The Seattle Star Newspaper, September 26, 1919, Page 13

HUNS CAUGHT IN | LUDENDORFE BITTER UEHLMANN LET CAT OUT OF THE B Section Two | IN RECALLING EFFECT OFRUSS PROPAGANDA iF Not alone with his disi have trouble in the early umm tegrating army did Liudendorff rer of 1918. He wos compelled to take a hand in forming government volicy and to try to @rrange matters in Rus to overthrow Lenine, but din authorities. sia and far off Turkey. He wanted, found himself at odds with the Ber. A dramatic incident was the fall of Foreign Secretary von Kuehimann. tng for the army command Negotiations, frankly told the was no longer possible, and ¢ @mbitions was necessary. His letting the cat out of th Junkers, and the army comma mann, who had also angered tolerating Joffe, the Bolshevik von Hintze was put in his pla This adroit diplomatist, thinking he was speak- in ndeavoring to initiate peace German reichstag that victory ompromise of Germany's vast e bag brought a:howl from the nd backed them up. So Kuehl- Ludendorff by receiving and ambassador, fell, and Admiral} ye. “MY THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS” By Gen. Eri Published by The Star thru Copyrighted, 1919, ed in Great Britair im Spain by Messrs s Australia. All rights Scandinavian countries At the beginning of July, Secretary State Von Kuehimann retired from office. His attitude in the Feichstag. and particularly his asser- @i6m that the war could hardly be @nded by a purely military decision, ‘Was going too far for the imperial “chancellor. We also felt it our duty to express our opinions. But what finally turned the scale in favor of ‘the resignation of Secretary of State Von Kuehimann, was his personal @ttitude during these days. Von Kuehimann was the type of the post-Biamarckian German diplo ‘Mat. The entrance of the Bolshe Viks in Berlin and the unspoken con gent to the propaganda sent out from the Russian embassy wil! al Ways be connected with his name. I greeted Secretary of State Von Hintze as his successor, as I consid ered him a strong nature. I told him of my hope to make the entente eager for peace, and pointed out dangers of Bolshevism, as well Qs‘ the revolutionary activities of “Herr Joffe. He continued in the Bolshevik current of hia predecessor fin office, partly because of his views on Russia, partly because he, too, did Rot become master of the old policies of the foreign office In Russia events had taken a pe euliar course, which was typical of the soviet government's untruthful attitude. With its consent, the entente had continued to organize Czecho-Slovak bands of troops from the Austrian Hungarian war prisoners. They were intended to be used against us. and were to be brought to France g@tross the Siberian railway. And this was allowed by a government with which we were at peace, and we let it go on! I wrote to the im perial chancellor at length about this at the beginning of June, and called his attention to the dangers which threatened us from the soviet gov ernment. CZECHO-SLOVAKS HELD I IBERIA This weapon, which had been forged against.us, was indeed to be turned against the soviet govern ment itself, The entente had recog nized that there was no use working with this government which, more over, leaned on Germany. Therefore, it took a stand against Bolshevism. The Czecho-Slovak troops did not come to France; they were held up on the Siberian rallway on the fron of Russia and Siberia, in order $to fight the Moscow government from this point. Th pressed for. ward more and more gne middie Volga, in the of Kasan and Samara. By occupying the Siberian rail- way, the entente, at the same time, succeeded in preventing the return of our prisonefs of war in Siberia This was certainly a blow to our strength. If the soviet government had been in good faith with its peace treaty, trains which ried the Czecho-Slovaks could have borne German prisoners of war weil. But it was not honorable. Bolshevism hurt us wherever it was able. Up the Volga and westward of its downward current, that waa still ly in Bolshevik control, the Don Cossacks occupied the lower Don, down into our sphere of occu pation. The hetman, Gen. Krasnoff, was decidedly anti-Bolstevik in feel ing, and fought the goviet troops But he lacked weapons and ammu nition, I had entered into communi ition with him in order to prevent hig joining the entente The wituation was opmplicated, in no far that I could hot make any Gifficulties for the Holshevistically inclined policy of the and that Krasnoff looked upon the soviet government, and not the en tente, his foe, Nevertheless, it was powsible to keep him from taking any open stand in fhvor of the en. against direction these same as governmen as tente, and to win him, in a measure, | fas a confederate. If we decided to fight from Moscow, then