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I he? |B 7s"? J} pe in E Gen. Ludend YOUNG } Big py RUGENE J oa of Russia's ame & great ™ promiged to upset all fae ter a time 1 Ary gen a and bring nd. He was uid have done > blunders of y shown by ¢ his achieve an bat ¢ Grand D 4 the yea the consequenc jeveled at the condu by the imperial fav duke was the sca Be authors of Russia's disasters i ben the canrina © Ger His ¢ howe led gas cate. , promotion of Ge Alexiefft “v yalty to Russia © mar rn front ‘presiloft, won his ie the distinction by the ma: Which he had helped @ early in the war e had br trap ae ought prepared 4 the lesson of ar from the west, ack in open ove forma. gaa ttat had cost Russia so many and is thousands, and reorpanised rwards wgeem of communications so 5 pinch, army could be ne over Austrians amrock re in the 3 were His artillery > Sport. ething that the ; | a Se ees SRRPSBASRASARARSRRGSUSHSSCREARE SRE RSGUGHK = = BARSRRSSASEAS jean frost had not known before eet Ga limited scale, The Aus thee crumpled up under’ it and he their lines both south Pripet marshes and the| | “MY THOUGHTS By Gen. Eric V righted, 1929, by fa Great Britain by Sein Har Tatehin 4 Martel: tn On Jane 4, 1916, the Russian of Austro-Hungar tsk, at Tarnopol, north of the r, began. (It was on a front than 200 miles on the south ted of the Russian battle line) Mier attacke were carried out the Russians had no decisive fity in numbers. In the neigh- of Tarnopel they were com-}| fepulsed by the army of Gen- | von Bothmer, who had the command of the Ger} succession to! ae 4 | Atte we were anticipating an at- @ our front (south of Riga), started divisions on march. Field Marshal Leopold of Bavaria’s army feuth of Ludendorff's) also} to the requirements of the | Our general headquarters heavy demands on both groups | withdrew divisions from the ‘The battle of the Somme had Wet begun. Austria gradually Off the Italian offensive and (i trepe to the Eastern front. | Te Italian army now started a tensive in the Tyrol. The! @ the war had changed com-| | Not much later the opening Somme battle and Rumania’ | ton of war was to make our! stil more unfavorable j ‘S$ HAD RESERVES to the failure of the Aus- defense, the Russian offensive made rapid progress, and the railway to Kovel, soon | the Stochod (about 40 from the starting point). The Teinforcements became in the retreat. A new Ger. front was gradually created on on both sides of the rail-| The Russians had not followed Wy smartly in a westerly direc altho @ great victor as beck They had too few re at hand to make full use of portunity. Saturtzky and Kisielin, south West of Stochod, the beaten Aus ae emy was able to collect its} ts. It was obvious that the} @ the Austrian army which “raped at Lutsk would have to Quickly to avoid being Up. Here Bruxiloff was not ‘hough for a really energetic Neer SS PASAT TS me i arrival of further reserves hed the front on both sides Gs Kovel-Lutsk railway. They Up with the Fourth army fur Suth and somewhere near Goro & strong counter offen Soup behind the Austrian wing me tO the southwest. Our situation did not allow of Multing for the arrival of all our a in order to attack all to | HER | THRU Sounter attacks of the Ger tfoops during the latter half of} ‘and early part of July obtained | Successes. The Russian | On the Dniester had broken \ the Austrian 4 ions under Yon Pfianzer Baltin in the Iniatin direction (north and| eat Of Czernowitz) and south | Tiver noon gained a lot of| Cuernowitz fell FE t a ‘ell. ty he i. une the Russlans | d reach ee 2° trom Tiumacz of the| + to Kolomea Kimpo- | and and were pushing on toward y thian parses, + Oiginally a very short one ) had now become And this long new 1s + NOW corr ¥ much | ne was, | " Communications, reserves “yl brought up with the ¥. German troops| of the commander-in- Hun Armies Had Narrow | Posen than were the German troops iy Palos by The Star thra special arrangement with the reserved for France. Belgium, Bi | Bothmer | compelled at the beginning of July | south ast in 1916, orff Reveals er river ore his first than 200,000. In what straita he put the Ger. man and Austriag commands on the! Hija bag of prison: | drives was more eastern front is abundantly wit nessed by Ludendorft, When al front has to ripped so that only! battalions and single batteries ar loft In reserve at vital points the sit