The Daily Worker Newspaper, June 19, 1930, Page 4

ee Page Four DAILY WORKER, NEW YORK, THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1930 oe PRE-CONVENTION DISCU SSIO le ———— SHORTCOMINGS INSTRUGGLE AGAINST RIGHT DANGER By SAM DARCY. A SINCERE and united struggle against op- | portunist tendencies in our Party began over one year ago. To date we have made con- siderable advances in that struggle. But the shortcomings in this phase of our work were and still are so great that they have prevented a decisive defeat of “right” tendencies. At this moment, not in our trade union work alone, | but in many fields of our activities, opportunist j h, methods of work, etc., characterize vities of our Party organs. This situation demands of the Party as a whole, and of the Party leadership especially, a careful examination of its fight against op- portunism and such correction as is necessary to make more effective the work of Bolsheviza- tion. The Roots of Opportunism. t put the question: In the right mply the problem of a few leaders have developed bureaucratic tendencies he “‘conservatism of officials,” or is it the to win large sections of our Party to ect line which flows from the Comin- s of the present historic moment? t simply the problem of a few in- d 1 leaders, as some comrades claim, it | be a comparatively easy task to defeat ht.” But when opportunist tendencies tantly defended by whole or large sec- Party fractions (as is the case in the dle, printing, building industries, etc.), defeatist analysis and consequent op- t tactics are proposed in many Party en we must beware of the superficial that merely a few leaders in mass tions have developed “office conserva- bureaucratic hesitancy and thus created ’ tendencies. For Example—The Shoe Workers’ Situation. The fact is clear that we have not yet won the entire Party membership to a complete un- derstanding of our Party line and the conse- quences in the new tactics, new methods, etc., which must be adopted in order to carry through that line. Let us take for example the situation which developed during the shoe workers strike: The comrades there developed the theory that the situation became difficult for them because the union grew too fast. This rapid growth, according to certain comrades, provoked the attack of the bosses and the De- partment of Labor. Had we moved slowly, we could have avoided or at least have lessened the attack. Out of this theory there naturally followed an open and hidden resistance to the main points of strategy in the Party line; the rapid spread of the strike, concentration on big Board of Trade shops, the demand for the 40 hour week, connection with the general poli- tical struggles, etc. Against the Party line the comrades attempted to win a few shops at a time, not to call out others until the few that were already out were settled, to make de- mands which the.bosses “were in a position to grant and which,” according to them, “the workers were willing to fight for,” to elimin- ate every trace of political character in the struggle, etc., ete. The organization of the strike suited these wrong tactics. There were, for example, no broad committees on a united front basis in the shops for more rapid mobil- ization than was possible with the existing union machinery. This line was followed not merely by a few,comrades at the top but was aggressively championed by the entire Party fraction. What do such errors show? Inherent bad nature of a few leaders? Rather they show that very many of our comrades do not under- stand the nature of our struggles in the pres- ent historic moment; the interests of big banks and investment trusts in even small strikes and the rapid mobilization of the state by the banks inst workers in struggle no matter how few. do not understand that every small strike | Has the potentiality for rapid transforma into a major political action of the workin dass, and that our organization for strikes must be such as to give play for mobilization of elemental forces which in this period are frequently unleashed in the struggle. They do not understand that strike leadership at such a moment cannot be limited to “pulling com- mittees” from the union office. The comrades above all do not realize the necessity for reach- ing the big shops and chain shops to which basie production is rapidly shifting. And finally there isn’t even a glimmer of realiza- that the failure to link the local struggle the major political issue means that the bosses through the very introduction of the state into the struggle have weapons which we in the spirit of the A. F. of L. fail to use. the Poisonous Roots, We are citing these examples in order to show that the basic source of these errors is the failure of our comrades to understand the character of the present period and to draw necessary corresponding conclusions as to tactics. If we examine the nature of the fight that we made against the “right” with facts such as cited above in view, then we can see our shortcomings much more clearly. Our fight against opportunist tendencies was not con- ducted so as to undermine the basis for right | errors. Instead of concentrating on the winning of the membership to an understanding of the analysis of the current historic moment which was the basis for our tactics and criticising each “right” error from this angle, we tended to treat every error by itself. The result was superficiality and