The Seattle Star Newspaper, November 18, 1919, Page 11

‘one SEATTLE STAR—TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1919. r COULD HUN GENERAL WAS DISAPPOINTED BY > FAILURE OF ALLY BY EUGENE J. YOUNG Standing out from Luden- dorff's account of thé campaign which finally resulted in the crushing of Rumania, is the evi dence of lost opportunities on the part of this nation. Refusing to follow the principles of sound strategy, she allowed her armies te be scattered and crushed in @etall. Too late she listened to Her opportunity for a exploitation. Rumania's first move in the war had been to drive across the Transylvanian Alps, with the double view of correcting her own strategic situation and strik- ing at German: Austrian southern flank. This movement was the only possible one for her. The province of Wallachia was thrust like the toe of a shoe into hostile territory and it was Necessary to safeguard its south. Mank by driving the line in- to Hungary until the front was with the toe of the shoe, shown before, this strategy Was wrecked by the slowness of portion of the army south ef Hermannstadt by a secret iw to thelr own territory the enemy got footholds thru allied advisers at Ru- in headquarters, particular now advised the army command to make sacrifice fm the interest of safety and vietory. They pointed forces in the toe of in danger of at mvelopment — from ih or south. Until was brought up to its th or more Russians ald, it could not hope such a long frontier. ight the Rumanians to the toe of the boot, the end of Wallachia, con their forces cast and Bucharest and be pre- strike either way, ac- to circumstances. They have had the advantage of lines and could have de- lightning blows at any exposed enemy forces, F 3 E # i ut] i NOT between sound strategy and the sacrifice of a rich province and its people was too hard. They | tried to hold the whole border. They made themselves alike too weak for offense or for proper defense, since the Germans had the choice of many places from | which to deliver blows Ladendorff and = Mackensen made full use of this weakness. While the Rumanians were rush. | ing troops to the western moun | tains to meet what they thought | was to be the main blow, Mack ensen drove in the Dobrudja, cut | the railroad to the Black sea and | entrenched part of his troops se eurely north of that vital line of communication between Russia and Wallachia, Kumanian re | serves were then moved to the east of Bucharest to meet a crossing of the Danube, which Was expected there, But Mack ensen hastily moved troops west ward and the next blow fell fro the mountains and the Danube west of Bucharest. Here, the blunder of the Ra manians in holding western Wallachia was paid for, Large forces had been guarding the toe | They did not heed; the choice | of the shoe, They were cut off by the descent of the Germans from the mountains and had to | surrender, Had they been with | drawn in the first place they would have been of supreme | value in meeting the advance on Bucharest. Lack of them meant that the Rumanians did not hav sufficient forces to meet the driving German attack or to push home the counter-attack west of their capital, which Ludendorff admits at one mo ment threatened disaster to the invaders. Perhaps the whole flasco due to Russian treachery, as the Rumaniang have often charged Perhaps they relied too trusting- ly upon the Russian promises of help and undertook more than they should, in the belief that re infercement would come in time. There is this evidence to bear them out; When the Russiens finally found their own flank in danger, when they saw the bat tle line approaching too close for comfort toward Odessa, they put plenty of troops into Ramania and they stepped the Germans. ‘These troops could readily have been sent weeks before. “MY THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS” By Gen. Eric Von Ludendorff the highest and broadest part of the ‘Transylvania mountains in face of &@ strong enemy, who could no longer be surprised, would have been hung WP, as had been the fate of a similar Bttack in October, south of Kron stadt. We did not like having to select the western end of the mountains for our attack, as in this way the strategic possibilities would be di minished; but this could not be helped. The first thing was to get ever the mountains somehow The Ninth army had mac tempt, at the end of October, Wance south of the Vulean and Seurdok passes (northwestern Wal lachia). This had been foiled by a gadden change of weather, and by the vigilance of the enemy. The troops had to be withdrawn as far as the heights overlooking the pass We had got some idea of the at ad. an ground, however, and had come to| the conclusion that the forcing, of the mountains at this particularly narrow spot was quite practicable. I also retied on the assumption that the KRamanians would not expect here the repetition of an attack which’ had cost us so heavily; so general headquarters decided to choose this position in the mountains as our point of sortie. Profiting by our dearly won perience, we made thoro prep tions, even to the smallest detal the troops we supplied with complete mountain equipment. Particular at tention was given to the improve ment of the mountain roads and the acctmulation of material, so that there might be no delay in pursuing the enemy. Motor trolleys, for use on the Rumanian railways, were also held in readiness. On November 10 General Kuhne had completed his preparations, and the opening of operations was fixed for the 11th. This group, with four infantry and two cavairy divisions {about 90,000 men), under the com mand of General Count von Schmet tow, were to concentrate here and push forward vigorously thru Cras ova to the river Aluta (115 miles west of Bucharest). This would mean that they would take the de- fenses of Orsova (at the western end of Rumania) on the east and the Red Tower pass in the rear At Orsova a