The Seattle Star Newspaper, October 10, 1919, Page 13

SECOND SECTION 1 Millions of German dead had not Ludendorf This master mind of German milita illing to go on Sacrificing other scores and hundreds of thousands if the rman government would give him the “can fodder the moment when his army was going to pieces and the slaughter, he satisfie ts was u non mation behind him was s to death the Wemanded more soldiers. He was still dreaming of Poland @nd the Ukraine and other conquests “Better a oreiie end than terrors reply of the German workmen of Philip Scheidemann So, while he wanted a defiant reply of withe transmitted t end,’ to him the the was thru sent to President Wil- ’3 questioning second note, he could not convince the cab- Bnet of Prince Max. He could get no more troops from the S @astern front; they were too full of lshevism. Gen Groner, the war minister, thought 500,000 more could be eombed out of the factories at home, but Bolshevism was Tampant there also. So the government took its next step i the surrender to Wilson. “MY THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS” By Gen. Eric. Von Ludendorff _ Published by The Star ¢ Byndicyte. — Copyrientes b Gopyrishted in Great. Nritain rangeme th the Mt wea In his answer to our secor ws ison gave us nothing; he d visions in the West wan quite in ac even tell us whether the entente| cord with my own ext Mook its stand on the 14 points, He) ing that they could ¢ ing that th 1 @emanded, however, the suspension! any e¥ch al " @f the submarine war campaign, stigmatized our conduct of the war tm the West as a violation of inter- Mational law, and once again sought tm obscure phrases to meddle with intimate questions of our domestic politics. No doubt was any longer possible &s to the intentions of our enemies, as to the predominating influence Clemenceau and Lioyd George. iison was not prepared to stand "against the comprehensive claims of France and England. situatio: with the E Our blockade agaiest the Bolshe viks was now everywhere very thin wd only barely effective. General Hoffmann and I explained that the danger from Bolshevism was very serious, and that the maintenance of this frontier guard was essential. We had heavy decisions to take he government as such did not We stood now clearly before the ear to take any definite stand on question, were we to surrender un- again Bolshevism, It did ‘conditionally to the entente, or was kk clearly or decisively. In the government to call on the people spite of the disagreement of Gen fo fight a last fight of despair? We eral von Lynder president ad to return a firm and dignified the imperial court-martial, it Feply to the note, and to emphasize released Liebknecht from pris Once more our honorable anxiety for ‘Qn armistice, but, at the same time. to maintain warmly the honor of! our brave army. We could not al low ourselves to be depriyed of our gubmarine weapon, for this would ‘amount to capitulation. |) The note was discussed 6n Oc ‘tober 17, at a meeting of the war in Berlin. Colonel Heye and “A were present. I had also requested Hoffmann to attend. On very day the Eighteenth army fighting a desperate battle at the | and it stood idly by while Herr ‘Lenine’s ambassador }money and pamphlets, |tor the revolution. Our warnings, as well as those of the headquarters staff in the Mark of Brandenburg, received no atten tion. It appears that about this time General Hoffmann, thru his re lations with Herr Solf, at last suc ceeded in opening the eyes of some members of the government Asa party, the majority socialists recognized the great danger of Hol- |sheviam. But while Vorwaerts on jthe one hand issued warnings jagainst this force, on the other it gave it the greatest help by its at tacks on constituted authority and jits advocacy of class hatred. At last, at the end of October, Joffe | Was dismissed. We were thus once again at war with Russia, and the need to take precautions against Bolshevism became all the greater. STILL TALK OF ANNEXATION At this meeting I emphasized once more the infinite economic import “never-endians.” In order to|*"°e of the territory under the con to the note it was necessary to | ‘Tl of the commander-in-chief in the ‘The chancellor again asked a mumber of questions, and, turning to me, made a statement to the fol- effect: That a new note had from Wilson, containing an | in his demands; that Wilson | plainly been placed in a difficult thru pressure from external that he apparently hoped tary | Bast. No decision could be taken ° a to evacuating the Ukraine, the L had & different view as to the| Necessary preliminary discussions ts of the enemy, and could not having yet taken place, and the pee in but their intention to|@uestion being one quite imponsih'- us. to settle out of hand. nt Roe il ¢ many questions that were | dern wanted to abandon the Ukraine “put to me, I took up in general the|®# the civil population