The San Francisco Call. Newspaper, August 18, 1901, Page 11

HE following official dispatches, Twhwh passed between the Navy Decpartment and Rear Admirals W. T. Sampson and W, S. Schley during the anxious days of the latter part of May, 1808, will throw considerable light cn the much discussed Sampson-Schley controversy, bearing as they do directly upon the charges imputed against Schiey isbehavior prior to the arrival of Sampson off Santiago on June 1. These dispatches were copied from the official records and are printed here without criticism, and with merely ex- planatory comment. The reader is leit to form what conclusions he may from them. In the first place, let the situation in the middie of May be recalled. At that time nothing was known of the where- abouts of Admiral .Cervera’s Spanish fleet, except that it had sailed from the Canary Islands and was due in the West Indies. On May 12, Sampson with a division of the North Atlantic squadron sought Cervera at San Juan, Porto Rico, bombarded that place, and not finding the Spanish squadron there started back for his station ofi Havana. Schley, with the flying squadron, was then at Hamp- ton Roads. On May 13-a press boat re- ported to Sampson that Cervera had re- turned to Cadiz, but on the 15th it was authoritatively announced that the Spaniards were at Curacao. Schley was then immediately ordered to Key West. Sampson on the 16th cabled to Captain Cotton ci the Harvard, one of the swift scouts, giving him this information, add- ing: “Destination unknown: Probably Santiago de Cuba or San Juan, Porto Rico.” Both sides of Cuba having to be guarded, Sampson took Havana and the north side, sending Schley to the south, with thesfpllowing orders: “Sir: I send you a copy of a telegram received last night from the Secretary, concerning a vessel which was to sail on the 15th, and cafrying a large amount of specie, and is supposed to be going to land it at Trinidad, or to the east of Cienfuegos. This may be a blind, how- ever, and the vessel may be bound for Cienfuegos, or even Havana. “Two cruisers will be sent out to-day, with the torpedo-boats following them. As soon as the Towa is coaled she will follow them. “It is unnecessary for me to say that vou should establish a blockade at Cien- fuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as ble. hould the Spanish vessels show themselves in that vicinity, and finding you on the lookout attempt to come around the island, whether east or west, please send me notice by the best vessel you have for that purpose, as to their di- rection,"that I may be prepared for them at Havana. “I will try and increase the number of light vessels at your disposal, in order that you may have them to send with messages to me in case you desire to do so. “After I have the situation more in hand I will write you and give youany information that suggests itself. “Very respectiully, “W. T.@AMPSON, “Rear Admiral.” Schley sailed from Key West, in obe- dience to these orders, on May 19, his squadron fully coaled, and taking 4500 tons of coal along in the collier Merri- mac. The same day Cervera entered Santiago, and the news was wired to ‘Washington. On the 20th the Navy Department sent this telegram to Admiral Sampson: “T4e report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might very well be correct, so the department strongly ad- vises that you send immediately by the lowa to Schley orders to proceed off mand, leaving one small vessel off Cien- fuegos. If Towa has gone, send order to Schley by fastest dispatch vessel.” Sampson answered this thus: “Replying to department’s telegram of the 2oth, after duly considering the information therein contained, I have decided to follow the plan already adopt- ed ta hold position Cienfuegos with B'moklyn, Massachusetts, Texas and the Iowa, Marblehead, Castine, Dupont and two auxiliaries. There remain the New York, Indiana and monitors for Havana. The latter very inefficient and should not be sent from base. Have directed Schiey to communicate with auxiliaries at San- tiago and direct one of them to report to department from Mole (St. Nicholas) or Cape Haitien, then to return to San- tiago and further report at Cienfuegos or Havana as he thinks best Plans may be changed when it becomes certain that Spanish ships are at Santiago.” Santiago de Cuba with his whole com-¥ mvavlnuunwumuwmuuu' the T R Em R R R m R P P Py Y T Pm P P P R PwoPm R T P P R P Mo P R Ten M P Pm P Pow P NEm M Rm M my Rm hm Rm Em mm ¥ Official Dispatches Between Sampson and Schley. hat 6hese Will Help You in a Degision as to erits of the (ase. Passed e el e, ol VTl e T omm e e v i Pm P P P R R P M Pm R R Rm R Pm P MmO OPm P Ru M P Pm Pm Pm P Rn P e u M Rm em hm R m R M Rw R R On May 21, Samps‘cm sent zo'Schley by the Marblehead the following (the often mentioned “Letter No. 87): “Spanish squadron probably at San- tiago de Cuba. Four ships and three torpedo-boat destroyers. If you are sat- isfied they are not at Cienfuegos, pro- ceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there, blockade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabi- tants—fishermen and others, to learn definitely that the ships are in port, it being impossible to see irito it from the outside. 