The Seattle Star Newspaper, September 19, 1919, Page 13

\ THE SEATTLE STAR—FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1919. GENERAL VON LUDENDORFF GIVES EXPLANATION > | WHY BIG PUSH FAILED 4 Ent Es a seneeennstitsnennie - | PLANS OF ” Mystery of “Big Drive” Cleared | Germans Planned to Break Thru +-HUN DRIVE ee British Flanders Army : | Rear of British Flanders Army — Ludendorff's great smash of March, 1918, however badly it shook the allies, did not turn ‘ Thoughts and Actions,” appearing in The Star today. ‘a it out as he had planned. This the German leader reveals in the installment of his book “My 4 TConti ued From Page One| | Thielt ¢ Capture of the devastated region was only the secondary part of a grandiose scheme. The 4 *Roulere | final drive for Amiens was an afterthought. eS : fama petra tga ee = What he intended was a break thru to the north of the devastated district and into the rear Sach other in turn, and with their in of the British armies in Flanders. His two northern armies were to perform this task and his Ber wings cut off the enemy holding 4 the Cambrai reentrant, afterward ty ecoutri = southern army was merely to’ support them. isos, ats atvanes cee be toe . But Byng's army around Cambrai stopped dead his northernmost attacking army and pun= — ished it so badly that it was exhausted within four days. His southern army broke thru and made — ithe drive across the devastated district, forming the great Amiens salient, which, Ludendorff Peronne. This advance was to be pro. tected on the south flank by the 18th army, in combination with the ex treme left wing of the second. The strength and equipment of these ar. ° 7° “ ” Tile was adnpied to Unie teams. | admits, was a position “by no means favorable. ; For the decisive operation the 17th On March 20, 1918, along the whole limits matters were left to the /it in view in my instructions to the French forces had 2 brilliant share And second armies were to+remain front of the attack, the guns and! groups. larmien. Tut the 17th army could not|in this work of bombing and se Under the orders of the army group | trench mortara, with th ammu lget on; the Second and 18th were | helped hold up the drive.) of Crown Prince Rupprecht. The! nition, were in position behind, in, BAD CHECK ‘etill gaining ground. I continued SITUATION NOT 18th army joined that of the German and in places even in front of the|* ao CAMBRAI he whote of 2%, efforts towards reinforcing the FAVORABLE 4 crown prince. | Heedine foremost trench rk for about two hours the whole of \tefe wing of the Second army, and - ve = Remembering the November cam. SPol. Able achievement, and at the same |OUF artillery engaged the enemy's |to direct it and the 18th on Amilens.| p14; notion 1e 0 a ae ‘ paign in Poland in 4 (when the time a marvel t the ny had batteries, then most of It was switch ‘The enemy's line was now becom: | Hon. in itself it was by no Austrian command brought on defeat | neither seen anything nor rd any |@4 on to trench bombardment, in| ing denser, and in places they were|ravcrable. How G. H. @ was to by insisting on its own schemes) I) movermént at night. At times which the trench mortars also took | even attacking themselves, while our| with it later on could not yet bey Meant to exercise a far-reaching in- batteries were subjected to harass | Part A little before 9 a. m. most Oflarmies were no longer StFONE \termined, as we were still in fluence on the course of the battle ‘Douai ing fire, end ammunition dumps |OUr fire—only a portion being left) enough to overcome them unaided. |r 44 stages of the operations. ‘ went up here and there, All this OM hostile batteries and special | (tt wag the rapid shift of French| ne avre bridge-head (@ nafrew must have attracted the enemy's at. Pointe—waa concentrated to form 4/ forces westward which countered hold the Germans had on the south VALENCIENNES {entlon. But he observed it all along DArrage. Our infantry advanced t0/the plans of Ludendorft at this|nonk of the Avre southeast the front, and could, therefore, ob- ‘he assault point) ‘The ammunition was not) ariiens The French afterwards tain no certain indication The 17th army, which had the sufficient, and supply became diffi-|Tinistered a sharp defeat on The divisions had at first been die strongest enemy in front of it, only cult. The repair of roads and rail-| troops exposed here with the tributed behind the front of attack, reached his second line; the barrage | ways was taking too long. in spite) a+ their backs) was a special but were pow crowded together in had gone far ahead; the infantry had of all our preparations leulty in the tactical sense. The anthatreraft shelters, behind the lost toweh with it, It remained in After thoroly replenishing ammu | viability of giving it up wae come mere interference from above. It was desirable to make the fullest Possible use of the resources of the ip of the German crown prince and this was facilitated by the organ ization adopted. Moreover, it was a personal satis. jumping-off places in our foremost this position, lying down, with no tion the 18th army attacked be-|cussed. But as this would lines. Th centration of 40 or 50 artillery support. |tween Montdidier and Noyon on the | shown the enemy that we had divisions (the ¢ an division Was) During the Second army's attack,|30th of March, ‘On April 4 the Sec-|up any further attack on now about 10,000 men) had Mot been the yperation between the in-|ond army and the right wing gf the | we kept it. observed by the enemy, nor had it/fantry and the artillery was better.|18th attacked at Albert and south of| ‘The new front had now to bel been reported to him by his highly The infantry penetrated Into the en-|the Somme towards Amiens. fied. Some of the played-out developed mecret service. emy’s second position. | ‘These actions were indecisive. It|signs were relieved by fresh The marches took place at night.| With the 18th army everything | Was an established fact that the en-| from quiet fronts, the leas tired but the troops sang as they passed pended asx intended. It was tnak-|¢my's resistance was beyond our were left in the line. Ev thru the villages. Such masses can: | {00° CO04 progrems, strength. the greatent attention and aia not be concealed. But no more did bestowed on completing the the airmen discover the railway| (The situation thus created was sivichiegditese in rear. Wee’ tal Gules transport that had been taking place |Most the reverse of what Ludendorft behind the front of attack since Feb- |*0Usht as he has explained his plans) 940° and on the south toward the left fruary. It was heavy behind the ph poder Povey be hea at Dank of the Oise, was anticipated. 3 Avae whole front, but the bulk of it was bs ae perl age ype Be proton Feints and preparations for further Tb lunmistakably going on behind the = Laggemye parade - we attack were made ) |line Arras La Fere, as was reported "topped. had been ordered, in con.) ggg eran torte ond Less. by the ie ey peti: = emg incover aay. Second army, to murround the hill bo | SHRI ILLIANT FEAT,” i ‘Getieen Ger semiseh| | dateet der. Gola hae ~ must as. sitiona southwest of Cambrai ani Pll pertecnty Solas tibee + - sume this; otherwise his defensive then break thru north of the Gev'| ‘The entente now attacked at Al- and the Argonne; ‘ fw 3 measures would have been more ef- cages region and into the noms be | bert and southeast of Amiens ina dis- By the newly formed group of von .__ ee : 2 fective, and hls reserves would have the British aruniee conomtrated ‘ta connected sort of way and achloved Dre " nore en ~ “ ng. nm ie Oo! il, gai rte Sr hl St RAB-SRGWING WOW CUDENGORFF'S GATTUE PLAN of MARCH.IDIE WAS UPSET “ijiinny gira sale uy ane sy wore tate ta ne eed Sey By the group of Duke Albrecht, be | ane —|sence of war is uncertainty; that ts £0 thru the devastated region and/made another attempt. with the aid oer experience, and the enemy's, too, |“UPPOrt this thrust. | As it happen |of tanks, to improve its position at tween Saarburg in Lorraine and Ste.| ° |the main blow intended for the de-|VilersBretonneax, it got ahead ee ae see. te om W f | DESEKRTERS TOLD struction of the British was parried| well but was unable to hold what it ndagau (upper Almac) | War or Oo ew for or OF PLANS ISep te won. the: enppectina rman | Sica Te ore fen eee & Gee.“ vos, Galiwits On the 18th or 19th of March two| which broke thru into the devastated | + oe en oe company. According to notes found | y+ = | Mpneatas tended toward St. Quentin, and could P. alins al ure r@) un ans ergy h ges: 17TH ARMY BADLY ally. From time to time fighting no longer properly attend to affairs ne to prisoners’ BATTERED broke out again, and the situation statements, they are alleged to have ‘The possibility of broadening the @ttack on the north toward Arras. at Verdun as well. Gen. von Gallwitz ENE J. YOUNG 17th army was northwest of only to the British second [given information of the impending) 0 March there was Little remained permanently doubtful. The was in immediate command of hix| (War Editor of the New York | Cambrai, bis 2nd army south line, the barrage went ahead of © | attack change on the 17th army front, but/ other parts of the ove a: to-| - Our losses were not Inco: own third army, as well as army World.) west of Cambrai and hix 18th | the am*aulting wave and the | On the other fronts, particularly |the Second, being firmly in hand and|wards Arras and Noon, Decaine | we had been fighting with large detachment C. One ofthe great mysteries of army on both sides of St men lay down without protec |near Lille and Verdun, artillery ac-|!