The San Francisco Call. Newspaper, October 26, 1901, Page 3

'SCHLEY DESCRIBES IN THRILLING LANGUAGE | THE BATTLE OF THE WARSHIPS AT SANTIAGO 14 L THE SAN FRANCISCO CALL, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1901. FAMED BROOKLYN’S PART IN THE FURIOUS FIGHT TOLD IN INQUIRY COURT Rear Admiral Explains How the Celebrated Loop of His Vessel Was Made and the Necess'ty for Such a Careful Maneuver ASHINGTON, Oct. 25—When | the Schley court of inquiry | adjourned to-day Admiral | Schiley had not completed his ] testimony. He took the | stand about 11:30 o'clock, after former | witnesses had been recalled for the pur- | pose of making corrections in and addi- tions to their testimony, and continued | his statement until the court adjourned at $:4)0 p. m adjournment, twenty minutes in advance of the usual time, was due to the fact t the admiral's throat -had be- e somewhat sensitive as a result of his continuous talking yesterday and to- day. He had made complaint to the court of the condition of his throat immediately after concluding his recital of the story of the battle off Santiago, and Admiral Dewe: who evidently himself had no- difficulty, responded by showing to adjourn the court. Mr. owever, expressed a desire to proceed, saying that he had a number of questicns which he wished to ask, and Admiral Schiey assented to his counsel's suggestion. A quarter of an hour later Aamiral Dewey nimself renewed the sug- gestion for an adjournment, and, all cou- cerned agreeing to this proposition, the court adjourned until Monday at 1l o'elock. Great Crowd in Court. he day was a notable one in the court. oads the largest crowd that has yet attended any of the sessions was present and deep interest was _manifested | throughout the proceedings. Long berore the beginning of the morning session ail the seats reserved for visitors in the courtroom were occupied, and the greater | ace in the rear of ihese seats covered by men and women standing. y not only stood on the floor, but upon and even the | in that portion he hall was covered by men. On only | one occasion was there any effort at ap- plaise, and this was suppressed before was the ad- of July 3, royed Cer- ry of this | s relatio; the American fleet s squadron. He told his st oric occurrence in plain words and in rle, but the narrative was rd and to the point, indi- familiarity witn ail the event. He said that the a time sustained the the Spanish ships, and Spanish land batteries Texas Not in Danger. historical turn of his Brooklyn, he said that ached to within less d that he | vessel in the that e fire of th: considered his in response to an inter at he had n ged in any colloqu; Hodgse admiral is “Damn the | ; gave the details of sance May when the » Cristobal Colon was bom- this connection he denied the m by Com- eship Massa- OPERATIONS OFF SANTIAGO. Retired Rear Admirai Explains the Movements of the Squadron. x continued the | his conguct K =3 anding and in notwiths re hi pped for order § was crowded Persons wjthout t rear of the hall or tc hearing the proceed- As was the case thoroughly sel spoke clearly and s were heard through- hley's appearance on vesterday were re- rrecting their tes- se witnesses thus nma H. of estion concerr jago on the this questic ivocate Les . The | from | chief shown a verbal report commander in activity t . ection the Vixen re- officer on the the night of ot on and to the best m . 1y did, carry such message t d to other vessels Captain Le personally present and thin r iis megaphone mes- f recoliection, and a now that such ommander {n ered 7"’ its having been n chief.” the 1og of s 10 examine | e was any entry | d performes 2 there was a dis- - Vixen and this, he 1 made a trip up and what time | n I the € the message recefved?” apta he replied. “T should first dog-watch He added in re- estion that he had kept a diary of gn, but said it is in Boston. ked him to get it and he p se to Raynor the w) was constantly golng on that record was made of com- paraiively of these in the hoat's log. Captain Clark was also recalled for the pur- pee of correcting his previous statements, but 36 qaestions were asked him and he was soon Schley Resumes Testimony. Admiral Schiey then took the stand and re- sumed his story. With the court’s permission a he would go back to Clenfuegos in order his narrative might be clear. Regarding McCalla memorandum he said he received one copy. 1 there had been another, he it should be in the papers which- were re- he Navy Department In January or 1900, He said he had not bombarded thworks at Clenfuegos because he was nced that such bombardment would be un- Subsequent experience in the war, he | out this opinion. | was procecding to say that | neerning which Lieutepant | ified (the dispatch containing ation that the Spanish fieet was | was not received by him unti | une when th: pdge advocate objected. Captain Lemly—If the court please, I regret much to be compelled to make objection s character of testimony, but 1 understand | rt itself that it wants facts, Schley (sotto voee)—Well, these are | bore Schley Admiral acts Captain Lemily—1 do not understand this wit- ness is here for the purpose of making argu- ment, and 1 do not think this character of tes- timory from a witness even on the stand In | his own behalf is a matter of testzmony. Raynor contended that Admiral Schiey was | ing opinions: that he was simply testi~{ ing to facts within his knowledge. | Aftsr some further sparring the members of * court held a brief consultation without ing the courtroom and Admiral Dewey unced its decision as follown: © court i of the opinfon that it s emi- proper for the witness to make the | | etficer of | from the Colon | ence of that Spenish v also that of other of t He said that when he tutable proof of t there and that officer expressed surprise. | the going in to develop