The Seattle Star Newspaper, October 27, 1919, Page 9

Dougall - fouthwick \) SECOND AT PIKE j ATTRACTIVE “Heatherbloom” Petticoats : Fashioned of the serviceable “Heatherbloom” cloth are these practical Petticoats in attractive | colors and styles. An elastic band at the waist fastens in the back. At $2.50—A ruffled model, with trim- mings of tucks and plaitings. In solid colors: navy blue, rose, brown, purple and green. | At $3.95—A plaited ruffle edged with a flowered border trims this model. The border is pink and white on ruffle, and petticoat is black, rose, | green, purple and navy blue. MacDougall. Southwick, Third Floor —————— DIES OF HEART FAILURE Mrs. Lydia Norman, mother of [Charles Norman, Wiltshire hotel, |died suddenly from heart failure! | Sunday morning in her room at the a, beg Neongge! ding men St. Lawrence apartments, 1809 Ninth : jo remedy Foley's Honey'and Tar for giving quick relief from coughs, colds and Let's Boldt’s French pas-| try. Rel 14 3d Ave.; down | town, 913 24 The body will be held at the ppblic LUDENDORFF PLANNED BATTLE WITH RUSSIANS ON ICY SWAMP Following his failure to crush the center of Grand Duke| Nicholas’ army in November, 1914, Ludendorff had to turn his attention quickly to the wings of the far-flung battle line} in the east, While he had been forced to concentrate in the center to meet the drive against Silesia and Posen, the Rus- sian commander had gathered fresh forces south and north and was threatening to invade both Austria and East Prussia. Ludendorff asserts he had information that this was part of the “gigantic plan” of the allies to crush the Germans early in the war, At any rate, it was highly dangerous to Ger- many. An advance thru the Carpathians to the Danube would deprive her of her own chief granary. Austria was on the point of crumbling. The Russians were in the passes leading thru the Carpathians into Hun- gary and threatening to move thru them in overwhelming force. In this emergency German troops were sent to stiffen the Austrian line and Ludendorff himself hurried into Hun- gary to arrange the defense. He found much to shock him| out of reliance on Austria as an ally.. He spent as little time | as possible there, hastening back to meet the menace of the| Russian invasion of East Prussia, ancient domain of the Hohenzollerns, which was again in panic. It might well be, with the Russians at the upper corner of the Mazurian lakes and threatening again to turn the southern flank of this barrier. Ludendorff was now, however, to get the aid for which he had been playing his game of delay. He had been compelled to strike paralyzing blows at the Russians with inferior | forces which he could move faster because of superior Ger-|torcen at the disposal of the © man communications and training. Now, however, the} western front had settled down for the winter. Both sides! were exhausted from bitter fighting, and needed time to re-| new the vast supplies of ammunition they had used up. So it was possible for Ludendorff to draw in new troops to the east, using the German network of railways to move them quickly. What he now schemed was one of the most remarkable} drives of the war. East Prussia lay under deep snow, The} Russians were used to such conditions and knew how to meet them; they did not think the Germans could do so. Luden-| dorff's veterans, however, had been inspired by their suc- | cesses into thinking they could do almost anything, and that|corps, the First infant,t division, they could conquer the Russians under any circumstances. The battlefield was that on which he had defeated Rennen- kampf's army in September, with the connivance of Rennen- kampf. Then, however, he had attempted envelopment of} the Russian main forces with only one wing, coming thru\ the lakes to the south. Now his principal blow was to be struck in the north, while the secondary envelopment was to! come from the south, 100 miles away. In his other battle he had been deterred from adopting this strategy because of the swampy nature of the low-lying country near the Baltic. | Now it was frozen and he could move over it the 175,000 men, to whom he had assigned the chief mission. | He was to find his task not easy, for, as he says, he found | “the grand duke was a really great soldier and strategist.” “MY THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS” By Gen. Eric Von Ludendorff | Published by The Star thru special arrangement with the McClure Newspaper ! Syndicate. Copyrighted, 1919, by Harper and Brothers All rights reserved. THE SEATTLE STAR—MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1919. their resistance as far our strength made that powsible, We were planning