McClellan. Porter was completely succeasiul, signaliy de feating Branch on the 27th of May, destroyin, portions of the railroad, soveral bridges an ‘a arrival | depots, and returning to his camp on the Chickahominy without further from the enemy. It was altogether abont the most lively and vigorous operation of the cntire peninsular ampaign. if we except the retreat to the molestation | James. Gen. Porter captured one cannon and some prisoners, and reports a loss ef 355 killed, wounded and prisoners, und estimated told. The confederate Gen. Branch stated bis killed aud wounded at 243, did not mention the lost gun, nor loss of ny prisoners. The report of one of his sub- ordinatea however, shows conclusively that the rebel loss at 1,000 Branch did not recite the full extent of his defeat. By the 25th of May the entire army corps of pushed across the nd ad- Keyes had been Chickahominy at Bottom's bridge, vanced to the Seven Pines on the m taking position ats the York River railroad, in rear of Keyes, and the watching the roxds leadius south vicinity through White Oak swamp. corps of Sumner, Franklin and cross. On the morning of 1 MeClellan rted his effective force at 003 men, Of this force 34,191 men, approximately, under Heintzelman and ‘he three orter did not the 4th that the rebel_ rear was brought to bay that night, and the first important event of campaign was the battic of h occurred the next day. Like most of the early Virginia battles of the this was one mainly of cross purposes aud misunderstandings, a small segment of an army fighting magnificently. with the greater number in the immediate vicinity in “‘observa- ticn,” but not firing a gun. The troops became inextricably jammed on the roads; Hooker's division advancing on the right Band road from Yorstown, and Smith's on that of the left from Hampton, actuaily “‘criss-crossed,” Smith getting from left to right and Hooker from right to left, wasting cousiderable time, though it does not appear that this lost time could have been made particularly available other- GEN. 30 JoMNSTON. great federal army so far from his base. His total force was less than 50,000 men. MeClel- Ian then hudted. To RICH © WAT From the first he was osed to the advance @m Richmond by the ~cros-country” route. He submitted a plan to the military authorities for a campaign from Fortress Monroe against the rebel capital After some hesitation and a good deal of bickering, Mr. Lincoln, against his better judgment, finally consented to the program. ouly stipulating that ton should be left perfectly safe. A rals to whom the matter wa ded that a force of 40.000 men id be necessary. MeClellan weqmiesced nd then began to transfer Bis arms by water to Fort Mom Before the ebange of baw: was completed 1: was diseovered that the commands McClellan bad designated to remain did not make up the stipulated force J the President issued an order Dowell’s entire corps. This evi- d some friction between them, but F FORTRESS MONEOT. neral's ashin, wise. Hooker early tn, the morning opened the ‘ht on the federal left with a single division, which was continued throughout the day, with varying fortunos, but be finally lost ‘some ground. Late in the afternoon he was rein- forced by Kearny with two brigades, who was by nightfall enabled to retrieve the ground reviously yielded. There was @ briliiant Miversion on the right by Hancock's brigade of Smith's division, which advanced and oocu- pied two or three redoubts of tae confederates, who were busy at the other end of the I with Hooker. Afterward Longstreet, who seems to have been compelled to turn and fight by the persistency of the federal pressure, brought back reinforcements and made a determined | sssaalt, on, Hancock, who yas bothering the confederates a good deal, But his brigade not only repelled it with great loss, but charged in turn and drove them off the field, capturing some prisoners. Hooker had been roughly handled in this battle before the rewt of the army fairly under- stood what was going on. In his official report ry will not be believed when it is at bis single division allowed to carry on this unequal contest unaided from moruing till night in the presence of 30,000 of their comrades, At Williamsburg Hooker, Kearny and Hancock all manifested the traits which afterward made them famous generals, | There were really two distinct actions, as there | was no connection between Hooker and Smith, until Peck with a division closed up the front between the two roads late in the afternoon, In fact, the federals were only fairly ready for batcle when the battle ol ‘There was no coacert of action, although Mis evident Smith's attack on the right relieved the pressure on mained on the easterly side, where Gen. McClellan had his headquarters at Gaines’ mill, ‘The strength of the confederate army