these batterdes. | ing that 1 | stream of prejectiies, statement that the dispatch was dated May 27 and not received until June 10. Then drop it, just give the facts.” To this Admiral Schley responded that thi was all he had intended to do. Thirteen day had elapsed before he received the dispatch. Proceeding, Admiral Schiey testified that he believed that Captain Cotton's statement con- cerning the offer of Lieutenant Field to go ashore at Santiago to learn positively whether the Spanish fleet was in Santiago was scme- what faulty and he detailed some facts re- leting to Field's offer which fixed his own impression of it in his mind. On May 31, after the bombardment of the Colon and after Cap- tain Cotton had gone for Mole St. Nicholas with a report to the department upon that subject, Admiral Schley testified that he sent Nunez,’ the pilot, westward to communicate with the insurgents. Nunez landed near Asceredores, fifteen or sixteen miles west of Santiago, d joining some of the Cuban in- surgents, went ‘into the interior. He returned June 1 or 2 with detailed information of the location of the Spanish ships in the harbor. “I sent him,” added Admiral Schley, “to the commander in chief with that information.” The witness then returned to the retrograde movement, saying: ‘‘Touching the question of the retrograde movement after the Merrimac had broken down, the movement was not made to the westward until toward 9 o'clock, the Yale having had considerable difficulty in setting & hawser to her. That hawser parted about 11 o'clock that night. I was signaled by Captain Wiss the Yale that it would take about four Hours to break out a, steel bawser. The ship at that time was absclutely unmanageable. She was not capable of turn- ing a propeller. I do not nk we got under way_again until 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the 27th and not long afterward she was taken in tow, steaming to the westward. “We went a little farther than I had in- tended on account of the difficulty in getting the Yale to hear our signals. We were obliged to go four or five miles farther on that ac- count. As soonyas the sea calmed down, and in my judgment it was not possible to have coaled {as I said yesterday that was one of the conditlons which I watched espeaially and was a better judge of that than any other the fleet, because 1 was especlally interested in it), I signaled to Captain Philip, asking ‘If he could coal and I think his signai | indicated precisely that he was uneasy atout it for he signaled back to me: ‘I can try.’ The impression left upon my mind was that at that time even he was uncertain.” Continuing, he said, that even as Jate as the following morning Philip had sighaled that both the Texas and the Merrimac had sprung 2 leak. The admiral also referred to the ex- treme heat, saying it was so great that the | men were exhausted and the doctors had rec- ommended that on this account coaling opera- tion be susnended. Arrival Off Santiago. Here Admiral Schley brought his narrative up to Santiago and he said 1n that connection that he had regarded the orders of the derart- ment concerning the probable presence of the Spanish fleet ai Santiago as more of a sug- gestion than a mandatory order. He consid- ered that it would take only a little while to get back in any event. Also he repeated that the proper military maneuver would be to proceed westward toward the bases at Havana and Key West He had arrived with the squadron off Santi- ago at about 7 p. m., May 25, he said. and had then taken up his position five or six miles out, afterward holding the fleet in tormation day and night. He had at night sent the Marblehead closer in with instruc- tions to keep clo Le noticed sig also observed at plane which he had Iyi b se watch. That night he said shore and he had hts on a_lower convinced were harbor. discovered the pres- sel there as he had e enemy’s war vessels. thus secured irre- ct that the vessels were Captain Sigsbee of the fact It was at this The next da told »d that he sent his dispatch to the de- partment, giving absolute information of the presence of the Spaniards, and Sigsbee had carried this cage to Mole St. Nicholas. miral Schiey =aid that after locating the in Santiago he formed the blockade in only way he believed such a small squad- ron could be utilized for such duty. were in column broadside on to the entrance of the harbor that a simple turn of the b rould_bring them in line if the enemy He called the captains of his ships ned his idea of the blockade his general plan of attack. ttack the head of the column The ships £ to first and confuse and cripple each in turn. The picket boats were to be used as torpedo-boat destroyers. The ships were to maintain steam able of twelve knots. fleet steamed back and forth before the entrance of the harbor. Morro Castle, he thought, was at no time more than five miles away. He judged this by the distinctness with which he could see the surf. The bottoms of a_knot 0 as to become c all his ships were foul, perhaps or a not and a half slower than they should have been. ‘The admiral explained how the fleet ard forth, using the bold head- > determine their position, with steamed back lands at night t the picket boats always inside. Every night, except when rain squalls occurred, and they were usually brief, the admiral .testified that could see the pickets either with the naked eve or with night glasses, He never went to bed without looking for them, and there was not a night when he could not distinguish the land and Morro. In concluding his description of the blockade that had been maintained the admiral said "hat it was sufficient is shown by the fact that during its existence no vessel entered or escaped from the harbor.” he Coming to the, reconnc ance of May 31 Ad- miral Schley said “On the 3ist, while the Brookiyn and