The Daily Worker Newspaper, October 3, 1925, Page 8

: i NT nee eee Hadsdaieianitirea ns Comintern Letter fo the Communist Party of Germany Editor’s Note.—Here is the con- cluding installment of the letter of the Communist Ingernational to the Communist Party of Germany. Yes- terday’s installment included the question of trade union work, the Comintern and the leading groups in the German Party central. It also took up the question of the relations of the German Party to the Communist International, of which the opening of today’s in- stallment is a continuance: . * * (Continued from yesterday) VERY delegate to the party con- gress received from the Central a copy of.a special number of the Ber- lin “Funke,” the main contents of which were a “diplomatic” attack by Maslow on the Comintern. In this article, entitled: “Some Observations on Our Tenth Party Congress,” Mas- low wrote as follows: “The subsequent left of the Ger- man C. P., before the Fourth World Congress, raised the demand of ‘Back to the Second World Con- gress’ in this sense, and quite right- ly. Comrade Zetkin, in her above mentioned book of memoirs, relates that Lenin laughed at this ‘foolish- ness. I do not doubt it, for I can easily imagine how this slogan was presented and interpreted to him. “It is not for nothing that the Fourth Congress, despite Lenin’s derision, expressly confirmed the 21 conditions, and it is not for nothing that the Fifth World Congress was compelled to return deliberately and emphatically to the principles of the Second. . .” Here again Maslow attempts, by means of demagogic confrontation of the Second, Fourth and Fifth World Congresses on the one hand, and the Third, on the other, to destroy ideolo- gically the political development of the Comintern, and to discredit the principles, of Communist policy at the presétit’ periéd.”’ Maslow also makes the untrue assértion that: “The Le- vites, unfortunately, have received the actual support of the Russian comrades.” This agitation against the “Russian comrades” is followed in Maslow's article by the equally dangerous le- gend that “the Levites rightly regard- ed themselves as victors at the con- gress in Moscow (!).” “The Third Congress,” proceeds Maslow, “had above all the effect of preventing the German C. P. from finding clearness for itself. Thus the ‘Third Congress. . . exercised a sim- ilar effect upon the German C. P. as the Heidelberg Party conference two years previously; despite correct de- cisions. . , a harmful effect.” “\“ ‘wre’ the principles of the Second “‘Gohgress had been propounded without the bogey of ‘Left’ dangers . being raised. then in all prob- ability the crises in the German and French Communist Parties would have been considerably shortened. “But the executive too, and the Russian comrades (!) were not at all agreed. . .” Maslow writes further that not his group, but the executive “has for a long time prevented the German Party from entering into satisfactory relations with the executive.” He relates with complete approval ed, after Jena, to correct its (com- pletely unjustifiable) attack by in- viting a Berlin delegation to visit Moscow, it was too late; the delega- tion unanimously declined this in- vitation to a feast already over, and Friesland, already right, wrote the letter of refusal at. the request of : : i é : elopment of the JYerman Party, hindering its partici- sation in sound political work, and poisoning its ideology. The most ex- pressed representative of these left, or rather Levitical dangers, is Maslow himself with his conception of the Third World Congress. The whole German Party, above all the best comrades of the German left in all the party organizations and districts, are faced with the duty of exerting their utmost efforts to break with the non-Bolshevist system of re- lations between the party and the Comintern promoted by the Maslow- Ruth Fischer group. Another thing which must be brok- en with—definitely broken with, is the system of “bookkeeping by double entry” employed. by the above men- tioned comrades for a full year in their relations to the Comintern. In- stead of sincerely carrying out the correct lines laid down by the Com- intern, this group has made continu- al attempts at side-tracking, substan- tiating their action to their own party members by references to an alleged “pressure to the right” on the part of the executive; at the same time they have offered systematic resist- ance to the executive, by referring to an alleged “ultra-left tendency” among the members of the German party. ; HE experience gained during the fighting period just past, since the Frankfort Party conference, have proved to every German Communist that the Comintern has proved to have been unconditionally right in every disputed question with the Mas- low-Ruth Fischer group. It has been right in the united front tactics and in the trade union question. It was as right in the question of the presi- dential election as it has been in its warnings—disregarded for years—as to the ultra-left dangers in the Ger- man Party. speedily recognize that in the present struggle for the inner party course to be pursued by the German C. P. for its relations to the Comintern, for its relations to the masses of the work- ers, for its relations to Leninist the- ory, the Comintern is absolptely in the right, whilst the Maslow-Ruth Fis- cher group is unconditionally in the wrong in all these questions. leading group of the party cen- tral has not showed itself capable of adopting the right measures for gaining access to the masses. An- other reason for this failure has been the wrong line of inner party policy tives of the German central at the session of the enlarged executive. These representatives of the execu- tive pointed. out that the ultra-cen- ures, the lack of propaganda and of any methods for spreading conviction, the dread of