The Seattle Star Newspaper, October 30, 1919, Page 13

PEROR'S FAVORITE PLARNED STRATEGY BALKING LUDENDORFF (War Editor of the New York World)! the supply lines of the Russians, al} + One of the most amazing chapters In Ludendorff's revelations of inner War secrets reveals a great quarrel Among the army chiefs in 1915, Tirpita bad given some indicatio: @f the intrigue carried on by the extreme military class of Germany fo break the hold of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollwee and commit the eantry to more drastic policies than Be woul! indorse. The submarine War was to be Intensified and the of Germany were to be organ on strict military lines. The Junkers wanted a real ministration, such as Ris «i given, and resented the otter, attitude of Rethmann at and abroad. So they wanted Hindenburg, then the idol of the German people, put in the chancel >" lorship and Ludendorff made chief of the army to drill the people. Results of this intrigue are shown Ludendorff, Bethmann, flatterer the kaiser, and General Falken. hayn, long one of his intimates and then chief of the great general state, ‘were able to sway the ruler, Evi dently fearing further success of Hindenburg and Ludendorft would endanger their power, they set out hamper the Eastern commanders get for themselves whatever it might come from the defeat Russia, They deeply’ humiliated by overturning his strat. ff independent of him, and he nly shows his bitterness, ‘The kalser’s favorites balked one the greatest strategic strokes of | time; gave up a chance for a vic that would have eclipsed any- accomplished in any German mampaign in the war; in fact, vetoed Teal chance for an early triumph Germany. It was lucky for the that the court cabal had its for Ludendorff, gambier of in the war game, was play- for stakes that would make his t at Tannenberg and the “>n lakes look puny. He wi at the complete smashing of ain Ruseian arm?, and he nid” t have accomplished it __ Mackensen’s advance left the Russian army in Poland a highly dangerous pocket. This ‘Pocket was about 200 miles deep, ‘Measuring from the positions in front of Warsaw eastward to a line run ning north and south between the bain easternmost point of the German left | wing near Kovno to the Austrian and German forces northeast of Lemberg Both north and south the Russians p were in ‘peril of a flanking attack | right angles to their main front | he outlet from this pocket might | “wide enough for safety. for it t 325 miles from German wing. But right in the rear the Russians were the great marshes, almost 100 miles penetrated by only one trunk and by few roads, and at time of year almost impassable On either side of this obstacle ran “blood and | and making Mackensen and) in Galicta | ready dangerously congested by | necessities of the army of about 1 500,000 which the grand duke had on | the Polish front. A drive from the south, to the east of the River Bug. ould have cut the main trunk line and roads by @ gain of 80 miles. To the north a drive of 175 miles thru | Kovno, Vilna and the country west Minsk would out all the remaining outlets. That wan the great scheme of | Ludendorff. 1 was a repetition on & colossal scale of the strategy that had destroyed two Russian armies in the battles of Tannenberg and the | Mazurian lakes. It was the sort of j thing he had tried against the British | hin 1918, when he sought to drive them against the sea Tt was risky, He had to fling his left wing far out in the north and } it might be caught between the Rus sians retreating and relief coming fram the Riga district the Russian right wing had been weakened to send forces to the south and there was a good chance of suc coms, At any rate, he could have made the Russian retreat much more precipitate and the German booty much larger and the German losses probably much smaller than they were in the cautious advance im posed on him by the general staff This drive aimed at enveloping the | Russians by marching across | north of Warsaw, where they were strongest and best prepared. It fall. ed and the Russians got away to form new lines against which the ex Yet in vain. All the world believes that Luden- }dortt and Hindenburg were in full command of the great German drive of 1915. They were supposed to be paramount on the Eastern front. Ludendorff reveals, however, that they had a big row with the chief of the great general staff, General Falk enhayn, a close favorite of the kaiser; that