the Marbiehead and the Texas were coaling, I ed my flag to the Massachusetts and ed that I would develop the fortifica- ton because of information which we had on board from the hydrographic ofice—my im- pression now is it was rather undetermined 1 think one stated that the batteries were old and another stated that Krupps were mounted. The general belief, however, was that all of the southern placés were very heavily forti- fied. In fact, we knew very little about the effect of higher-powered artillery either on shore or .on board ship, and feeling that I ought to know something about the fortifica- tions which defended that place I determined to £0 in and take advantage of what I believed to be the longest range of our guns and de- welop fully what these defenses were and in- cidentally if we could get a shot into the Colon, that was lying exposed somewhat, to do it. Reason for White Uniform. “I think we were lying in a position per- haps four or five miles to {iié westward. The steaming in was at slow speed. I transferred my flag, named 7000 yards and went on_hoard the Massachusetts. When I boarded her it was near the dinner hour and Captain Higgin- son suggesied that we postpone until 1 o'clock as- sented 1o that. After the meal we went fo quar- ters and steamed in pretty nearly head on. There was not much opportunity for anybody to seek cover behind a turret unless he got behind the protecting plate which was n guard to the entrance to the rear. Some weight has been laid upon the fact that we wore white clothes, 1 would like to invite atgention to the fact that that was a matter which I con- trolled_entirely for my squadron and it was about the only suitable dress for that region. Giving the names of the persons who accom- panicd him when he went on board the Mas- sachusetts, the admiral said they were Lieu- tenants Sears, Wells and George Graham, a newspaper correspondent, who, he said, had insisted upon accompanying = him, notwith- standing his protests. Once on board he had, he said, engaged In a conversation with Cap- tain (now 'miral) Higginson. “I was not excited,” he went on, “nor ner- s, for I need not have undertaken the econnoissance if 1 had not destred to do so. I had some regard for those standing on the turrets, thinking they ‘were exposing them- selves to danger from shock which was un- necessary to them, though I was differently circumstanced, and 1 80 expressed myself. Commander Potts entirely in error in say- tock advantage of cover. That I d(;]r not do, for I was not concerned about my- sel Speaking of the range of 7000 yards the ad- miral said that Commander Potts had himselt suggested that range and he (the witness) had not known for several days that the range had been altered ““The moment we began firing,” he went on, the shore batteries responded, some of them vsing smoleless powder. There was quite a and 1 was Impressed with the idea that they must be from gurs of six or eight inch caliber. The shot from the Zocapa battery evidently reached the fleet. Some went over our ships and one went beyond and over the Vixen, which was half a mile | distant. ““The strength of the batteries having been established it would have been military folly to have risked the battleships further to fire from these shore batterles under my instruc- tions. If we had lost one or two of our six or seven vessels the loss would have been a very great disadvantage and it might have in- vited attack with disastrous results. I thought it better policy to save the ships for wider and f— REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM T. SAMPSON, WHOSE ATTENDANCE AT THE SCHLEY COURT OF INQUIRY WAS RECENTLY DEMANDED, BUT WHO, ON ACCOUNT OF HIS ILL-HEALTH, MAY NOT BE OBLIGED TO FURNISH TESTIMONY REGARDING ONE OF HIS DISPATCHES. P it, o - better use, and subsequent events confirmed the | in chief of the Norfh Atlantic squadron. In | recollection now, as mear as I can state s B | speaking of this event and the change in com- | is that the ship’s head was near morth-north- Here the witness abruptly turned from the bombardment of the Colon to a discussion of the coaling question. He said that his instruc- tions had been to coal on every possible occa- sion. He then quoted and put in as evidence a number of dispatches giving the instructions of the department on this question. He re- lated In_this connection the receipt of a num- ber of dispatches from the department which | had, he said, been brought by Captain Cot- ton. He was sure that the dispatches not have been received before May 31 When he received these dispatches the ad- miral, in answer to questions by Raynor, t tified ‘that he had already discovcred the Span- ish fleet. He had also surmounted the difficul- ties about coaling and had %o informed the department. In this connection he went back and narrated the (incident of the capture by the St. Paul of the Restormel, the English col lier bound for Santiago. Captain Sigsbee had reported . that the collier had been captured May 2 Off Santlago. Sigsbee's letter mention- ed the fact that the Restormel Lkad touched at Porto Rieo and Curacao and that he had sent her to Key West, adding: ‘‘There is absolutely no news of the Spanish fleet here. On the 8ist he received, he thought, by way of a press tug from Port Antonio, the dispa of Admiral Sampson congratulating him upon the location of the Spanish ficet. In reply to a question by his counsel, Adimiral Schley ex- plained that Cape Cruz was an cxposed place 109 miles from Santiago and he did not regard it | as an available place for coaling. Some of the smaller ships might have been sent there, but with a squadron such as he had, practi- cally of the same size as the Spanish fleet, had never considered the question of separating ships of his fleet, He regarded it as of prime importance that the®fleet be kept