The Daily Worker Newspaper, January 29, 1934, Page 4

Page Four DAILY WORKER, NEW YORK, MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1934 Soviet Union Maintains Its Firm Peace Policy, Cont preventing the of commodity reserves Finally, an place under condit industrial crisis takes is of capitalism, when ons of th states, in colo- capitalism has not and cannot have, in leadi | Y s and stability, which October Revolu- niés, and deper it had in the tion, when ir the impe h and an army of millions of ur untries received, as heritage y under-utilized enterprises nployed, from which it no longer has the strength to free itself. Such are the circumstances determining the deep, nged character of the present industrial crisis. pro- These circumstances also explain the fact that the crisis is not limited to the sphere of production and trade, but is embracing also the credit system, currency, the sphere of debts, ste., breaking down the traditional relationships between sepa- rate countries, and between social groups within separate coun- tries. The fall of the prices of commodities plays here a great role. Despite the resistance of monopo! cartels, the price fall grew spontaneously; the prices, before all, of commodities of unorganized produc y, handicraftsmen, petty capitalists, and only gradually and in a lesser degree, commodities of organized capitalists united in cartels. The fall of prices made the situation of debtors, (indus- trialists, handicraftsmen, peasants, etc.) unbearable, and, on the other hand, increased the privileged situation of creditors to hitherto unheard of degrees. Such a situation should result and actually did result in the colossal bankruptcy of firms and individual capita . During the last three years, be- cause of this, tens of thousands of corporations were destroyed in the United States, German, England and France. Following the bankruptcy of these companies came the depreciation of the currency, somewhat lightening the situa- tion of the debtors. Following the depreciation of the cur- rency came the legalized state refusal to pay debts, external as well as internal. The crash of such banks as Darmstadt and Dresden in Germany, the Credit Anstalt in Austria, con-} cerns such as Kreuger of Sweden, Insull in the United States, ete., are well known. CRISIS IN TRADE Tt is understood that after these happenings, shaking the basi credit system, there would come, and| actually did come the ct ilment of | Paymenis of cred foreign loans,| deputies have sensibly maintained curtailment of payments of interallied | silence. debts, curtailment of export capital. were recently shouting, I speak about of the} the actual dumping practiced at pres- ent by nearly all “civilized” states, about which these brave and esteemed It is also understandable that these the} ‘The new decrease in foreign trade, the mew decrease in the export of com- Modities sharpened the struggle for foreign markets, and trade war be- tween countries and “dumping.” Yes, comrades, dumping not of Soviet so-called about which some esteemed members of the parliaments of Europe and America, factors accompanying industrial crises, and operating beyond the sphere of production, could not in turn but in- influence the course of the industrial crisis in the sense of its deepening and complicating. Such is a general picture of the movement of the industrial crisis, ' SOVIET INDUSTRIAL GROWTH Here are a few figures from official sources, illustrating the movement of the industrial crisis for the period under report: The extent of industrial production in 1933 compared to 1929: 201.6 per cent; United States, Britain, 86.1 per cent; $ per cent; France, 77.4 per cent. ‘Thus, during the period when basic industry of capitalist countries show- ed an average decrease in the extent twice, that is, by more than 100 per cent. (Applause). | It may seem, according to this table, | that of the four capitalist countries, | Britain is in the most favorable situa- tion. This is not altogether correct. If we take the industries of these coun- tries and compare them with the pre- war level, the picture received will be somewhat different. Here, the corres- ponding table headed “The Extent of Industrial Production in 1933 in Per- Of their production by the end of 1933, | "tages of Pre-War Level” follows: : = | 1913 1929 1931 1932 1933 in comparison with the 1929 level,| soviet union 100 1943 314.7 359 9019 amounting to 25 per cent or more,| ea States 100 170.2 115.9 91.4110.2 i : Soviet ritain 100 99.1 83 82.5 85.2 the pal of the Sovie Union grew, lecteny 300 118 21 618 84 during the same period by more than| prance 100 339 19 geLdhe 290 PER CENT ADVANCE US.S.R. Industry in England and Germany , decline, in 1933 it began to increase has not yet reached the pre-war) somewhat. Taking the monthly figures level, while in the United States and | for 1932 and 1933, they show still more France it is higher than the pre-war| the correctness of this conclusion be- Tevel by some