Ludendorff’s battle plans were vetoed by the kaiser, and that soon after the advance began they were even deprived of command of two of the German armies engaged. Mackensen, who had broken the Russian army in Gal! was made independent of them, and Prince Leopold of Bavaria was also given a separate command. Tirpitz has thrown a sidelight on | had been under way to make Hinden | burg chancellor and Ludendorft chiet of staff. Even the kaiserin had been enlisted in the effort to upset Beth. mann-Holiweg and the inner court ctrele ers in the East was the answer of the kalser’s favorites. They made Ludendorff follow their strategy in stead of his own. He obeyed orders. | but he makes no bones of saying the | Faikenhayn strategy was immensely costly to Germany and of insisting that his own plan would have been |much more costly to Russia. “MY THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS” By Gen. Eric Von Ludendorff ed Great ted in by Mesere. Seix and Bartel: in All rights reserved for wian countries, withdrawal of the Russian /army could receive even small rein: | Galicia, however painful it | forcements at the right moment and ¢heir point not resalt in any 19) rper Britain by Hutchinson & Co France, Belgium, the McClure Newspaper All rights reserved. ompany and the Londen Tim Italy by Fratelli Treves: in Canada and Motiand, Russia and th | be supplied with sufficient transport it was to be hoped that they could | fall on the northern flank of the re | | treating host, via Vilna, with such |force that the summer campaign of" forces | lines | hausted Germans threw themselves | Sgainst the Russians in the summer} this state of affairs. A great intrigue | Humiliation of the command: | |1915 would end in a decisive defeat | the | staff and the troops it wax eral von gained ground cellent spirit ef the Ntirely successful aliwitz's divisions | got right Into the j enemy's syntem of defenses, and con }tinued to press forward, On the 16th, after heavy fighting, a strong rear guard position was stormed, and by the 17th the Narew had been | while the right wing had rthwest of Novo Geor ine was now from | north of Warsaw, an ad-| f about 30 miles in two days) SAW THE BATTLE BRGIN The field marshal and I were pres ent with the Twelfth army at the battle of the 13th and 14th, we were | mont favorably by both leaders and tro The Twelfth army, like the Bleventh army In West Galicia, had gained a great deal of ground tn the first attack On the Narew, gs had been the ease on the San, fations now ensued. Roshan were stormed on July Ostrolenka waa taken on Augtst and thus the crossing of th on a wide front was secured Germans were now ws the Nie men on a 40-mile line.) Other forces moved against Sieroe and Segershe | (north of Narew about 18 milea north of Warsaw), so that as soon as these | works were taken, Novo Georgievak | (the strong fort guarding Warsaw) could be cut off from the north east | The Russians offered stubborn re! suftered | | | | ne 28) a pause in the oper Pultusk alstance everywhere and very heavy los#es. | The Ninth army and General von | Woyrach’s detachment had gone | forward in the Polish bend of the Vis ltula. Woyrsch’s detachment had beaten the Russians on the Iishanka jand near Radom, occupied Radom on | July 19, and forced the Russians to j retreat behind the Vistula. As a con | sequence of thix on July 21 the Rus- sians north of the Pilien also retreat ed behind the Vistula and the outer defenses of Warsaw, The Ninth} army, which was still weak, now ad | vanced to the attack of this position | Their further mission was to cut off | Novo Georgievak from the south | Between the Upper Bug and the } Vistula the allied armies gained far | ther ground to the north in succes-| aive frontal attacks | HE IS AGAIN OVERRULED Par from the « Poland, the Niemen army bh started an offensive in the middie of July and made great progress east ward, j 1 was now quite convinced that the time had come to initiate the move ment I had recommended, a move ment on the Lower Niemen againat Kovno, followed by an attack in full} jforce in the rear of the Russian armies, The troops could be taken | from Woyrsch’s detachment and the | | Ninth, Twelfth and Eighth armies. | We had delays quite long enough | already. The taking of Kovno would | }take time, and the Russian retreat in Galicia was already tar advanced. | But it seemed still possible to achieve | great things, at any rate, something | | Digger than