together. His attention was called to Lieutenant Har- ber's testimony likening the situation south of Cuba with that at Dry Tortugas, Wheve ships had coaled. The admiral said that the two places were not comparable. The sea to the south of Cuba was exposed for hundreds of miles. reefs in which g sea could rarely enter. From information he received from Captain Cot- ton he thought he received the impression that only small ships could be coaied at Mole St. Nicholas or Gonaives channel, Avoided International Trouble. The witness stated that he had not gone into forelgn waters for coal because he wanted to avold international complications and espe- clally wanted to avold the charge of taking advantage of weaker nations like Hayti and others, After this digression the admiral returned to the reconnolssance of May 31 That some of the younger officers Who testificd regarding that occurrence were mistaken, he said, was proved by the fact that there was to-day on the deck of the Indiana a plate showing where an 8- inch shell from the land fortifications entered June 4 and wrecked her, wardroom. The offi- cers referred to had testificd that there were fo guns of ever 6-inch callber in the Santlago land batteries. The admiral said the shell which wrecked the wardrcom of the Indiand might posdibly have been fired from a mor- tar, of which there were several, but that the range of the batteries was beyond the ships as they went in for the reconnoissance was evident, not from the fact that there were one or two shells which went over the American There were, he said, many more, per- sald he, few minutes.” Agein leaving the question of the reconnofs- sance, the witness related the particulars of the arrival of the New Orleans on May 30 with Cavtain Folger in command, and convoy- ing the coiller Sterling. Captain Folger had, the admiral said, brought instructions to sink the collfer in the channel at Santiago, the de- tails to be left to Admiral Scniey’'s discretion. “1 did not understand that this passage was to be blockaded except in case we should be compelled to abandon the port, in which event that expedient was to be resorted to. He then proceeded to detall his conversation with Captain Folger concerning which Captain Folger also_testified as a witness for the de- partment. While satisfied that Captain Folger had not meant to do any injustice to him (the witness) he felt that the captain had failed to glve all the details of the conversation, ““He d'd not want to exvlain to this court just what the conversation had been, for I had condemned the clrcular formation of block- ade and had advocated the form which T had established as being more mobile and more faclle for a small fleet, such as ours wi case of attack by the enemy, as more manipulated and handled under signal. captaly spoke of advising me to keep closer,” continued Admiral Schley, it was very lively for a in ‘‘whereas on the next day he signaled that the enemy would fire on us at the then range, We had not changed our position.” Admiral Schley also took occasion to speak of the instructions to him to examine Guanta- namo as a coaling base. To do this was, he sald, not practicable, as at least 1000 marines would have been necessary to guard that point and these could not be spared, “If we had gone there we should have in- vited attack.” he sald. ‘‘These he added, “‘were among the matters T had to consider. This brought Admiral Schiey to the time of the arrival of Admiral Sampson, commander he | Dry Tortugas was surrounded by | could | it involved, he ventured upon which Captain Lemly considered as Coming to this point mand which ground somewhat questionable. the witness said: “On June 1 Admiral Sampson arrived. He brought with him the New York, the Oregon and the Mayflower and steamed down to the westward a little inside of the line of block- ade. He found us at that time just making the turn and I was on board. He was very cordial, very glad to see me and I explained to him the situation and the fact of the re- connoissance. He seemed to be very glad to find out the situation there and I pointed out to_him the Colon lying in the entrance.’ Captain Lemly—If the court please, we are getting beyond the court’s construction of the scope of the precent, Admiral Dewey—As I understand, he is turn- ing the gommand over to the commander in chief. ‘want to hear that. I would like to hear ‘that part. Continulng Admiral Schley said: T handed him a number of dispatches. explained to him the situation and told him the form of black- adé that I had maintained and I. heard no word of complaint from him. In fact, in view of the telegram of congratulation, I supposed nearly everything was approved. Admiral mpson's relations and mine were always cor- dial. I never had any difference witn him." Admiral Dewey—You have turned the com- mand over. Now %o on. “I turned the command over to Admiral Sampson and my squadron was not broken up until the 1Sth or 19th of June. I was still in command of the flying squadron and com- posed the left half of the blockading line at Santiago. Of course 1 have no criticisms to offer; merely a plain, straight story to tell of what its operations Were up to that time.' Raynor—May It please the court, we are get- ting to the battle and as it is five minutes to 1 o'clock could we take an adjournment at this point? Admiral Dewey—Yes: a recess until 2 gclock. DESCRIPTION OF BATTLE. Schley Explains How the American Warships Crushed Cervera’s Fleet When the court resumed its session at 2 o'clock Captain Lemly read a written state- ment explaining discrepancles in some of the dispatches referred to by Admiral Schley in his morning testimony. The dispatches re- ferred to coaling and in one case the name “‘Gonaives” was used, when it appeared the name ‘‘Guantanamo’ should have been given. Then Admiral Schley, at the