¢d with energy, defeated the enemy | aulet onlle wean Over by April 4, 1t|b0Ps for along time. The ‘The headquarters of the German| the war has been: Why did | Quentin tion and were shot to pieces. | tivity had increased and pressed on. The 18th gained a} | ve riitant teat, and will ever:be|!2.the 11th Ariay. was tho aay southern army in Galicia, under Gen.| Ludendorff imake his great Planned | Pincers Move Gen, Sir Jalian Byng smashed At noon, on the 20th, G. H. Q. had Gitar apneksen ovate. iter tasteen so regarded in history, What the |/!088es in officers had been ‘yon Bothmer, joined the army group| plunge in March, 1914, to re the Ludendorff scheme in four |to face the great decision whether The 17th and right wing of tactical groups too much Iatitude;! English and French had not succeed-| aruout But, me 90008 n of Duke Albrecht, and was put inthe! capture the district he had so A days, when, as Ludendorff says, |the attack was to commence on the had taken some 90, line in Lorraine as the 19th army! thoroly devastated the year be reg be go poppe ving the i7th army was exhausted lsiet. or be put off [Bet tor thle sation! of: the dittecent | OS that ie mr route four ee7tht prisoners, and in addition the hheadquarters; the chief of the staff! fore? He had laid it waste so ag kM dni og region. Meanwhile the 18th army had very delay must have increased | formations begs teo. Popeye oy pocag] fred 's battle casualties had was Col. von Hemmer, who had al-| that the allies could not ad tee eee a SS prort broken thru Gen! Gough's weak | the difficulties of troops, crowded to: |G. I. 2 hres oe oi Lefe | ‘eagetically we had achtevea | De2Yy: We could expect to get ready distinguished himself ina sim-| vance across ‘it against him : ie vine caeditaieed be Britis $th army and flowed |kether close up to the enemy. Al-|"ral direction of the fig ie ta ae eg ea eteven (many of the slightly wounded with: ilar position in the east. “A” army| without tremendous expendi ee eee eee into the devastated region, In |Feady the teosion was very hard to) More firmly in hand the events of the 25rd, 24th /in a reasonable time. We had been headquarters took over the sector} ture of energy and without be ween Croisetles and Moeuvres , order to keep the alignment the |bear. The spiritual pressure of the The result of the situation on the th had encouraged us to hope attacking and had come off well, Saarburg-St. Marie-aux-Mines. ing constantly exposed to ob- and cut in behind the Britieh a ae eC ‘ mass was urging them forward 17th army front was that the enemy for, That we had also failed to take even in the matter of casualties, vation. Then why take the | of the strong hill position to ee geek. ad ae aes In the Cambrai reentrant was not|Amiens, which would have rendered) Phe arrangements for dealing with ARRANGED FOR persis , Han: aaa | the west of Cambrai, h had and (he south wing of Byng’s | FEARED DELAY Id the opposition to|communication between the enemy's! the wounded had not sufficed at all RETIREMENTS ~ cae Mieka! at ye | been the acene of British suc army made a slow retirement in | OF ASSAU § y be indirectly re-|forces astride the Somme exceed: | points, altho they had been carefully All fronts maintained their defen-| | io es my ps "ange sede va cons arid almost immediate Brit order, punishing the Germans | And yet, our artillery relied on 1. The later had been obliged to|ingly difficult, was specially disap-| examined by the director of medical sive arrangements, in case the enemy — a x wana oe re There. | ish reverse the year t on all the way and setting |for its effect, and that was depend: | on its own unaided efforts, and pointing. Long range bombardment | service before the battle. ‘The cis tiesedl attedk: fa come je March atiack printed here. | rng ‘north wing of the and themselves tight near the west lent on the direction and strength of |had, therefore, not got ahead so fast|Of the railway establishments of|numerous slightly wounded made places it was intended to retire in . ° aon 4 lustrates how | army was to «mash into the ern edge of the devastated diss |the wind. I had to rely on the fore-|aw wax desirable from the point of | Amiens was by no means an equiva: |things more difficult by the stupid that case. prog oran he gg: eal ; , | south of this position and com. | ‘ret cast submitted to me at 11 a. m. by| view of assisting the 17th. And so| lent. and displeasing way in: which they Work had been carried on along i 3 ita gr wa | plete a pincers movement that | Then Ludendortt changed bis my meteorologist, Lieutenant Dr.jagain Grown Prince Rupprecht's FOUND Froop hurried to the rear, these lines according to program and| UT @ oo fs ba = eb | would have cut a big hole in | Whole plan. The 18th army was |Schmaus. Up till the morning of the| group cobild not gain ground between AND STOPPED The battle cost me a great deal with the greatest devotion from the| #4 not the one he would have the British line. | not badly battered and he made [20th #trength and direction w by | Croisities. and Peronne to the ex-| also. My wife's youngest son fellon © chosen had he been free th - {t the main striking force. try- |no means " vorable od. t . ~ However, our troops had beaten) am “4 middle of January. By the beginning Eke Gah oe ee This done the two armies iking means very favorable; indeed, it/ tent that had been originally intend: |, "oe! oo sastign and proved | {te 22rd. He was a flying ofieel ‘ebruat e attack w: wa! le inted. to strike for we: then te on treot ing to push far enough to cut eemed almost necessary to put off! ed " Clenmence on March 21, altho the| {he channel’ ports up to Calais Pere eee ee react ety | the main Inve of communica |the attack. ‘That would have been| Gn March #8 the atth and Becona | mnamves. superior, That they @d/ oi". nee 0) Sete, Sapien ae situation in the east was still quite| beth to shorten his line and to | > Sida: the Sith” saute tion bet the French and |very herd to do wy oe yd i to Besting Seeteen oe M5" the success that was cin the English ieaeriptasalt besbs ac! rY > SU dee ae oe rit That : vies had passed far beyond the ble was due, not only to their "s a ebecure. The military situation, how.| Teach the British, Hoes of cc es be past the devastated region British armies, That was the ry anxious to nee what! jing Bapaume-Comble Fighting | Ponetble Thing’ ctioe Pit anf | rest two German flying officers” E ever, made a decision imperative.| nication. anders = mui and ott in the open strikihe object of his push toward report I should get. It) hard all the way, the 18th army had ‘ bebe ta ath had the sad task of identifying my ‘al k deep and sticky vetoed this Amiens, past Montdidi 4 | waw not strik favorable, but it all, to thelr not being in all cases Later on we could always make - at Aged 4 th for the rear of the British main pay mMontdidier an¢ : taken Nesle and met with but little under the firm control of their of-|22% Now he rests in German soil, changes, but we would be unable to| ** heme until pri, an e armies concentrated in Filand southward Here the trap of | did indicate by at the atta ws POT resistance, The 17th army was ak ticers, They had been checked by The war has spared me nothing. a fresh start, American legions were coming | ee ms ad sand the isth | devastation he had laid for his |sible. At 12 noon the army groups |poady exhausted: It had lont too heav: [fling provlsiens and valneble die | MY Journey to the badtlefield hadl 6 work of the army headquar-| %° fast he had to strike in armiee: were. merely to support enemies proved fatal to him, He ere told that the program would be jy on the 2ist and 22nd, apparently had tinea. beens lout, taken me thru the two trench sys ters, the quartermaster-general, the} March. this movement, guarding not get up supplies fast [carried out. Now it could no longer | hecause it had fought in too det r P tems in which the opponents had * intendant general, the director of rail The only ground over which ggaitet: tte tmetription from and the French moved |be stopped. Everything must run/fopmation, The Sccond Generally senha aur, tection nag faced each other for so long. The’ ways and the officers of my immedi-| he could move so early was the , gna from the east and the British [its cours fresher, but waa already proved soun¢ hat had happened | impression it made was great; a strip, ate staff all fitted in admirably. 