eclecticism. In the shoe workers situation, for example, the nature of the Party position in the mind of most workers is that if one was for the 40-hour week then one was true to the working class, but if one was for the 44-hour week then one was a “right winger.” Similarly if one was for endorsing the C. P. in the election campaign then one was loyal to the working class; if one was against the action possibly because it was not prepared, then one was a right winger. The reasons for these slogans and the felation of these slogans to the entire program and analysis was never made clear to them. In other words, the Party line which was cor- rect was not carried through politically. The results were disastrous. No attempt was made by the Party fraction to win the workers to an understanding of the political class forces at play in the shoe strike and the strategical value for the outcome of the shoe strike in endorsing the C. P. platform and ticket and thus bringing working class political strength against the bosses’ use of the “‘~*e. Instead in a purely mechanical manner, by the use of | @ majority the ticket was endorsed in the leading committee of the union by a narrow margin. The impression was created among the workers that the action of the Leading Committee actually weakened the strike, be- cause the endorsement of the Communist Party brought nothing to the cause of the shoe strik- ers and created more enemies. Every dema- gogue and social ,fascist was able to use the argument that the Communists are not inter- ested in winning better conditions for the work- ers but are only interested in using the union for certain gains for the Party, not in a class sense but in the narrow organizational sense. The District Executive Committee of the Party in New York did not pay sufficient attention to this situation and therefore overlooked these | mechanical methcds used by the leaders of the | Party fraction in carrying out Party decisions. It failed itself to carry these issues, in this as well as other struggles, to the mass of work- ers. The result was that immeasurable harm? was done to the Party and the union in the entire situation. This same failure to watch the situation closely, brought on certain left errors which though of a minor character hindered the strug- gle against the “Right.” Thus the District Ex- ecutive Committee did not realize, early enough in the struggle, that the ground was not prop- erly prepared for the 40-hour week slogan. The resulting failure to change the slogan at a certain point in the struggle was an error. The opportunist elements in the union tried to use this error to cover their own wrong line. The above cited points are only examples, they are sufficient to show that it is a fact that we did not succeed in defeating the right dan- ger as Leninists should—basically and funda- mentally—by winning the workers to an un- derstanding of a Leninist analysis of the feat- ures of the current historic moment and the tasks which dialectically flow from this analy- sis for our Party and class. : The present Party discussion should serve this purpose. If, however, one judges by the discussion in the units in such districts as New York and Philadelphia (of which we were able to inform ourselves) then one must say it does not. In many cases the discussion consists of vague generalizations about the world crisis and the third period. Or it consist of criticism of details of organization. The relation of one phase of our Party program to another must be made clear. Tactics to analysis; organiza- tion forms to political tasks; slogans to poli- tical objectives; the proper understanding of these relations is a basic weapon in the strug- gle against the right danger. In this discussion also right tendencies are manifest which are not so easily recognizable— which are therefore even more dangerous. Right tendencies which are pronounced on the floor of the discussion are comparatively easy to fight against. These are tangible. In our cur- rent discussion there is a right danger which expresses itself in a passivity towards the dis- | cussion. In part at least this passivity re- flects a certain defeatist spirit among some comrades. In one section where we held a discussion, out of a full meeting of function- | aries only an insignificant handful partici- | pated. After much urging one comrade arose and spoke as follows: “Well, if we must speak, let us speak frankly. You speak of radicalization. Where is it? .It is true we had some big demon- strations, but where are the results? We shave been concentrating for many months on certain factories. We do not even have one contact. This shows the workers are not Tesponding. There is no use of making radi- calization out of thin air.” In another section, one comrade who finally arose (in the spirit of putting her head in the guillotine for the sake of truth) spoke along this line: “The workers are only responding to agi- tation in a general way. They do not want to organize with us because they «feel the moment is not here. This is no radicaliza- tion.” In some units the right tendencies were more bold. Expressions were ourselves,” etc. It is not impossible that many of the comrades who do not speak have ideas rynning in this direction but do*not speak be- | cause they are conscious that the Party recog- nizes such expressions as part of the right | danger. The discussions in the units are, ab- normally