3 “When the (duplicate) sent by the Iowa and Dupont were writ- ten, I supposed that two fast scouts would be in the vicinity of Jamaica, but I have since ledrned that they have been ordered by the department to touch with the Spanish fleet on the north coast of Venezuela. I have just telegraphed them to report for orders at Nicholas Mole.” Later, on the 2ist, to make doubly sure, Sampson sent a duplicate of “Let- ter No. 8” by the Hawk, adding: “It is thought the inclosed instruc- tions will reach you by 2 a. m., May 23. This will enable you to leave before day- light, so that your direction may not be noted, and' be at Santiago, a: m., May 24 “It is thought the Spanish squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as they must have some’ repairs to make and coal to take. “The St, Paul and Minneapolis have been telegraphed to scout Bff Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron goes west- ward, one is to keep in touch, and one is to go west and attempt to meet you; if the Spanish squadron goes east, one will keep in touch and the other go to St. Nicholas Mole, to telegraph me at Key West. 1 shall be off Cay Frances, 200 miles east of Havana. If you arrive off Santiago and no scout meets you, send a vessel to call at Nicholas Mole and get information to be left there by scout as to direction taken by Spanish, in case they may have left Santiago de Cuba. “The Yale has been ordered to cruise in the Bahama Channel until May 24. It is thought possible that the Spanish, hearing of your departure from Cien- fuegos, may attempt to go there (Baha- ma Channel). “If this word does not reach you be- fore daylight, it is suggesteg that you mask your real direction as much as possible. Follow the Spanish squadron, whichever direction they take.” On May 22 Schley wrote the following dispatch to Sampson (via Key West), and the latter received it on the 26th in Nicholas Channel (north coastof Cuba), whither he had gone on May 23 to in- tercept the Spanish fleet should they at- tempt to pass to the northward from Santiago. He had received positive in- formation then that they were in San- tiago. This is Schley’s dispatch, the first Sampson received from him: instructions “Off Cienfuegos, Cuba, May 22, 1308 —Arrived May 21 off Cienfuegos, Cuba. Standing in to-day, May 22, within 4000 yards entrance, found them busily min- ing. Canndt say whether Spanish fleet in port or not. The anchorage not vis- ible from entrance. Iowa and Dupont arrived to-day. Expect difficulty here will be to coal from colliers in constant heavy swell. Other problem easy com- pared with this one, so far from base.” ! As spon as Sampson got this, he hur- ried the Vesuvius, which brought it, back with the following dispatch for the scouts Vale, St. Paul and Minneapolis: “Spanish squadron in Santiago. If Schley has not arrived there, go to Cien- fuegos and inform him.” The same day (May 26) the Dolphin brought this dispatch from Schley, dated May 23: “Sir—In reply to your letter No. 8, I would state that I am by no means satis- fied that the Spanish squadron is not in Cienfuegos. The large amount of smoke seen in the harbor would indicate the presence of a number of vessels, and under suth circumstanges it would seem to be extremely unwise to chase up a probability at Santiago de Cuba, re- ported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse. “T shall therefore remain off this port with this squadron, availing myself of évery opportunity for coaling and keep- ing it ready for any emergency. “Regarding the inclosed information from Captain McQalla, I would state that I went twice yesterday close in to ‘the mouth of the harbor, the . first time about 2000 yards, the second time within about 1400 yards, but saw no evidence of any masked batteries near the entrance. Well up the river, across their torpedo mine fields, now laid across the mouth of the harbor, there is a new battery construct- ed, hardly within range from mouth of river. “The Castine, Merrimac and Hawk ar- rived this morning, and I send the Hawk back with these dispatches. “Last night I sent the Scorpion east to Santiago de Cuba, to communicate with the scouts off that port, with in- structions if they were not there to re- turn at once to me here, and I expect her back day after to-morrow. “I am further satisfied that the desti- nation of the Spanish fleet is either Cienfuegos or Havana. This point, be- ing with Havana, woul | be better for their purposes, if it was left exposed, and I think that we ought to be very careful how we receive information from Havana, which is no doubt sent out for thé purpose of mis- leading wvs. “The Towa is coaling to-day, having reached this station with only about half of her coal supply.” Accompanying the above was an- other of the same date, saying: “Steamer Adula, chartered by Consul Dent, with proper papers from U. S. State Department to carry neutrals from Cienfuegos, was stopped off this port in communication this morning. She had no cargd and was permitted to enter. “She reports that she left San- tiago de Cuba 4:30 p. m.