a new hammer blow in Weet Prussia, Such a blow would also have been of strategical value in the Carpathians if the Hungarian railways bh en better developed in days of Ny the end of the r the Austro Hungarian general staff were al ready afraid that Praemysl would }fall in the spring, and anticipated an inv@ion of Hungary by strong hostile forces, | order further to maintain our pres sure on the Russians and break down | Tho Russians had in the meantime continued thelr attacks on Ge Boroevic's army of eral and won the crest Carpathians, General von now wanted to undertake a punterattack himaelf large seale and relieve Przemysl the same time. I considered the reinforcement of the Austrian army in the Carpathians necessary, in view of her internal ; all the more so, if the th on a at vigorously at some I was accordingly obliged to sup port the suggestion that German forces should be sent to Hungary, even tho they were taken from the mn manderinchiet in the East y war in the West had taught us that on the defensive, in a war of pont tions, considerably longer fronts could be allowed than had up to now been thought possible, A num ber of divisions could be withdrawn from the Ninth army for use else where TO MAKE MAIN ATTACK ON PRZEMYSL The following units were released! for the Hungarian front: The head quarters start of the secona army Forty-eighth reserve division, as well as a special brigade of three! regiments, out of which a Guard] divixion was formed later, and the Fifth cavalry division, At the same | time, still further reserves were| withdrawn for dinposal by the com: | manderin-chief in the East. If it! were possible to carry out the of-| fensive proposed by General von! Conrad, with the help of the rein forcements in view, it would be bet ter than mere defense. General von Conrad, on his side, decided to reduce the number of! troops on the Serbian front, as far as conditions would allow, and send all available for to the Carpa thians, He proposed to deliver the tain attack on Praemys! with the bulk of his forces between the Uszok and Dukia pases, Kast of that point, the German troops, reinforced by Austrian formations, and style SECOND AVENUE AND UNIVERSITY S j FRASER-PATERSON Co. Special Price Basement Y concentrating all buying efforts upon securing correct and dependable Ready-to-Wear and Millinery’ at extreme reduc- tions—by taking advantage of the occasional emergency which compels a manufacturer or wholesaler to make a quick disposal for cash—the Special Price Basement is enabled to specialize on. Value Giving. Large, conv Special at $: At $18.50 —Coats of wool velour in navy and black—lined to waist — with large collars, pockets and bélts—smartly trimmed with _ buttons. Sizes 43 to 58. Special at $18.50. Coats For Stout Women Sizes 41 to 53 At $25.00 OATS of fine all-wool French broad- cloth, full lined with interlining to the waist; splendid models for the full figure. ertible collars of self material; deep pockets and broad belts. The colors are navy, brown and black. Sizes 41 to 53. 25.00 each. At $12.50 —An unusually low price for de- sirable coats, and a price of ticular interest when applied to coats of the larger sizes, 42 to 52. —Of good black Thibet coatings, in belted models, with convertible collars and deep pockets, trimmed with 3-inch bands of plush. morgue, pending the arrival of her |son from Vancouver, B. C. croup. Mrs. W. M. Stevens, Vivian, | Copyrighted in W. Va., writes: “When my baby was Ti months old he had a terrible | . and nothing did him any og I read about Foley's Honey Nervous, Weah, | and Tar, and the first dose helped rec | i spam {meee se. Been cough had | "ow effec superlative «one % vb = mae Honey | Teconstructive and restorative,— and Tar saved my baby’s life after Pe tiron ‘The Real everything else had fafled.” Contains Pp Iren Tonie Mo opiates. Sold everywhere. read: with in by Hutchinson & Company and the London Times. y by Fratelli Treves, tn Canada and Belgium, Moliand, Muesia and the At|pany had a percentage of war-hard- and particularly able officers, N. C, Ofs nnd men, The higher po- sitions also were well filled. Naturally, I wished the four corps Talk about adventures! Men in the Navy come home a with the kind of experiences that most chaps read of only in books. ag Here’s your chance if you area he fellow! Uncle Sam has, as you know, a big Navy and gives red-blooded young fellows like you an opportu- nity to step aboard and “‘shove off”. ; What will you get out of it? E Just this: A chance to rub elbows with foreign folks in strange parts of the world. The chance for good honest work on shipboard—the kind of work that teaches you something real ; the kind of