he would come to some compromise with it ways also ‘é c¢ Von Ludendorff A reserved Londen Tin n Canada and and the Russia openly come out on our side In the wide, fruitful steppes of the district of Kuban, between the Don Cossacks and the Caucasas moun tains, Gen, Alexeteff, with his volun-| teer army, was fighting against the! Bolshevik troops. He was acting un- der English influence. But 1 believe that he was so good a Russian that |he, too, would have joined us if we! {had fought the soviet government. SOON A HILATED BOLSHEVIKS The Bolsheviks, for the time being. were In the ascendency. In the be ginning of June, altho the Moscow government could not go far enough in its assurances of peace, they land ed a few thousand men from the southwestern Azof district over the Sea of Azot at Taganrof. Here they were soon annihilated by German troops. In Novoroasisk were still the rem. nants of the Russian ships which | had escaped from Sebastopol. Our military right and the laws of necessity required us to demand or enforce their return from there. In this, too, the foreign office, in com. sideration for the soviet government, delayed negotiations, altho no better proof could have been shown of its unfriendly attitude, at least of its inability to prevent unfriendly ac- | tions of its troops, than the landing at Taganrog. | At length the soviet government agreed to the return of the ships to Sebastopol. Only a portion of them arrived; the majority of them were sunk by the Bolsheviks, influenced, after all, by a national feeling, in the harbor of Novorossisk. We had stipulated with the soviet govern: ment to make use of the ships dur ing the war as much as the military situation should require. We have had no use of them. | MY THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS | As regards Great Russia, our pol fey, as carried out by Ministerial Di rector Krieg, worked directly in fa vor of the There is no doubt that right thru the summer it prevertted’ us from forming a new military front. This I recognized On general grounds I held such a |policy to be short-sighted, as it was | bound, in the long run, to strengthen ole Bolshevist movement. tolshevists, t could only do us harm; and} irded it as the duty of our gov. ernment to guard against such an eventuality, not only military grounds, and indeed more urgently, from the purely political point of view. Dr. Helfferich re. |garded this as quite posable. The | Position of the government was cer. tainly difficult, but they had only themselves to thank for it. They assured me that their polley reflect ed public opinion in Germany. Here, again, | was compelled to be that consideration for ten cies of internal polities was imp the effective ution of the As for position could easily ha made rapid tack on Petrograd with the troops had im the F t. With the help Jot the Don Cossacks, we could also jha attacked in the direction of Moscow. This would have been far jbetter than merely defending a long line, which more troops n would been required for a short besides unnerving the troop would have been maint We on but also He n Jing war we at pre our military we absorbed ha whose moral ned by operat could have deposed the government, which waa thoroly | tlle to and given authorities in Russia, which working against us, but indeed anxious to co-operate with us. This would have success of great importance to the general conduct of the war. TRAP SET BY BOLSHEVIS' If some oth stablished in | most certainly h acti mn. r hos. help to other us were not ernment were Russia, it would al ve been possible to RIVAL CHIE JOHN FITZPATRICK, union organizer for the steel work-,and atte: ers, and ELBERT H. GARY, SEATTLE, WASH., FRIDAY, chairman U. 8. Steel Corpora- tion board of directors, both are Illinois men. FITZPATRICK is a horseshoer by trade; Gary is a lawyer) by profession. FITZPATRICK FITZPATRICK GARY has been successfu mayor and county judge at politics for law and business, FITZPATRICK has been unsuccessful in politics, is poor; GARY is rich. is the younger man. Wheaton, IIl., before he quit if win- SPTEMBER 26, 1919. ‘S IN STEEL STRIKE | JOHIV FITZPATRICK =~ ding labor meetings. GARY, as an orator, deals in facts, figures, logic and the law as it is written. FITZPATRICK, too, is an orator, one who deals with things of the heart, and the stomach, the dinner pail and the right of every man to have a nice little home of his own. GARY wasn't satisfied with law, altho he was the high- of the Federal Steel Co., which afterwards was included in the U. S. Steel Corporation. |. FITZPATRICK didn't stick to the forge, altho at one BOLSHE HUN ARMY |* “ || Continued From Page One * “4 no why were no complaints heard from them’? | The cultivation of corps the authority {manding officer, the fluence lolder men the