got little Position: j benefit from it “Already on a previous occasion I} Secretary Solf mentioned the great NT ical ateh a aatinar of ques-| Wealth of the Ukraine, and desired |humanitarian grounds. I could not look at the question from any other | point of view than that of Germany's advantage. tary von Waldow brought no Precise answers “War is not a sum in arithmetic. ally happen no man knows. When ‘* we went to East Prussia in August, ° lchtenment, but ghtenment was 1914, and the orders were given for **#ential, and I b ed the chancel b lor to ha "© question exhaustiv mined. eral heada. occupied the Uk agreement with the government, the latter being then fully convinced of the absolute necessity for Battle of Tannenberg, even then none knew how things would go, or whether Rennenkamp! would or would not move. He did not move, and we won the battle. Part of war is luck, and luck may come Ger-| the step, many’s way again. not merely to avert the danger of “I can only tell you my convic-| Bolshevism, but also to secure the tions. For what I tell you the re-| Supply of the quadruple alliance. sponsibility is mine, and has been| In the surnmer Austria-Hungary | mine, for four long, weary years,.”|had only been kept alive with the | TROOPS BADLY |hejp of the Ukraine. We in Ger many had obtained from the coun- try cattle and horses, and much raw CORKUPTED | In particular the question was dis- even a part of them, the front could P be so strengthened that we could hold out for a long time. To deal complete failure. By early thresh ing we had again had to mortgage our future. only possible source. Without this aid there would be @ severe crisis in the early summer of 1919. TROOPS NEEDED IN EAST The government nev this I had to have an answer from the government to my two earlier questions as to the danger of Bolshe vism and the importance of the Ukraine to us. At this time we had in the East, Russia and 26 divisions in er cleared up Rumania, this question of the value of the composed only of men over 35, and| Ukraine in the autumn of 1918. Had f weak in strength. In Lithuania| we evacuated at this stage, which there was one soldier to every 18| would t taken us a considerable square kilometres (7 square miles.)| period « . We should have srad In the West there were 185 divisions; | ually released ten divisions which § =o many had to be broken up were not r fit for the line. Tt Divisions recently removed from advantages would not bh been [ ~—s- Fast to West had not done well un-| equal to the disadvantages that we c der their new conditions, and { had should have brought upon ourselves had very unfavorable reports of by evacuation : them. In spite of the shortage of| I am confident that not a mar q men, drafts from the East were re-|too many was kept in the Mast % ceived with the greatest reluctance. We now turned to discuss the They brought a bad morale and had vital question: how much could and an unfavorable effect on their fel. would the people still give to the lows. army? Everything elae depended on According to the explanations of | this, I had hoped that the govern General Hoffman, the temptations to| ment would have been c on this which the men were exposed from | point the corruption of Jew traders in the| The new minister of war { East and from Bolshevik propa-|Groner) gave me a more opt ganda, and, indeed, also by propa unt of the prospects for rei . ganda from home, had broken their ements than I had hitherto re- ey fighting mpirit. How far this had ceived. He estimated a figure of gone was not known until the begin-| 600,000 men. I could not check his ning of Novernber | figures, TOLD OF | I was very greatly imprémied by BOLSHEVIK PERIL |the statement that 60,000 to 70,000 ‘The views of the general ax to the|men were immediately available to possibility of employing these di- be sent into the army. Why had od distributed |! and prepared |‘ THE SEATTLE STAR BATTLE, WASH., FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1919. PAGES 13 10 24 the t been sent sooner? IT ert ¥ cele If | have these reinforcements now Lean face the future with confi le ' 1 have them im ' The minister promiaed t to lowe a day SCHEIDEMANN 18 GLOOMY 1 w turned ¢ the question of th i in the army 1 x tm an I have #0 often k k. Lemphanized that T . . yested the three " arien of state to t r did not speak Wuite to the the matter Seeretery 8 idemann spoke very seriously, Me was glad to believe that we Id still release hundreds of thousands of men for the army, but it would be quite wr « to sup. pose that these men would improve the spirit in the army working men were beginnin “Better a terrible end ¢ terrors without en c . was the wed the splendid heidemann's so terr ‘ 1 declaration of ‘ meatic policy of anoellor and the majority parties Secretary Hausamann thought that eal to the people would have Able effect tary Eraberger was not pres. ent. He had recently lost