The Daily Worker Newspaper, February 26, 1927, Page 8

After the Imperial Conference HE essential problem of British imperialism at the present stage is the problem of main- taining the unity of the empire under British hege- mony in the face of the disparate tendencies of the different parts, consequent on independent capitalist development, and the growing economic and stra- tegical weakness of the British centre. This prob- lem takes different forms according to the charac- ter of the parts: in the case of the conquered col- onial races, where the control is directly military and autocratic, and the ‘ocal bourgeoisie weak, the principal menace is the menace of mass revolt; in the case of the emigrant White colonies or Domin- ions, where there is a strong local bourgeoisie with many ties with the British, the control is necessarily less direct, taking the form of alliance, concessions of autonomy, financial domination etc., and the strug- gle of interests take more subtle forms. The im- perial conference, as the conference of white ex- ploiters, concerns itself directly only with the prob- lems of the latter group; in relation to the subject eolored nations, constituting six-sevenths of the whole, the British and dominions bourgeoisie main- tain a united front, as the single session on colonial and mandates problems showed. ~ British hegemony over the White Dominions rests on three factors: first, the economic supremacy of Britain as the principal industrial workshop and customer of dominions products; second, the finan- cial supremacy of Britain as the source of new capital for development; and third, the strategical supremacy of Britain as the protector against for- eign attack and maintainer of sea communications. The weakening of British hegemony over the do- minions follows on the weakening of the above fac- tors: the industrial decline, financial inability to maintain sufficient supplies of new capital, and the passing of naval supremacy since Washington; sec- ond, on the invision of a new and stronger candi- date for these functions in the shape of the United States; and third, on the independent development of the dominions towards their own industry, accu- mulation of capital and even their own military and naval forces. The solution of this situation for British imperial- ism would depend on, first, a complete economic re- organization of the empire in accordance with new realities and the weakened position of Britain; and second, a closer alliance with the colonial bour- geoisie. Such a reorganization is, however, beyond the powers of British capitalism in decline; and both these tasks come in conflictgwith a thousand developing forces, both inside and outside the em- pire, which make their realization impossible. Hence the failure of the successive efforts at empire de- velopment and unification, which nevertheless re- mains the principal line of policy of the British bourgeoisie (and consequently of the reformist la- bor leaders who follow them) as the sole solution ef the economic crisis. In the 1923 Imperial Conference the attempt was made to achieye a simple economic unification on the lines of imperial preference. This policy broke down on the divergent economic iaterests: the dominions, while nominally granting imperial preference, have actually raised their tariffs against both British and other foreign goods; British manufacturing and commercial interests were not prepared to penalize two-thirds of their trade for the sake of one third. The Baldwin government, introducing the program of tariffs, fell at the general election of 1923; and subsequent developments in this direction have been on the whole limited. The three years between 1923 and 1926 saw a growth of separatism, as well as of American eco- nomic penetration of the dominions. This separa- tism gave rise to acute political problems: ques- tions of separate diplomatic representation, of a separate foreign policy, a constitutional crisis in Canada, demands for independence in South Africa, repudiation of war obligations by all the dominions, repudiation of the Locarno Pact. The 1926 Imperial Conference was principally con- cerned with this political crisis. When the imperial- ists speak of the conferenve as a “success,” they mean that the immediate acute points of this po- litical crisis were successfuly faced—-or evaded— without a break-up. The character of such a claim as a “success” sufficiently reveals the delicacy of the situation. The political document in which the constitutional agreement is registered exists in the Report on Inter- Imperial Relations. This report, which is the prin- cipal public document of the conference, is nomin- ally a character of dominions autonomy, proclaim- ing their fullest independence and equality with Britain. A closer examination. will show that this appearance is deceitful, and that while the document concedes no right to the dominions that they have not already won in practice, its drafting is cun- ningly devised to strengthen—-so far as constitu- tional form goes—and reaffirm British hegemony. In this sense the report on Inter-Imperial Relations | is a diplomatic victory of the British bourgeoisie. The report defines the mutual relations of Brit- ain and the dominions as that of “ autonomous com- munities within the British empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the crown, and freely as- sociated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.” In this magic formula, already, the dog lies buried. I'he dominions are solemnly freed of all allegiance to the British, government; instead, they only owe “allegiance to the crown” i.e., the British king. Who is the British king? As everyone knows, the paid servant of the British government. Throughout the document, relations to the British government are substituted by. relations to the British king. By this means as the king is supposed to be “non- party” ete., the constitutional instrument of British control in time of crisis. e.g., in case of war, is strengthened. As “Augur,” the foreign office spokes- man in the Fortnightly Review, remarks with cynical satisfaction, no one suggested that the Civil List (the king’s pay) should come from. any one but the British government. But the British hegemony is in fact more ex- plicity laid down in the report. For after the formula of freedom and equality comes the limitation: “but the principles of equality and similarity, appropri- ate to status, do not universally extend to function”; and this limitation is made more explicit in the sentence which “Augur’” acclaims as, the “crown” of the report: “In the sphere of foreign policy as in the sphere of defense the major responsibility rests now and must for some time continue to rest with His Majesty’s Government in Britain.” Thus in the sphere of forein policy and war which. is precisely the principal political question facing Britain and the dominions, the effective hegemony of Britain is maintained, while at the same time the dominions retain their right of repudiating specific obligations such as Locarno. What is the conse- quence in case of war? “The King” cannot be at war and not at war at once, at war in respect of, say, England and Austarlia, and not at war in re- spect of Canada and South Africa. The empire must go to war as a