percentage, while the Soviet Union has increased its indus- ‘trial production during this period, in comparison to the pre-war level by more than two hundred ninety per cent. (Applause) From this table we can make this further conclusion that during the time when basic industry in capitalist ouniries continued to fall, beginning 1930, and especially from 1931, reach- img in 1932 the lowest point of the | cause they show that industry in these | countries, in spite of wavering during 1933, does not show a tendency to fall | to the level of the greatest decline of | Summer 1932. What does this mean? | Seemingly it means that industry | in leading capitalist countries has al- | ready reached a point of greatest de- cline, to which it did not return dur- ing 1933. | MILITARY INFLATION; FACTORS IN CRISIS Some are inclined to ascribe this phenomenon to the influence of ex- clusively artificial factors, such as the _ mailitary—inflationist conjuncture, ‘There can be no doubt that military, inflationist factors play here no smail Tole. This is especially true in rela-| tibn to Japan, where this artificial ‘factor is the chief and decisive force in some of the revival of some chiefly military branches of industry. Bui it would be a great mistake to explain all of this by military-inflationist con- juncture. Such explanation is incor- rect, if only because the increase in andustry which I have characterized is observed not in separate and acci- ; dental districts, but in all, or nearly all industrial countries, including countries with fixed currencies. It is evident that along with military, in- flationist conjuncture, there also has | taken place here the action of the in- ternal economic forces of capitalism. Capitalism has been able somewhat to better its position in industry at the expense of the workers through a | policy of utmost low prices for labor, | on food products, and partially on raw | material, at the expense of the peas- | antry of the colonies and economically weak countries by still further de- | creasing the prices paid for the pro- | ducts of their labor, chiefly on raw material and then on food products, F NOT END OF CRISIS 3 fronted with transition from crisis to “usual depression bringing with it new ‘advance and blossoming industry? No, {6 does not. + At all events at present, there do ‘ot exist such data, direct or indirect, Which would indicate an approaching advance in industry in capitalist coun- tries. Further judging by all such data, ‘there cannot be, at least in the near future; it cannot, because all those un- favorable conditions continue to exist which do not give industry of the cap- ifalist countries the possibility of rise to any serious extént. We speak about | the continuation of the general crisis ‘*f capitalism under conditions of which occurs the economic crisis, about chronic under-utilization of in- dustrial enterprises, about chronic mass unemployment, interweaving the industrial crisis with the agricultural crisis, the absence of any tendencies | to any serious renewal of basic capital foretelling the usual beginning of an advance, etc. This clearly shows that we are dealing with the transference from the lowest point in the decline of industry, from the point of deep- est industrial crisis to depression, but not to & usual depression, but to de- pression of special type, which does not lead to a new advance and blos- soming of industry, but also does not lead it back to the lowest point of decline The result of the drawn out eco- nomic crisis an unprecedented sharpening of the political situatoin | in capitalist countries, both within thesé countries as well as between/ growth of military naval armaments | them. The strengthening of the struggle| France, represent the result of this| for foreign markets has resulted in the abolition of the last remnants of free trade. Prohibitive t , trade currency war, dumpi many other analogous measures dem onstrate that the extreme national }ism in economic policies has sharp- | jened to the extreme the relations | | between countries, and has created | | the basis for military clashes and has put war on the agenda as a means | for a new redivision of the world and | spheres of influence in favor of the} | stronger powers. | The war of Japan in China, the | occupation of Manchuria, Japan’s exit from the League of Nations and TRADE FIGHT SPEEDS WAR advance into sharpened The for the have more. stru; Northern China the situation still accentuation of the gle the Pacific and the in Japan, the U. S. A., England and sharpening situation. Germany's exit from the League and the spectre of revenge gave new g and/| impetus to the sharpening situation | and the growth of armaments in Europe. No wonder the bourgeois pacifism maintains its pitiable existence, and babbles of “disarmament” while it is {replaced by “business” talks regard- ing increased armaments. Again, as in 1914, the parties of militant imperialism, the parties of war and revenge, now advance to the first