at this time, according to the nearest contem- neous return, which was the report of 21, is stated at 53,698, FAIR OAKS, ‘This was tho situation when the next import- ant event, the battle of Fair Oaks (Union name), or Seven Pines (confederate name), occurred. The confederate commander observ- ing McDowell’s movements toward Richmond, and perceiving McClellan's weak position astride the Chickahominy, matured a plau for attacking and destroying the isolated forces of Heintzelman and Keyes before they could be reinforced. ‘This plan of precipitating the entire confederate army upon 34,000 men was romising. But there was no surprisp at Fair aks. a8 the first accounts of the battle led the public to infer. Both Keyes and Heinjzelman Suspected from the increased activity of the OzN. FITZ JOHN PonTER. enemy on the 29th and 90th, pushing out per- sistent reconnaissances, that a general attack was meditated. McClellan's proximity to Rich mond made an attack imminent at any moment. No special warning was necessary, The very nature of tho situation made it im- perative that his army be concentrated on one Side or the other of the Chickahomins, ready to fight. But as in tho Williamsburg’ affair, ouly a small proportion ‘ot his army was en- Hooker, and enabled Kearny’s troops to regain the lost ground. ° ‘The federal loss in this battle was 2,239—456 Killed, 1.410 wounded and 373 missing—out of thirty-three regiments and six batteries en- grged. The confederate loss is officially stated at usd killed, 975 wounded and 297 missing; total, 1,560. ‘Longstreet, who commanded the confederates. considered the battle a very “handsomo affair” for that side, Its conduct ‘and the result warranted the claim. He csti- Lhe donbt that the force McClean was jeaving Was iar short of the wumber originally -d upon. MeCleiian aments in favor of the Penin- gular route were thas it was stcriar; that the geads dowa there were always mated the forces actually engaged at 9,000 coutederates and 12,000 foderals Gen. McClellan's ‘arrival ou the field after oo the Usion ‘side: ‘lind’ tis occurred sit hours earlier, supplemented with reinforce- Gaged; one-third of it was permitted to be whipped before it couid be supported by the A tremondous rainstorm broke on the night of the 30th, nearly submerging the entire Chickahominy valley, making the movement of ee difficult and that of artillery almost impossible. The rebel attack was initiated bj Fortunately for the isolated Union corps, concert of action on Johnaton's part Huger’s fank movement was so alowand feeble from bad roads, misconception of orders, or some other cause, that his troops took no con- siderable part in the action. Longstreet. who was tu advance and attack simultancously with Huger, waited fer the latter several hours, and did not go into action wptil about Pp. m.,' at which time Hill's onsot had about spent its force. Meanwhile, Smith, only three miles away, wio was to attack the federal right as soon as Hill's guns wero audible, n account of the peculiar condition of the wet atmosphere failed entirely to hear that General’s tremendous battle, and did not advance until 4 p. m. But notwithstanding the miscarriage of the concert, Hill's attack was so fiorce and strong as to partially succeed. Casey's division was badly defeated, though the greater portion of it fought mapfully, giving time for forming now linesto the rear aud supports to position, Couch and some of Heiutzelman's troops came to Casey's aid as rapidly as pos- sible. About 2 o'clock MoClellan, learning the condition of affairs, ordered ‘Sumner’s Corps acroms the Chickahominy to the support of Keyos and Hetntzelman. near the bridge heads, Prepared to march, But the heavy rain of the night before—upon which Johnston largoly counted—had raised the river 69 rapidly that the approaches to Sumner's bridgos’ were all under water, and the br: themselves very shaky. "Tt was with the utmost diffculty thet mo of his brigades and a few piecos of artil- lory wore crossed. The advance under Sedg- wick did not arrivo on the field until after 4:30 P. m., but they were,just in the nick of time to meet and stay the long-delayed attack of the confedcrate geucral Smith in that quarter. Longstr ‘attacked and made some head- jay meanwhile, Sumner was — SS EDWIN AL. STANTON. The fourth corps and two brigades of Kearny's division of Heintzelman's—Hooker being absent at White Oak swamp—aloze fougut the battle of Fair Oaks until the arrival of Sumner’s troops late in the afternoon. These unsupported troops were crowded back during the day porbaps a mile and a half, but ally repulsed. A study of the official reports on both sides leads to the conclusion that if of Johnston's other divi erly timed with the vigorous and ot Gen, Hill on Casey, 1 disas- prompt attac! trous defeat of the federals