lacking in liveliness. Some comrades say that it is a reaction to the verboseness of the factional fight. This is, only a superficial answer. Passivity towards the discussion, es-, pecially by the older members who are at | present the greatest offenders in this respect must be fought as part of the right danger. Sharp Self-Criticism But No Pessimism. Our point of concentration in the discussion must be to win our comrades to the tasks out- lined by the Central Committee on the basis of an understanding of these tasks in the light of the objective situation. A sharp strug- gle must be carried on against expressions of | defeatism and passivity, some of which we have just cited. We can point to the facts: Where we made the correct approach to the masses of workers we obtained unprecedented response; That the failure to achieve greater organ- | ization is not caused by lack of militancy on the part of the workers (although the general- ly low political level of the American working class, as compared with, let us say, the Ger- man workers is a factor), but the dispropor- tion between our influence and organizational ¢| strength is brought about largely by our own inner organizational weaknesses. That even in this respect there has been considerable progress. Thus, for example, where a year or so ago we could speak only of about 15 per cent of our membership really active, this year we can show 35-40 per cent active. That the shortcoming of the moment does not lie in any factual retrogression of the rev- olutionary movement but on the contrary the lagging of the revolutionary organizations of the working-class behind the speedily grow- ing will of the masses of toilers to struggle. In other words while making progress we still fail to set the pace at the head of class strug- gle but in many instances arrive on the scene long after struggles ee well under way, This very important weakness can be cor- rected, if the whole Party is galvanized into heard about | “moving to the left too rapidly,” “isolating | By S. WISEMAN. T= building of the Food Workers Industrial Union is one of our greatest tasks. It necessitates a complete understanding of the | Present period of capitalism, with the #evelop- ment of trustification of finance capital. The food industry is one of the most important it time of war, and at the present time the tap. italist class is placing essential parts of the food industry on a war basis. There are over | two million workers in the industry, whic! ; takes in packing houses, large food factories | cannaries, flour mills, i | tions of the indu: | workers are undergoing the most i ploitation at the hands of the e the larger factories ery; | practiced. | of progress understar r a complete must be hed. | feed the p | hend our weaknesses < s hinders the a bilities of the moment One of the most important shorteomin our fight against the nger 1s th of cone! in crit m and the failure to follow up cri . The result is that activi- ties, revolutionary in phrase but opportypist in practice, become a chief obstacle in our | Party’s progress. It is: not uncommon, for | example, that the greatest bearers of right tendencies in the trade union fractions are also the greatest mouthers of revolutionary phrases in the street nuclei. Thus some comrades in the printers fraction, are against issuing shop papers and industrial bulletins which carry forward the T.U.U.L. program. These com- | rades have even prevented the issuing of a | shop paper in Hearst’s plant because the dis- trict insisted that an attack on shop congitions | be included and the situation in Typo Union | No. 6 be exposed. But amongst these com- rades are many who in the sections speak most glibly and with blissful vagueness about “revolutionary overthrow” of capitalism. Breast Beating Is Not Self-Criticism. Opportunism in practice has another expres- sion, especially among the functionary cadre, in a tendency to accept every criticism made, even foolish criticism, but to correct nothing. Comrade Amter in his article “Not Only Self- Criticism But Self-Correction” pointed this out clearly. Thus the entire Party, from the | Central Committee through the District Com- | mittee has been criticizing itself. for failure to pay proper attentio: to | the keeping of our new members. To | date, several months after the membership drive closed, no systematic and checked up program has been followed to correct this gre- vious error. Such self-criticism is useless. It is only for the record. Concrete measures to correct every proven shortcoming is the only way to fight opportunism in practice. The gap between the decisions in our resolutions and the failure to carry out the decisions must be eliminated. Better to budget our work, under- take less and achieve more, than to undertake with great bombast and achieve almost noth- ing. Bolshevize the Party. Since the elimination of the organized right elements from our Party we have made some progress towards Bolshevization..We have far to go yet. This convention ean make a tremen- dous contribution to the political progress of the American revolutionary movement by seri- ous attention to this paramount problem of the struggle against the right danger, of eli- minating the shortcomings in that fight and thereby hastening the Bolshevization process action. And if the sharpest self-criticism is in our section of the Communist International, Mi ° NEMPLOY ED 