place. Things obviously new war. move toward a ieee FIFTH CRISIS YEAR DEEPENS MISERY ft ea ae | Owing to the action of the same] | factors, the internal situation of cap- | italist countries is sharpening to a ; Still greater extent, four years of in- | dustrial crisis have exhausted and| | brought anguish to the working class. | Four years of agricultural crisis have utterly ruined the poor strata of the peasantry, not only in the main capi- talist countries, but also, and espe-| cially, in dependent and colonial} countries. It is a fact that notwith- standing all kinds of statistical man- ipulations aiming at underestimation of the number of unemployed, the number unemployed. according to official data of bourgeois institutions, reaches 3,000,000 in Britain, 5,000,000 in Germany, 10,000,000 in the U.S.A., not to speak of other countries in Europe. Add to this the partially unem- ployed, the number of which exceeds 10,000,000, add millions of ruined peasants, and you have an approxi- mate picture of the want and despair of the toiling masses, REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS DEVELOPING | ‘The masses of people have not yet arrived at the point of storming cap- italism, but the idea of storming ripens in the consciousness of the masses. There can hardly be any doubt of that. Eloquent proof of |that is furnished by such events as the Spanish revolution, overthrowing a regime of fascism, and the growth of Soviet districts of China, which the united forces of the counter- revolution Chinese and foreign bour- geoisie is unable to crush, It is this that explains the fact that the ruling classes of the capi- talist countries painstakingly destroys or annuls the last remnants of par- liamentarism and bourgeois democ- racy which might be utilized by the working class in the struggle against their oppressors, drive Communist Parties underground and pass to open terrorist methods maintaining their dictatorship. Chauvinism and preparation for war are the main elements of for- eign policy, repressing the working class and terror in the sphere of in- ternal policy, as indispensable means for strengthening the rear of future military fronts—that is what particu- larly engages at present contem- porary imperialist politicians, | FASCISM, DESPERATE STAND OF CAPITALISM No wonder fascism now becomes the most stylish commodity among militant bourgeois politicians. I speak not only of fascism in general, but first of all of fascism of the Ger- man type, which incorrectly calls it- self National Socialism, which the most minute investigation finds it impossible to discover in it even an atom of socialism. In this connection the victory of fascism in Germany should be con- sidered not only as an indication of the weakness of the working class and a result of the betrayal of the working class by social democracy which cleared the path for fascism; it must also be considered as an indi- cation of the weakness of the bour- |geosie, 2s an indication that the | bourgeoisie, is no longer able to rule |by the old methods of parliamenta- |rism and bourgeois democracy, owing to which it is compelled to resort in its internal policies to terroristic methods of ruling; as an indication that it is no longer able to find a way out of present conditions on the basis of a peaceful foreign policy, owing to which it is compelled to resort to a policy of war. Of course, there 1s no ground to suppose that war could bring an ac- tual way out. In the contrary, it must tangle the situation still more. Moreover, it will unleash revolution and will challenge the very existence of capitalism in a number of coun- tries, as happened in the course of the first imperialist war. And if, not- withstanding the experience of the first imperialist war, the bourgeois Politicians, nevertheless seize at war as one who is drowning seizes at a straw, that means that they have become definitely tangled, have reached a blind alley, and are ready to fly headlong into the abyss. | CAPITALISM PREPARES FOR WORLD WAR It therefore is not amiss to examine in brief those plans of organization for war which are at present being nurtured in the circles of bourgeois politicians. Some think that war should be or- ganized against one of the great pow- ers, They think of administering an annihilating defeat, and improve their own business at the expense of one of these powers. Suppose they organize such a war, What may come out of it? It is known that during the first imperialist war they also wanted to annihilate one of the great powers—Germany—and profit at its expense. But what came out of this? They did not annihilate Germany but sowed in Germany such hatred to- wards conquerors and created such fertile soil for revenge, that to date they still cannot, and we might say, Will not, be able soon to get rid of the hideous mess which they themselves had brewed. But it did result in the smashing of capitalism in Russia, vic- tory of the proletarian revolution in Russia, and—in the Soviet