could be effected by the Operations then in progress, These could end in nothing more than a pure frontal westeast retirement of the enemy General t battlefield in} headquarters stuck to} of view and still preferred | their movement over the Vistula and Narew. We were not allowed to weaken the armies engaged in that | operation for the benefit of the Tenth | and Niemen armies. Whether our) general staff, for reasons connected “It remained to be seen whether @ther plans would not hold out better) Prospects. We couki add nine or 10 divisions to Gallwitz’s detachment (north of Warsaw), which had now developed into the Twelfth army, for ‘® concentrated oftensive in the di- of the Lower Narew, but we No great hopes of this. _ to be assumed with certainty that the | Russians, at the best, would offer F esistance, and then withdraw as they had done in Galicia. In theory the operations which we had contemplated after the winter J campaign seemed more promising: F t is. preas forward along the line, and perhaps corner of East Prussl of Warsaw and the Vistula po- © Such a movement might have had ve results, It was by far the st way to the rear of the Rus forces which were retreating East Galicia Between the Vis and the Bug. We reconnoitred swamps on either side of Osowiec the hope of finding some way . but, as we had foreseen, the its were unsatisfactory. The ition of the ground put all ht of crossing there out of om) 7 We had to reckon on strong resist on the Osowiee-Grodno line, a very strong tactical position in itself and presumably strongly held. .We could not expect to overcome this re- ‘sistance and the other difficulties ¥ etiich tay before we. It was wer Me “deepest regret that I felt myself un- ‘able to agree to such an offensiv ttle the suggestion of general Ms ® juarters. Every operation further to the increased the distance from decisive point southeast of Grodno. This disadvantage would have to be counteracted by speed, es Decially if the rate of the enemy re treat was accelerated. In that case the enemy flank was more and more Iikely to be found in the direction of Vilna-Minsk. A big German ad- vance between Grodno-Kovno would ‘not be sufficiently effective in itself. ‘We should find ourselves in a cul de wac. It seemed more advisable, in the A. first instance, to take Kovno by @ attack of the Tenth army f the west, and a simultaneous loping movement by the Niemen from the north, Since this ortress had fallen, the corner stone the Russian defense on the Nie n, the road to Vilna, and to the of the Russian forces, would be They would then have to re- with all possible speed. and the of the Russian armies. The harder| with the general military situation, | | We pressed our advance from East/no longer wished to embark upon Galicia into the area east of the Bug, such an extensive and far reaching the more likely were we to achieve this success. KAISER REPEATS | HIS PLANS The attack on Kovno was facili {tated by the fact that our line had} |been so far advanced that it was | possible to bring our heaviest artil- lery Into position. The preparations for the opera tions against Kovno were just about | te be ma me ond the field marshal to go to Posen for duly |. Here, a the suggestion of the chief of the general staff, and after having heard | the field marshal's proposals, the kaiser decided that the Polish offen- | sive should be continued, and, in par- \tleular, that the Twelfth army should break thru the enemy line | toward the Vistula. | Our general staff believed that in | these operations part of the Russian | forces still in the bend of the Vistula could be annihilated. I had to keep |my views to myself and hope that | the movement I wanted would be carried out when General von Gall |witz had reached the Narew, and found that he also could only make progress by means of frontal attacks I thought that even then there would still be time to put it into execu- tion, The advance of our line in | Lithuania and Courland by the troops already there might serve ax la favorable introduction to t eration. But we had to abandon any idea of getting the reinforcements hitherto earmarked for Courland and taking Kovno. In accordance with the instructions from general headquarters, prepara tions for the crossing of the Narew were now begun on an extensive scale. Not only the Twelfth army, but the right wing of the Eighth that the Twelfth army should ad | vance between the Vistula and the Schkwa with Pultusk-Roshan