weak brigade, includ- ing German cyclist troops under the Austrian Colonel Szivo, was to at tack simulaneously. General von Krafft, who was reinforced, and the troops south of Kronstadt were to continue their attacks, November 11 brought complete success to neral Kuhne, He crossed the mountains, defeated the opposing Rumanian divisions in the battle of Targu Jiu, on November 17, and had occupied Craiova by the 2ist. On the 23rd General Count von Schmettow, with his cavalry di- visions, had reached the Aluta east of Caracal; the Aluta bridge at this point was in his poswession. Further north our infantry had reached the Aluta opposite Slatina. Here, as further up stream, the bridges had been completely destroyed. MACKENSEN GETS ACKOSS On the same day, im » thick fog, ox ra and the MoClure Newspape All riehts re A. on nada and the Field Marshal von Mackensen had gained « footing on the nerth bank of the Danube, near Symnitea. Here again the operation had been very well prepared. This is the day we had fixed on to get the armies work ing in cooperation by exploiting all the possibilities of the situation. Ap parently we had been successful, but we were not yet at the end of our difficulties. In the rear of General the Ruman: y had withdrawn sova, down the Danube still retreating. keeping ch Tho surrounded on a they did down their arma until they had reached the conflu ence of the Aluta at the beginning of December. Their hope that an attack on the Danube army by parts of the Rumanian army from Bucha rest would save them was not ful filled. In the operations east of the Aluta the orders were to press forward re lentiessly and effect a junction of the armies with their inner wings in the direction of Bucharest I attached special importance to a rapid cromning of the Aluta by Gen eral Kuhne's group, in order to ae cure the left flank of the Danube army. ADVANCE ON BUCHAREST ‘The Danube army ward march November 25. On 26th they crossed the Vedea (65 miles from Bucharest), and on the 30th their left wing, after heavy | fighting, forced ita way across the Nejlow plain southwest of Bucharest while the right wing, keeping ‘level with them, advanced down the Dan ube On the 27th the Alpine fought its way out of the Red pass into the plain, had entered Pitesti on the 29th and on the follow ing day, by exerting their main pres. of the Arges, gained southeast This made it possible for the right wing of the Kronstadt group, which volved in heavy fighting north of Campu- lung (north of Pitesti), to debouch from the mountains. | Further back stood General Kuhne His infantry divisiona had | made terrific efforts to force a cross ing at Slatina, instead of immediate ly crossing farther south near C cal, as the c y corps had done, and thus gainisg time, in spite of having to make a detour. They only Renew Offer to | Sell Line to City The Western Washintgon Power Co. renewed its offer Monday to sell | the North Ballard or Greenwood) street car line to the city. Some time ago the owners sought | to sell the Greenwood line to the ety | |for $81,001, ‘The offer was rejected | by the efty council. | The latest offer to sell is for “an amount to be decided upon as the re. sult of an appraisal made by repre. sentatives of the city and company, or by the city council and represent atives of the company.” If the city agrees to buy the car line, the owners agree to accept util ity bonds in payment.” Kubne's fighting from Or nd me to ans were the river, sides not lay two started Its for the corps b sure north ground to was TO 20. SECOND SECTION PAGES 11 RELY ON AUSTRIANS.” SAYS LUDENDORFF croa#ed the Aluta tn the course of the 27th, and on the 30th were atill In the meantime General Kuhne’s about 65 miles from the left wing Of | ier, wing had effected a junction the Danube army and the right of} with al Krafft'’s group, and Krafft's group. | forced ba the Rumanian First The Rumanian high command had | army eastward acrows the Arges. ntended to hold up Generals von | tenceforward the Danube army and Krafft and Kuhne and attack the| the Ninth army fought wide by side. | Danube army, Their first object W8# | The success of the operation was as apparently to hold these two groupA | sured, on the mouths of the mountain! 44 had not been easy to bring the angen, When this was no longer |twe armies into close tactical co- possible they tried again and ein | operation at the last moment, on De- to make their First army, fiehting | cember 1. The attempt had almost nerd, stand on some line further| miscarried, Even in war accidents back, HO an even at the eleventh hour! of all kinds have to be reckoned to take full advantage of thetr aita-| wig. ation with regard to the Danube LOAD TAKEN army. — . - Orr HIS MIND TURKS SAVE No nooner had this crisis been eur evaded by the Rumanians Rumanians, under English orders The and directions, had effected a very | Poor thorough destruction of the oll | char fletds, |Our tr tired and 0 far the Russians had not,taken | attack the enemy f jany serious part in the fighting, A| «ibility of outflanking Russian thrust December 5 | only slight, an he southeast of Bucharest was of orees, eapecially in the mountains importance. |The Russians were soon in great It ts not easy to understand why | strength; they fought better than the they let the Rumanians be beaten | umanians before they came in; they could very easily have sent forces to Wallachia, It was only because the Russians Were not there that we were success | tions had become much worse. Heavy | wien yh ful, | rain wet in and was followed towards Nacen oy (The Rumanians have charged that | the new year by an unusually heavy |)” German tnfinences at the Petrograd | frost | r court kept reinforcements from com 5 was in no way ing to them until they had been de- | BREAK TH and fighting in Wallachia GERMAN TROOPS rgeunted than we found ourselves | feated.) STRONG LINES January, Our men On December 1 the left wing of | faced