would have been tho result, Had Longstreet, Smith ard Hug attucked ‘simultaneously with Hill, Heintze! man would bave been provented from support- ing Keyes and both must have been used up long before Sumner’s arrival from the other side of the river. It wax bad enough as it was, On the Sist Gen. Johnston was severely wonuded and the confederate command de- volved temporarily upon Gen, Gustavus W. Smith, ‘THY. SECOND DAY. The next day, June 1, the confederates on the right in front of Sumner made a serious Ex, MANCOCK. attack, but the federals were at last concen- ated and fully prepared for them, In the final operations of this day, in fact, the fed- erals ausumed the offensive, and all the ground lost on the Sist on the left was fully recovered by Hooker and some other troops, The con- federate retreat was so rapid that many of their wounded were left on the ficid and the federal wounded were recovered, Johnston's report claim the capture of ten pieces of ar- tillery, but Heintzcliman says that but eight were lost und one of these was recovered. ‘The Union loss in this battle was 5,031, vi 790 killed, 3.504 wounded and 647 missing. 1 confederate loss was greater! 6,134—280 killed. 4,759 wounded and 405 missing. jasted about six hours and was of the tercest nature. Smith and other coufederates claimed that the fed Lelind breastworks, This w ‘of the regimental losses in this conflict were terrific. Fox's book on “Ke gimental Losses gives the following figure Sixth Alabama, 36%; fourth North Carolina, 363; sixth South Carolina, 252; forty-ninth Virginia, 202; fifth Alabaina, 210; twelfth Alabama, 203— total in the six regiments, 1.603 killed and wounded, nearly one-third of the entire con fedcrate lows, Some of the Yankees were doing pretty straight shooting at Fair Oaks, The nix Union regiments sustaining the heaviest lows in killed and wounded. uccording to the same authorit ixty-firet Pennsylvania, 240; fifth New liampsbire, 173; sixty-fourth New York, -seventh Now York, 162; third M , and one hundred and titth Peansyl One of Casey's regiments, » 153. one hundred and fourth Po&nsyivania, lost 139 killed and wounded. McCiellan impulsively, but none the less cru- elly, reported to Washington, without fully knowing the facts, that Casoy’« division nad broken divgracefaily. Part of his raw troops, | Rethape, did not act as firmly as could be de- sired, but the losses of the division show that itmusthave done hard fighting. In fact,a large proportion of the rebel mortality was in- curred in front of this division. In this battle, besides the confederate commander, Gen. Pot- tigrew was wounded and captured, Gen, Hamp- ton wounded and Gon. Hatton killed. On the Union side Gens. Howard and Devens only were wounded. Howard losing his arm. Col. Guilford D. Bailey, chief of artiliery, was killed. Gen, Sumner grimly observes in his official r port that on the second day, before the battle closed, ‘Gen. McClellan came upon the field and after looking about expressed himself as eatisfied with my arrangements,” THE MISTAKES OF GENERALS, It is the modo in writing about the events of the war to take it for granted that all the jealousies, all the quarrels and all the disas- trous errors resulting in defeat occurred on your own side, ‘This is a great mistake. Doth sidos averaged about alike in respect of these drawbacks. Gen. Joe Johnston in his report and in his “Narrative” claims this battle to have been @ confederate victory; Jeff Davis in Bl book on tho war says it was practically a fizzle anda defeat. I have pointed out what the records show concerning the mistakes of the rebel commanders as well as the less excusable, because deliberate, blunder of McClellan, as demonstrated by the event—that of posting his army on both sides of a swampy. unfordable ream, thus inviting defeat in detail, But Fair Oaks, in fact, wav a Union victory, because the designs of Geu. Johnston, from hatever cause, were completely frustrated, and also because the federals inflicted on their enemy tho greater loss. Many able critics hold that McClellan lost his great opportunity after Malvern Hill, and it is of record that some of his generals vainly urged him to promptly re- sume tho offensive after that victory. It is not probable that McClellan was endowed with the sort of vigor and nerve to win ‘a great and striking military success under such circum- tances, but I think his best opportunity oc- curred not at Malvern, but on the lst of June, after Fair Oaks, when he had in hand 4 50,000 fresh troopsto pour upon repulsed FORTIFICATIONS AT FAIR OAKS, VA. retreating enemy. The time to attack with su- force was when the enemy was outside fortifications, 4 Moto ieen ee i at nightfall the confederate attack was effectu- | the { or cats (Stores fuiled, as it commonly dove in such cases. Gen. | on the