ounger |these things less important for th re id they mmon life ours of duty even during the tradition of the “esprit de of the com of the on wer oper: ment Jalone did not suffic to hand on t corps of unger generation. The had men, lid wc sible to do otherwise in battle or |while in the trenches. Fin ad had to kéep up the dignity of his po xition, which must be clearly d: 4 and he had to maintain his authority for how else would it have been pos sible for him to exert ro a r the troops in all emer 8 All this demanded, among imany other requisit atuthen of authe exclust pes oe © would lose re ers to officer live with to It was not 5 ny dec tative vene the offic ne spect | Were the reasons forgotten which jin peace time prompted the removal jof the non-commissioned officers from the men's quarters into separate quarters of their own? But there | was no inclination to think of such things; people were only anxious to undermine authority, to shatter the foundations of the state, in order the |more easily to further their own wretched Interests. DECLINED TO LIVE ON in politics; he was elected est income-earning lawyer in Chicago, and became president FARE OF TROOPS Life in the corps of officers was governed by regard for the men, the officer himself, and, lastly, the whole structure of municipal and imperial ning at the polls is success, for he was defeated last year time he was one of the best blacksmiths in Chicago, and order which stands and falls with the when he ran for mayor on the newly formed Labor Party became president of the Chicago Federation of Labor. ticket. GARY is a LL.B., LL.D. and Se.D., which indicates that GARY drank at the fount of knowledge in schools, col-|he is a man of much learning. leges and law offices. | FITZPATRICK is plain “Fitz” to every Chicago working- _ FITZPATRICK acquired his learning mostly at the forge!man, which indicates that they think well of him. over the Peace of Brest, whereas, in| dealing with the Rolshevists, a «im ple pandonment of the treaty with out any idea an to how matters would develop, would have been the same kind of “payment in advance” policy as were all the ideas about a peace of “understanding,” so long ax the enemy would accept no such peace Our government remained wholly |tgnorant of the underground activi ties of the Bolsheviks, whom they regarded, or wished to regard, as honest. They entered into further negotiations with them over those points of the treaty which had not been cleared up. Nothing, not even unavenged murder of our ambassa. dor at Moscow, shook their faith. They walked straight into the trap |met by the Bolsheviks, while stmul [taneously showing distrust of all lother tendencies in Russia, The Rolshevist government was very accommodating; it granted the German demands with regard to E thonia and Livonia, conceded the in dependence of Georgia, agreed to pay an indemnity by installments, and held out prospects of the delivery of raw material, including oil, from Baku. Later on, the first install ments of the indemnity were actually paid as agreed, rather to my sur | prise. Our government's confidence in the BolMhevists went so far that they actually wanted to supply arms and ammunition to Herr Joffe. The gentleman who brought from the for ign office the document dealing ro with the matter, remarked to me,|eonic dreams of world conquest. The|vorable opportunity to get matters | “This 4 jand Joffe | At the jour Georgian erial remaing in Germany, will use it against us here conference in Spa, when policy was being dis cussed, th imperial chancellor agreed to send Col. Von Kress, who had returned to Germany from the I eutine front, to Tiffia, as his rep- resentative, with an esort of one or two comparfies It had become sential for us to # aA stronger hand In this district ot merely be we hoped to secure some mill- from t quart er to obtain raw rm terials. (Germany and Turkty were {then clashing over control of the riches of the Caucasus.) COULD NOT RELY ON TURKEY That we us tary assistance |but also tn ord could not rely on Turkey in the matter had been o1 ain demonstrated by her in |Batum, where she claimed the right to retain all the stocks for herself. We could only expect to get oll from Baku if we helped ourselves. conduct The shortage of fuel at home, and |the difficulties of our winter fight ing, with all their tendant incon veniences, were only too firmly Im pre my m™ After the attack the Seventh army, the army's reserves of fuel had also run lout, and we felt the shortage keenly Oil was needed for the Ukraine rail. sed on mory. | The director of railways had to solve the problem of tank ships. I was highly disgusted when the Bol shevists, simply in order to injure us. sank the Elbruz, the largest tank steamer In the Black sea, at Novorow nink. $ The