ation is indeed critical, Only the! coming of the better trained Ger-| man troops to stiffen the Austrians and plug the holes, combined with th lack ef reads and railr ln to up supplica and reinforce. to the Russians afte the had been made, prevented the infliction of @ disaster that might have taken the entire German line! back to ite own frontier nt of Bruatlofts waa ous to This movem the enemy ne to the gulf of Riga. Ih front of Kovel and in Eastern Ga Ucia he was nearer the vital coal and Industrial regions of Silesia and the north. Moreover, the main supply lines of the Austrianay cape cially south of the Dniester, lab par | allel to the front on which he was} advancing and each good gain meant! the crippling of the Austrians #0 much. | Were he able to cut in south of Lemberg and stop the main passes thru the Carpathians the Austrians would have been routed worse than they were at the beginning of the war and any that got away would have had to retreat across the lines of communication of the Germans. Ry what strong measures Hinden-| burg, ahd Ludendorff averted this peril” is the subject of tomorrow's article. They were never again free from the peril of Brusiloff, however, until the Bolshevik doctrines rotted the Russian army to ghe core. To! the end this great solflier fought to keep Russia to her task, and his loy alty cost him imprisonment and death at the hands of the Reds. AND ACTIONS” on Ludendorff MeCtore Newspaper Brot All rights reserved. son & Company and the L- Ttaly by Fratellt Treves: tm Western front, were conveyed to the Carpathians and the Dniester, Even all the fresh divisions that were thrown in were hardly sufficient to hold the front. RUSSIANS LACKED SUPPLIES In these circumstances tacks were inadvisable. They were attempted by our troops all the same, but remained without result A pure defense from the start would have been our proper course, as the Russians were also contending against extraordinary difficulties of supply and were not very strong. ‘Thie fact helped the Austrian army more than its own defense. Owing to the complete failure of our allies south of the Dniester, General von (with his German army the Dniester) saw himself ountera above to withdraw his right wing from Buczacs as far as the mouth of the Koropiec @bout 19 miles, Thanks to the excellent influence of our army and the Austrian troops with| it, all the Russian attacks had been beaten off. While the Russian onslaught on the Austrian army was gaining its first successes, and when the greater part of the reserves of the com- mander-in-chief in the East and of Field Marshal Prince Leopold of Ba- varia had proceeded to the relief of our allies’ front, a violent Russian attack was delivered again Woy- rach's army group (north of the Pripet marshes and about 100 miles | from the Pripet battlefield) on June 13. It collapsed completely after extraordinarily severe fighting. The army group General von Woyrsech were compelled to throw in all their reserves. DANGEROUS PLIGHT IN NORTH At that time we were anticipating an attack at Smorgon (200 miles} of Riga) or, as now seemed! more probable, on the old battle-| fields of March, and at Riga. At these points the Russians were stil? in very great strength. In spite of| this we denuded our front to the ut-| most to help the armies in the south. | We even had battalions to serve as) reserves for our long lines. I formed these battalions from men at recruit depots, altho I realized that if the) Russians bad a really great success at any point these units would be but @ drop of water on @ hot stone.| In the first place, the Russian forces on our front had not been no- ticeably reduced. They had to de cide whether they would really at- tack us, or follow up and consolidate their successes in the south. Of course they realized that we and Austria-Hungary would send reir forcements. They meant to obtain a decision on the Austrian front, but had such large reserves at their dis- posal that they could attack us in foree as well, and thereby prevent! us from sending further help to the south. | While the Germans and Austrians were concentrating round the Lutsk alient, on the Dniester and in th Carpathians, and in the second halt| of June making local attacks nea the Russians rushed u reser to the points where ‘i had broken thru and brought the German local efforth to a standetull by