his son in the service of his countr Vice Chi r von Payer did not take #0 serious a view as Scheide He more or spoke In agreement with lesa to the following ef The arrival of the second Wilson nsolidated public o} as at it was a qu and death, but the mood ha anged again. Men realized that th in, expecially economically, ed, If we say to people, dest re is just a chance, if you hold out But if you cannot held out for ano} rtnight, then you must ex- peet Germany to be more or leas wiped out from among the nations. You must expect an absolutely crush ing burden of indemnities’—then you will never rouse them again. “If you aucored in having the note #0 regarded thatthe people gain the certainty ‘We are, true In an anxious situation, but we are not throwing up the sponge’—then we are not lost.” Secretary Friedberg spoke to the same effect, adding the view that in any case we must act quickly In addition to the question of rein forcements, there was always the question of nerve strain, on which everything depended. Why had not | these gentlemen, who knew of these | available tions to which it is impossible to give | also that it should be retained on | whether by transferring from | ™aterial, even if we had not the| agg to West all our divisions, or|CoT™® we expected. The war was Bas! over. Rumania’s harvest was with this one had to know how| We and our allies had | much general headquarters could |‘? look somewhere for additional withdraw from the East. To know | '0dstuffs, and the Ukraine was the | | men, called them up sooner? This is to me an insoluble and disastrous riddie. COULD NOT VOUCH FOR ARMY , Of the general military situation I had nothing new to aay. Of the West front I re pe regard a break but not probable. ask me on my I ean only anewer that I do not expect it.” I stated, however, that the position might grow worse at any moment. The recent fighting had brought no thru as posnible If you conscience, Surprises. The front had held neither | better nor worse than before. Our troops had done what we expected | The enemy's strength in| 0 them attack seemed to be falling off The ‘otiations with Wileon had so far 4d to no ait Wew n masters of our own 1 could break off or con the negotiations, We had a hand to do either In it a crime to fight on, when one honestly wants peace and cannot get t? Is it a crime to abandon the hope 4 what I had eaid on} tion of | to 2 | of & compromine for which one has honestly striven, when the opponent | demands more than one can give? Did an accuse Trotaky of dis honest at the beginning Febr not sign the peac could doubt that we honestly desired peace. On the other hand, we| had every right to protect our life and our honor to the laxt. The gov- ernment owed a duty to the people to use every possible means, at any rate not to break off too abruptly the negotiations for the compromise that they had #0 honestly sought. It was a principle of elementary common sense—the stronger we were in the field, the better we could negotiate DUTY TO CONTINUE FIGHT Moreover, it was n duty to continue the more than our t, unless we t were prepared to surrender uncon. ditionally to an enemy from whom we had nothing to hope. Negotia tions might improve our position but, in any case, could not make it worse, The best elements of the urmy, and a large part of the peo ple, expected ys to negotiate The majorit were ready the last of army, and it of the German people and willing to sacrifice thelr strength to the was the duty of the government to carry out this aac rifice. I spoke to this effect, using the same tone as that of the chan cellor his of October 5, and I also suggested that Ebert, as leAder of the social democrats, should be & leading post, in order in speech n some by his help to strengthen the resist ance of the people and bring new strength into the fight I agreed with Admiral Scheer in. holding it impossible to abandon submarine warfare, which was con- | tinually reducing England's strength, To throw down a weapon at the enemy's bidding would be grossest confession of weakness im- aginable and would immeasurably the | Bolt’s i Cm i amp: abandoned. This com views, led me t a enntc son was the deepest with Major Baron von blow army, and especially to hin ch of the beg the nav The injury to the morale r from four Buropean nations in represented in the roll of officers for the new I onal Feder-/ October, He could again only refer! oP ine fleet must have been iim ation of Trade Unions, which will soon hold its first world convention here, The officers right, are:|to his not Colonel Haeften, | veasurable. The cabinet bad L. Souhaux, France, first vice president; Edo Fimmen, Holland, secretary and treasurer; W. A. Appleton,| too, had never spoken any sUCh| thrown up the sponge. England, president; J. Oudegéest, Holland, joint secretary and treasurer; Corneille Mertens, Belgium, second tastrophe. ‘World Trade Union Heads From