James river immediately } up so close to it, es to effect a cog of below be fi uncovering it to of the federal navy, thus openi a new water base, from which it would have" been impossible to dislodge him. Lut nothing of this kind could be expected of a commander who from the be- ginaipg labored under the absurd hallucina- n that he was fighting trom 150,000 to 200,000 m. £0, instead of pressing the enemy with ‘s superior numbers, McClellan actually drew back from the most advanced position, subsided into an inert defensive and redoubled his frantic appeals to Washington for immediate rein- forcements. LEE SUCCEEDR JOHNSTON. Johnston's wount afforded President Davis the opportunity which he no doubt had long secretly desired. ‘The next day after the battle ARLINGTON, 1862. the wounded general's place was filled by R E. Lec. But this was not the only favorable result the battle of Fair Oaks had upun the confederate fortunes. As before remarked, it completely paralyzed Gen. McClellan for a period of nearly four woeks, affording the new confederate commander ample time to collect large force and consummate his arrange- ments for a final and successful assault upot the Union army. Lee brought down Jackson’ forces from the Shenandoah, a body of troops front North Carolina and still others from South Carolina. It is very difficult to “size up” ex- actly Lee's force when the Seven Days’ battles began,as there is no complete official return of strength covering that date, but from the nom- inal returns and othor sources it appears that his movable column was over 80,000 strong, with 20,000 men in the Richmond fortifications. Most southern writers place his force at b tween 60,000 and 70,000, but these estimates are Johnston in his ‘‘Nar- rative” estimates Lee's reinforcements afte: Fair Oaks at 53,000 men, which is doubtle too high, but it 1s clear that superhuman efforts were made to hurl upon McClellan an irresistible force. Gen. Lee's plan in brief, as stated by him- self, was to cross the Chickahominy above Me- Clellan’s right with his main force, sweep down that stream on the north side, striking the Union army in flank, menacing its communica- tions, while Huger and Magruder should de- fend Richmond and distract attention from the flank movement (and cover its extent) by noisy demonstrations from fbat front upon the federals over tho ChickaYominy. M2Clel- Jan's dispatches to Washington show that he partially penetrated Lee's design and was fully uware of Jackson's presence in the neighbor- hood at least two days before the blow fell. et he still declinod to concentrate at the real point of attack. ‘M'CLELLAN’S POLICY. “Change of base” found lodgment in Me- Clellan’s brain prior to Lee's attack; certainly before the result of that attack could be known, He was in a most gioomy frame of mind, wildly exaggerated the enemy's strength and antici- pated defeat, Filled with forcbodings of dis- aster, it is not surprising he was averse to ac- cepting the gage of battle and failed to avail himself of the splendid opportunity Lee ten- dered him of fighting a strictly defensive bat- tle with his entire available forco against a nu- merically weaker enemy and almost certainly winning asignal victory. He more bent cu retreat then fizhtine. On any other hy- pothesis it is wholly unaccountable that he should leave Porter's single corps to meet 75.000 confederates when it 1s remembered the attack could as well have been met-with 90.000, If fight ai McClelian should have followed Lee's example and put in his whole army. Vorter's fight preves conclusively thet he could not have been whipped in the spleudid position of Gaines’ a position from which Porter for hours, with one-fourth of that army, re- pulsed the charging confederates. On the 25th of June, the day before the ball opened. he telegraphed to Washington that he and the army would do the best’ they could against Leo's 200,000 men,” and that “the re- sponsibility for the result” would not rest on his shoulders—an unpromising, desponding let- ter from the chief general of the republic, not to mention its insubordinate, even insolent, tone. The wounded President replied to this dispatch as follows: “Wasnxatox, June 26, 1862, ‘Maj. Gen. McClella Your three dispatches of yesterd tion to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your ut, are 'Y gratifying. he later one of 6:15 p.m., euzgesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000 and talking of where the responsibility belonge. ps puch, I give you all Tcan and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I couid give you more if I would. Ihave owitted aud shall omi: no opportunity to send you reinforcements whgnever I possibiy can, ‘A. Lixcon On that day MeCl fan had 95.000 effective infantry, 5,036 cffecti¥e cavalry, 3,197 effective CAMP