counterattacks. GREAT RUSSIAN ATTACK Ia the middle of July, after severe fighting, in which the Austrian troops had again ghown only slight resisting power, they prevented the Germans from eloping their in {tial successes in the Lutsk salient The enemy gained stili more ground south of the Dniester in the direc tion ef the Carpathians, everywhere, While all this was taking place at| pletely successful. Advance of more than 50|the two main points of attack, the|garian troops let their lines be mbarked on a violent on-| broken slaught on the front of the com,|The German units that had been sent Austrian front south of the| mander-in-chief in the east, between! to help were once more in a critical Lakes Narotch and Vischniev and at| position, and on July 1 General Von ten the tiver and the Fumanian | Smorgon, on the army group of Field! Ldnsingen Ri Bg erat bo write ‘The right wing of Field Mar- Prince Russians fa, viel, Marshal Prince Leopold of Ba northeast and south of Baran front of more than point south of Dvinsk to the north- orn edge of the Litsk salient) In July a terrible struggle chod, pondingly thin.| and on Von Linsingen’s army group shal 5 fo the extraordinarily bad|in the bend of the Styr, (This was @ group, south of the Prip« miles from a retire also, (When Laitesk the was|held to the bank of the Styr river, 4s well a» the raging on the eastern front, while in! which bends abruptly east to the THI DOINGS OF THE DUFF \ JUST Missed A CAR i Lat STAR—SATURDAY, Tis 15 Gone TO HELP Me OvT A LoT AS I'm A LITT © Tus MORNING meat c WEDLOCKED GEE, ANNIE ‘LL BE TICKLED T’ DEATH WHEN SHE HEARS “TH’ Goon NewS WAIT'LL TH’ JONESES HEAR WE WENT To THIS WEDDING DEAR: SASSIETY HE'LL AP MIS COFFEE OFF TH’ SAUCER ELL, (F THAT SLICKER OTD ATO DARE® \ | (ae i “THIS OL’ WATER TANK, I RECKOS —— went | gaining mame: gainst off in battles lasting many days line of Woyrech's group (to the north of the Pripet marshes) was successfully where it was he garian troops. lthrew in all our carefully hoarded The | reserves. and from July § onwards the batt here died down. AUSTRIANS ARE AGAIN BEATE, The Russian offensive at the bend \of the Styr, north of Lutsk, was com: | Engiand and France were | their first successes on the | mil We managed to hold out! northern the attacks nd beat d at the point) hope that 4 by Austro [tun To fill the gap we for fied, They held thelr ground, | | trom the ment, we | lens The Austro-Hun thru in several places. Kovel. varia’a » had to Leopold of ‘I Prusiloff broke thru at Germana and Austrians mous F Riga bridgehead west of the Dvina and gained ground at once 1 orth of Lutak. Here menace Brusiloff, them | now straightened out his front for | more than 100 miles northward.) This was one of the greatest crises on the eastern front. the Austro-H troops would be able to hold the line of. the Stochod, which was unforti- flank north). attack might begin a extended ou 4 single regiments in order to support the left wing of Linsingen's army group, northeast and east of NOVEMBER 8, 1919. o Tis not all gold that glitters! "4 GAD % Do rr- Ve GoT % srop oP HERE BUT MLL ONLY BE A MINUTE ~ (ve Gor W see A FELLOW AND Ili Be RIGHT OVT- WELL AT LAST THEY APPRECIATE YOUR SERNICES DOWN THERE There W. By Gouy! TH’ -BRIDES LOOKS LikE IT e WAS A FUNERAL! 1 FATHER _. 1 CANT SAY TAT 1 Im CVER JOYED WITH THIS WEDDING! WONDER WHAT THIS GUY 1S Dow’ IN There - I'VE Deen wary’ Our HERE FIFTEEN MINYTES OF AND Now THAT TH’ FIRM GANE You A RAISE -1' HERE ‘You LL GIVE ARE, DEAR £15 —By ALLM. wm PL} Taar Guy must } 8" ng Tank VM ON ~ "CAUSE TM WRITIN! A COMPOSITION ON ™ HIGWENA? as a Reason NO MQ M*GINIS Vary! GET YOUR EXES READY CONSTABLE - CLEAR TH AVQLES THRODEM YouR MMISKERD 90'S YoU CAH WATCH “THIS ~ HASNT HE SETTLED ANYTHING ON THE BRIDE ? NO BuT 1 THINK HES SETTLED HIMSELF ON RE For TH REST oF HiS LIFE! ‘or about thirty over the We had little | ngarian | We took the risk of denuding our lines still further, and | Prince Leopold of Bavaria followed our example (bringing more reserves Altho the Russian nin at any me line and re If this wing were to retreat still further it was impossible to imagine when it would end. ribly anxious days. everything we had, knowing full well that if the enemy were to attack us could help us. And that is Just what ha the Russians, in enor the Those were ter- We gave up ed, out from but he 1d Marshal We went through a