Union, Where is the guarantee that the sec- ond imperialist war will give them “better” results than the first? Would it not be more correct to suppose the opposite? Others think that war should be or- ganized against one of the militaris- tically weak countries, but large as a market, for instance against China, which it appears cannot, in addition, even be called a state in the proper sense of the word, but represents only “unorganized territory,” which may be seized by strong powers. They ap- parently want to divide her finally and improve their business at her ex- Pense, Suppose they organize such a war. What may be the result of this? It is known that in the beginning of the 19th century, Italy and Germany were regarded in the same way as China is regarded at present, 1e., they were considered “unorganized terri- tories” and not states, and they were enslaved. What was the result of this? The result was as is known, the wars of Germany and Italy for independence, and the uniting of these countries into independent states, The result was the strength- ening of the hate towards their op- Ppressors in the hearts of the peoples of these countries, résults of which have not been eliminated to date, and we might say, will not be elimi- nated, The question arises: Where fs the guarantee that the same will not happen as a result of an imperialist war against China? The third group thinks that war should be organized by the “higher race,” say the German “race,” against the “lower race,” in the first place, jagainst Slavs, that only such a war might furnish an outlet from the sit- uation, because the “higher race” is destined to fertilize the “lower” and rule it. Suppose this strange theory heaven from earth, suppose this strange theory has been realized in practice. What may result from this? It is known that ancient Rome looked upon the ancestors of con- temporary Germans and French as representatives of the “higher race” Jook now upon Slavic tribes. It is known that ancient Rome treated them as a “lower race,” “barbarians,” destined to be in eternal subjection to “higher race,” to “Great Rome,” and let it be said among us that ancient Rome had some ground for this, which cannot be said of representa- tives of the contemporary “higher race.” (Thunderous applause.) But what was the result of this? The result was that nou-Romans, that is, all “barbarians,” united against the common enemy and overturned Rome with a crash. The question arises: Where is the guar- antee that the claims of the repre- sentative contemporary “higher race” will not bring about the same results? Where is the guarantee that the fas- cist literary politicians in Berlin will have more luck than the old expe- rienced conquerors in Rome? Is it not more correct to suppose the opposite? Finally, a third group thinks that war should be organized against the US.S.R. They think that they will smash the U.S.S.R., divide its terri- tory, and profit at its expense. It would be a mistake to suppose only certain military circles in Japan think so. We know that similar plans are nurtured in the circles of politi- cal leaders in some European powers, Suppose these gentlemen passed from ee deeds, What might be the Tt is hardly possible to doubt that this war will be a war most dan- gerous for the bourgeoisie. It willl be meet dangerous not only because the Peoples’ U, S. 8. R. will fight to @ finish for the conquest of the rev- olution. It will be most dangerous for the bourgeois also because this war will take place not only on fronts, but also in the rear of the enemy. The bourgeoisie may not doubt that numerous friends of the working class of the U. S. 8S. R. in Europe and Asia will strive to hit at the rear of their oppressors, who undertook a criminal war against the Father- jand of the working class of all countries. And let not the bourgeois gentlemen following such a war they will miss some of their own governments which at present happily rule “by | | which is as far from science as} ie us if on the day! Grace of God.” { (Thunderous ap- | plause.) | There has already been one such war against the U. S. S. R., you will As is} known, universally honored Churchill, at that time, put this war in a poetical formula, “Invasion of four- teen powers.” You, of course, re- Member that this war consolidated all the toilers of our country in a | unified camp of self-sacrificing | fighters defending their workers, and peasants’ fatherland against foreign enemies. You know how it ended. It | ended with the routing of interven- | tionists from our country and the | creation of revolutionary “committees of action” in Europe. It is hardly to be doubted that a second war against the U. S. S. R. will bring a complete | remember, fifteen years ago. in a number of cguntries in Europe and Asia, and the“Smashing of bour- | geois landlord governments in these countries, Such are the war plans of em- broiled bourgeois politicians, As you see, they don’t sparkle with wit or valor (Applause). But