The Daily Worker Newspaper, January 23, 1929, Page 3

Peer rrncgeee pre resirerrse- ee a AR i Rat Ral a re a Page Three DAILY WORKER, NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1929 THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND TASKS OF THE (NOTE—Today The Dail Worker prints the sixth instalment of the theses of the 6th World Congress of the Communist Interna- tional on “The International Situation and the Tasks of the Commu- nists,” adopted at its sessions in Moscow in July to September of last | year. pleted—EDITOR). * Publication of these theses will * be continued until com- | * 83. The fight against imperialist war and the fight for the defense FIGHT AGAINST CLASS COLLABORATION In “advanced” capitalist countries, in which decisive battles for 85. the proletarian dictatorship and Socialism will take place, the general tactical orientation of the Gommunist Parties must be towards preventing the labor organizations f4om “growing” into private or State capitalist organizations, towards preventing ed” with the trusts, and against trade unions from becoming “graft- “industrial peace,” compulsory of the Chinese Revolution and of the U.S.S.R. call for the raising of the militant. international solidarity of the working class. Experience has shown that the Communist Parties are not coping, with their international tasks, The VII. Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.1. stated that, “hardly any of the Parties affiliated to the Communist International developed sufficient energy in the struggle for the support of the British strike and of the Chinese Revolution.” Subsequent experience has confirmed the fact that precisely the in- ternational tasks of the movement are insufficiently understood. In a number of cases, particularly in regard to the fight against intervention in China, the sections of the Communist International displayed a lack of adequate mobilizing ability. The Congress calls upon all Communist Parties to take determined measures to remove these shortcomings and urges the need for systematic work on these questions (wide publicity in the press, propaganda and agitation material, etc.)—it urges the need for far more energetic international and militant self-education of the Party members and education of the masses of the world proletariat. ENERGETIC SUPPORT OF COLONIAL MOVEMENTS | 84. Support of colonial movements, particularly on the part of the | Communist Parties in the oppressing imperialist countries, represents | one of the most important tasks of the present day. The fight against | intervention in China; the fight against the suppression of the libera- | tion movement in all colonies; work among the armed forces and de- termined support of rebellious colonial peoples—such are the measures to be adopted for the immediate future. The Congress at the same time | instructs the Executive Committee to devote more serious attention to the colonial movement and correspondingly, to reorganize and strengthen its own departments directing this work. | i | | | The Congress also lays special stress upon the necessity for the energetic organization of a movement among the Negroes in the United States and in other countries (especially in South Africa). In this connection the Congress demands that all manifestations of so-called “white chauvinism” be resolutely and ruthlessly combatted. arbitration, against the state power of the bourgeoisie and against the trusts. The Communist Parties must untiringly explain to the masses of the workers the close connection that exists between “industrial peace” and arbitration and the measures of repression exercised against the revolutionary vanguard of the proletarian movement and the preparation for imperialist war, 36. In view of the intensified trustification of industry, the ten- dencies towards state capitalism, the grafting of the apparatus of the reformist unions with the organizations of the state and trusts, and in view of the new, thoroughly bourgeois and actively imperialist ideology of social democracy, the struggle against the “bourgeois Labor Party” must be intensified. This follows logically from the change in the relation of forces and from the changed position of social democracy, which is now entering into a more “mature”—from the point of view of imperialism—stage of development. The Congress therefore entirely approves the tactics outlined at the IX. Plenum of the E.C.C.I. The test to which these tactics were subjected during the election in France and in the British movement has wholly confirmed their absolute correctness. UNITED FRONT ON IMMEDIATE DEMANDS 387. These tactics, while changing the form, do not in any way change the principal content of the tactics of the united front. The intensification of the struggle against social democracy transfers the weight of importance to the united front from below, but it does not relieve the Communists from the duty of drawing a distinction between the sincere, but mistaken social democratic workers, and the obsequious social democratic ‘leaders cringing at the feet of imperialism. On the