request of Ray- nor, stated his observation of suspicious clr- cumstances on land and in tke harbor of San- tiago on the evening of July 2. He sald that the outlying Spanish land forces were at that time being pressed Into the city by the Amer- jcan and insurgent forces, and he had noticed dhat several of thelr blockhouses burned that evening. Me had at the same time observed smoke coming from over Zocapa hill and he thought the enemy Wwas preparing for a sortle. Of tnis circumstance he had notified Admiral Sampson and he thought the admiral had acted upon the notice as the blockading line was mioved in closed that night. He explained why all the engincs of the Brooklyn had mot been coupled up, saying this was largely because of the intense heat and also because Captain Cook Tad_not considered it necessary to do o, Admiral Schiey began his description of the battle of July 3 at 2:30 o'clock. “On the morning of July 3." said he, ‘‘the day broke beautifully. The skies were fleeced with white clouds, and the brecze continued a little bit longer off the land that morning than usual. - After I had eaten breakfast 1 came up to take a view of the situation with glasses. We® were lying at that time possibly thres miles or a little bit over from the land, and I wondered very much why they had permitted us to remain so close. It was a_matter of constant inquiry and discussion on hoard, and especlally why the batteries did not fire on o “Enemy Is Coming Out.” At a quarter of 9 my order.y reported to me that signal had been made from the flagship to disregard her movements, and that she had gone eastward. 1 did_mot, of course, know where she had gone. I saf under an awning ihat we had put bito position each day as the sun rose, in order that the officers might collect there. I think we also had one for- ward for the men. I came on deck with my glagses after having gone below for a lttle while, and while I was sitting abaft on a hatchway I heard a call from the forward bridge: _‘Tell the commodore that the fleet is coming out.’ “That was some time after the men had been called to quarters. about 9:35 o'clock. The ship at that moment was lying with her head in toward the land in the direction of Cabanas, which was a little cove to the west- ward, and oné of the marking points we used in maintaining our positions. 1 looked over the starboard side and saw the enemy coming out of the entrance to the harbor. I.then looked eastward to see the order of the ships, and I saw the Texas apparently a point of more abaft the starboard beam.. My own the court will take ~ west. ing on some of the_easterly courses. left of her was the Iowa. She was, to the eastward of the Texas. to the eastward of the lowa. was eastward of that position and cester was Iying in under the land, in the neighborhood of Aguadores. York was out of sight and out of tance with glasses. tc determine what my position was to be. in The Texas appeared to me.to be head- To the of course, The Oregon was The Indiana the Glou- 1 thougit The New signal dfs- I looked at that in order the battle If the New York had not been out of sight 1 should never have made a signal. ““The moment I saw that I went forward onta a little platform I had constructed on the battie tower as my position in the battle, order to be very close to Captain Cook. in 1 had only been there a mcment when Captain Cook joined me. In the m antime Mr. Hodgson, Who was on the upper bridge, sang out some- thing to the captain abaut being connected up and ail ready, and he at the same time said to:me: ‘Commodore, they are at us.’ ‘Well,' I said The helm was put aport. The shi ahead. first at perhaps about ha do not remember. She took her ‘go right coming rignt for them.® was started I speed; I way very quickly and when we headed around I said to Captain Cock: ‘Go ahead full hoist signal to clear ship for action. erally made ‘that signal because spee e and gen- there was around the quarter deck and the forecastle of most of these ships a little temporary railing composed of oars and rope, from falling overboard. Genlerally to keep people an awning of some sort was up. That signal was followed by: ‘Clese up for close action.’ The Brooklyn as well as the other vessels of the squadron charged immediately into the en- trance in accordance with the signal plan of seeking the enemy’s ships in the entrance or driving them ashore. ‘We continued directly for the head of the enemy's column, the idea uppermost in my mind being that if we could arrest them long enough for the battleships to close in and knock them to pleces that would be our best point of attack. ‘They continued on this course, porting and starboarding to meet the movements of the leading ship, which I assumed to be the flagship from a flag at her masthead. I suppose from the time we started we were ten to twelve minutes turning first with port helm and then advancing direct to the enemy. and westward closing in. I said Coolk: First Gun Is Fired. 1 saw the ships to the eastward to Captain * ‘Close action or close up has been hoisted and it means to keep inside of a thousand yards, out of their effective torpedo range.’ Captain Cook was standing alongside me and said: fire of these ships.’ I said: saw we had advanced first gun, 1 think, was fired by “Yes," Wwithout 'firing. “‘Yes, we will soon be within the cross- and that I The Lieutenant Simpson, almost directly over the forecastle of the ship. I saw the leading ship, which ap- parently had started with the intention of ram- ming, take a turn ahead to the westward, leav- ing a gap betweeh her and the ship following, which subsequently proved to be the Viscaya. ‘We were advancing in the direction of the Vis- caya, when she aleo seemed to have given up the intention to ram, and turned to the west- ward following the direction of the leading ship. “It then became apparent, as we were steer- in diametrically opposite plan had failed, ing the original Spanish_fleet, courses, and that the in order and avparently at dis- that tance, had succeeded In passing the battleship line. medlately apparent. order to port helm. done it in a second. swinging _very rapidly, wheth 1 did not. and I A new feature of the fight became im- Captain Cook gave the I should have I saw the shin's head asked him his helm was hard aport, and he replied that it was either aport or hard aport. I think he said hard aport. I never saw the ship turn more rapidly than she did at this time. Her turn was continuous. no easing of her helm. board side of the Texas at all. across her bow. We There was I never saw the star- were never 1 never was at her port side, and she never approached any position that was within six hundred yards of the Brook- yn. a menace or danger. around the circle. We passed She never entered into my head at all as completely The least range that was glven was.1100 yards and the fact of the near- ness of that ship (the second Spanish ship) im- preesed itself upon my mind and will never be forgotten, eye men running over her turrets because I could see with the naked to her su- perstructure deck, and I observed the daylight between their-legs as they ran. ‘We turned very rapidly, and I had been for & long time under the impression that our star- board engine was backed, from the fact that 1 was standing upon the starboard and In look- ing astern I saw an unusual amount water. of churned It looked to me very much as if the en- gine had been backing. Though the matter was not one of record, I found out subsequently, I had always been under the Impression that that engine had backed. During the turn Mr. Hodg- son very properly made some allusion to look out, perhaps, for the Texas. I do not recall what it Is, but there was never any colloquy of any character between Mr. Hodgson and my. self. First, he was too good an officer to have transgressed one of the plainest dutles of an officer at such a time, and, second, undertaken it I would not have if he had vermitted ILLNESS WILL PREVENT ATTENDANCE BY ADI1IRAL SATIPSON AT TRIBUNAL Question of the Advisability of the Offi- cer’s Appearance Is Discussed Before the Naval Court at Washington, D. C. ASHINGTON, Oct. 25.—Just before the Schley court of incuiry adjourned to-day Juige Advocate Lemly ad- dressed the court as follows: “Before the court adjourns I would like to ask counsel a question. He announced publicly that he desired a summons issued for Admiral Sampson. 1 have stated from time to time that if he would give me notice when he wanted the ad- miral summoned I would summon him. [ have not received any notice and I do not want to leave the record in this shape, and I would like to know what his wishes are in the matter.” Mr. Raynor—My wishes are that if you can summon him, summon him. As I understand it, Admiral Sampson is not in a condition to be summoned. He is not well enough to come intg court. I am perfectly willing to have him here and I, of course, don't retract for a moment anything I said at the time when the call was made. The court will recollect_the use of the words ‘Cienfuegos’ and ‘San- tiago.” The word used .in that dispatch was ‘Santiago.’ At the time Admural Schley sent the dispatch in to the Navy Department there was in the paragrapn ‘this_evidently means Cienfuegos. W. £ 8. I took it for granted ihat that, of courge, would be admitted. There was only one person in the world who could explain that, and that was Admiral Sampson. My learned brother declined to admit it. I do :ot think now the question is as serious as I did at that time. - “Now, you and I both know that Ad- miral Sampson is not in condition to be called into court. I do not want to be put _in the position of abandoning my position or of calling Admiral Sampson into a controversy where his presence is not necessary, and when he is in no coi~ dition whatever to be brought into cour<, even if his presence was Necessary. D e e e p sl it for a second. That is fiction; there was no colloquy. ‘‘Before we turned the leading ship was abeam, or a little abait the beam, anu Woen we turned about she was ahead of us, that s, on the starboard bow, and all four ships and | the forts were firing &t the same time, and from that.moment tne following ten or fifteen minutes were the most furious part of this combat. I remember very distinctly seeing, from time to time, as my attention was at- tracted for a moment, the jets of water ahead and astern and over and short. The roar of projectiles was one of the things that can be heard only once in a lifetime, and then never forgotten. It appeared at that moment that all four of those snips were at work upon the Brooklyn, and up to she momefit of turn- ing, so far as we could perceive, there Was not the slightest evidence they had even been injured. 5%, “The thought passed through my mind tha after all our precautions and waiting those fellows would g:! !uwn)a k:d((;hnl ‘moment I felt, and I thought I remar] fhiat “we were alone and would perhaps have most of the fight upon ourselves, because I did not know then that the battleships could possibly keep up their lgeed, But l‘uld to him: ‘We must stay with this crowd.’ I had no idea that we would escape. Of couue.dllé they could have shot as well as our people they certainly would have g 4 “%Vhen we had completely turned around on a westerly course the ships appeared to have been broken up a little, aithough still in some semblance of formation, and just at that mo- ment I saw the Oregon breaking in through this cloud envelope. She broke through on the starboard quarter of the flag. I hoisted the signal of ‘Close up’ and then ‘Follow the flag, feeling that a new disposition was necessary. That signal was replied to, and I saw it re- peated. Captain Clark knew very well it was not intended for him, because he was follow ing the flag, so he repeated it totheother ships. In a very few moments after the Oregon broke | through this cloud of smoke she was perhaps 400 or 500 yards distant. Ships Belching Flame. “These two ships, the Oregon and the Brook- Iyn, were firing in a manner I had never seen I never realized what rapid gun fire before. Iflee:;(. Both ships were at that time a sheet oF flame. Soon after that I saw that the lead- chip was evidently battered hard. She lag- e P {'saw Smoke coming out of her ports, and out of her hatches, and the fact that Impréssed itself upon me was that the columns were going straight up in the air. 1 sald to Captain Cook, who was constantly at my side, “We have got ome. Keep the boys below in- formed of all the movements. They cannot see and they ought to know,” and he did so throughout the action. Every few moments messages were sent below to the men, that were answered oftentimes with cheers which we could hear through the ventilators. T “It appeared to be a very short interval of time after that that I saw a second ship on fir: which proved later to be the Oquendo. She evidently had suffered very severely and start- ed immediately inshore, leaving the Viscaya and_the Colon. 0 Dosition on the bow and I thought for a little While that she would perhaps outfoot us. The Colon worked inshore, and the time between the dropping out of action of those two ships until the Viscaya turned inshore was a period of perhaps thirty minutes, quring which she Was abreast of the Brooklyn and the Oregon. T looked to the eastward and got occasional glimpses of the Indiana and of the Gloucester. I could not see very ing, owing to the clouds of smoke. though I knew that both were doing admirable work. I felt that the moment those vessels ran in to the beach the commanding officers of the Ships which could not keep up the pace with the two leaders would take care of the pris- oners and would save them from the insur- as well as from their own fire. Bout thirty minutes, as nearly rememter, was the length of time from the turning in or the wounding of these two fir vessels until the Viscaya went ashore. She was a little forward of the beam of the Brook- Iyn, and I do not think at any time over 2300 or 2400 yards away _She was in most excellent farget range, and I remember that a marine stationed in the ton reported that he did not See any of the shots of the two ships, the Brooklyn and the Oregom, hitting the water. So 1 imagined from that that they were strik- ing the ship. It was on the trip outward after tha turn. 1 was very anxious about the ranges, because I did not want the Viscaya and the Colon to get out of good fighting range. Sad Fate of Ellis. “Ellls, who was an expert with the stadi- meter, constantly kept that instrument on those vessels, and knowing exactly their heights, reported to me that they were main- taining the same range, but I thought my eve was a little more sensitive, and I said: ‘No, they are evidently gaining.’ He went from me the second time, and that was the last I saw of him alive. In performing this magnifi- cent duty he lost his life. He was struck about ten feet from where I was standing. His brains and blood were thrown over a great many people, and some of it reached me. He. immediately fell, of course, to the deck, and it was a shocking sight to men who had never seen such a thing before. “Licutenant McCauley and Dr. Devalin got down, or rather they were standing between me and the tower. They picked up the body and carried it to the side. I just happened to see them through this opening and called out to them not to throw that body overboard; that I thought that ome who had fallen so gallantly deserved to be buried as a Christian. His body was laid under the lee of the for- ward tyrret and covered with a blanket and there kébt until after the battle. ““Just before the Viscaya turned to run ashore | she put her helm starboard, apparently start- ing out for the Brooklyn or the Oregon, I don't remember which, and evidently at that moment got_a very severe wound, for I saw quite an explcsion under her bow, and in a moment afterward she put her helm hard aport, turning inshore, smoke coming from all of her hatches. I thought she was going _to cavsize, she had such a tremendous list to port. Just then I saw a shell strike her that appeared to me to rake her fore and aft, and I thought to myself she would sink in deep water, so I told the signal officer to signal to the Texas to look cut for her men and to save them, but the Texas was too far astern to receive the mes- sage. 1 made the remark at the time, ever, ‘Philip is always sensible. He needs no instructéons about such things.’ “During this part of the fight I noticed that all of the signal halvards of my ship were cut, I think possibly with one exception. One of the speed cones we had hoisted was cut and came very near striking me. It came down in front of me and went overboard. “After the Viscaya had turned in afire, her colors down, the Colon edged in shore and ap- peared to be following the comtour of the coast and I thought that at that time, look- ingeastern and observing what had happened to her consorts, she was seeking the best place she could find in order to end the matter at once. From Acerrederos, which was behind some sixteen miles west of the harbor of San- tiago to Point Rio- Tarquino is perhaps about thirty miles, so I said to Captain Cook ‘cease firing’ and to make the signal. I also told Captain Cook to let his men came out of the turrets into the open air and get some- thing to eat and hurry up his men below. I think I went into the battle tower myself at that time and sang out to the men below that we had got all of them except one and I thought they could be depended upon to ecatch that other vessel. I heard a good deai merriment and rejoicing. 