work that puts beef on your To any father and mother: In the Navy, your boy's food, health, work and play, and moral welfare are looked after by responsible experts, =and from there we went to Japari shoulders and hair on your chest. You will get 30 care-free vaca- tion days a year, not counting shore leave in home or foreign ports. You will have the kind of com- radeshipin travel that sailors know. You will have regular pay, over and above your meals, lodging, and first uniform outfit—'good stuff, all of it. You can join for two years. When you get through you'll be physically and mentally “tuned up” for the rest of your life. You'll be ready through and through for SUCCESS. There is a Recruiting Station right near you. If you don’t know where it is, your Postmaster will be glad to tell you. PShove off !-Join the U.S.Navy vated the language jthe German Southern army, und the command of General von Linsin. fen, a particularly farseeing and ‘The 1914 campaign had not brought |These corps were stronger than the *4lous leader, were to follow the ad a decision and I could not see how |eartler formations, in that each com. one was to be reached in 1916. the end of the year, four new army | ened corps were formed which Werade be y in February, The the new formations of the an- Made by C. 1. Hood Co., Lowell, Masa tum, 1914, had taught us our lesson. (to be under the Eastern command, in vance of the main forces on Preemys! at right flank echelon. | SURPRISED BY HIS ORDERS While these operations were being dincunned, I was surprined by a tele gram from our general headquarters, |wtating that I had been made chief | of staff of the Southern army. | eral Field Marshal von Hin denburg did not want to part with |me. He wrote fully to his majesty [the kaiser, asking to be allowed to retain me, and in the position I had hitherto held. Meanwhile, aa once before at In \eterbure, I said good bye to the mem bers of the staff, and entered on my new duties, convinced that I would |shortly return. We were warmly welcomed by the population of Hungary, as we were later when we freed Transylvania But once we had done our duty, their \eratitude soon wa All sorts of things occurred that made life un comfortable for our troops, The | Magyare are a strong and masterful | people, but they lacked understand. |ing of the common interests of Aus trin-Hungary and the just wishes and | |needs of the numerous nationalities living in Hungary. Hungary was the stronger half of the dual monarchy and misused her position to further & disastrous foreign policy on the |part of the empire against Serbia jand RumfMfhia. Unfortunately, we made no protest General von Linsingen and 1 trav | elea thru the concentration area |The troops were insufficiently pro- | vided for, not only as regards the |preparation of positions, but also |shelter, Much had to be made good FOUND RAC BADLY MIXED On a walk thru the wooded hills, T once can neroms A wentry. He gave me & message in some, I do not know what, foreign language. Even the Austrian officers \ accompanied |me could not understand him From this incident 1 gained some idea of the difficulties with which this army had to contend, These | difficulties were aggravated by the fact that nationalities were much mixed in the regiments, in order to |make them more reliable. Czech and Rumanian had gone over to the enemy, Men jof these nationalities were now di | vided among many regiments. But these measures did no good. They lowered .the inherent value of the brave Hunga and particularly good German regiments, and aggra difficulty to an | Let's go eat at Boldt’s—uptown, | 1414 8d Ave.; downtown, 913 2d Ave. BLISS ir. TONIGHT AT BEDTIME If you feel out or “all in” if you are constipated, is out of order, take BLIS: VE HERB TABLETS, In se- rhe NATIVE liver NA taken, up. next morning ery much bet ter, Blias Native Herb Tablets act gently but effectively on the kidney, liver, and bowels, The dollar ‘box contains 200 tabi and usually lasts six months, € the genuine, and look for th trade mark’ and mone: back guarantee on each box, ‘Two sizes, 50c and $1.00. Bold by leading dru and focal agents everywhere. by Alonzo O, Bites Co., Washington, D, C. regiments | Jextraordinary degree. Once more, as at the time of my journey to NewSandec, in Septem- ber, 1914, I gained the impression of the complete lack of development of all the races which did not belong to the ruling nationalities. One of my Journeys led thew the villages of Ha- aules, 1 shall never forget the poor housing conditions of this unhappy people. How different were things in Ger- many, thanks to the wise measures of her rulers, and how bigh kultur land progress stood among