crucial question was how wo were to get to Baku Here, again, consideration for the soviet government prevented us from acting firmly or rapidly, and the first gvent of importance was that the English from Enseli crossed the Caspian sea at the beginning of Aug ust, and took possession of the town. Their oceupation éf Baku, which was only rendered possible by the complete inactivity of the Turks in North Persic, was a serious blow for us. By this move the English also came into closer touch with the vol unteer drmy in the Kuban district, |but, on the other hand, at Baku, |they were within our reach. An attack upon them, involving only a small fore |General headquarters set about pre- paring a blow against them, with the co-operation of Nuri's troop® and sent & brigade of cavairy and a few battalions to Tiflis, The ques- tion of the transport of troops had not yet been settled, when the situ: ation in Bulgaria compelled us to |send the troops to Rumania. | NO NAPOLEONIC DREAMS In the East IT went as, in my view, was absolutely manded by our military position and leconomic needs. I had no Napol- of course, | only #o far nxious struggle in which I was 80 |deeply engaged, left me no time to pursue fantastic schemes. 1 wanted no territory in the Ukraine or Caucasus; my only object was to procure the supplies that | were so urgently needed for our bare maintenance, and the prosecution of the war. I hoped also, now that had succeeded in breaking the bloc ade at this point, to,improve our Jeconomie position, and’ thus to rai our physical strength and morale. I wished to make w use was |possible of the manpower of these Alutrict rtly by direct recruiting, but on a larger scale, and with greater prospect of success, thru en listing labor for employment in ¢ many, so as to release men for the pursued this course in all of the ind had hopes 1) of obtaining direct recrutts from the German population there. We did not, however, work quick ly enough, The Highth army, at | Riga, complained that the ministry jof war, in spite of all my persist ence, had failed to give any instruc: | tions in the matter. It was only to prot German kultur that I immediate military thought of the future, That did not involve any expenditure of military strength, I wanted to strengthen and consolidate German national #0 I dust, and foster nt beyond et wi spirit, and thus increase ite influ for an air flight 4 seemed possible. | requirements and | lence Some of my acquaintances {had placed a substantial sum of { |money at my disposal for this end HERE IS CHAMP I used it to mupport the German na-| IN HARD LUCK tional press in Austria. Robbed, Thrown Out of Auto I steadily furthered my pet scheme of settding the isolated Germans scat tered thruout Russia, side by side with our soldiers in the Eastern dis. tricta, In this matter, I made my ; |nelf the advocate of Germanism and Jailed against the government. I rejected as fantastic, however, such proposals ‘ as the foundation of a German lonial sta n the Black sea. No pi as had b nh made with the solu n of the Polish pro! m™. The Emperor Charles’ attitude var led from time to time. Baron Burfan. the successor of Count Czernin, ad hered to the Austro-Polish solution ‘(which involved an Austrian king for! Poland). Our government was still jin the position of not knowing its own mind. It was as uncertain on this point aa in the rest of its st rn policy A good opportunity to dispose the Austro-Poligh questh for all, was not taken. Charles had written the Parma letters (proposing to France and of. fering to urge Germany to give up| Alsace: Lorraine). Um preasure |from Vienna, he had to decide in |May to gake his “Canossa” pilgrim age to Spa (This journey was made to make amends to the kaiser) |Mexicans Warned | The position was one of which | . . . in Frisco Strike anything might have been made, The | field marshal and myself urged| SAN FRANCISCO, Sept. 26.—Mex who have been brought here |Count von Hertling and Secretary of | State von Kuehimann to use this fa to break the strike of dock workers and longshoremen t been warned by the Mexican consul to avoid all strike breaking if they wish to keep out of troub Many strike breakers are at work, union officials admit, but they class them as being inexperienced. Coastwist have had thoir schedules deranged by the strike de. lay and some transpacific liners are b @ held up. Mayor James Rolph {s continuing his efforts to end the strik: |Chicago Officials Say Men Returning CHICA », Sept. 26.