MARBER. artillery. with 316 guns—total effective, armed nd equipped ready for battle, 103.288, besides over 10,000 engineers, escorts end quartermas- ter's guard, &c. No wonder old Horace Greeley Groaned that “never before did an army so Constantly, pressingly need to be reinforced— not by acorps, but by a leader; not by men, but bya man,” M'CLELLAN'S CHARACTER, This credulity concerning Lee's overwhelm- ing numbers is evidence that McClellan wanted some of the common-sense elements of a com- mander. Ho unfailingly overestimated the enemy's strength, audacity and powers of ro- sistance; consequently it was very nataral that he should underrate his own capacity and means to overcome them. This peculiar weak- ness is demonstrated in his constant appoals for reinforcements, Remembering Bull Run, itis an open question if he did not secret) doubt the staying qualities of the troops, not. withstanding his many glorious tributes on to their bravery and endurance. hero is more than a hint of this in his hesi- tation to fight all his army simultaneously; it chet to have been a moral impossibility for [eClellan to do this, a dictate of timidity, not the result of bad dispositions, No man knew better than he now to marshal troops. McClel- Jan pinned his faith on large reserves, to fall Upon. He was always looking toward the rear. A safe commander, perhaps; a splendid organizer beyond all doubt, but a ‘victory “Of wust evail would MeDo what av: well's additional 80,000 have been toa general who could only evolve the false tactical y that pitted 25,000 against 75,000? If he could not beat dor’s 7,000 with 100,000, é coldneheee cue that 'with only 135,000 he Sono Lots "wnat aitete arte abet was, outnum! Lee, but yet the confeierate general never i doubtful if MoCiellan would have been able to do this with au army of 200,000 men.* He cer- tainly failed to avail himself of his overwhelm- ing numbers at Yorktown, at Willamsturg, at Fair Oaks, Gaines’ Mill and at Antietam, where Bis corps were pager terns sazing world he Geenly loved Tinderslood the tick of preeerr: and Sheridan order in him. His vanity was so Great as to dostrov his moral courage. Nothing ‘was 80 dear to this general's hoart as riding down the lines of a magnificent army, with balf a dozen rmed generals at his’ mde, followed by a clanking escort. He was a sort of chariatan of the military genus. He k how to’ baild up and disciplive splendid ae oe hhe lacked the nerve to fight ema, Gen. Leo was not only af&ategist, but a born fighter. The confederate was well aware of the fact that he was outnumbered, yet he did not Toward night Loncetrest and D. H. Mill zot across the Chickahominy and pushed down their columns to A. P. Hill's support The ext morning, June 27, Jackson crossed the Beaver Dam above the federal position and ap- Peared upon their right flank, and McCail, ac- cording to previous directions, at once aban- After Jackson's arrival the confederate army. ‘was united and it “swept down the Chickahom- iny” upon the federal right. Jackson extended well out to the left, fecling for the York River | railroad; D. H. Hill next, with Longstreet and A.P. Hill near the river. The federais were all drawn in and occupied a strong position on swain's creek. facing in a semi-circle from the West around to the east and southward, with the creck and deep ravine protecting’ their left dank. The troops occupying this position were Porter's corps, composed of the divisions bother his superiors with rot’ and rhodomon- tade about his ‘brave and _self-sacrific: sol- diers,” who would do the best they could, bat the moment Jackson arrived be set them at the business of cleaning out the enemy. GEN. McCLELLAN’S RETREAT. The Seven Days’ Battles—The Victory at Malvern Hill. T FAIR OAKS A SEC- ond “On-to-Riehmond” episode had practically come to an end, and after Gaines’ Mill the retrograde to the James was substituted. Win- field Scott, after his own disastrous failure the previous year, as- serted that McDowell's army, under the high Pressure of public = clamor, had been pre- maturely sent against the enemy, wholly inad- equate in numbers and unprepared by the necessary drill and discipline to defeat him and capture Richmond. But to meet what Scott thought to be the requircments for vie- tory, after many tedious months devoted to the accumulation and preparation of a great army,had McClellan succeeded any better than McDowell? His failure somewhat differed in kind, but in degree its vastness overshadowed the Bull Run incident But he had at least demonstrated that tho army as a fighting in- strument was equal to tho task before it: that all it requiredto put down the rebellion was a competent general. The first demonstration of the series of mili- tary operations called by a misnomer the “Seven Days’ Battles,” because there were