7 CONVENTION chHicaGo vy 42 De Lp ing | ON WITH THE FIGHT FOR “WORK OR WAGES!” By GROPPER Building of Food Workers Union Only in the small units in the food industry, such as restaurants, cafeterias, and small bake shops is there any organization. These organ- ized workers are under the control, largely, of ihe fascist A. F. of L., and comprise mainly bartenders, cooks, waiters, etc. All in all, with the four thousand in the. Amalgamated Food Workers, an independent organization, con- trolled by the social-fascists Lore and Burk- hard, and the approximately three thousand in the Food Workers Industrial Union, about five per cent or less of the workers in the inlustry are organized. If our Party is to a powerful union in the food industry, a tremendous task. Our orientation rds the building 6f a national king House Workers Industrial it must be stressed that all pre- ‘or the organization of the workers of a national union in the food s immediately. time we must realize and orientation has been wrong. d our struggles ameng chose in the small w (cafete- , Lakeries), involving usually At the present time the revolul workers in the Ws ai y only taking place in ey York, on a small scale even York there ers, and although there are ° cowrletely disregatded them and tod en the workers in the small nt shops. It, is be- ble to understand the tcanization of an indus- c i tua! uniow, a ‘utionary industrial union which is te ¢ the tens of thousands of vovcers in the 0 around the revolu- tionary propvam of the ede Union Unity I ie Now riliculous to c ive that with the tiemendous lask of m ng and building our revolutionary union in the present period when the capitalist ,class is preparing more than ever before for an attack upon the Soviet Union, and for war between the capitalist countries themselves; at a time when hundreds of thousands of workers in the food industry have been thrown out of employment and are starving; at a lime when the contradictions of capitalism develop ever sharper and sharper and the colonial peoples are in revolt against imperialism of all countries (China, India, Haiti, etc.); when we must build a revolu- tionary union which will be able to mobilize the workers in the food industry in support of the struggling colonial masses against im- perialism, That at such a period we have failed to orientate up till the present time towards the large factories of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers where the exploita- tion of these workers is most severe; that we have failed up till the present time to create a national movement for the building of a national union, when thé millions of workers in the industry are totally at the mercy of the capitalist class; when in the packing houses the workers, who have had good traditions of the struggle have been totally neglected, at a time when they are under the most severe attack of the capitalist class, we have been spending a lot of valuable energy in tinkering around with small individual strikes, in many cases not even having the workers in these shops ascent to these strikes. What kind of a revolutionary union can we build in such a period when we totally neglect to see the hundreds of thousands of workers struggling under the oppression of the capital- ist class, when we base our struggles on those workers in the small bakeries, restaurants and cafeterias? While these workers must not be neglected and while most of these workers have good traditions of organization, and will are over a half | 2. | with red letters in the history of the American | working class, for their militancy. The miners | traditions from the A. F. of L. and the A. F. PARTY TASKS IN THE _ MINING BY VINCENT KAMENWITCH, | AG inining industry is one of the chronically | sick industries. Rationalization was intro- | duced in the mines right after the close of the world war. The coal operators, with the help | of the Lewis machine in the U.M.W.A. squeezed aut of the industry over 300,000 miners in the last ten years. The wages paid to the miners are below the 1917 scale. New wage cuts are taking place daily, and the wage cut of 12 per cent by the Rockefeller controlled Consoli- dated Coal Co. the other day is a sig: for new wage cuts on a national scale, alg will be followed by wage cuts in all the mines. The speed-up has intensified hundredfold. The conveyer and loading machines are introduc- ing the belt system into the mines, and the percentage of the coal loaded by the convey- ers and loading machines és increasing by Jeaps and bounds. In 1924 this percentage was very insignificant, it 1929 it has reached to 15 | per cent of all coal mined. Unemployment in , the mining fields was chronic, but since 1919 | whole sections of miners are totally unem- ployed. The miners have resisted the wage cuts, rationalization, and speed-up, and despite the betrayals of the Lewis machine have strug- gled very militantly. The strikes of 1919, 1922, 1927 are marked ! have supported the progressive movements, } and the votes given in the election of 1924, 1926, for the program of the “Save the Union Committee” show the deepness of the radical- ization in the mining fields. The support the National Miners Union is receiving in the mining fields is further indication of the deep- ness of the radicalization of the miners. The mining fields today are very fertile ground for the building of the Party into a mass Party and of the N.M.U. into