as their objective, and the Eighth army |should reach the river between the Schkwa and the mouth of the Pissa. General yon Gallwitz decided to make his opening move on either side of Prasnysz (60 miles north of War- saw). Ih preparation for the attack we had concentrated, especially in the area of the Twelfth army, what was then for the Eastern front, a very large amount of heavy artillery |(Ludendorff's description of the upward of 300,000 men for this drive.) ‘ Both armies began the attack on July 13, Thanks to the careful or- ganization by the army headquarters gun when his majesty cof | p Op | jarmy also were got into position, so | |forces involved shows Gallwitz had | plan as that we had suggested, it ix impossible for me to say. The Ninth, Twelfth and larmies continued to advance same lines as before and {| strength settled by general quarters. Preparations for tack on Nove Georgievsk wer | gun At the same time we decided |to take Kovno, and the Niemen army | ontinue its attacks if all went well As I had expected, the operations of the allied armies in Poland to the east of the Vistula meant purely frontal pressure on the enemy and in cesgant fighting, Repeated efforts to envelop the Russians ended in a fail ure. The Russian armies were cer tainly kept on the move, but they es caped, They frequentty | counter attacks with strong and again took advantage of the many marshy areas in the neighbor hood of rivers and streams to rally | jand offer prolonged resistance Owing to the continuous movement for many weeks on bad roads and,| ‘ ral speaking, the strain on our tre- Clothing and boots were in rags and tatters. Supply was | difficult, It was almost impossible | | to find billets, as the Russians sys |tematically destroyed or burned stores and villages. They drove the cattle before them and left them to die‘on the high road, The population which they carried off with them were driven into the | swamps at the sides of the road if they blocked the Ma new in the Russian campaign have been | indelibly imprinted on my memory. | The supp and transport con. | | ditions me more unfavorable | from day to day, especially with the| |Twelfth army, which was getting ud further away from its Communications with the improved for the Kighth army after the capture of Lomza Onowlec. It was then possible, but still very difficult, to send supplies from that side. COULD NOT | | HELP EXHAUSTION | What vehicles we had were prin-| \cipally employed in bringing up am. | munition. In attack our exhausted in fantry required more support from the artillery the futher east they got. As the distances increased, the diftt- culty in bringing up ammunition in- creased proportionately, Thus the movement slowed down and lost its sting. After the conclusion of peace with | Russia, a highly-placed Russian of. ‘tier told me he had never been able to understand why we had not push ed on with greater vigor, hs if we had the Russian army would have gone to pieces, Officers and men did everything in their power to bring about that result, but when perfect discipline, the greatest enthusiasm Fighth the the head. the at be made fierce forces, n bad weather troops was mendous. way ‘ {i { A_ TYPICAL UPSTAIRS VALUE An All-Wool woven Blue Serge belted model. four outside with tailored suit. in sizes 9 to 1 - oa stairs price, $ Men’s Suits $15 t Our upstairs cash sellin very low pric gate these wo and the most strenuous efforts on the part of every If@ividual cannot stave off the stage of exhaustion, the will of the commander is ¢qually powerless. The lines of communication became longer and longer; they far exceeded the one hundred and twenty kilo- meters (80 miles) which we had re garded as the extreme limit. The en tente were better off during their big | attacks in the summer of 1918. They had numerous railway connections running direct from behind thelr front line and were able to bring up their enormous supply of muni tions continuously and thus support their infantry effectively. Motor transport enabled the infantry to re- cuperate in good, well-furnished billets, and return to the line again and again with renewed vigor. ARMIES TAKEN FROM HIM Operations continued in accordance with the plans of the general staff. At the end of July Cholm nd Lublin fell into our hands. Further east we were not making much progress, and thus gave the Russians time to with draw troops from the salient we were making in their line and send them