1| high terrain between Arras and js from and closed the G. HW. Q, sonior commanders and! ing of the olf shcll-holes. It in the 17th army did not necessitate | many miles in width, bleak and deve was able to satinfy myself of that; La Fere. So here he concen | , Smashed by Byng gap, lea ' he admit troops had all done their duty, The go¢ no farther than Albert. Its left ®"Y fundamental changes, altho | astated, stretches thru France, the when I visited the front. On these| trated the three armies of more What happened was precisely In a position by no [fost was in the he fute: UM wing hod been more delayed by hay. | SMe lessons needed more drastic | mark of the war conjured up by the occasions I discussed all relevant| than 40,000 chosen troops. His the reverse. The 17th army | mea wind a rnin d the «tt thin the Somme than by the | *polication, Above ait the tnfantry | entente. tions, adjusted difficulties, and | —————— — —_ —_—_—— he ges, fog impeded and onc must be more extended, A Retped. . tbs titein * ‘a diet ba ahh ; “% " roterded our movemonts and pre) phe 18th army was still full of |Places machine gun posts had given) (pubiianed by special arrangement with ls th tie oisiltik ae mig! ain in order to strengthen | in the east, and in spite of our im IU was their duty to spare) vented our sup rior training and gent and confidence; on the 27th it|¥S &n Undue amount of trouble and | the McClure Newspaper Syndicate. Copy= 1 gfaowen headauartors gave, me |the enemy's inclination to peace by | minent attack e and army further fight leadership from rovp'ng its full retook Montdidier, Soon, the enemy {80 caused delay. The infantry groups |tikhted. 1919. by Harper and Brothers, | hort verbal reports on the ground, |™eans of tropaganda. Col. von Haef-| saw NO CHANCE ing, if possible. Count Hertling’s 4 This was the predominant formed a fresh front north of the|had often been lacking in initiative, | reat ritain by ‘Mutchinees and Come | the distHbution of the troops, the |'™ had drawn up a memoir on the) op prack laration of February 25, in which he about the fog, but # few) comme, which was sure to be diffi.|“nd thelr co-operation with the com: | pany and the London Times, in Spain by artillery combat, and the state of the |ubJect, which I sent to the imperial | took his stand on President Wiison's | thought it an advantage, Gkit ta beadeania: panion arms had often failed, Mesars. Selx and Barlel, in Italy by Pres ‘tions. In my remarks 1 laid |Chancellor, who apparently passed it | At that moment I could not posst-| four (sic) points of February 11, had| On the 2ist, just before 4 a m., ‘ The troops had found special diffi- Wena neetatacser aie Ap ry, the greatest stress on co operation to the foreign office. Nothing of im. | ly yd in i ap Leva auc met with no response from the en-|the battle began with a tremendous | HAD TO CHANGE culty in reorganizing themselves for|{and, Rusia and the’ Soandim ? cep, | portance done. now the enemy had invariably reject | tente. crash on a front of 45 miles, between PLAN! defense at the conclusion of the at-| countries.) between the inner wings of the 17th jolbagess and . n 5 ‘i mn Se aeeaten et yp Peete Prince} The imperial chancellor was per | ed a peace by understanding. Should SECRET PEACE Croisilles and La Fere, As regards| In the direction of Amiens the en-|tack, and particularly in recognizing Rupprecht’s group, #0 as to ensure |fectly acquainted with our intention | "7° in the actual situation, have of. |" i > the Second and 18th armies (the cen-|emy's resistance seemed weaker, | when no further success was to be| In the next article Gen, Ladendorff the Cambra! reentrant being cut off, |of attacking in the west. It was the| fered him Alsacelorraine, parts of FEELERS ter and southern forces) the hours! ‘The original idea of the battle had| gained by continuing the attack. complains because the German gov- Eiec mach depended upon it, and i¢|reason why we insisted on the diplo. the province of Posen and an indem Dot. vou. 3 ten had just been|had been fixed by higher authority |to be modified, and the main weight| All troops, especially mounted | ernment did not. take sufficient steps seemed to me that the 17th army was|matic negotiations in the east being | ™tY visiting forelen countries, in order to|for the main operations; the 17th /of the attack vigorously directed on| troops, had suffered heavily from |to press for pence after his victory. Heginning to look to the west a little |accelerated, and why we had decided| (This observation is a reply to Ger-| diveuws questions relating to propa-|army, which wag fighting by itself, that point, 1 still hoped we should | bombing from hostile airmen, (Amer. | He also tells of hls further attacks: ie noon. i lio denounce the armistice with Rus-|man critics who have charged we|ganda, Without my knowledge, he|W& left more latitude, Within these! get thru to open warfare, and kept! fean flyers with both the British and |to improve his unfavorable position, LIKE sia, He knew the enormous impor-|C0uld have avoided the great slaugh-| established communication with @ ne _ ft ener : (ingle ety tance we attached to this offensive,| ter of 1818 by offering reasonable | «ubject of one of the enemy coun-|‘The government never informed mo| ‘Tho new headquarters had in the| therefore proposed te take Avesnes | We had chosen the place because the GLACK- Further, I had him informed of the| ‘rms of restitution to the entente)| tries, who was acquainted with the|of theso events, tho it must have|meantime been established at Spa.|ay the quarters of the augmented |18th army headquarters had been We discunsed the cooperation of | date it was to begin Nor did the imperial government] objects and intentions of the authort- | known of them. We got every accommodation there. there, and the telephone comm! ie operations branch. From there We! tions only needed slight additions, two army groups on the boum| Germany could only make the ene-|Mention the posuibility of peace.| ties in London and Washington, and] | am all the more surprised that it| The offices were in the Hotel Britan- could easily reach all parts of the Our mess was at first very um| ore| between the second and the 18th | iy inetined to peace by fighting. It| Secretary of State von KuhImann,|made me a verbal report on the sub-| did not contradict the rumor that a| nique, in which I had been billeted armies. The preparations were ir | was fret of all necessary to shake|Who was supposed to be conducting| ject. peace would have been arranged in| before, during our invasion of Bel- ied out a# intended. Work was ar) ing position of Lioyd George and|the whole of our foreign policy, was) ‘The terms then demanded of us| March if I had not insisted on attack-|gium in. the autumn of 1914. Spa ried on everywhere with confidence | Ciemenceau by a military victory. | first at Brest and then at Bucharest.| were o severe that only a defeated|ing. I personally requested the im much nearer the front, and with a without losing sight of the ob | petore that was done peace wax not| Neither he nor the imperial chan-| Germany could have acceded to them. | perial chancellor and the vice chan-| Verviers, could accommodate the front by car. TX intended to see a/ pleasant; later on we found m great deal for myself, and to send my | agreeable rooms. We rationed staff officers to the scenes of impor-|owners and fitted the place up wi tant events, in order to obtain im-/ furniture from Spa. To stay in pressions at first hand. rooms and have our meals there On March 18 the field marshal and a relaxation we all needed. 2 All arrangements fitted tn like i4 be thought of. All the world, in-|cellor had been able to open up any|‘rhe colonel further informed me | cell do so, They both of them whole of general headquarters, work. It was certain that the cisding the entente, knew we were | negotiations which might have led toltnat the then Reichstag depucy, Con-| refrained, without ever giving me armies would be ready for battle on| ying to attack in the west, Clem. | Peace without further fighting. rad Hauszmann, who has since con-| any reason for It. TRONS 5) BAR I went to Avesnes with the augment:| His majesty came the next : the day Jenceau declared himself decisively, I| ‘They probably continued their en-| firmed this statement, and Herr Max| Karly in March general headquar-|THE ATTACK ed operations branch. Our offices|He lived in his court train, : I considered it necessary to take | think on March 6, in favor of con-|deavors in that direction, in spite of | Warburg-Hamburg had also tried to|ters left Kreuznach, where it had| For directing the battle, for opera-| there were not good, everything|was sidetracked in a eévantage of such success ag we tnuing the war, in spite of events the entento’s refusal of the invitation negotiate peace, but without success, | been for morethan @. year, ¥ ns, it wis still Loo Lamback, was-very o Ni Vee sot * eee i SANT iy 4 4 . Bh SNA ee