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Among the German Communists gleaned from their conversations A Semi-Legal Party T was difficult to find the leading é German comrades. First they were at their national convention (a re- markable feat, indeed, to organize a secret party convention of some 150 members right in the face of for- midable military dictatorship aided and abetted by labor union fakers and social-democratic traitors, then, upon return to Berlin, they were in hiding. When you came to campaign head- quarters which was located in one building with the general office of the party and the editorial rooms of the “Rote Fahne (“Red Banner”), you would not be admitted without cre- dentials. If you had convinced the keepers of the gate that you were no spy and no provocateur, you would still be disappointed to find in the building only minor party function- aries busy with routine work, while absolute silence was maintained as to the whereabouts of the leaders. Only in a roundabout way was it possible for me to meet some members of the new C. E. C. of the party. One of them was in actual disguise which had changed his appearance to such an extent, he said, that his own mother would hardly recognize him. These precautions were imperative in spite of the party’s return to legal existence. The party had just emerged eut of a five months’ underground starvation. Even in the worse times ot persecution the illegality could not be complete, for the simple reason that it is net possible to drive under cover a mass party of several hundred thousand. The return to open exist- ence was not so much a result of slackening persecution as a seizing of liberties by the masses whom no reichswehr (militia) could subdue. But while the government was forced to tolerate the activities of the party, it kept a close watch over the leaders. After I had left Berlin I learned that warrants were issued for the arrest of the fourteen members of the new C. BE. C. of the party before the com- ing election so that they might not hide later behind the immunity of M. P.’s The “Rote Fahne” was repeat- edly issued and repressed and reis- sued. Party headquarters in the various cities were being raided and some permanently occupied by the police. Some party members had been sentenced to 9 and 15 months’ im- prisonment for spreading appeals of the Executive Committee (this is what they call freedom of elections in a bourgeois democracy). In Thiringia the “democratic” landtag (state par- lament) had inacted a law forbidding the May first celebration, and the same body deprived a Communist re- presentative, Neubauer, of his parlia- mentary immunity in order that he might be delivered to the authorities for trial on the ground of treason. High Treason. This “treason” business, in spite of the tragic aspect it assumed for some of the comrades, does not fail to pro- voke a derisive laughter among the German workers as a manifestation of the stupidity of the present reaction. It is a well known fact that the Fas- cist forces of Germany are armed to the teeth. It is well known that the proletarian hundertschaften (fighting battalions) were by far less equipped with rifles and ammunition than were the Rights. Now, while the government suppresses the pro- letarian units with an iron hand, while it allows the Hitlerists to arm openly, to make armed demonstrations and to do as much sabre rattling as would make the spirits of every old general soar high, it declares it an act of high treason to state openly, in the press or on the platform, that there are armed units within the empire. Mind you, not the arming itself is criminal, if it is done by bourgeois forces, but the’ mere mention of its existence. This is only one example of how far a disgruntled reaction can go in face of a revolutionary movement. All the comrades I met in Berlin were still under the spell of the re- cent party convention. They were hardly able to discuss anything but factional controversies and party pro- blems. This is a brief outline of what ten and discussions. The Swing to the Left After the defeat of last October- November and after the party was driven underground, there ensued a period of inactivity towards the outer world and of heated discussion with- in. The left wing, then a minority in the C. E. C., accused the majority of having missed the opportunity, of having been undecisive and timid, of having pursued a united front in Saxony to the detriment of the revo- lution. Times after the ebbing down of a high revolutionary wave are al- ways times of bitter accusations on the one hand, of differentiation in the revolutionary camp on the other. So it was also among the German com- rades. Some went so far to the right as to practically give up hope of a re- volution in the near future, while in the left wing had greatly increased in fest which went beyond the logical de- mands of the situation. On the whole, th eleft wing had greatly increased in the course of those transitional months, which were marked by no de- cisive steps and no clear line of action on the part of the party. By the time the national convention was called, the rank and file had recuperated far more than the leaders, and was mani- festing a strong fighting spirit. Of the rights, none were elected to the con- vention; of the so-called center, thirty- four, of the left, ninety-two. The membership clearly wanted action. extremists in the left majority, a un- ion of the left with centre appears within reach. To the Left of Reason. This group of extremists, many of whom, I was told, had had no Marx- ian training and had not participated in the labor movement up to very re- cent time, came into prominence after the October-November debacle. The group as such would be of little consequence if it were isolated from the rest of the party. The difficulty lies in the fact that extremist ten- dencies in modified form can be dis- covered also among the responsible elements of the present C. E. C. who are to steer the party in the near fu- ture. This gave rise to an enormous volume of discussion both in the Ger- man party and in Moscow. Briefly stated, the tendencies of the extrem- ists are: (a) to repudiate the united front tactics; (b) to create left wing unions, breaking up the old bureau- cracy-ridden organization; (c) to do away with centralized form of party organization; (d) to slacken the tie between the party and the Commun- ist International. These tendencies become the more pronounced the more we approach the left sector of the left majority of the present C. E. C., their chief exponent, Schuhmacker, being outside of that body, but, as I have mentioned, they color to a lesser degree also the utterances of such majority leaders as Maslow, Rute Fischer, Rosenberg, Scholem. THE SWORD Clang, clang! a burning torrent, clear And brilliant of bright