contrary, ib. makes it. more obligatory for them to do so. Nor is the slogan, fight fer the masses (including the ma§ses following the lead of the bourgeois-afid.the social democratic parties) repealed by this. It must become the object.of attention in the work of the Com- munist International more thah evet before. | To care for the everyday needs of the working class, | streneous support to even the most insignificant demands of the masses of the workers; to penetrate deeply into all mass proletarian organiza- tions (trade unions, cultural organizations, sports organizations, etc.); to strengthen the positions of the Party in the factories and works and in large enterprises particularly; to work among the backward strata of the proletariat (agricultural Jaborers) and among the un- employed, and at the same time unfailingly to link up the minor ever day demands with the fundamental slogans of the Party—all these must serve as the principal tasks of the Party. Only to the extent that these tasks are fulfilled will the winning over and mobilization of the masses be really accomplished. BASIC WORK IN TRADE UNIONS In regard to the trade union movement, the Congress reso- lutely calls upon all the Parties to exert the maximum of effort on this sector of the front. The very fact that in a number of countries the reformists are forcing the expulsion of Communists (and of leftists generally) from the trade union organizations makes it necessa the fight for Communist influence in the trade unions to be c at the present time with greater energy than ever. strengthen their positions in the trade unio become isolated from the mass of the industrially organized proletariat. For that reason, the Communists, by everyday, devoted and patient in the trade unions, must win for themselves among the broad of the trade unionists authority as experienced and capable organizers, who fight not only for the proletarian dictatorship, but for | all the everyday partial demands of the masses of workers; they must win authority as leaders of well-conducted strike struggles. CONSTANT STRUGGLE AGAINST UNION FAKERS The Communist Parties, the revolutionary trade union opposition and the revolutionary trade unions can win the leadership in these struggles only in intense struggle against the social democratic and politically corrupt trade union bureaucracy. In order to achieve real success in winning over the mas: special attention must be devoted to the careful preparation of strikes (mass work, strengthening of trade union fractions, etc.) to the capable leadership of strikes (estab- | lishment of strike committees and utilization of fact councils) and to give | explaining to the masses the poli success or failure of every industri; Where a united front exists be ployers’ organizations and the re jointly striving to suppress the st pulsory arbitrat and the initiative of the masses a COMMUNISTS ion, the fundamental task ical cau: and conditions for the al conflict and strike, tween the bourgeois state, the em- formist trade union bureaucracy, ri movement by means of com- to stimulate the energy reumstances are favorable, nd, i to conduct the strike struggle even in opposition to the will of the reformist trade union bureaucracy. ORGANIZATION OF UNORGANIZED precaution should be taken against being provoked by the into acts calculated to secure the expulsion of the Com- s and to split the trade union yvement, and while taking all 's to paralyse unexpected blows from the reformists, every effort t be made to combat tactics of capitulation (unity “at any price ning from defending expelled comrades, failure to fight strenuously against compulsory arbitration, unreserved obedience to the bureaucratic trade union apparatus, toning down of criticism of the reformist leadership, e muni meas To organize the unorganized, to win over the reformist trade unions, to organize the expelled where conditions are suitable (in countr where the trade union movement is split), to break away local organi- zations we have captured and get them to affiliate tc volutionary industrial organizations,—these are the tasks of the da Under no cireumstances must the Communists lose the initiative in the struggle for national and international trade union unity. They must conduct a determined struggle against the splitting policy of the Amsterdam International and of its national sections. In view of the intensified struggle between Communism and reformism, it is ex- tremely important to develop the work of the Communist trade union fractions, of the trade union opposition and of the revolutionary trade unions and to increase in every way the work and activities of the Red International of Labor Unions. The Communist Parties must support the work of the Pan-Pacifie Trade Union Secretariat and of the Latin-American Trade Union Secretariat, in so far as the latter stand on the basis of the class struggle and conduct a revolutionary fight against imperialism for the independence of the colonies and semi-colonies. | (To Be Continued) ‘PARTY PRE 1. “In the present international situation, the Right danger is the main danger within the Commun- ist International and its American -CONVENTION DISCUSSION SECTION Opposition, Cannonism and the Right Danger section.”