if the bourgeoisie selects the | path of war, the working class of | | capitalist countries, brought to des- peration by four years of crisis and unemployment, will enter the road of revolution. This means that the rev- olutionary crisis ripens and will con- tinue to ripen. And as the revolu- tionary crisis will ripen, the faster, the more the bourgeoisie will become embroiled in its war combinations, the oftener it will resort to terrorist methods of struggle against working class and the toiling peasants. Some comrades think since there is | defeat of the aggressors, revolutions | Stalin Declares a revolutionary crisis, the bourgeoisie must get into a hopeless situation, that its end accordingly is already pre-determined, that victory of rev- olution is thus already assured, and that all that is left for them is only wait for the downfall of the bour- tions. This is a profound error. Vic- tory of revolution never comes by 1t- self. It must be prepared and at- tained. And only a strong revolu- tionary party can prepare and at- tain it. There are moments when the power of the bourgeoisie totters to the very foundation, but victory of revolution still does not come be- cause there is no revolutionary party or proletariat sufficiently strong and authoritative to lead masses and take power into its hands. It would be | unreasonable to think that such | “accidents” cannot take place.” | Stalin then reminds his hearers of | Lenin’s words at the Second Con- | gress of the Comintern, on the ques- tion of the revolutionary crisis as a basis for revolutionary action that “prove apriori, any ‘absolutely’ hope- Jess situation of the bourgeoisie would be an empty pedantry or play on conceptions and words. Real “proof” in such and similar ques- tions can only be the practice of rev- olutionary parties, their sufficient consciousness, organization, contact with exploited masses, determination, ability to utilize the crisis for suc- cessful, for victorious revolution. “It is easy to understand how dif- ficult it is for the Soviet Union to carry out its peace policy in the at- mosphere poisoned by miasmas of war combinations. | U.SS.R. MAINTAINS ITS PEACE POLICY In circumstances of this pre-war) witches dance, which had seized a number of countries, the Soviet Union continued during these years firm, unshaken its peace position, fighting war menace, fighting for the preesrvation of peace, meeting half way those countries which in one way or another are for preservation of peace, exposing and unmasking those | who prepare, who provoke war. What did the Soviet Union count on in this difficult and complicated fight for peace? First, its growing economic and po- litical might. Second, on moral support of vast masses of the working Icass in all countries, which were deeply con- cerned with preservation of peace. Third, on saneness of those coun- tries not interested, owing to one reason or another, in violating peace and which were desirous of develop- ing trade relations with such punc- tual clients as the U. S. 8. R. Finally, on our glorious Red Army which is ready to defend the country from foreign attacks. On this basis came about our suc- cessful campaign for non-aggression pacts and the pact defining the ag- gressor with the neighboring coun- tries.” IMPERIALIST CLIQUES PROVOKE INTERVENTION VICTORIES OF U.S.S.R. PEACE POLICY Stalin then dwells on a number of facts reflecting the successes of the peace policy of the Soviet Union, | emphasizing two of the most import- ant significance. “The first recent improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the policy between the Soviet Union and Poland, and between the Soviet Union and France took Place recently. This does not mean, © fcourse, that indicated process of rapproachment be considered as sffi- | ciently firm as assuring ‘final success. | Surprising and zigzags in policy, for | instance of Poland, where anti-Soviet sentiment is still strong, cannot by far be considered excluded. But a change towards the improvement in | our relations, irrespective of results | in the future, is a fact deserving to be noted and put to fore as a factor for im proving the cause of peace. What has caused this change, what. is its stimulus? Victories of U. S. S, R. Peace Policy First of all the growth in the | strength and might of the U.S. S. R. In our times, it is not customary to take into consideration the weak; only the strong are considered. And then some changes in the policies of Germany, reflecting the growth of revenge and imperialist sentiment in Germany. Some German politicians say, in this connection, that the Soviet Union at present orientates itself to- wards France and Poland, that from an opponent of Versailles treaty it became an adherent, that change is explained by the establish- ment of the fascist regime in Ger- |many. This is not correct. Of course, we are far from being de- lighted with fascist regime in Ger- many. But that is not the point. We have» never had an orientation