sparks, is poured Around, and up in the dusky air, As our hammers forge the sword. The sword! A name of dread; yet when Upon a freeman’s thigh ’tis bound— Whenever for the truth and right It flashes in the van of fight— How sacred it is then! Whenever the battle-word Is liberty, when men do stand For justice and their friend, Then Heaven bless the sword! The Center and the Left. As far as I could ascertain, there are no basic differences of outlook, of policies and tactics between the left and the center. What separates them is, first, their attitude towards the defeat of October-November, second the question of partial demands in the present, third the existence in the left wing of a group of extremists. The appreciation of past errors may be of very great importance for the party, but since the center accepts now—and has accepted at the conven- tion—the majority view on the pro- spectives of the movement and on the immediate tasks before the party, the difference of attitude towards the past cannot form an insurmountable barrier between the two factions. The question of partial demands may ap- pear much graver. The left wing declares to be decisively against par- tial demands short of the conquest of power. The centre says: we must relentlessly fight for immediate im- provements in the situation of the workers. To the impartial observer, however, it is evident that the max- malism of the left wing cannot hold water. It has justly been pointed out by the leading minds of the C, I. that, whatever the phraseology of “everything or nothing,” the party as a whole will be compelled to fight for the eight-hour work-day which is now being assaulted by the capitalist class, that it simply cannot avoid the fight for the abolition of military rule or for the control of production. These demands, and many others, which, if properly utilized, will only attract the to the party and accelerate r movement, wili not to unite both factions in common e, masses the fafl strugete, The fact is that, but for the Julius J. Goldstein. The Unions. The gravest of these problems is the union problem. The so-called “free” unions under the bureaucratic leadership of Social-Democratic re- formists are in the midst of a formi- dable crisis. Their membersh.p is alarmingly decreasing: Out of some ten to twelve millions a few years ago it has dwindled to three or four mil- lions or even less at present. The metal workers’ union of Berlin had 180,000 members only three years ago, now its membership is slightly over 30,000. This collapse is primarily due to the compromising spirit of the un- ion officials who are afraid of a vigor- ous stand against capitalist exploita- tion and who prefer “democratic per- suasion” of the bosses to strikes and demonstrations. It is natural that the workers, failing to find in the un- ion the staunch defender of their in- terests, should turn to it a cold shoul- der. The crisis, however, is also due to unemployment which throws the worker out of the factory and out of an organized contact with his fellow workers, . One would expect the Germans, known paragons of efficiency, to do everything in their power to maintain the unity and cohesion of the workers’ economic organizations. But such is the fate of those elements and groups whom history has doomed to death: they hasten their own perdition. In- stead of revising their tactics and at- tracting all elements that are willing and capable to do the work of re- construction, the union bureaucrats declared the Communists a fight to a finish. At a recent convention of the textile workers’ union the leaders de- clared it to be the task of the German unions first to get rid of the Reds and (Impressions and Facts) By MOISSAYE J. OLGIN only then to resume a struggle against the employers. In accordance with this animus, members of a Communist orientation are being thrown out of the unions, whole locals under the control of Communists are being ex- cluded, others are being reorganized after the well-known receipe of Schlesinger and Sigman. In times of an enormous economic crisis, with millions of unemployed aboard and a sense of. hopelessness permeating large masses, this could only add con- fusion and weaken the unions still more. On the Communist side, es- pecially among the less stable ele- ments, it engendered a secessionist movement. Eighty per cent of the German Communists are now outside of the labor unions. A large portion of the left wing was disposed to break with the old unions altogether and to start the organization of “pure” class- conscious 100 per cent revolutionary “industrial” unions under the leader- ship of the Communist party. : It appears that this was the biggest problem of the recent convention. There were heated discussions. The view of the C. I. was known to be for continuation of the old union tactics. The opponents of such tactics pointed at the mood of the masses which, they maintained, was for breaking away from the hopeless mess of the old dis- credited union organizations. The supporters of the C. I. policy argued that by forming dual unions the Com- munists would isolate themselves from the mass of labor and so only help the union bureaucrats to continue their deadly influence over the work- ers. It is the task of the Communists, they argued, to lead the workers in the coming revolutionary struggles, and this would be impossible if a barrier is created between the party and organized labor. The decision was in favor of coming back into the old unions and fighting from within, but the echoes of the discussion are still reverberating in wide circles of the party. United Front. This difference of attitude naturally involved a wider discussion of the en- tire united front tactics. It is com- monly accepted among the German comrades that one does not make a united front with the Soecial-Demo- cratic leaders any longer. What one strives for is to form a united front from below, with the mass of workers who do not belong to any party or still belong to the so-called socialist parties. But here is the question of a general labor congress looming up on the horizon. The congress is to repre- sent the shop and factory committees and will embrace all shades of opinion and all possible party affiliations among the workers. Should the Com- munists stay within and form the left wing, or shall they split the con- gress and capture the most revolu- tionary elements? The extremists were in favor of the latter decision. The more moderate of the left wing decided in favor of the former. But the spirits are not yet quieted down, the heat of clashes is intense, and time will be required to coalesce dif- fering views into a set of uniform tactical ideas. One instance may illustrate the mood. Clara Zetkin is the most known and most revered leader of the German Communists. But she is on (Continued on page 8) CLARA ZETKIN ; i