—Statement of the C. E. C. of November 16, 1928. This basic recognition is unani- mously accepted b ythe whole Party, thus constituting the most essential prerequisite of the unity of the Party. However, it is not uniformly understood. Only such understanding can bring about the effective accomplishment of unity. And unity is indispensable for the development of the full fight- ing strength of the Party. 2. The most dangerous deviation from the correct understanding of the Right danger is represented by the cynical attitude of some of the leading comrades of the opposition toward the above state- ment of the C. E. C. They accuse the C, E. C. of the Party of down- right perjury. “They say it in order to please the C. I., but they do not believe it. They agree to the classification of the Right danger as the main danger by mouth, but they minimize it in fact. They plead guilty to the Right errors when discovered, but they do not intend to correct them honestly, nor to guard themselves against such errors in the future. They try to beat about the bush by pointing out minor mistakes shared by their opponents in order to distract attention from hte major ones, for which they carry the sole responsibility. They try to cover the chief exponents of | the true-to-form Right wing ten- | leading bodies of the Party and | of the C. I. represents an even “is what its broken ranks try to re- to be understood further, that a | diplomatic attitude toward the worse offense against Communist discipline than an outright breach not a lesser one. Skillful maneuv- ering on the battlefields of the class struggle is an excellent thing and constitutes an essential part of Leninist strategy; maneuver- ing within the Party and the C. I, not only means a waste of talent on the part of the strategist, but discloses that he considers the Party as a battlefield of conflict- | ing interests. This is diametrical- ly opposite to the Leninist concep- tion of the Communist Party as a monolithic bloc. The most essential prerequisite of a constructive Party discussion is that there be outspoken frank- ness, scrupulous honesty of critic- ism, without keeping anything in the back of one’s head. Careful apportioning of criticism, be it for the purpose of prospective bar- gaining, be it for the preserva- tion of a ready-to-break unity of the faction, or for any other rea- | sons, constitutes a striking ex- ample of impermissibl€ inner- | Party diplomacy. This is exactly what the opposition was guilty of at the congress of the C. L, this peat now. 4. Trying to explain away the depletion of the ranks of the op- in a wrong way. They did not have any objections in principle against my criticism of the C, I. as stated in the same caucus meet- ing of the leading group of the opposition, except for considering it inexpedient to voice this ecritic- ism openly. Moreover, Comrade Aronberg tried hard to convince me thereafetr that I should not withdraw from the opposition on account of Cannon’s expulsion, as Cannon really is a Trotskyist and | I am an uncompromising enemy of Trotskyism (they had known it, then). To which I had only this ican imperialism effectively with- out having the American Party adequately prepared, it is inad- missible to postpone the fight on account of ‘more important’ or ‘more pressing’ tasks, as there can be no successful struggle against world imperialism without proper attention to the main position of the imperialistic front; it is en- tirely non-Leninistic to drift along awaiting that the American Par- ty will straighten itself in the course of events, without attempt- ing to analyse and to remedy its errors and shortcomings. las the embittered “last of the Mo-,;the C. I. of adopting decisions hicans” cf factionalism assume, but | against its own best understanding. | by overcoming entirely their fac- | This means to declare the decisio | tional attitude. It is not the case of | meaningless. |former “Fosterites” now becoming| g. In cddition to corstituting a |““ovestoneites.” Just as there are | violation of discipline, the “criticism” no sufficient political differences be- |] made, while still afflicted with |tween the Majority and Minority |¢actional blindness, was, moreover, which would justify their existence | totally unwarranted. It is sheer |as opposed entities—‘no principle | : - eC jnonsense to pretend that the Con- basis for the continuation of the fac- | press did ee otaie the America \tional struggle in the Party.” | cuestion “divi it i = s properly, or “divided it in | (Theses of the C. E. C. on Economic ltwo: American imperialism on the jend_ Political , Situation and the | one side, and the situati in th |‘Tasks of the Party, adopted by the| American Party on the other” cut already, the did not discover Trotskyist leanings in Cannon only by October 3rd, but already in Moscow, All I say does not involve in’ the jownership of “ihe Right danger” jleast Comrade Foster. That’s why platform, the C. I. analysis is still I emphasize the new lea ore needed. 