1 went back to the bridge and soon realized that they were dcing their best. There wia a jingle to the rails and a vibration to th¥&vessel, and I percefved that the motion of the ship was sluggish. 1 suggested to Captain Cook that we possibly had some compartments filled. He sent the carpenter down and it developed that ome of the after compartments had filled with water which we thought was due to the fact that we had received some injury below he water line. " Schley Urges More Speed. “The carpenter as well as the tain thouskt it vawlse to exanmne the cn':‘xmu.rp t- Captain Cook, | The Viscaya took a leading | well what they were do- | as T can | how- | of | | | shig's speed, | the bar at the mouth of Rio Tarquino. | tially | weakening drains, heals inflammation ment unti} we could get into smoother water, where we could possibly nandle it much more readily. That cuurse was decided u The of course, came up With some rapidity and toward 1i o'clock it was very apparent that we were gaining upon the cnase. I said to Captain Cook several times during the action, ‘Would it not be a good idea to edge in so that we couid finish those fellows quicker? and he replied that we had them in the most excellent target range and that the guns of the two ships seemed to be doing most admirable work. We were point- ing at that time for Tarquino Point, under Cape Cruz, at the point extending to the southward. My idea was that in steering that course if the Colon kept up her course she would be obliged to come out. I then said 1 would get up a lot of extra ammunition so that when she came out into close quarters it would be a question of but a few minutes be- fore we knocked her out. As we were gomg out to head her oft there were various signals between the Oregon and myself of a pleasing character. “Some were official. I gave the order to Captain Clark to open fire with his 13-inch guns. Captamn Clark has testified that be did not receive it, and I always had been under the impression, until 4 heard him say otherwise, that that order had been trans- mitted. However, we continued to advance, the Oregon and the Brooklyn. I don’t think the Oregon was further astern. than 500 yards. I do not believe the prolongation of her courss at any time would have passed within 500 vards of the Brooklyn. We were practically "and relatively at the same distances, Perhaps the Brooklyn was a littie nearer at times, and then the Oregon a little nearer. ‘We continued in this position until about 12:50, when we realized that we were within range of this vessel and we tried the_thirtecn- inch and eight-inch guns on hep. Several of them fell short, but I remember that one of | the Oregon’s 13-inch shots passed entirely over the Colon, and that one of the S-inch shells of the Brooklyn passed over her also. I saw witi my own eyes the jet of water beyond. I thought at first it had gone through her, but it appears that it did not strike her. Colon Strikes Colors. ““The position of the Colon being directly | under the fire of the two ships, there was no question in the mind of the Colon that it would be fatal. captain of the 1 think he cid exactly right. A sacrifice of life would have been unnecessary, so he fired a gun to the ice | ward and hauled his flag down and ran in on 1 sig naled at ouce to cease firing, that the eneuiy had surrendered. We hauled up and imric- diately passed into position. We had some difficulty in getting out a boat, on account of steam being turned off and the cranks hav been struck. They were more or less jammed. We steamed into a position for a thou: yards. 1 remember distinctly Captain asking 1f we should slow up. I said, ‘No, tinue in.’ Captain Cook changed his couise. We_ were all in fighting rig. ““We arrived in the vicinity of the Colon at 1:30. At the time she hauled her colors down I did not think she over four miles from us. We were running then in the neigh- borhood of fifteen knots. When this surrend took place I naturally feit interested in vessels that were following. I was then on the bridge and with glasses 1 saw three ves- sels astern. I could see the masts of two. I could see only the smoke of the third one We lowered the boat and Cavotain Cook went ashore. He sald to me: ‘Commodore, what are the terms of surrender “I said to him: ‘Unconditional. Those ar matters that the commander in chief must ar- range. We can only receive an unconditional surrender.’ t 2:23 o'clock about, the New York came up. 1 had made signals to her. I think she was quite half an hour in answering one of them. Of course there was nct very much breeze under the land. When she came up I made the signal to her that it was a glorious day for our country, and as soon as I could I went on board to pay my respects. In the meantime Captain Cook, who had been tained some little time,” started off to make his report and went on board the flagship. When he returned I took the boat and went on board myself. There I renorted substan- what had occurred, the incidents and events of the battle, in a hurried way. ““After having stated them to the commander in chief a group of officers who werp standing on the opposite side came up to me ‘and asked me—of course everybody was interested—for the details of this battle, and I repeated them in a hasty way. Chaplain Royce of the York came up and Commodore, work Is not over yet. The Resolute has arrived. Captain Eaton reports that there is a Spanish battleship on the coast and the ad- miral wants to see you.' 1 went over and thera found Captain Clark in the presence of the commander in chief. I made some suggestion just Continued on Page Five. ADVERTISEMENTS. Just within her grasp is safety—but she does not see it; she is looking the wrong way. 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