The Daily Worker Newspaper, January 28, 1933, Page 6

Page Two DAELY WORKER, NEW YORK, SATURDAY. PnBieh ss it ses Mis Sasser Best Se tt 7 AN OEE a SCENE SL PTE SCS MESES JANUARY 28, 1933 aaa this work would demand serious sacri- fides and that we,must: plainly and openly take these! sabrifices into ‘account if we wish to ‘achieve our aim. The Party reck- oned on performing this work with the inner forces of our country, without en- slaving credits and forei loans A bold task? A’hard road? But our Party is called the Leninist Party because it has no right to fear difficulties, More- over, the conviction of the Party of the feasibility of the Five-Year Plan and its faith in the forc of the working. class were so strong, that it found it possible to set the t of realizing this difficult work not in five years, as the Five-Year Plan demanded, but in fo ‘Ss, Or more exactly speaking, in four years and three months if we add the special quarter On this basis there arose the famous siogan: “Five-Year Plan in four years.’ And what happened? The facts showed that the Party was right. The facts show- ed that without this boldness and without belief in the forces of the working class, the Party would not have been able to achieve this success of which we rightly boast, * * * HAT are the results of the Five-Year Plan in four years in the sphere of industry? Have we achieved a victory in this sphere? Yes, indeed. We have not only achieved victories, but also done more than we ourselves expeeted, than even the most sanguinary members of our Party expected. Even our enemies cannot deny this. now. ‘The less therefore can our friends deny this. We had no smelting industry as .the basis of the industrialization of our coun- try. Now we possess one. We had no automobile industry. Now we possess one. We had no automobile industry now. we possess one. We had no considerable modern chem- ical industry. Now we possess one, We had no real industry of any im- portance for the production of agricultu- yal machines. Now we have one. We had no aircraft-consiruction indus- try. Now we have one. As regards the production of electrical energy, we occupied the last place. Now we have advanced to one of the first po- sitions. With regard to the output of oil products and coal, we occupied the last place. Now we have advanced to one of the first positions. We possessed only one coal and foundry basis, the Wkiaine, which we were not abie completely to utilize. We have suc- ceeded not only in extending this basis, but have also created a new iron and foundry basis, the East, which is the pride of our country. We possessed only a few textile indus- trial centres in the North of the country We have succeeded in a short time in establishing two new cenires of the tex- tile industry: in Central Asia and Eastern Siberia, And we not only created these new gi- gantic branches of industry, but we de- veloped them to such an exient and on such a scale that they place the European indusiry right in the shade. And all this has resulted in the capit- alist elements being finally -eradicated trom industry for good, and the socialist indust:y becoming the sole form of in- dustry in the Soviet Union. * * And all this has led to our country being converted from an agrarian into an industrial country; tor the specific weight of industrial production compared with agricultural production increased from 48 per cent, at the commencement of the Five-Year Plan in 1928, to 70 per cent at the conclusion of the fourth year of the Five-Year Plan (1932). And all this led to our succeeding, at the conclusion of the. fourth year of the Five-Year Plan, in fulfilling, 93.7 per cent, * of the program of the whole of indus- trial production calculated for five years, in that we increased industrial produc- tion more than threefold compared with the pre-war level, and more than twofold ~ eompared with 1928, As regards the pro- ~ gram. of output of our heavy industry, we fulfilled thé Five-Year Plan up to 108 -per cent. But we remained about 6 per ent behind the total program. of the Pive-Yeur Plan. This is due to the fact «that, in view of the refusal of neighbor- ing countries to conclude non-aggression pacts with us, and in view of the com- plications in the Far East, we had to switch some of our undertakings as rapid- jy as possible on to the production of modern weapons of defense for the pur- pose of increasing our defensive power. Now this adeption of production in consequence of “he necessity of passing through a certair’ period of preparation, jed to .these fattories changing their production for four months, which had an éffect on the fulfilment of the general preduction program of the Five-Year Pian in. the course of the year 1932. This operation resulted in our completely fill- - ing up the gaps in the defensive capacity of the country. But this could not but have an adverse. effect on the fulfilment of the production program of the Five- Year Plan. There can be no doubt that but for this circumstance we should not only have fulfilled the plan but exceeded - ite figure. ° * J ’ 3 phone for yourselves: what after ali, is the talk of the bourgeois press about - the “collapse” of the Five-Year Plan in the sphere of industry worth? And how dees the matter’ stand with the capital- dst countries, which at present are ex- _ Perfencing the severest crisis in regard to | the’ ow of their industrial production? "e In .this connection there are official re- turng known +o alk: ‘ i Oe Wiiist at the end of 1932 industrial pro- duction in the Soviet Union stood at 33¢ per cent of the pre-war level, industria! production in the U. 8. A. declined in the same period to 84 per cent, and in Ger- many to 62 per cent. Whilst towards the end of 1932 industrial production in the Soviet Union increased to 219 per cent of