terrible time until the crisis here wag overcome, | thanks to the valor of the troops and the careful handling of affairs by the headquarters staff of the Eighth who ‘were compelled to use battalions and batteries as re- @ battles were not yet over at the end of July, when there were sure Indications that the attacks at Baranoviel (an important railroad junction north of the marshes) and along the whole course | of the Stochod would be resumed, We awaited these with a sinking heart, for our troops were exhausted by constant fighting and had long fronts to defend. The Austro-Hun garian troops had lost all confidence in themselves, and needed German support everywhere. We could see everything that was going on as far as the Stochod, but further south we were less in the pieture. We only knew that Gen | Boem-Ermolli was also now expect ing an attack at Brody (on th northern frontier of Galicia south of Lutsk), that the Russians were con tinuing their offensive between the Dniester and the Carpathians in full strength, and that they were gaining Pripet | ‘ground towards the crest of the ridge. General Count Bothmer (the Ger man general near ‘Tarnopol) had stood like a rock in the maelstrom of continuous attacks, and in all essen: tials remained master of the situ [gtion, It was clear that the Russians were gathering strength for another mighty blow, While we were still [bleeding from many wounds on the mme, and the Austro Hungarian troops were being hard pressed on the Italian front, Storms were threatening and our nerves were strung to the highest pitch, We had maintained the closest touch with general headquarters (the German general staff at leville) during the difficult and anxious days we had passed thru tn Kovno since the beginning of June, We had repeatedly pointed out the nocessity of unity of command on the eastern front, Of course, if neces sary, we could have carried on as before, but it had become evident that reserves could be moved about with les friction if the command | of the whole eastern front was un der one control, marshal and I were summoned to Piess (the kaiser's e ters) to give our views conc the position in the East. It only be described as very grave. n headquar-] The Austro-Hungarian army had rning arranged their reserves in such a uld way that at given intervals each in- regiment had a _ so-called fantry Of course we came back to the! smarch-hattalion,” composed of | re: question of the single eémmand, and servists, assigned to it. The bat- in this connection we emphasized the | taijons were often attached to the necessity of extending the process of | ;oriments as introducing German units into the | n Austro-Hungarian army. Also, Austro-Hungarian of the chief in strongly that troops, especially the should be trained on really lines, "The journey to Pl 8 regards any front the east. infant setUement command question, for the opposition at, But general head- quarters decided to form three di visions from troops taken from the ‘These were to be ready for use in Poland The desired interchange of German and Austro-Hungarian troops was begun sived a battle-worn Aus division, |then still under the control of the ndwehr di This was | poor quatity and not trained to that Before the end of June the field|immediately handed over to Gen, von Was still too gre western and eastern fronts. about the beginning of August, andy tro-Hun| n infanty which set free the 10 visions of the Tenth army, Linsingen, troops could be used on the quieter par of the commander-in. We urged very the Austro-Hungarian | modern was fruitless of the} fighting battalions. Regiments that had not suffered at all sometimes contained five or six battalions instead of three, whereas t#/the strengths of othera were often very low, What was wanted was an even distribution, and this was uncom- |monly difficult on account of the |many nationalities among the Aus- |troHungarian troops. National dis- |tinctions among the men were also jmaintained. What was still more grave was the very inadequate training of the march battalions. They only served to swell our losses in prisoners. We had to take a hand in the training of these march battalions, and wo did. We thereby discovered much good and useful material in | the ranks, but the officers, who were | Austro-Hungarian command, were of strict sense of duty which distin- guishes our German officers