us as com. pared with Austria-Hungary. When 1 saw those huts in Huzules, I real. ized that this nation could not know what it an fighting for. PUTS BLAME ON AUSTRIA Austrialungary had been very negligent. As an allied power we id have known how to prevent it. Had the dual monarchy and the Aus {troHungarian army accomplished even half of what could properly have been expected of them, German she troops need not have been brought | masses to reinforce their In the long run we should in such fronts |have had more troops at our disposal jfor the Western front 1 admit that Austria-Hungary | jcomplained that we had failed in | France in the autumn of 1914, and that they had been exposed single: handed to Russia's overwhelming numbers | In any case, it was fatal for us that we were allied with decaying states like Austrin Hungary and Turkey, A dew in Radom once said to one of my officers that he could not understand so strong and vital a body as Germany should ally itself with a corpse. He was right. | But Germany was not to obtain jany vigorous battle allies, We even |neglected to infuse any new life into jour perishing allies. I only got to | know the condition of affairs in Aus tria-Hungary in the course of the |war. I had never had any oppor tunity previously 1 was utterly amazed. Our respon. | sible authorities had realized that the dual monarchy had become the “Sick Man of Europe,” but failed to draw the correct conclusions from it. We should have kept faith with her and led, instead of binding ourselves to her and seconding her strong but| one sided policy. My stay in Munkacs was not of long duration. At the end of Janu ary T was again in Posen in my old position. I had had an extviting time, and found that I had missed nothing of importance. Meanwht the _ commander-in chief in the East had been advised by general headquarters that during the first half of February three new corps and the Twenty-first army corps could be placed at his disposal for the Eastern theater of war, Gen era) headquarters had considered that the replacement of the Twenty- first corps by a new corps was nec essary, in view. of the fact that its reserves consisted of men from Al- sace-Lorraine. ‘The untrustwortht- ness shown by some of the troops from the Reichland on the West front inc: the war went on. ‘They were, therefore, generally sent to the t. Of course, this meant that many loyal Alsace-Lorraine sub jects had to suffer, but it was not possible to do justice to each indl- vidual. On the Eastern front the Alsace-Lorraine troops fought excel- , and the Twenty-first corps even with distinction. It had been arranged with general headquarters that as soon as the four corps were detrained, they should be concentrated for a blow at the Russian forces facing the Wighth army. berg and the battle of the Mazurian lakes had shown us that a great and The experience of Tannen: | rapid success in battle was only to be obtained when the enemy was at- tacked on two sides. BLOWS FROM BOTH FLANKS We now had the possibility of chrrying out two enveloping move- ments, one from ‘the Tilsit-Wlad- tal “Kalvarya direction (due east of Konigsberg), with a strong group of three corps which were to be as sembled between the Nieman and the road from Insterburg to Gumbinnen and another with the Fortieth re- |serve corps, to which the Second in- |fantry division and the Fourth cav- lalry division were attached, between Lake Spirding and the frontier from the direction of Bialla-Raigrod-Au- gustowo and the south. (These attacks would be about 100 miles apart from the northeastern and southeastern corners of East | Prussia.) Simultaneously, the enemy was to |be pinned down by a frontal attack. |Both our opponent's wings were | weak. We could hope to gain a lot of ground before the enemy main forces could get away from our |frontal attack. Both our thrusting wings were to surround the enemy— the earlier the better. If we succeeded in annihilating the enemy, it might be possible, whilst guarding our flank against any move from the Kovno-Grodno line (opposite the southeast corner of | East Prussia and resting on two strong forts), and take the Bobra crossing near Osowtec from the rear. This presupposed that the long flank stretching thru Wloclawek, Mlawa and Johannisburg to Osowiec held firm. | NTIC PLAN” |OF ENTENTE The measures which I took as a result of this course of reasoning |completely upset the enemy's calcu lations, which had become known. ‘The entente hoped to win the war jin 1915 thru Russia, While the grand j|duke intended an offensive in full force in the Carpathians, strong Rus- sian forces were, according to the so-called “gigantic plan,” to be sent forward