towards Germany just as we have no orientation towards Poland and France, We have orientated ourselves in the past, and are orientating our- selves at present on U. S. S. R., only on U.S. 8. R. (Thunderous applause) And if interests of U. S. 5. R. de- mand rapproachment> with some countries or others which are not in- terested in violating peace, we do not hesitate in agreeing to that. The fact of the matter is, that even be- fore the advent to power of the present Germany politicians, and particularly after their advent, a struggle began in Germany between two political lines, between the old policy which was reflected in the treaties between the U. S. S, R. and Germany and the “new” policy, which fundamentally reminds one of the policy of the former German Kaiser, who at one time had oc- cupied the Ukraine and undertook an offensive against Leningrad, turning the Baltic countries into a place d’armes for such offensive. Moreover, the “new” policy quite obyiously has the upper hand over the old policy. It should not be con- sidered an accident that the men of the “‘new” policy are getting the up- per-hand in everything, while the ad- herents of the old policy are in dis- favor. Neither is the famous decla- ration of Hugenburg dn London ac- cidental, just as the less known declarations of Rosenburg who di- rects the foreign policies of the ruling party in Germany are not ac- cidental. That, comrades, is the fact of the matter. T also have in mind the resumption of normal relations between U. S. S. R, and U, S, A. there can be no doubt that this act is of the most serious significance in whole system of international relations. It is not cause of preserving pease, strengthens trade relations; it is that it marks a turn from the past when the U. S. A. was considered in various countries as bulwark for all kinds of anti- Soviet tendencies, anq the present, when this bulwark is voluntarily re- moved from the path towards mutual profit of both countries. Such are two main facts reflecting successes Soviet peace policy. How- ever, it would be incorrect to think that during the period under report everything went smoothly with us. We may recall the pressure on the part of Great Britain, embargo against our export, the attempt to interfere in our internal affairs, and to feel us out in order to try the force of our resistance. To be sure nothing came of this attempt, the embargo was lifted afterwards, but an unpleasant residue of these at- tacks still makes itself felt in every- thing that concerns the relations be- tween Great Britain and the Soviet Union, also in the negotiations for a trade treaty. And these attacks against U. S. S. R. cannot be con- sidered accidental. It is known that a certain part of the British conser- vatives cannot live without such at- tacks. Just because they are not ac- cidental, will the attack on the Soviet Union in the future create menaces of every kind and harm. etc. ‘We cannot also but have in view the relation between the U.S. 5. R. and Japan which are in need of serious improvement. The refusal of Japan to sign a non-agression pact, this | of which Japan is no less in need than the U.S. S. R., once more em- phasizes that in the sphere of our international relations not everything is well. The same must be said re- gerding the break of negotiations con- cerning the Chinese Eastern Rail- way which came about not through fault of the Sovieh Union, and also regarding the fact Japanese agents perpetrate impermissible acts on the Chinese Eastern Railway, lawlessly arresting Soviet officials on Chinese Eastern Railway, etc. not to men- tion the fact that one section of military persons in Japan openly propagates in the press the necessity of war against U. S. S. R. and the seizure of its Maritime Provinces with apparent approval of other sec- tions of military, while the Govern- ment of Japan instead of calling to order these war incendiaries, pre- tends that this does not concern it. It is not difficult to understand that such circumstances cannot but create an atmosphere of disquietude and uncertainty. Of course, we will continue resolutely to carry on our peace policy and strive to improve our relations with Japan, because we want to improve these relations. But not all is dependent on us in this case. Therefore, we must, at the same time, adopt all measures to protect our country against surprises, and be prepared to defend it against attacks (thunderous applause). Our foreign policy 1s clear. It is a OS ce ee toate seicteca eis aa si countries, oe nent aae of attacking any! , whoever it may be. We are for peace, and maintain- ing the cause of peace, But we are not afraid of threats, and we are prepared to answer blow for blow the incendiaries of war (thunderous ap- plause). Whoever wants peace and strives towards business relations with us, will always find support from us. But those who should attempt to attack our country will meet with so crushing a resistance, that in the future they will not take it