the 1928 level, in the same period in- dustrial production in the U. S. A. sank to 56 per cent, in England to 80 per cent in Germany to 55 per cent, and in Poland to 54 per cent, What else do these figures indicate but that the capitalist system with its indus- try, in its contest with the Soviet system has not stood the test, that industry un- der the Soviet system possesses all the advantages over the capitalist system They say to us: this is all very well, many new factories have been erected, the basis of industrialization has been created, but it would have been much better to aban- don the policy of industrialization, the policy of extending the production of the means of production, or at-least to defer this work in order to produce more Calico, shoes, clothing and other articles of daily requirement, Nevertheless we must know ard take into acceunt whither such a policy of postponing the tasks of indus- trialization would have led. It is true, we could have employed half of the 1% milliard rubles valuta which we expended in this period on equipping our heavy in- dustry, in importing cotton, leather, hides, rubber, etc. Then we should have had more calico, shoes, clothes. But then we should have had neither tractors nor an autemobile industry; we should have had no smelting industry to speak of, no metal fer the construction of machines, and we should have’ been disarmed in face of the modern technique with which our capitalist neighbors are equipped. We sheuld have been deprived of the possi- bility of supplying agriculture with trac- tors and agricultural machines; -it might have happened that we were left with- out grain. We should have deprived our- selves of the possibility of winning a vietory over the capitalist elements in our eountry. It might have happened that we increased beyond measure the chances of the restoration of capitalism, We should not have been in possession of all the modern means of defense, without which the independence of the country is impossible, without which the country would have been converted into an ob- ject of the war operations of the enemy abroad. Our position would then be more or less similar to the present position of China, which has no heavy industry of its own, no war industry and which is carved up by all who will. In a word: in such a case we should have had armed inter- vention, not non-aggression pacts, but war, a dangerous deadly war, a bloody unequal war, for in this war we should have been almost completely unarmed in face of enemies who possess all the mo- dern weapons of attack. * * * It is clear that a self-respecting state pewer, a self-respecting pariy, cannot adopt such a suicidal attitude. and pre- cisely because the Party rejected such a counter-revolutionary attitude, it achieved a decisive victory in fulfilling the Five- Year Plan in the sphere of industry. By ealizing, the Five-Year.Plan, .by organiz- ing the *victofy ar the; sp htre of industrial + construétion,’ the Party ¢arried out the policy. of * accelerating ‘thie pace of de- elopment of industry. The Party seemed to spur on the country, to drive it for- ward. Did the Party ati rightly in carrying out the policy of accelerating the tempo? Yes, absolutely. -On¢ spur-on a country which is a hundred years behind and is threatened with the danger of perishing on account of its backward- ness Only in this manner could one render it possible for a country rapidly to readapt itself on the basis of modern technique, and finally to proceed on the broad path of development. Further. We could not know on what day the imperialists would atiack the Soviet Union and interrupt our work of construction; that they could attack us at any moment they thought fit and would at the same time take advantage of our technical and economic weaknes- ses—of this there could be no doubt. The Part® was therefore compelled to goad on the country and not waste time. . It had to make use of the time right up to the end of the breathing space in or- der to lay the foundations of the indus- . trialization of the Soviet Union, which constitute the basis of its power. And the Party had no. possibility of waiting and maneuvering; it had to carry out the | policy of the most accelerated tempo. Did the Party have a real possibility of realiz- _ ing the most rapid tempo? “Yes, it had. It had this possibility only because it found time to bring the country in good time into swing, in the spirit of a rapid forward movement, but above all because in regard to the broad-scale new con- struction, it could support itself, on the old or renovated workshops and factories which were already mastered by the work- ers, engineers and technicians, and which thereby rendered it possible to realize the most rapid tempo of development. That is the basis on which, in the period of the first Five-Year Plan, in the per- iod of the rapid progress of new con- struction, there arose the enthusiasm of the developing construction, the shock- brigaders of the new constructions, the practice of the tempestuous increase of tempo. * * * age one say. that a similar policy of ac- celerated tempo will be carried out in the second Five-Year Plan? No, one cannot say that. Firstly, as a result of the successfully carried out Five-Year Plan, we have ful- filled in the main our chief task—the creation of the basis of a modern tech- nique for industry, transport and agricul- ture. Secondly, as a result of the suc- cessful fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan, we have succeeded in raising the defens- ive capacity of the country to the neces- sary level. Finally, as a result of the suc~ cessful fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan, we have succeeded in erecting dozens and hundreds of new big factories and combi- nates and equipping them with a modern, complicated