10. The C, I. could not see in July that the American Opposition rep- resented a formation analogous to |the former Zinoviev-Trotsky com- bination. If the C. I. had pressed |harder on the Opposition, it could |have been found out at that time. | It is not true that the leaders of the Minority did not know anything | about the imminent danger of Trot- | skyism in America while in Moscow. |During the discussion on the con- the minority. Comrade F out of New York during the time of these caucus meetings I speak of. He left Moscow before the other delegates. Comrade Foster knows the “inside dope” of the situation only insofar as he is informed by the new leaders of the faction. And there is no reason to believe that they are more truthful toward Comrade Foster than they are to- ward the Party. It is none of my business to de- | aL answer, “I may be mistaken as to Cannon, but if you are right and he is a Trotskyist, then the Op- “Furthermore, if, as was stated | correctly, the Right mistakes were by no means confined to the position is dead, anyway. You Lovestone _ leadershi: rH Y ip alone, it cannot fight the Lovestone group 1 . while fighting Trotskyism. If {AOU ABEre vate | the. situation, there is really a ‘Trotskyist dan- | aking the more imperative a ger in America, then the whole a apres Party must fight it united, which the congress failed to do. Snare ans, my seeiarsiion of : ced this into consideration, wil ‘omrade Aronberg, was | I am firmly convinced that it was nevertheless invited to the larger | wrong to endorse the work of the caucus of the Opposition, where | congress without pointing this out Comrade Bittelman made his re- | as a serious shortcoming and a port aban oe Gareciee Bo | typical right wing error. . .” came to 1s tit * uw repeat kn a Bead |not for the pleasure of seeing them ment that Comrade Aronberg car- ‘ ues at aaAnoe hes Pleasure. if ries in his pocket. Why does | ould write anything like that at Comrade Aronberg keep it there | Present. I would immedietely tear it for weeks and weeks instead of |": call myself an ass in strictest presenting it to'the CEC, if this | privacy, and consider the matter statement contains an inadmissi- | *<ttled. most thoro-going analysis of the situation in the American Party, The above paragraphs are quoted, |Plenum, Dec. 19, 1928), so there is | ‘no basis for shifting positions either. | | porting the C. E. C., are loyal sup- | porters of the C. E. C., nothing more lor less. They have overcome the | Now the task is to help the rest to recover. This requires a relentless fight against factionalism, it may |call even for disciplinary action (I hope it will not). But it does not | require, by any means, charging the | comrades of the Minority with in- |tentions they do not have. Returning to the question of the |reservations, or abstention vote, it was inadmissible. being objectively \directed against the decisions of the Congress of the C, I. The reservation vote was, in my opinion, worse, as it represented a crass example of diplomatic evasive- ness, while the abstention was, at The “former Fosterites,” now sup- | | malady of factionalism, that’s all. | | It is sufficient, I suppose, to point out the real grievance behind it and |to refute it without waste of time. |The Congress rejected the claims jof the faction I belonged to. So the Congress must be wrong—that’s j all. And, of course, as the Congress did not endorse the faction which is so valiantly fighting “the Right |danger,” it was a “Right wing er- jror.” What else could it be? | It was a typical bit of factional | stupidity to claim to be the only jones who know that “it is impos |sible to fight American imperialism effectively without having the American Party adequately pre- pared” or that “there can be no suc- cessful struggle against world im- perialism without proper attention to the main position of the imperial- istic front.” But, being still af- flicted with Bittelmania, I could not admit that anybody understands this fend Comrade Foster, and I am not attempting to do so, I am simply stating the facts in order to avoid misunderstandings, 11. It would be entirely wrong to accuse or suspect the comrades of |gress report of Comrade Bittelman | (October 14, if I am not mistaken) lone of the new leaders of the fac- {tion told us that Spector stated in| |his presence that he (Spector) is| jentirely in accordance with Trot-| +16 minority of any sympathy. with sky’s opinions. Cannon, we were ry 13; . «| Trotskyism. They had the com- |informed at the same time, was in| latform of factional fight™ |Moscow in closest contact with;™O" Piattorm a ji | . | against the C, E.C. For this reason Spector. This to prove that Cannon! . . + i framed oimiesiatanhila ent . {they failed to discern in time a ORR SOIE HEAL OSCOW- | crafty Trotskyist maneuve They | My question, why the comrade are blinded with factionalism. jwho made the above statement did) not inform the comrades there im- | mediately about Spector, (who was jelected then to the E. C. of the C. I, remained