really only three of sufficient magnitude to be designated battles, was that against Mechan- iesville, in front of Beaver Dam creck, a fed- eral outpost to the northwest, covering some crossings of the Chickahominy over which Lee wished to pass the bulk of his army. The federal general ‘Reynolds, _—_af- terward greatly distinguished and killed at Gettysburg, commanded on this ad. vanced line. Gen. A. P. Hill moved against his front on the 26th, in concert with Jackson, coming dowa by way of Ashland and Hanover, who was to strike the Union position in flank and rear. MECHANICAVILLE, Itwas not intended by Gen. McClellan to hold Mechanicsville and the line of Beaver Dam creek louger than was necessary t> with- draw the heavy guns and trains to a stronger position further down the Chickahominy. As soon, therefore, as Hill's pressure was felt after he had crossed the Chickahominy at Meadow bridge above. the federal general drew every- thing from Mechanicsville back behind the creek, which was partially fortified Jackson failed to perform his part of the program of the 26th; his march was long and tiresome, anf besides, his movement was greatly ham- pe¥ed by federal skirmishers, who destroyed the bridge over Totopotomor creek in front of his'advance directly on the federal right flank. Every effort made by Hill to drive MeCall’s di- Tailed, hough he pereited il sidug’ the line failed, though he aléng the line until dark, “The federal artillery was magnif- cently served in this battle and the infantry repulsed several advances of the confoderates. ne bold charge just at nightfall at Eller- son's mill was disastrously stopped. This is genorally known asthe buttle of Mechanics- ville, otherwise Beaver Dam creek. The Union troops engaged were tho brizades of Reynolds, Meade and Seymour of McCall's division, less two regiments detached, and Griffin's brigade GEN. MEINTZELIAN. of Morell's division, and seven batteries of ar tillery—in all about 12.000 men. The fecera!- love was insigni‘icant—361} lled, rounded and missing-as they fought tuder cover, “onthe The ecbacd Torin csunned we the brigades were of Field, Pender, . Archer, J. R. im the © of Morell, Sykes and MeCail. OES. w'cALL. The confederate advance, as has been stated, was fully noted by both McClellan and Porter; together they had watched the progress of the fight at Beaver Dam and had been in consulta- tion the night following until 1 am. Scouts had reported Jackson's proximity and together they bad arranged for MeCail’s withdrawal to Gaines’ as soo as Jackson appeared from the saw the attack. McClellan knew its strength; it, Porter's corps of 18.000 men was alone left on the far side of the Chickahominy to breast tho storm. A call for axes from Porter during the progress of the battle which ensued, with which to obstruct the rebel advance, could not be filled, a call, considering all the circum- stances, there should have been no occa- sion to make at this stage of the game. It is robable that Gaines’ mill and perhaps the Rrst day at Gettysburg were the two mest des. perate fights of the entire war. The Union troops behaved magnificently and Fitz John Porter handied them ably. His great source of trouble was in not having troop# enough to cover the long front necessary to be held and the fact that most of the ground was unfavor- OF THE CENTURY COMPAN a strong and brilliant arm in | his corps, The action was opened by | about 2:30 p.m. along Gen. Moreli’s front. | Jackson and D. H. Hill came in on A. P. Hill's | left late in the afternoon, Longstreet, in fr: of the federal left, had been waiting for Ja on's arrival, but was obliged to att | the latter could deploy to relieve the Prossure upon A. P, Hill, and about 4 in the afternoon the batile became general. All the confederate divisions were pushed forward in one simultaneous sweep between 5 and 6 o'clock, under the immediate direction of Longstreet. Jackson and the two Hills, with a score of boid and zealous subordinates riding with and cheering on the advancing lines. Porter sent urgent calls for help, and Slocum's division of 8,000 men was sent over from the west side to his relief, arriving on the ground at 4:30 p.m., and later Meagher’s and French's brigades arrived and aided to stop the confed- erate rush. Porter received no otber reinforce- meats from the 75,009 men in sight of this desperate battle. The federal line was broken about 6:39 p.m. near the center, held by Morell, and where Porter deemed it strongest, and the whole line was soon forced back toward the river. Up to this hour the Umon front, thin in many places as it necessarily was, had been solidly maintained. During the night tho troops were withdrawn to the sonth side of the Chickahominy and McClellan's offensive against Richmond had come to an inglorious end. A DAY OF DESPERATE