into their heads to shove their swinish snouts geoisie and to write victorious resolu- | the situation is revolutionary, when | WELL-BEING, CULTURE IN STEADY ADVANCE | The task is to continue carrying out this policy with all firmness and consistency. From the point of view of the internal situation in the U. S. S. R., the period under report pre- sents a picture of constantly develop- ing advance, both in the sphere of national economy, as well as in the sphere of culture. This advance was not only a mere qualitative accumulation of strength. This advance is significant in that it brought about basic changes in the structure of the U.S.S.R. and radi- cally changed the face of the country. From an agrarian country, it be- came an industrial country. From a country of small scale individual farming, it became a country of col- lective, large-scale, mechanized farm- ing. From a country that was dark, illiterate, uncultured, it became— more correctly, it is becoming—a country literate and cultured, cov- ered with an immense network of higher secondary and elementary schools in the languages of the na~- tionalities of the U.S.S.R. New branches of production have been created; machine construction, automobile industry, tractor industry, chemical industry, engineering indus- try, aviation, construction of har- vester combines, production of power- ful turbines and generators, special steel, ferro-alloys, synthetic rubber, nitrogen, artificial fibres, etc., (pro- longed applause). During this period, thousands of new modern industrial enterprises have been built and started. Such giants as Dnieprostroy, Magnitostroy, Kusnestroy, Chilarstroy, Dobrike, Uralmashstroy, Kramashstroy, have been built. Thousands of old enterprises have been reconstructed on the basis of new technique, New enterprises have | been built, and centres of industry have been created, in the nati Republics and the outlying district, of the U.SS.R.: in White Russi: Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, caucasia, Central Asia, Buryat, Mongolia, Tartaria, Bash- kiria, the Urals, in Eastern and Western Siberia, in the Far East, etc. More than 200,000 Kolkolzes (col- lective farms) and 500 State farms were created, with new district cen- tres, and industrial points for them. On almost empty ground, new cities have grown up with great pop- ulations. Old cities and industrial centres have grown immensely, The foundations for the Ural-Kus- netz combine has been laid—linking Ural Kusnetz coking coal with Ural iron ore. Thus, we may consider the new metallurgical base in the East as turned from dream into reality. The foundations have been laid for @ new powerful oil industry in the Districts of the Western. and South- ern slopes of the Ural range—in the Ural region, Bashkiria, Kasakstan. It is obvious that immense capita} investments of the State in afl branches of national . amounting during the period under report, to more than sixty billion rubles, have not been in vain and already being to show results. As @ result of these achievements, the national income of the Soviet Union grew from 29 billion rubles in 1929, to fifty billion in 1933, while at the same time, the national income dur- ing the same period in all capitalist countries, without exception, drop- ped tremendously. It is self-understood that all these achievements, all this advance had to bring and indeed did bring about a further strengthening of the in- ternal situation of the Soviet Union. SUCCESSES DUE TO SUPERIORITY OF SOCIALISM How could these immense changes come about during some three-four years on the territory of an enor- mous State with its backward tech- nique, with backward culture? Is not this a miracle? It would have been a miracle, had the development taken place on the basis of capitalism and individual small-scale economy. But it cannot be called a mriacle if it is considered that the development took place on the basis of unfolding Socialist. construction. It is evident that this gigantic ad- vance could unfold only on the basis of the successful socialist construc- tion, on the basis of the social labor of tens of millions of people, on the basis of the advantages of the so- cialist system of economy over the pete and individual peasant sys- -| tem. ‘ No wonder, therefore, that the tre- mendous advance in the economy and culture of the U.S.S.R., during the period under report at the same time signified the liquidation of capi- talist elements and the shoving of individual peasant economy into the background. When Socialist economy was first introduced, Lenin said that in our country there are elements of five social economic systems: One, patri- archial economy; two, small scale commodity production; three, private capitalism; four, state capitalism; five, socialism. Lenin considered that of all these systems, socialism will gain an upper hand in the long run, We may, say now that first, third and fourth social economic systems exist mo more, and the second social- towards