a mass union. On the other hand the weaknesses of the Party and N.M.U. are such that we have not, been able to organize this support into the form of Party mine nuclei and N.M.U. local unions. Why? The Old Factional Fight. The factional fight that was wrecking our Party, was deeply rooted in the mining fields. The factional fight permitted all kinds of right tendencies to flourish in the mining fields. The Lovestone leadership nurtured. right line and all types of opportunism and bureaucratism went on unchecked. The Party was sort of a “Save the Union” commmittee with no serious political discussions taking place in the units; no Party bulletins or only a few issued in the mines and this only for records sake. No serious attempt to change the composition of the Party membership; no real drive for Party membership on the basis of the Party line; recruiting carried on on the basis of personal relations and contacts, no real functioning local, sectional, district or national fractions which would put the Rarty line into effect not mechanically, but on the basis of understanding and political support of the line. In this period some of the grossest right wing mistakes were made. The membership of the Party had to go to the miners and ask them to support thg Bren- nans Brophies, Hapgoods, etc., in the elections in the U.M.W.A. and alliances with these ele- ments were kept up even after it was very obvious that these alliances were harming the work in the organization of the N.M.U. The leadership of the national and district move- ments was of the worst type of old line U.M.W.A. édlements. The Party carried on the struggle against these elements on the top, mechanically, and the membership was not able to give the Party full support in these fights, and on occasions the membership was opposed to the Party line due to this method. In turn this did not tend to raise the political level of the Party membership, but on the con- trary, created the feeling that the Party is in New York City; makes its decisions there, and the membership has to carry them out. The absence of the fraction work to explain to the masses of the miners these decisions, also created difficult situations in the lower branch- es of the S.U.C. and lost us some able supporters in the ranks. The period ji pre- ceeling the N.M.U. organizational convention be valuable in the building of the industrial union, we must realize that we have been mak- ing many errors in the application of the policy in building our industrial union. To build a local union without an orientaation to- wards the building of a national union in the food industry is political suicide. Take for instance a National Biscuit Company with its chain of factories throughout the country, in- volving thousands of workers, is it possible to organize and carry on successful struggles without attempting to organize on a national scale? Is it possible to even organize a chain store such as Thompson’s or Child’s without approaching it with an orientation of building up national struggles? It is quite evident that our main orientation must be towards the building of a National Industrial Food and Packing House Workers Union. It must be towards developing struggles in the large fac- tories where thousands of workers are concen- trated, and under the sharpest exploitation of the bosses. This demands a complete break with all methods and policies carried over from our old unions, and we must develop into our leadership elements that will be able to carry the burden of the struggle along the lines laid down by the R.LL.U. A leadership that is not prepared to understand the role of the revolutionary union in such a period of colonial revolts, preparation for attacks on the Soviet Union, preparation for capitalist wars, and mass unemployment and suffering on the part of the working class, will not be able to lead the struggles of the workers in the food industry. At present our leadership is not able to lead those struggles. We have a leader- ship that is carrying over too many of the old W. Younger elements must be drawn into the leadership, and this must be done boldly, der veloping these young comrades in the course of the struggle. Our organization will not be built over night. °It will only be built in the sharpest struggle against the fascists of the A. F. of L., the social fascists of the A. F. W., FIELDS and the factional maneuvers, left-a rotten situ. , ation in the top ranks of*the newly organized * N.M.U, The leadership of the N.M.U. carried on the work in the old factional style, using the old factional methods in the inner life of the N.M.U. At no time in the “Save the Union Committee” or in the beginning of the life of the N.M.U. was there an atempt to build the N.M.U, into a class struggle union, with struc- ture, constitution, methods of work, etc., that would, make it possible to mobilize all the forces in the mining industry, to build it into a mass union, and into an instrument of the struggles of the miners. The N.M.U. was made into a replica of the U.M.W.A. in its organization, its structure, its organizational methods. The leadership was old line U.M.W.A, leadership which could not build the N.M.U. This leadership was bankrupt from the first; day, and when the Party line was changed by the decision of the Communist International and the Party leadership attempted to change the situation in the N.M.U. this leadership re- si