whole or break up. This crisis remains unsolved; but the British bourgeoisie un- doubetedly hope to holve it in the moment of crisis by their effectve hegemony n the manoeuvrngs lead- ing up to a war crisis and by the appeal of loyalty to the king, ete. “What results the conference actually reached in respect of foreign policy and war, and the prepara- tions for the next war, it is not possible to say, as the whole of these proceedings and decisions, constituting the most important part of the confer- ence, remain secret. The whole of Chamberlain’s speech on foreign policy, as also the speeches of the military, naval and air chiefs, and subsequent dis- cussions remain secreta. In 1923 the major portion of Curzon’s speech was published. In the 1911 im- perial conference, Grey’s famous speech to the Col- onial Premiers, outlining the nner polcy of the En- tente, was kept entrely secret. Thus 1926 returns to the position of 1911. The increasing secrecy, as also the heavy stress placed on questions of arma- ments, and the carefully staged and-imposing mili- tary, naval and air displays, all bear witness to the increasing imminence and urgency of war conditions. Whether any secret understandings or commitments between the respective governments were refiched at this conference can only be matter of surmise at present, F Certainly it is essential that the working class forces both in Britain and the dominions should con- duct the most active campaign against secret com- mitments for the next war reached as a result of the conference, as well as demand complete publicity of the whole proceedings. In Austarlia left wing working class propaganda has actively taken up this question. In Britain the servile labor party leaders have not even challenged the secrecy of the proceed- ings, thus affording a true measure of their con- cern for “democracy” in the most vital issues of a eo 3y R, PALME DUTT (London) war, peace and governing policy, affecting directly one quarter of the human race, Whatever diplomatic victories, however, the Brit- ish bourgeoisie may have secured with the aid of their superior experience and manoeuvring ability, an examination of the realities of the position will show that none of these have changed, and that the actual gulf between the interests and policy of the dominions and Britain remains unbridged. Even in respect of foréin policy, all the tanglible results, in regard to the most acute questions, are negative. — Thus on Locarno, the dominions “congratulate” the British government:on the work achieved, but show no signs of accepting any of the responsibi!lties themselves; on the contrary, by the very character of this “congratulation,” they ostentatiously mark the pact as a sole concern of the British government. In the same way, on Singapore, Australia and New Zealand “note with special interest” the work done towards developing a naval base, but regret their inability to shoulder a share of the “heavy expense.” Still more conspiciuous is this position on arma- ments expenditure. According to an official state- ment in March, 1926, the naval expenditure per head amounted in Britain to 26/—, in Australia to 13/—, in New Zealand to 8/—, in South Africa to 1/9, and in Canada to 15 cents or 74%d—a farily accurate scale of values. The report on defense notes with “regret” the failure of schemes of araments limita- tion, and registers the “formidable expenditure” necessary for naval development. But no proposal is made to share out this formidable expenditure. - Finally with regard to diplomatic representation, the existing separate representative of Canada and - Ireland at Washington are confirmed, and the right to appoint others recognized, while the only limita- tion is a pious wish that it is “very desriable that the existing diplomatic channels should continue to be used.” On this the American government organ, the Washington Post, has immediately drawn the moral: “The United States must deal separately here- after with the nations of the British commonwealth.” If the gulf is thus visible even in questions of diplomacy and war, it is abundantly more visible in the underlying economic questions. Here the con- ference made no attempt to touch the position.. There was no Imperial Economie Conference as in 1923. In the sessions devoted to economic questions, the gloomy facts of increasing economic isassociation were set out, but no solution was proposed. The British government representatives endevored to put on an optimistic tone, and boasted that British trade with the empire had risen in proportion to total trade from. 37 per cent before the war to 44 per cent in 1925, and that the total value of exports to the empire in the same period had risen to 48 per cent. But the boast was obviously hollow, as the dominions nominal value of, 48 per cent (actually, allowing for the change in money values, equivalent to a stationary or even declining total) was out- stripped by the United States increase of exports to the empire in the same perio by 108 per cent; while finally in the figures of dominions trade the British proportion was diminishing. A liberal observer of the school of Lloyd George, McCurdy in the Contemporary Review, has re- marked, as the most striking feature of the confer- ence, the fact that for the first time the dominions representatives appeared as public critics o the eco- nomic stability of Britain. To this it might be added that the comparison to Britain’s isfavor was almost invariably with the United States. The significance of this needs no stressing. ; On the crucial question of migration, of decisive importance alike for unemployment in Britain under capitalist conditions and for the British develop- ment of the dominions, no gress was reported, nor any hopes held out. The results of the Emipre Settlement Act of 1922, alreay declare dat the 1923 conference “incommen- surate with the needs of the situation,” showed no improvement: 36,000 in 1923, 40,000 in 1924, 39,000 in 1925—this for the territory of the dominions representin one seventh o the globe! Nevertheless the 1926 report recognifze that it is “impossible” to look or “mass movements” o migration, in view of the urban industrial character of the British population and the agricultural needs of the domin- ions. Here, too, is so far deadlock in the plans of Britaish capitalist development of the empire. ; In view of this whole situation, what is the “unity” which the British and dominions bourgeoisie have proclaimed to the world? To answer this question, it is neessary to differentiate the situation ini the main dominions, as the dominions are not a unity. In Canada non-British influence .are strongest. Here United States influence is already predomin- ant, as shown in the recent election, and in the figures of, industrial holdings and trade. Canada could not participate in any war against the United States. But British influence is ‘still strong, es- pecially in the eastern states, in landholding, rail- roads and banking. The Canadian bourgeoisie would not wish any sudden break with Britain, although fearful of any .external commitments or entangle- ments, and insisting on'their own independence of action. Thus Canadian participation in the empire remains a passive one, refusing any obligations, but (Continued on Page 6)