—Steel com- pany officials In the Chicago district claimed today that they we gradu | The Illinois Steel company, in | South Chicago, had six furnaces go: jing this morning. An official pre- dicted that all departments would be in operation at a limited capacity by the first of next week, C. FB. Nilson is the champion hard victim of Seattle, according to his opinion Frida morning Nilson awakene in the city fail with a big dd. a skinless chin bruised joints, an empty pocket book and a police ¢ ge of drunkenness against him Nilson was robbed of $250 and thrown from an automobile at First ave.and Broad st, shortly after mid night. Sergt. Robert L. Boggess . the incident nd fired a number shots at the speeding automobile af had been sent to spital Where his injuries were unable to furnish the a description of the men who robbed him He wasn’t certain about anything. But he believed he remembered the men taking his money Just befo ‘found himself lying on the street pluck oe f st ot |. Nilmon he the city h n once and 2, le » Emperor dressed, w police with icans |put on a clear footing. They, how ever, lacked the necessary resolu tion, | With great solemnity, same docu |ment or another was drawn up and jxigned, not merely by the leading statesmen, but also by the two mon archs personally, This however, laid no obligation whatever on Austria-Hungary, and was utterly worthless, Our diplomacy had failed, and the dual monarchy had won. | Everything had turned out as we soldiers had prophesied. I Burian felt himself, and with good reason, not bound by anything. He continued to aim at the Austro- Polish solution with the persisten which was at once so prominent feature of his character and so noying to our diplomats vessels ron s a |Ezra Meeker Sees Tacoma From Air TACOMA, Sept. Ezra Meeker, of the Northwest, The Gary works of the Tilinols Steel company had 75 coke ov crossed the old Oregon trail several| Sc! comE way Ay ity Sh, |operation. Four thousand men were |times in an ox-drawn prairie schoon:| reported working in the plant which took his first Joy-ride in usually employs 12,000 Thureday ploneer who re-| er, an air plane when he flew over v The jto have USE JAF a MEXICO CITY, Sept. ~Ameri- can capitalists are said to be plan ning mineral developments in Mex- ico with Japanese labor, ‘ with Percy Barnes. is believed age record coma pilot 89-year-old pioneer established an » he} status of the officer. The way of life of the higher staff officers was also sharply criticised | Yet is there a man who does not (know of the nerveracking work and og burden they bear unceas ingly? The troops were relieved, but the staff remained on duty, day and | night, | For four years I endured this state f tension without rest or relief. In such circumstances I could not live on fleld-kitchen rations ertheless, in October, 1918, I de- Jelared to the new war cabinet of |Prince Max that headquarters was | willing to live on the fare provided |by the field kitchens if the various | secretaries of state and the whole of Berlin would undertake to do like- but until then we should live in _ way as was considered best the men and ourselves. The im ellor, Prince Max, de clin®d to eat field-kitchen fare, and long as I remained in the fleld |we messed simply,” but as before, | The other higher e#taffs were in a similar position. They lived much in the same way as we did. I have never countenanced excesses, and if they have occurred, I disclaim all responsibility, So long as we have any social order at all, authority must exist, and there must po distinctions. There must still b before, a corps of officers, in which | the individual officer must keep him |self distinct from the ®oldier while continuing to be his true friend Then came complaints that the off: cers were living at the expense of the men—a shameful calumny spread |by enemy and home propaganda | Many men of undoubted honesty and intelligence came to me bleating out such general accusations, instead of vigorously assailing them, They had already lost all regard for the mo- rality of the corps of officers, so in, extricably had they fallen into the snare spread by the circulators of | these reports. It was said that officers of the reg- |ular army hid in their quarters, This was the reward of a grateful people to the regular officer for his sacrifice and devotion! ‘There were only a few Jof them left. The remainder had |fallen or had been hopelessly dis jabled. The corps of officers had lost from 80 to 90 per cent of its full strength. Could they not understand that to fill certain posts of the staffs, on which the fate of the troops depend. ed, officers of exceptional experience and initiative were required? It is obvious that for such duties the reg- ular officer was more fitted than an | officer of the reserve, and that even. tually it would be impossible to re- | place the former. I begged the military cabinet to in vestigate these charges, This ex: posed their injustice all along the line. Notwithstanding this, T persistent: ly issued reminders that officers fit for service should be sent from home Jand