This was done on local, district and national scale. The bankruptcy of the lewd- ership nec: tated reorganization in many of the districts and nationally. The New Leadership Makes Mistakes. The new leadership being inexperienced, has faced many difficulties, has made many mis- takes, but at least it has not offered resiste ance to the Party line. However the new leade ership has been very, very slow in acting ow many occasions, both politically and organiza. tionally, and has not carried on a vigorous campaign against the various deviations in the mining fields; such as legalistic approach to the questions of wage cuts, evictions, halls,’ ete, and especially—a sharp struggle against the right danger, which is expressed in the resistance to form local unions, mine commit-’ tees and committees of action which must as- | sume responsibility for work in the mines. To. broaden and systematically build the N.M. leadership. To develop the line on local scale, coordinating it to the general line of the N. M.U. The new leadership in the N.M.U. and the Party in the mining fields is faced with: the problem of overcoming the past mistakes, the past right line, the past alliances, and‘ the work to build the Party and the N.M.U. must be intensified or else the danger of the Muste-socialist - Howat - Farrington - Peabody” controlled U.M.W.A. taking advantage of the situation to again betray the miners, becomes | a real danger. The experience in Illinois must not be repeated again. How can we best’ over- come all these difficulties 2 i Build Communist” The building of the Communist otfons -tn - the locals of the N.M.U. is the first j= | site for the building of the Party and the; N.M.U. The new leadership has been very | slow to take up this basic problem and ‘work out minute details of ways and means to estab-' lish fractions. It must correct this mistake, The Communist fractions must’ be organized on the local scale and linked up onthe sec‘ tional district and national scale. The free; tions must be responsible for ‘the work fn! their local unions, sub-districts, districts and national committees. The fractions must give full support to the Party line in every day work, and must translate this line fto i every day life of the miners, in,order’to the miners feel the Party every monient their lives, in the mines, in the*loca d in struggle against the fakers,.ii the’ political) elections, etc. And thus will/Bbecome an fn! tegral art of their life and ‘not something! that has its headquarters in New" Xork” City, ! and issues leaflets now and then, { The fractions must assume responsthfitty, the establishment of mine committees Sie mines and be the guiding hand in the work of these committees. The fractions mush de’ mand that the mine committees carry on per sistent struggles against wage cuts, speed up, rationalization, penalizing, lengthening of the’ working hours, ete, The fractions must see that campaigns of the Party such as’ “Work! or Wages,” “Defend the Soviet Union;* “Clase! Against Class,” etc., are raised to a political! level, by applying these slogans to the situa-i tion in the mines, This can be done and must‘ be done through issuance of local bulletins,; notices, open local meetings, mass meetings,’ etc. The fractions must find ways and means’ to have the bulletins, notices and Meaflets die- tributed in the mines, ) Through the proper application, of the -Farty,{ line, we will gain support—not thiougl ‘orga | izational control, but through actual ance of the line; and on the basis of this ceptance, we will be able to gain for the Party, that will help to change tl \ bad composition of the Party. And ‘with the! changed composition of the Party we will He! able to systematically develop the best ele-} ments for responsible leading positions, then the present crisis in the leadership ofthe M4 M.U. will be liquidated. Through the fractions we will, be able to carry on the struggle against the right line! of the Lovestonites in the Anthracite, and the’ Trotskyites in Illinois. Through the mine com- mittees we will be able to carry on @ fight against the Peabody controlled Muste-social- fascist-Howat-Farrington outfit, and’ the fase cist Lewis outfit. Through the steady develop- ment and rise in the political level of the miners and the Party membership, we will be able to give full cooperation and support the general Party campaigns, and the T,’ R.LL.U. campaigns, and raise these cam} not as mechanical decisions of the centers, bet as real live issues, indispensable in the life of the N.M.U. The establishment of the Com- munist fractions will be the best guarantee against the repeating of the past mistakes; the best instrument in the fight upon the right elements in the ranks of the Party and ‘he N.M.U.; will be a real check upon the adven- turist tendencies expressed in some sections; will make it possible for the Party and the N.M.U. to uncover any bureaucratism in the leadership; and expose and remove the oppor- tunistic elements on a political basis, and not through mechanical control, Establish functioning Communist fractions, build a mass Communist Party, organize mine committees, build the mass National Miners Union! Organize all the forces for the national con- yention of the N.M.U. on June 28th. Carry on the Lovestonites, and every opportunist ten- dency within our own ranks. ] “« systematic mass elections for delegates to the R.I.L.U. Congress, Leite i