unanswered. As far |as I know, the comrades of the Min- | ority failed to disclose this part of | their information about Trotskyism in America even during Cannon’s | trial before the Political Committes. Why did I not do it? Soon eased bythe genuina I simply Santal Midy | position, its new leadership re- | | | Rae : . erar * e i did not believe it, as I did not be- 7 dency by shoving off the responsi- ble criticism of the C. 1.2? To | Jt appears in print not because least, honest in its factional situation of American imperialism lieve their information about Can. Eihetivertionarae bility on scape-goats...” | sorts to the time-honored method | cover such offenses constitutes an |Comrade Aronberg guards it in his | stupidity. who does not know, “Why doesn’t |/non’s Trotskyism in general. I Thus the opposition accuses the | of mud-slinging. “Well, he is | offense of no lesser gravity, does | poset as a precious document, a| 6, It is inadmissible to vote with the Party grow? ... primarily for C. E. C. Consequently, this end- less chain of iniquities imputed, leads to the conception that the very focus of the Right danger in our Party, if not the source itself, | jumping on to Lovestone’s band wagon,” is the usual contribution | toward raising the ideological level | of the Party. In my case this | gag could not work for several it not, Comrade Aronberg? And |tertifying weapon against the vile to hide such offense in order te | traitor who ran over to the camp warn the offender, “better be (of the wicked right wingers, careful”—does it not look like | What is wrong and what is right political blackmail? Do you think in the above quoted paragraphs? lreservations for, or to abstain from voting on a resolution of endorse- |ment of the decisions of the Congress or of the Convention of the Party. Voting on such resolutions, one is \the following reasons: (a) the Right wing political line of the Political Committee Majority, ete.” (Thesis lof the Minority.) You see, it is vrimarily, according to the Minor- misjudged the new leaders of the Minority, I must confess. I held |them capable of slanderous gossip | about their adversaries in the fervor |of factional struggles; but I never | THE {oes bet. Rev s ; jah: | Suspected them of being able to for- | is the CEC of the Party. A Party | Teasons. So another one was on | this permissible within the Com- | First, the question must be an- not expressing one’s opinion about ity’s gospel, the Majority of the Po- |get about elementary duties of al KRASSIN led by such a CEC would be, ob- | hand: “He is a Cannonite.” This | munist Party, Comrade Aron- swered: jthe correctness or incorrectness of |I'tical Committee of the Party that |Communist toward the Party and] viously, unable to fight the Right | seemed to be more promising, es- | berg? 5. Was it admissable to vote for |decisions. This may be done when lthe C. L | by danger to any extent. Moreover, while pretending to fight it, it it would constitute in reality an obstacle in the way of a genuine fight against the Right danger. ‘The same would apply to the C. L., at least as far as America is con- | cerned, because the C. I. not only “tolerates” the present Jeadership of its American section, but posi- tively refutes the accusation of its being a Right wing. Thus, the accusation that the CEC of our Party has a hypocrytical attitude ‘n respect to the Right danger, con- tains by implication the most sev- ere criticism by the position of the cI 8. Criticism of the Party leader- ship, as well as of the C, I., is by pecially due to the fact that I | parted with the opposition in the | very moment when they were | shaking off Cannon, and exactly | in direct connection with this in- | teresting procedure. | 5. None the less, the shot mis- | sed. The short, matter-of-fact | statement of my position toward | Trotskyism and its American ex- | ponents has proven ‘satisfactory | to the CEC, and was characterized | as a clean-cut one. For this rea- son, it could not satisfy the new leadership of the opposition, which I felt forced to characterize in my statement, according to my deep- est conviction, as being politically dead, So Comrade Bittelman could not For my part, I can only be the resolution of endorsement of the thankful to Comrade Aronberg | work of the Congress of the Com- for relieving me of the uneasiness |munist International with reserva- one feels in speaking about the |tions or to abstain from voting? inside doings of a caucus to which | Which was worse? Both the ab- one formerly belonged. I would /|stention from voting and the reser- have to do it anyway, in order to | vation-vote were essentially wrovz. fulfill my Communist duty toward | Neither constituted, however. the Party. But Aronberg made rect breach of Communist it much easier for me; as now I |}ine, as the original mistake was am just calling his bluff, |committed.by the district organizer, Here is the incriminating part (Comrade Weinstone, in putting the of the statement I\made in the (question to a vote\in such circum- last meeting of. the, Opposition | stances’ that it could, and