FIGHTING, The confederates had won the day, to be sure, but it was dosperately near a defeat, Gen. Leo supposed the “principal part of the federal army was on the north side,” engaged in this battle. Gen. A. P. Hill reported that thunder of artillery” indicated that the whole federal force was in isis front. The report shows that he was repulsed everywhere, Longstreet says that up to the time the federal line was broken the confederate loss must have been the greater. Jackson's report shows the hardest kind of fighting. He was repulsed at all points, Ewell having to be withdrawn from the front, though just at dark the “enemy Plelded the leld end fed in disorder” —proba- ly after Morell’s line was broken by Whiting. No doubt 10,000 fresh troops would have saved the day to Porter. Gen. ammunition of some of exhausted and they roplenishe to the figh: in some instances three times. He attributes the final breaking of his line to the contusion caused by» stampede of cavalry among the infantry when Gen. Cooke's and ill-considered charge upon the rebel in- faniry was repulsed. Potter's repart corroborates those of the confederates in respect to the desperate char- acter of the fighting. His loss in this four hours’ battle was 4,001 men killed and wounded, | and 2,896 captured or missing. Gen. Reynolds was among the latter. Many colonels and other officers were killed and wounded. Bosides these he lost twenty-two pieces of artillery. His heaviest rogimental losses of killed and wounded, according to Fox's book, were: Ninth Massachusetts, 206; sixteenth New | York, 194; third New Jersey, 171; twenty-second ‘Massachusetts, 166; six‘eenth Michigan, 161; twelfth United States, 156. The returns show losses in fifty- uti fH ul i ft { north. It ts undisputed, then, that they fore- | in fact, greatly exaggerated it, as we have seen. | Yet no energetic preparation was made to micet | . Hill | the “‘incessan$ roar of musketry and deep | | MeClelin in which the loss exceeded 110 (inc! the ma, foregoing), and their aggregate of and wounded was 2.921—one-third the total com- federate loss with only twenty-six missing. This shows the nature of the fighting. The figures effectually prove the courage and destructive capacity of the federal soldiery &s well as the irresistible determination of their assailants. The official records (see p. 973 et s0q., part 2, vol. Il, Rebellion Records) show losses in 111 different confederate infantry Fegiments and thirteen batteries of artillery, After reading the foregoing account of the battle of Gaines’ Mill it will not be difficult for the most prejudiced veteran of the war to fogcive Fitz John Porter many of bis alleged defelictions at the Second Ball Rua, Had he | been properly supported by his chief there range of hills near Gaines’ mill, behind Boat- | would have bee! Kun! 0 occasion for a Second Bull THE RETREAT To THE Jaane, Porter's defeat was not « defeat of the army. The destruction of stores along the railroad and at White House, which was hurried by that event, because Lee's success at once threatened McClellan's baso, hada panicky look, but the #wing of the army toward the James was other- of the most deliberate character, ‘Twenty-four hours elapsed after Porter's battle before the confederates became full aware that McClellan was retreating at all, sod that it was toward the south and the James instead of back eust by way of the peninsula, aa was hoped. In «tudying the movements following Gaines? ‘Mill ot m forgotten that the balk of L ainet north of the Chicka forenoon of the 29th, push- ing for McClellan's ratiroad, believing that large proportion of his ermy would be used to Protect his communications, and hoping to strike at in flank should he attempt to Ri back, by way of th la, which was a nataral presumptic staken one, This error of Jackson and Lee was of great advantage to giving enty-four hours’ time for his pi inary dispostt Bat I cannot think that any masterly general ship was displayed im this tr to the James, in view of th isconception of the confederate commander, and his conse quent loss of time. MeCiellan’s total march from Savage's station to Malvern was onl about fifteen miles by the roads; his left flan! along its line was safely covered ‘b: with the bridgos all dow: toward Richmond waa swamp aud creck most of the wa suflicient force of the enomy in an: vefy much endanger that flank, though Mo- sb undoubtediv beloved at the time thet aced all along the Richmond froat ¥ 109.000 men. ‘There were but two real_ alternatives for the enemy—to head off the fedorals with troops from Richmond and Petersburg at Malvers Hill, where all the roads from the north con verge, which th could have done easily om the 28th and 29th, or to press McClellan's rear Yas to compel him to tara and fight, and then defeat him. Both schemes