technique. This means that in the industrial pro- duction of the second Five-Year Plan the old factories, whose technique we already master, will no longer play the chief role, as was the case in the period of the first Five-Year Plan, but the new factories, ON GUARD—PROTECTING SQPIALIST CONSTRUCTION whese technique we do not aster abd which:, must, be mastered,: wilf' play thé chief role: . Nevertheless, the master- ng of the new undertakings, of the new technique represents ‘much greater diffi- than the util old or enovated factories , whose technique we already master emands more time in order to increa he quali- fication of the workers, engineers, and technicians, in order that they shall ac- quire the new skill and dexterity for the complete utilization of modern technique After allthis -is-it not clear that even if we wished, we could not realize the policy of accelerated tempo in the period of the second Five-Year Plan, especially in the first, second and third year of the second Five-Year.Plan? I believe, there- fore, that we shall have to fix a less rapid increase of tempo of industria! production for the second Five-Year Plan. In the period of the first Five-Year Plan the an- nual ine ease of industrial production amounted on an average to 22 per. cent. I believe that for the second Five-Year Plan an. average annual increase of 13-14 per cent will have to be fixed. For_the capitalist countries such an increase in the rate of growth of industrial produe- tion constitutes an unattainable . ideal. And not only such a rate of growth of industrial production, but an annual average of 5 per cent is an unattainable ideal for them at present. But after all they are capitalist countries. The case is different with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet economic system. With our eco- nomic system we have every possibility of attaining such a tempo, and we must realize an annual-increase of 13-14 per cent as a minimum. In the period of the first Five-Year Plan we succeeded in organizing ‘the enthusiasm, and we achieved decisive suc- cesses. That is very good. But now this does not suffice. We must now complete this work and fight with enthusiasm for the miastery of the new enterprises, of modern technique, to increase the produc- tivity of labor and to achieve a consider- able reduction of prime costs. That is now the chief matter, the chief thing, for only upon this basis can we achieve, let us say, in the second half of the Pive- Year Plan a new fresh impetus both in regard to construction and the growth of industrial production. * * * Finally, a few words on the tempo it- self and on the annual percentage in- crease of production. What is a one per cent increase of production and what is actually behind every per cent increase? Let us take, for example, the year 1925, the reconstruction period. The annual increase of production amounted at that time to 66 per cent. The gross produc- tion of industry amounted in value~ to 7700 million rubles. 66 per cent increase at that time represented in absolute fig- ures over 3000 million. Thus every per cent increase at that time was equal to 43 million rubles. Let us now take the year 1928. In this year the increase amounted to 26 per cent, i. e. it was scarcely more than a third of the per- centage increase of 1925. The gross out- put of industry amounted at that time to 15,500 million rubles. The total in- crease for the year amounted in absolute figures to 3280 million. That means. therefore, that every per cent increase at that time represented 120 million rubles— nearly three times the amount in the year 1925, when we had an increase of 66 per cent. Finally, in the year 1931, we had an increase of 22 per cent, i. e., a third of the increase of 1925. The total production of industry amounted to 30,- 500 million rubles. The total increase in absolute figures amounted to 5,600 mil- lion. This means that every per cent increase figured at more than 250 million rubles, i. e., six times as much as with the 66 per cent increase in the year 1925. and twice as much as with the 26 per » cent increase in the year 1928. * * & HAT dees all this mean? It: means that in examining the pace of growth of production one must not confine.one- - self to a general survey of percentages of growth. One must also know. what. is behind every per cent increase and what is the total sum of the annual increase . - of production, -Let us take, for example, ~ @ 16 per cent increase for the year 1933, ~ i. e., a fourth of the increase of the year 1925. That does not mean however that the increase of production this year will likewise be four times smaller, In ab- solute figures, the increase of production * in 1925 amounted to more than 3000 mil- lion, and every. per cent increase repre- sented 43 million rubles. There is no reason to doubt that the increase of pro- duction in 1933, with a norm of 16 per cent will amount to not less than 5000 million, which is nearly twice as much as in the year 1925, and every per cent increase will represent at least 320 to 340 million rubles, i. e., at least seven times as much as a one per cent increase in the year 1925. These are the results of the Five-Year Plan in four years in the sphere of in- dustry. In the sphere of agriculture the Five- Year Plan has been the Five-Year Plan of collectivization. What was the start- ing point of the Party in carrying out the Five-Year Plan? The Party proceeded from the fact that in order to strengthen the proletarian dictatorship and build up the socialist society, in addition to indus- trialization it is necessary to go over from the small individual gna farms to the collectivized ae wire A jcuuipped with tracts, ny ma- chinery, is the Pag f fe ove iet Power"in the village. "ene qe -pro- eecded from the fact that without col-