fresh forces, etc., were bound to be absolutely disastrous in effect. At this consultation it was We were of the opinion over the right left has the purely administrative methods are + employed in the party, the same pol icy is applied on a larger scale to the workers outside of the party, and the result is the cutting off of the possibility of winning over fresh workers. We believe that unless the party undertakes these inner party re- forms, it will not be capable of car- rying out a correct policy among the masses. For this reason the execu- tive demanded these reforms to be made in the direction of “normaliz- ing party life.” During the session of the enlarged executive the Ger- man delegation, headed by Comrade Ruth Fischer, accepted these propos- als. These problems were discussed once more with the German delega- tion before the party conference, The executive proposed that the central should be enlarged by a number of party workers closely connected with the masses. Among other points, the Russian comrades pointed out that since Lenin's death the Russian C. P. has greatly increased the number of members in its central, thus strength- ‘ening the central, establishing its au- thority more firmly, and at the same time improving its communications with the mass of the party which—in combination with the inner party de- mocratization—created better connec- tions with the masses of workers out- side of the party (Lenin recruitment). HE German Party conference how- ever, was prepared and carried out in such a manner that, in spite of all promises, the direct contrary was at- tained altho there exist strong wing groups in the party (ultraleft and right), this fact was not reflected in the least at the party conference it- self. There was no political discus- sions, as every delegation had discuss- ed in detail beforehand what was to be said; even at the party conference itself—the highest instance of the party—freedom of discussion was an- nulled. How scanty were the prepar- ations made for*the party conference may be seen from the printed motions sent in by the districts. Only seven motions were proposed; one referring to Esperanto (!), four to subscrip- tions, One to worker correspondents, and one to courses of communal in- struction. Analogous phenomena are to be re- corded in the sphere of ideology. Ne- ver in the labor press has one wit- nessed such advertising as that ac- corded to Comrade Maslow’s pam- phiet. As a matter of fact this pam- phlet consists solely of correct quota- tions and thoroly incorrect observa- tions furnished by Comrade Maslow. It was according to this pattern thet it was attempted to develop the men- tal life of the party. This would not matter so much if the personal authority of the leaders stood very high. But this authority Must possess some prerequisites, and not merely be mechanically acquired. Unfortunately, these prerequisites are lacking, and this is a danger for the whole party. In the party there is a lack of con- trol from below, that is, frem the members of the party. At the same time the leading group has been car- rying on a perpetual struggle against control from above, that is, from the executive of the Comintern. In this | ee” 3 ? i : ; the with the line accepted. The underly- ing basis of this group is extremely pessimistic; it lacks revolutionary perspective; it is filled with the con- ception that the masses are complete- ly passive, fleeing’ from everyday life, playing at soldiers, etc. The task of winning over the masses is impossible of accomplishment, And on the other hand the Comintern “demands” that the masses be won. Here already there is consistency within this lead- ing group. Its pessimism leads to its conquetting with the ultra-left. The demands of the Comintern are met with an acknowledgment, on paper, of these demands, and with an endeavor to realize them in life, but without faith in them. Hence the vacillating attitude and political flabbiness of this group, a flabbiness combined with a diplomacy of the worst descrip- tion in its relations to the Comintern, A typical example of this is the tenth party conference. — We have already’ referred to the “intellectual” preparations made for the conference; Comraie~ Maslow wrote the articles, the sole purport of which was to discredit the import- ance of the Third World Congress, to deprive the whole tactics of the In- ‘ternational of their basis, and at the same time to lay the foundation for the ultra-left groups. RMALLY, however, the fight was against the ultra-left at the con- ference. But as soon as it came to a conflict with the International the po- litical tine was immediately forgotten and the bloc with the ultra-left form- ed, And in Moscow Comrade Ruth Fischer declared that the party con- ference had tended to the ultra-left, and that she could do nothing against it, altho anxious to do so. On the other hand, support is lent to ultra left tendencies, and on the other hand it is declared: We found our- | selves in a state of emergency. These “tactics” already possessed their traditions, In Moscow Comrade Ruth Fischer declared over and over again that the “masses” hinder her in carrying out olicy recommend- ed by the Beliivs, whilst in Ber- lin she has stated the C. I. forces an incorrect policy upon her. i the fundamental contention against the Communist Internation- al a great part is played by the ar- gument that we are constantly want- ing to “drive the German Party fo the right.” : We once more here expressly point out that in all important problems ly justified the standpoint of the Com- intern. This is now clearly under- stood by everyone. Only a politically completely limited mind could fail to grasp that without these tactics we should have had today, in. place of the party, merely a small group of Communists, and of very bad Com- i Ey : Ss F By (Continued on page 6) ee -