were at tempted, but too late, and Loth failed, though the one on his rear was push resulting in some is confederates failed to achieve anythi Cigive. The attompt down the tosds trom Richmond found the commanding position at Malvern aircady occupied by the federais and it was easily repuleed. Bat to retura to the beginning, Nothing of importance in the way of fighting occurred the 28th, the day following Gaiues’ Mill, though the confederates occupied the high ground abandoned by Porter and led Franklin's corps out of some of his positions on the south side. He drew back into the woods about Golding’s farm. two Georgia regiments, whick attempted to charge his rear, being repulsed with loss. All the troops of Sumner, Heinteele niin were drawn in somewhat Y. the contederates becoming e from the Richmond direction, where Magruder and Huger had perbaps 25, 000 troops. man and in the movement to the new "* order to Keyes to push ades with artillery across White Oak swamp by daylight of the 28th and cligibie positions on the south side te Protect the crossing of the immense wagom train and reserve artulers, This was to fore stall a confederate operation from Richmond or any other direction, such as I bave herein- before indicated. Keyes was delayed some hours rebuilding bridges, butat noon on the 28th two brigades were ‘over and four miles out to the south, deployed in strong positions covering the roads in all directions, Keyes lett Gen. Nag! brigade on the Chicke- to destroy the railroad bridge and Lottom's bridge, which work he performed ef- fectually. The ‘rest of his corps was ali com centrated on the south side of White Oak swamp at nightfall on the 28th, “a POSITIQN OF sareTY.” On the 20th at suhdown Fitz John Porter with Moreli’s and Sykes’ divisions, with the reserve artillery, moved atter Keyes acrous the swamp. After Keyes’ crossing the movement of the wagon trains and a herd of 2,500 beef cattle followed and went on without interme sion. Porter was directed to go to the James and select and hold a position of safety. He selected Malvern Hill as this “position of safety.” Keyes’ and Porter's troops marched alll night the 29th, arriving at Malvern, on the James, early iu the moraing of the 30th, where ey were deployed ou the high ground im port of the powerful artillery which Porter d placed to command all the adjacent coun- try and converging roads, The march of these with by of Porter's Sumane Clelian's beadquarters vec od from Savage's ste- tion across the «¥atfp on the 29th and daring the 30th he was ing with the naval of- -rmined at last to fight with the entire Army of the Potomaa, rave force under Gen, Holmes ap- ra the direction of Kichmond on the imade a demonstration on the left the Malvern poxition abaut 4 pam. Col. Warren (afterward the woll-kuo Gen, Warren of the dfth corps) with his bi Porter's batteries repulsed this attac 3 two guns. Gen. Holmes says that morning were Prt iS " was observing the position at Malvern in the afteraoom and approved his advance. So it appears that both Davis and Lee were on that frout as early as the mornin; of the 30th. ‘This was notso much of an affair as mi be inferred from Gen. Porter's report. The confederate force amounted to perhaps 7,°00 meu; Porter easily imagined it to be 15,000. Holmes stated his lows at 2 killed and 49 wounded, aud does not mention the loss of the two guns claimed by Porter, bat animadverts upon the bad behavior of part of Branch’s bat- | tery. The Union lines on the night of the 29th extended practically from the vanes river by way of White Oak swamp to Savage's station. looking toward the north and west for ite enemy. SAVAOE’S STATION. Let us return to the wing above White Oxk swainp, Gen. E. V, Sumner commanding, com- posed of his own corps and those of Helintzel- snd Franklin, the division of McCall and other detachments, which was to destroy all govern- ment property, cover the moving wagon trains across the swamp aud bring up the rear. Sumner had begun the real movement to the rear on the 29th, abandoning Fair Onks at daylight. Moving east, he stopped at Orchard station and destroyed the accumulated stores. Then ho retired to Allen's farm, taking tion across the railroad, =p eg Magruder's forces, which’ had covering Richmond while ‘Lee was out gunning for McClellan. followed Sumnor's withdrawal closely. There was a sharp collision at Allen's farm, Magroder musketry and artillery, finally drove the enemy off having previously repulsed ‘of the Chickabominy to ad- LF Fy ys centrate aud therefore he fell back on station, Franklin had also drawn back oo —. Heimtzeiman at Navage' cy Ln ge my the lery ‘wagon trains radroed track, the last passing et 10:30 am., south, and the care and other were burned by his orders. Sumner Hieintashnes thd © wind whe So Sb moiety to us il f i i di