between the Niemen and the Gambinnen-Insterburg road (north- east corner of East Prussia) against |the weak north wing of the Eighth jarmy, crash it in, envelop the army, and throw it back to the Vistula. Other troops, especi: masses of cavalry, were to break thru our weak forces between Ml and the Vistula (north of Warsaw and oppo- site the southwest corner of East Prussia), and invade West Prussia, The strength of Prussian territory east of the Vistula was to be over- run, and the German troops which occupied it were to be annihilated. The execution of the “gigantic plan” was still only in its first stages; but the Russians had already fixed their eyes firmly on the coun. try east of the Vistula, As early ag the beginning of January they had taken away troops from their front west of the Vistula in order to use them in the north, If we forestalled their plans by our own, we should certainly have to reckon with strong |counter-attacks across both the Nie- men and the Narew, These counterattacks were actu- ally made, and indeed with such \force and continuity that we had a very hard time of it. The grand duke was a really great soldier and strate- gist. . TROOPS MOVED | SECRETLY The development of the German troops would be complete by about | February 20. They had been moved |very late intentionally, We feared |that the withdrawal of troops on such a large scale from occupied Po- land could not be kept secret, and might disclose our plan for an of- fensive in East Prussia. I attached the utmost importance to secrecy for — the success of our operations. Now that all this is past, a natural question suggests itself. Was it wise to send German troops to the Cam pathians? Undoubtedly they e badly missed in our winter campal east of the Vistula, where. their rightful place was. But they wes needed still more in the owing to the immediate condition | jthe Austrian army, which req stiffening. In the meantime local fighting |continued in the Polish satient the Vistula. In order to make the Russians belleve that our off was to continue, the Ninth army to attack in full force in the borhood of Balimow (west of saw) at the end of January. For purpose our general headqui placed 18,000 rounds of gas shells at Jour disposal, It is characteristic of our ideas at that time that @ amount of ammunition was consid jered something quite exceptional, | AMMUNITION if RAN SHORT In the East we were never short of ammunition, We always had as — much as was possible for the P services to bring up on the bad 3 during open warfare, and in . | warfare no great dumps were made in_these days. In the West, how. — lever, conditions were different—am- |munition was very short there indeed. None of the warring nations |timated correctly either the |of concentrated artillery fire, or the |consumption of ammunition. . | When I was director of the opera- |tions department before the war, continually pointed out the necessity of increasing our ammunition sup plies in peace to such an output that it would last until deliveries were forthcoming under war contracts. I was unsuccessful in getting even anywhere near the required amount; |but even if my proposals had been adopted, there would have been a |shortage, because the rate of con |sumption was too enormous. But we should, at any rate, have been jable to overcome the crisis sooner, jand perhaps got well ahead with our joutput instead of always remaining — behind the demand, c |DECEIVED THE GRAND DUKE ‘The Ninth army's attack near Bolle mow took place January 31. The weather was too cold for a gas at- tack, tho that as yet we did not realize. Other things, too, did mot turn eut as we could have wished. — ~ We took a few thousand prisoners, | but otherwise, from a tactical point of view, our success was small, All the same, our attack made a great |impression on the Russians, and strategically our hopes were realized, The development of the four corps detailed to make the attack (in East Prussia) started at the beginning of February and went off smoothly. On February 6 it was completed. We moved our headquarters to Inster- burg. We did not find it eas? to say. goodbye to Posen, where we had | passed thru great and eventful times, But Insterburg called up pleasant memories of the events of September, 1914, | Ludendorff in tomorrow's Star tells of the great winter battle of the Mazurian lakes, in which the German soldiers, by hard marches in deep snow, drove the Russians out of East Prussia, de priving them of the position from which they would have been able to turn the line of the Mazurian lakes in the campaign of the coming spring. This battle was | one of the most remarkable im | cidents of the war. ope