with another, Would Kuchar | mean MOVES On December 10 the Danube army n sore need of rest, 1 was the Danube was very heavily | ext be defended as a fortress or not? | wage RU RSIANS and the Ninth army, on the Jalom- worried as to how I was to get them Attacked southwest of Bucharest and | such a defense would have been very f 4 nista and at Misil, southeast of Bue out of this corner again to the larger pushed back, The man troops.) awkward for us, for it would have mau, were facing the Kumanian and theatres of war who had already crossed the Nejlov,| prolonged the campaign in Kumania Russian troops in prepared positions tverything ponsibl were cut off. ‘The situation was cer-| considerably, The season was ab Yet they succeeded in quickly break t the Ruman tainly critical, The enemy's! ready far advanced. We had to ing down their resistance, crossing | working order again, but they could ly than enveloping movement was only stop-| make preparations for the following the Jalomnitas on the 12th and tak-| only cope witha very limited amount | ne {lt more Intensely be by a Turkish division which| year, All kinds of material neces jing Buzau, after hard fighting, of traffic. "We also made prepara was marching in the second Iine wary for attack had been placed in | the 15th, tion to transport troops by way of On the 17th this army group was|the Danube. but with an unumually readiness and everything possible had been done to hasten the fall of already in the plain before another winter setting in, we had to |strong position between the Danube |reckon with the freezing up of the the fortress. possible speed to meet it On De | A great lond was taken off my 4nd the mountains to the southwest river, In spite of all our efforts of Rimnicu Sarat would, In any case, take a long time nber 2 the cavalry of the Ninth | mind when, on the 6th, the report | army was in position on the action| was recelved that our cavalry di-| to get all our troops ny front of the Danube army. On the| visions had in the night of December At after another vi Int we had infantry as well within | 5-6 found the northern works of the the Danube army took Braila on reach, and so the crisis was over | fortress unoccupied and blown up. | January 4, It reached th reth come. On the 4th we started a! On the 6th we were in possesion of down stream to the confluence of the counter attack, which was skillfully Bucharest, Ploest! and Campina, The Keeping touch with battles east of the Bucharest! mouth of thin river { line now assumed a different | tually ter from their predecessors Ninth army haa Sereth in the ugerments, in wed Us pate On the captured Foe of the which December 24 was reach th hen wheeled tr Braila right ban pos! In the | the army 1 not Ul ammunition had bee After a very Ninth army broke |and Rumanian positions mas and forced the ener draw his whole front toward |per Sereth, more particularly in tt direction of Braila and Focsani mm were could only 4 The the enemy was Ge bridgehe ontally Dene 6th attack un. | 8th plain west of the group co the on wa asing his ‘ought u res north the |town as far as the Putna The great exhaustion of the troopa, ime and weathe demanded the onclusion of the campaign, Thi which Mackensen’s army group now occupied waa approximately the one we had intended to reach. The attack was broken off. The armies lug themselves in the line on which they stood. T TERRIBLE ANXIETIES The second stage of the Rumaniam campaign was over, thus bringing to an end. It had been an operation rich in great deeds of valor of our brave troops; in tremendous deck sions of the leaders, from junior of- ficers to general headquarters itself; uso, in terrible anxieties, which me no thru the Russlar The supply of ammunition, which was, now needed in larger quantitie wan a slow business, as communica on army From this time onward the Ras» brought had been done an railways into very |own flank. They reduced thelr forces in th Dobrudja in order to be stronger in Wallachia. For the rest of the campaign the object in view was to strike an even more crushing blow at the Ruman- lans, defeat the Russians, whose ar rival was now a certainty, while they were ansembling, and bring the oper- ations to a conclusion by reaching the mouth of the Danube-Sereth Tro tunk line, This was the shortest line we could take up. Our military-eco- nomic situation made it imperative that we should secure it ' ped n How Ludendorff undertook to the whole German nation lines, so it would be- an adju of the army, is n up in the next installment. has been most severely erith ed for his dictatorship and akes to show he was merety acting to save Germany from @ disaster which appeared im- minent as early as the beginning of 1917. ate i the | g— The Rumanian attack wi not} preaned home; the right wing of the Ninth army was brought up with all hal von Mackensen had ordered the Bulgarian sIno to take up a poni right bank of the Dan Without meeting any serie intance, it pushed on as far as the Buzau ut nt bat Third army tle tion on the ube. r Keep The Home Baking afeguarded Users of Royal Baking Powder are sometimes “urged to try other baking powders because they are cheaper or under the false pretense that they have been exclusively selected for government use. Be on your guard against cheap baking powders as they almost always contain alum which is derived from mineral sources and declared by many of the highest medical au- thorities unsafe to use in food. England and France Prohibit the sale of baking powders containing alum. The label on the can must show whether baking powder contains alum. Read it carefully and don’t be misled by tricks or deceptive tests. Royal Baking Powder is an absolutely pure and healthful cream of tartar baking powder. It contains no alum, leaves no bitter taste in the food, and care should be taken to prevent the substitution of any other brand in its place. ROYAL Baking Powder Contains No Alum Leaves No Bitter Taste