was con- caucus in which I participated: sidered Ly many as_a factional man- “1, To vote for’ the -Hesolution |cuver, intended to’ put over some jand if the question is opened for \diseussion. Nothing is being dis- jeussed on decisions once made, but |ways and means of carrying them Jout. The endorsement means, in \this case, willingress to carry out ithe decisions. To endorse is a |declaration of readiness to do ones jit must be unanimous, regardless of any criticism one may retain in one’s | mind. 7. It was entirely inadmissible to jexpress such criticism as contained in the quoted paragraphs of my | statement. It was inadmissable in duty as a member of the Party. So) preyents from growing the only |force which is bound to deliver the final blow to American imperialism. |The Majority of the Political Com- | mittee, according to this conception, jis the best shield of American im- |verialism. And the Congress failed to see it and to act upon it! .. Well, I believe that if I had known this Minority thesis of Dec. 15 before |IT concocted my “eriticism,” I would | have been prevented from doing the most stuvid thing of my life. The famous Bittelman-Cannon platform ‘of July, 1928, “The Right Danger in the American Party” was much | Now I am compelled to state that | their statement of January 7th con- tains a straight lie as far as it} | states that “in their handling of the |Cannon-Trotsky matter between Oc- |tober 3rd and the Polcom meeting of the-A6th, the comrades were guid- ied solely by the thought to find the most effective means to expose Can- | non before the Poleom and the Party.” Maurice Parijanine ee | WHAT HAPPENED TO \ MALMGREN? The heroism of the Rus- sian rescuers of the fas- cist explorers—an amaz- ing revelation—the inside story of the great exploit They wer ided solely by y were guided solely by the of the Ereuin fea: that the C. E. C. might find out about Cannon thru other chan- nels, and they said so frankly | ILLUSTRATED . $2.50 endorsing the work of the ‘con- gress (of the C. I), even with the |kind of an endorsement of the Ma- jority of the Central Executive Com- reservation about the right sto" mittee as against’the Minority. Of | ucus meeting of a faction, as it | more carefully worded than this per- | ould be in a Party meeting or any- fect product of Bittelmania, If not for |where, because it was a criticism of | this, I would not have had the only the decision of the C. I., which I/one, very thin, though not unim- enough, within the limits of the! caucus, In the meetings, when they were jfinally divorcing Cannon (October Order from Workers Library Publishert Ean ; F Nat ; the N | criticise in due time its decision, | course, it is extremely bad to have |ha! no right to express, even if my portant reason of my criticism,” | 4 oy 5 rounds that s 35 Easr 1251H Srreer, N. ¥. C. are oe tay or n real Se enone ute oc De. | on the American question, but \the Party divided factionally from opinions were correct. As a loyal namely: the lack of a political let-| no aN ae Tekcay ania i Son ninae at a time when the | cember 27th, that I am, at least | Without criticising it actually, ‘top to bottom; but so far as the ex- |Party member, I should have re-/ter of the C. I. to our Party. deal- x —_——————_—_——————— i , ‘e ! question involved is open for dis- cussion, Even if erroneous, if erroneous, if based on misunder- standing or on insufficient Lenin- ist knowledge of the critic himself, it should be voiced at the proper time and place as nothing is more harmful to the development of real understanding and discipline than mental reservations. Of course, this does not mean “the freedom of criticism” as in the good old S. P. of pre-war times or in the manner of the renegades of recent times. Not only the decisions of the congres- ses of the C. I. and of the conven- tions of the Party as well as of their authoritative executive bodies must be accepted without reserva- tions and carried out without eva- sions, regardless of one’s approval or disapproval, the criticism of the decisions, must be withheld most conscientiously until the question 4s reopened fo rdiscussion. to some extent, a Cannonite; ad- ding, with a touch of condescen- sion, that he is very glad to see | that I have not drifted away en- stirely from the Party toward Can- | non, altho I am (in Comrade Bit- telman’s opinion) very confused in these matters. To this Comrade Aronberg gently contributed the “information” that they (the op- position) have split with me on the ground that I did not want to part with Cannon and on the ground | of my criticism of the C. I. which» they did not share. In corrobora- tion of this, Comrade Aronberg added emphatically—he has in his pocket a statement of mine, and T had better be careful, Comrade Aronberg’s “informa- tion about the “splitting” is not true. They did not split with me on me on any grounds. In fact, they did not split with me at all. It was I who declared my with- drawal from the opposition, after means at least a partial surrender of the position of the Opposition. It would be admissible to endorse the work