construction on the soundest basis—machine construction—is en- tirely in our hands. It is only neces- sary that it should be utilized skill- fully, rationally, The proportion of socialized indus- try in total production grew from 99.40 per cent in 1929 to 99.93 per cent in 1933, while the proportion of private industry correspondingly fell from .6 to .07 per cent, This shows that we have already finished with capitalist elements in industry and the socialist system of economy is at present thé only sys- tem in our industry (applause). But of all the achievements gained by industry during the period under report, the most important achieve- ment should be considered the fact that it succeeded during this time in training and educating thousands of new people and new leaders of in- dustry, whole strata of new engi- neers and technicians, hundreds of thousands of young skilled workers who have mastered new technique and who moved our socialist industry forward. There cdn be no doubt that without these people industry could not have had those successes which it has at present and of which it is justified in being proud, Data show that during the period under report 800,000 more or less qualified skilled workers have gradu- ated from factory schools into pro- duction and more than 580,000 engi- neers and technicians have gradu- ated from higher technical and gen- eral educational institutions and technical schools. If it is true that Kazakstan,” economic system has been shoved to|the problem of forces is the most @ secondary position, and that the | serious problem of our development, fifth social-economic system—Social- ist _system—is the undivided ruling and single commanding force in our entire national economy (thunderous Prolonged applause). In this sum total is the basis for the firmness of internal situation of the U.S.S.R., the basis for of its advance in circumstances of capitalist encirclement. Of all the branches of national economy, industry grew the fastest during the period under report, that is, beginning in 1930, industry grew more than double, and, compared with pre-war level, it grew four times. While in 1913 the proportion of in- dustry in the gross production of national economy equalled 42.1 per cent, in 1933 it already equals 70.4 per cent. This means that our coun- try has firmly and definitely become an industrial country. Of decisive significance in the cause of industrialization is the growth of production of means of produc~ tion, in the general volume of the development of industry. The pro- portion of this item in the general advance of industry became prepon- derant. It grew during the period under report from 48.5 per cent to 58 per cent. In the general advance of industry machine construction has in the general total of heavy indus- try already exceeds 26 per cent. ‘This means that our industry is de- veloping on a sound basis, and the key then it must be recognized that industry is beginning seriously master this problem. Such are the basic achievements of our indi . It would, however, be incorrect to think that industry has had only successes, No, it has also its short comings.’ Comrade Stalin then enumerated the most important of these short- comings and dwelt in detail on the immediate tasks in the sphere of in- dustry: “To maintain the present ferrous metallurgy, to develop coal mining in new regions, parti in the Far East and Siberia, and the transforming of ,Kuzbas into a second Donbas, to seriously undertake or- ee of a new oil base in the Ul Develop production of goods of q eral consumption in all branches light, food and tiniber industries. To improve the quality of goods, st- tain systematic growth of labor pro+ ductivity, lowering of costs and intro- ducing business accounting. as ie oe oe and equalization in the system wages. Put an end to bureaucratic office methods of management in all links of national economy, while system- atically checking up on the fulfillment of decisions and instructions of direct= ing centers by lower organizations, GREAT GROWTH IN RATE OF FARM COLLECTIVES | * Many times more slowly than in industry, but still faster than during the period when individual farming was predominating, the advance of the basic branches of agriculture has been growing during the period under report. In stock breeding we even had period of rapid growth and powerful running start, as & period of creating pre-requisites for such growth and such a running start in the near future, Data concerning growth ed areas during the period under re~ port refiects two basic lines in agri- culture: One line, towards increasing in every Way cultivated areas during the period when of reorganization agriculture was at its height; when Kolkhozes (collective farms) were stalling correct crop rotations and plowing to raising the yield, and, if it should be necessitated by to practice, temporary curtailment of existing eul- tivation areas. As is known, the second line—the Gontinued on Page Five) of cultivat- |