south to form a new front. buttoned - down flap; pants are full lined. An excellently t f Hi finely Has pockets Shown 8. J haf at t nh oop O UR Boys’ Department has made another score— we've hit the bull’s-eye square- ly and scored heavily. Mothers of Boys who. have visited our boys’ department are enthusiastic over styles of ,our boy mother what very JOSHUA GREEN BLDG. | General von Woyrseh took the western bridgehead of Ivangorod, and lon July 28 crossed the Vistula to the | north of this point under the enemy's none and was heavily attacked, I thought this crossing very hazard- ous, Tactically it succeeded, but it did not alter the general strategic | situation, | ‘The Russians facing the Ninth army withdrew from the outer de- }fenses of Wari and early August from Warg: On August 5th th |eupied the capital of Poland. This army (Mackensen had been brought from Galicia to command it) was taken out of our command and placed under the direct orders of general headquarters. Field Marshal Prince Leopold of Bavaria was at the same time put in command at Woyrsc’’s detachment. No doubt general headquarters had thelr own reasons for thus reorgan- izing the command, but it did not simplify matters for me, especially Jas the lines of communieation of tt | Ninth army remained under our con- trol. ‘The movements of the Ninth and Twelfth armies were very close ly related. General headquarters were far too busy for me to venture in} s/ suits clot et nd Overcoats $7.50 to $22.50 plan enables us to sell at these . We urge every mother of boys to investi- erful values upstairs. wisi Lalli quality and Many a prised to find at could be LEE EPRI IL IE IL IP ES LENE NETTIE EE TE WEEP ER FTE Clothes Shop to trouble them with such details. | The capture of Warsaw gave us |apecial satisfaction, We had fought so hard for it in the autumn of 1914. In that campaign were laid the foundations of the present successes, of which the occupation of Warsaw was the sign and symbol. During the following s Field | Marshal Prince Leopold of Bavaria's larmy group crossed the Vistula be- ggrod and Warsaw on a front, Ofice again general her | veloping movement by @irecting this detachment straight on Brest-Litovsk (more than 100 miles eastward), whilst strong Russian forces were still north of Lublin, But in vain; the Russians got away. Whilst Field Marshal Mackensen was struggling toward Brest-Litovsk, Prince Leopof’s group was advanced to the Bug below the fortress, After the crossing of the Narew by the Twelfth army at the end of July, General von Galiwitz had cast his eyes due south toward the Bug. As I had feared and General von Gall- wits had also thought possible, these hopes were not fulfilled. Somewhere about ¢he 10th, the Twelfth army. re- ceived instructions to march east, 4TH. AND PIKE | with the right wing moving up. the | Bug. In this way it came into close | touch with the Eighth army, which, jafter the fall of Ostrolenka on | August 5, had gained more ground jon the southern bank of the Narew, and was now advancing with Lomza as its objective. GREAT FORTRESS CUT OFF In the meantime Sieroe and Seger- ‘|she had fallen, also Dombe; Novo | Georgievsk had been cut off from al) |sides, The capture of this fortress was entrusted by the field marshal to General von Beseler, The troops of the Ninth and Twelfth armies investing Novo Georgievsk were placed under his command. He also received a considerable number of the heaviest Austro-Hungarian how- iteers. The plans for the capture of Novo Georgievsk, the direction of the Eighth and Tenth armies, the attack on Kovno and the situation in Lithuania and Courland made fur- ther great demands on myself and my staff, Altho we had not had the same free hand in conducting the operations of the summer campaign of 1915 as in previous campaigns, but followed the plans laid down instructions of general headquart there still remained an eno amount of work for me to do, the necessity of forming and ecuting a number of decisions, great and small, Added to this there were ences of opinion with General Falkenhayn, such as are only likely to occur between men of pendent views, but which made more than ever incumbent on me carry out most punetiliously the plans of general headquarters, ch were opposed to mine, rather my own or those that coincided mine, Further troubles with and confusion in the advance ;the Austrians over the division © Poland begin, Club breakfast.at the I ing at 40. cents, - 5b