from the various staffs to the |front, to be replaced by officers fit only for garrison duty. The staffs during the summer of 1918 were so composed that several divisional commanders complained to me that they had too few fit officers on their staffs to cope with all demands, wise: 80 “The Seattle Star = »==| OFFICERS. I was always opposed to the prem father and son on the same Vhen I had direct command, well as when I was chief of staff th ast, I set my face againa= »w all I could do was to draw attention of the military cabinet: ta in the this the to it ‘ I heard unfavorable reports com cerning the working of canteens, Hi 0, the officers were said to be acting to the detriment of the I went into the matter. Everye was in order. The canteen ons, on which the soldiers sented, controlled the work od the distribution of prof its. The sale of goods in the canteens: was strictly rationed for officers and men alike at so much per head. Each man might buy only as much as was allowed on the carefully calewe lated distribution schedule. ‘The higher staffs, having no can of their own, drew on the cen« stores at the same prices as the eens did. As these supplied off- nd men at a fixed rate and @ ) profit, the higher staffs—both: officers and m@n, of course—bought their goods somewhat cheaper tham the regiments. This | also stopped. SCANDA | THE C! Then !t was asserted that the cam teen moneys were unfairly adminis tered. This accusation was as false men thing commis: wer BITTERLY ATTACKED — BY PEOPI | as the others. It was only the soldier |who derived any benefit from the profits, mainly, of course, in kind. But it was in the lines of commun | cation that the officers were posed to live in special luxury. There I have seen an enormous amount of | loyal work, from which the army de 7 |rived incalculable benefit. It was Ob- vious that in these lines officers, ag” well as men, lived more quietly and ~ iy comfortably than was the case with the troops who were only in the come munication areas on their way to” and from the line. Naturally, also, the men felt this, altho everything possible was done for them. Was it such a crime for an officer to buy something in Belgium or any- where else to send it home to his — family, in order to brighten their life” a little? Was it not the families of officers, (neans, who suffered most severely from the increased cost of living af | home? | When T was with the commander in-chief in the east in July, 1916, Tar ranged similar facilities for the men, these facilities being, later, still fur | ther developed. From the west and from Rumania parcels were sent home in large numbers by the men. Any special case of irregularity om” the part of an officer which was brought to my notice, even anonye mously, was subjected to most searching investigation. The statum and way of life of the officers were frequently discussed by the highe® staffs. Under the pressure of the continual complaints the field mar shal issued an appeal to all officers, HARSH WORDS | FOR LOOTERS | The corps of officers has emerged triumphant from this attack on its The man who infringed the code was an exception, and was not one of us. No measures adopted jagainst him cofild be too severe, The | officer who did not emerge from this war with clean hands as an hom jorable man, who retained |which was not his, even if only to |save it from destruction, besmirched the Fatherland, the army, the of officers and himself, be | The corps of officers, as a whole, may be proud of itself, not least bee cause, despite all the work of agi tation going on in its rear, it held the army together for four years, led it so often to victory, and was still able, in co-operstion with loyal non- |commissioned officers and men, to jlead it back over the Rhine—a stue pendous achievement, amongst the |sreatest deeds of the war. | Enemy propaganda did not cone |cern itself with the non-commissioned officers, It was considered that their authority was already impaired jand it was not deemed necessary to any particular attention to them, But antagonism between commise sioned and non-commissioned officers which had not existed in the in peace time, was ingeniously ated. CROWN PRINCE Is ALARMED Many signs of disease had bee! progressively showing themselyes the German people and army, symptoms of disorder were no lon , to be ignored; indeed, thelr presence . was recognized by many, 4 The crown prince, who juently — visited me at Avesnes, refi abe to the matter with increasing » and also sent in a report to the kaiser _ jon the subject. I could only ac | quiesce in this. Md T | In cases of mental disease it is ex: |ceedingly difficult to know exactly what to do during Initial stages, ‘The existence of malady is felt, (CONT'D ON PAGE FOURTERN) honor. who are rarely men of . Ba og