Four Naiions Increase the confidence could of a) @'Now, as before, I hold that if it} On the contrary, we must « Do| no pearer knowledge of events there. | 1144 spon himself the duty mot 1 reptied in ax in any way p we must .n-| tell us clearly what we are lid not thé secretaries of state,! + Low unresisting tea peace Of Via that the government had also ftikte armiat t, if you ask anything incons: who b expressed themselves #0/ ))) A government who had no continue the fight if| “We éanne accept any h our national honor, or to! confidently on th 1ith, move to cose of that would deserve and eaiel came to the worst. conditions ¢ rovide for| render us incapable of fighting fur-| action? They knew well what was/tne contempt of the fighters and Even if I had now spoken with more | an orderly evacuation of the (er-|ther, then our answer must be| at stake workers.” This speech, teo, was Une than bel the secretary ritory, This involves a time limit of “No!"’ It to me wholly ineompre-| accompanied by action. Nothing was should kiad to hear | not less than two or three months.| “In saying this, I am not depart-|hensible that, on May 12, 1919, Secre- done to raise morale at home oF im judgment of the Nor must we ace nything that | ing from my previous position in the tary Konrad Haussmann should say,| the field. Prince Max has pronounced thereby be rendered more easy for hostilities, The note forces one to I then dealt with him assume that thinis the o which the entente allege i iwas not thinking of enemy. The conditions’ are designed hod carried out on the retreat breaking off at the moment, but wae to put us out of the feld “We have, in only pressing for clearness in our Before we go into detalis, the! duty, done e\ thought and final aims I summed | enemy must tell us clearly what his | destruction fer as is up my views once again in th terme are We do not wih to with military needs it of fr en willing worst and any more favorable situation 1 j lowing phrases break off with since the negotiations must makes it impossible for as to renew. least Electrically Toasted OLLED OATS are a staple that builds up and holds up a splendid vigor in men, women and children, Oats are what they have been for cen- turies, but scientifically and mechanically knowing how to produce Rolled Oats for the table has greatly developed. Through long and searching tests made in our laboratories, every detail yr ah to produce Superior Rolled Oats was completely and originally determined. In our mechanical and experimental rooms was created a method for electrically toasting our Rolled Oats which gives them.a rich, rare and su- perior flavor. Wilson out of hand the destruction ‘WILSON GAVE US NOTHING. SAYS LUDENDORFF — Refers to Reply Note of the U.S. | abnotute y Inexcumable to leave 17 That is an historical « t hely the nemy The enem warned them against capitulation, t destroyed the 1 that was required was to look the afterwards, In Lille we left unhurt! facts in the f to cease deceiving the electric light, the water «upply| themselves and the people, and and the unw line, but destroye w themselves with resolution in the te " nes and r ction, suck was to be found at ways, The wor me! general headquarters by the BEng hk nn f On the 20th received the new “The rer 1 t an er 1. The submarine inolated cases of brut I n wa doned; the way lone be the with all ite disastrous abuses req er neer ndertaken. The phasized the n for a 1 I drew attention to The meeting then closed. them of thé aay tarie er and their Tt Th lint amid great app! if our workers h ber & ake 4 that we/ acéordance with our! would not have | rything to limit the/ but would have fought on.” Everything plainly consistent | would be! w: For Sale at Your Grocer’s Manufactured by Fisher Flouring Mills Seattle Tacoma Bellingham whom I was sitting in confident mood. meeting about ral b in drafting such answer, The pirite. traveled back to Spa in drafting suena very coda . this. Why, I do not know. We were eee ee men with views of our own, and We yy followed the course which we fe epg garded as the right one, and whiel in ae free er we had always pursued. |tember or the beginning « The wes in Wieon a This, takan together wit patched on the 20th. The submaring: Improvement in spirits in Ber ed until nv when, optimism dixappeared We proposed a rallying ery to the aned 10 me | ople. We refused to take any Bae nproved exp their pleasure that 1 had so chancellor did not alter the jon by his speech on October ne man who takes his stand on the peace of justice The situa on October I have honorab use: “If our army, | judgment on himself and his eo 4 known on Novem. | | 9 that the peace would terrible form, the arnty down its arms ues The minister for war alone did any work, striving to provide the foreements. Here, too, nothing achieved, for part of the men |to go to the front, and the on | ment yielded! that to has come about be expected