of the congress in gen- eral with reservations as to some minor details. But to consider the American question as a minor de- tail, constitutes in itself a major error, and a typical Right wing error. However, this was exactly the way the American question was treated by the congress and the “reservation vote” (of Com- istence of factions is tolerated, for | the'time being. it does not constitute |a breach of discipline to vote in a \factional way. Asuming, I repeat, that neither the abstention from |voting nor the vote with reserva- tions was meant to signify an in- tention not to carry out the decisions of the C. I. I think that the GC. E. C. makes ers or even the leaders of the Min- oriiy of the intention of opposing en error in accusing the support- | lfrained from criticism until the | ing exhaustively with the whole sit- | question. is opened again for dis- | uation. ‘cussion. This I feel in duty bound) 9, I am still of the opinion that to state. an exhaustive analysis of the short- Comrade Aronberg claims for the comings of our Party should be Minority that they did not share my given by the C. I. I am of the opin- ‘criticism of the C. I. to the extent jon that suck an analysis should ‘of alleged “splitting with” me. If have been given immediately after that were the case, there would be the Congress. I um not afraid to jabsolutely no excuse for the failure | state frankly that T consider it a openly to denounce my criticism for | mistake to deal with such accusa- what it was: a violation of Par Y tions against the C. E. C. of the \discipline. But T was only express-' party as were voiced on the floor ppctian they tried to convince me by the argument that they must bring |their suspicions before the Party and do'it quickly, because they are \threatened by a German comrade who knows about the situation that he will do it if they fail. And, if Cannon were to be exposed as a Trotskyist while still connected with the Minority, then the CEC would |be able to crush the Minority with \the charge of Trotskyism. | Well, what are you afraid of? You Complete Sets of THE COMMUNIST for 1928 $1.00 rades Aronberg, Wagenknecht, | the G.I. I am practically sure that Gomez and others) on Comrade there is-no trace of intentional op- Weinstone’s resolution, means the position against the C. I. within endorsement. of this essentially | their ranks (except, of course, some wrong attitude, |under-cover Camnonites. where there “2, It would be an even worse jpre such). However, the comrades error to attempt to divide the [of the Minority are still so blinded American question itself in two: (with factionalism that they are un- American imperialism, its role, | able to see the objective meaning of developments, ete., on the one side, | their actions. This is bad enough and the'situation in the American |in jtself, and there is no need to Party on the other, and then to | make it worse. agree with the congress as to the | The factional situation in our ing openly what they did not think |expedient to express for the sake of | diplomacy. aoa Bittelman presented the ‘eaucns with the startling ‘“informa- | tion” that “in reality the best ele- | ments of the Congress were in favor lof the position of the Minority; only, | they were not ready to fight for us. Stalin, himself, you see, is for the | Minority. Only he does not want to fight Bucharin, who, in turn, is supporting Lovestone, This is some- lof the Congress of the C. I. by the \spokesmen of the Minority, in the ;manner of a summary denial. This helped to maintain the confusion in \the minds of the Minority followers ‘by creating the impression that the \vefutation of the charge made against the C. E. C. Majority of be- ing the Right wing in our Party as | unfounded, does not mean that this | charge is not true; that it may have been accepted as valid, if the Min- ority had been able to present more a a ila AAO Vorkers Library Publishers 35 Easr 125TH Srreet, N. YooGQ vare not Trotskyists, are you? The | \C. I. would not accept. any framed- up charges. Moreover, as pointed: i} YOU CANNOT BE A GOOD WORKER UNLESS YOU HAVE GOOD HEALTH, and to have good health you must live on NATURAL and UNDOPED food products: such as we deliver to your door—free within first 2 zones—nt moderate prices. Step into our store (open evenings) or send 2c postage for our Catalog and Decalog ot Health. HEALTH FOODS DISTRIBUTORS 113-D EAST 34TH STREET, NEW YORK CITY This is, generally understood | they decided t oexpel Cannon. I | “one side of the question” and to | party is improving. The ranks of |thing worse even than to criticize |. vidanee to that effect. At present, | (Between Lexington & Park Avenue) and agreed upon, even tho not | believed then that he was expelled | disagree as to the other. the supporters of the Minority are|the decisions of the C. I This | when the Minority from one side, Phone: Lexington 6926, always complied with. It ought without sufficient reasons and “It ia impossible to fight Amer- |decreasing, not by “running over,’! means to accuse the Congress ¢f|Connon from the other, claim the | Aged ‘ \ “