-May 18, and that night she saw the lights of seven vessels, seventy miles to.the southward of Santiago. Next' day ~(Thursday, May 19), at Kingston, cable reported Spanish fleet at Santiago, Friday, May 20, the fleet was reported to have left Santiago. “Now, Saturday, May. 21, when about forty miles southwest of this port, I heard, from the bridge of this vessel (the flagship Brooklyn), firing of guns toward Cienfuegos, which I interpreted as a welcome to the Spanish fleet, and the news this morning by the Adula convinces me that the fleet is here. “Latest was bulletin from Jamaica received this morning, asserting that the fleet had left Santiago. I think I have them here almost to a certainty.” U_;Jnn receipt of this Sampson, on the 27th, sent the following to Schley by the Wasp: “ST. NICHOLAS CHANNEL, “May 27, 1808. “Sir: “Every report, and particularly confidentjal reports, state Spanish squadron has been in Santiago de Cuba from the 19th to 25th instants, inclusive, the 25th being date of last report. “You will please proceed with all pos- sible dispatch to Santiago to blockade that pert. If, on arrival there, you re- ceive positive information of the Span- ish ships having left, you will follow them in pursuit.” Hardly had the above been sent than Sampson (the sanfe day) received the following from Schiley, dated May 24, off Cienfuegos, Cuba: “Coaling off Cienfuegos is very un- certain. One collier is not sufficient for the work, when it is possible to coal. In great need of two more for this squad- ron, thoroughly equipped with hoisting engines, buckets, etc., for utmost dis- patch. The Stirling, not having hoist- ing engines, could not be useful. Rec- ommend that she discharge cargo at Key West. I would suggest quality must be equal to best Pocahontas coal for this work. Every collier should carry sev- eral thousand gallons of oil. also three 6r four compressed balls as fenders, to prevent acgidents. I have communicat- cd with insurgents to-day, and have sup- plied ammunition and dynamite, also clothing. “Have ascertained that the Spanish fleet is not here, and I will move east- ward to-morrow, communicating with you from St. Nicholas mole. e “On account of short coal supply can- not blockade them if in Santiago. “I shall proceed to-morrow off San- tiago, being embarrassed, however, by the Texas' short coal supply and her inability to coal in the open sea. I shall not be able to remain off that port on account of general short coal supply of squadron. So will proceed to vicinity of St. Nicholas mole, where the water is smooth, and I can coal Texas and other ships with what may remain in collier. Will communicate with you from St. Nicholas mole.” ¥ When Sampson received this letter, which he did in Nicholas Channel on the 27th, he decided to hurry to Key West with the New York, coal, and. if author- ized by the department, proceed himself at once to Santiago, but first sending the New Orleans off to Schley with these orders to her commanding officer, Captain Folger: “Sir: You will proceed to Santiago de Cuba to convoy the collier Stirling. You will communicate with Commodore Schley and direct him to remain on the blockade of Santiago at all hazards, as- suming that the Spanish vessels are in that port. “Tell him that I desire that he use the collier Stirling (the Merrimac was substituted later) to obstruct the chan- nel at its narrowest part, leading into this harbor. Inform him that I believe it would be periectly practicable to steam this vessel into position and drop all her anchors, allow her to swing across the channel, then sink her, either by opening the whatever means may be best in his judgment. “Inform Commodore Schiey that the (details of this plan are left to his judg- ment. In the meantime he must exer- cise the utmost care that none of the vessels in port are allowed to escape. And say to the commodore that I have the utmost confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a successful conclusion and earnestly wish him good luck.” Instead of waiting for the 25th Schley, with his squadron, leit Cienfuegos at 8 p. mion the 24th. Forty-eight hours later (8 p. m. the 26th). when twenty- two miles SSE. of the entrance to. San- tiago harbor, Schley made the-following signal to the squadron: “Destination Key West, via south side of Cuba and Yucatan Channel, as soon as collier is ready. Speed nine knots.” However, the collier (the Merrimac) broke down again, and the departure for Key West was postponed. Sampson arrived at Key West on May 28, where hLe received orders from ‘Washington to be ready to convoy the army transports from Tampa to Cuba, “with the New York, Indiana, Oregon and as many smaller vessels with good valves or . batteries as possible, going in person,” and along the north side of Cuba. Sampson wired to Schley the same day thus: “The New Orleans will meet you off Santiago with important dispatches. The Spanish squadron must be block- aded at all hazards. Immediate commu- nications with persons on shore must be entered upon. You must be sure of the Spanish squadron being in port. I sug- gest communicating ~ with Spanish- American ‘Company’s pier at Baiquiri Bay, at a distance of fifteen miles east of Santiago de Cuba. One collier for you left yesterday. Shall send, as soon as possible, another. If Spanish squadron has left Santiago immediate pursuit must be made.” At midnight (May 28) the following telegram from Secretary Long was re- ceived by Sampson: ENERALLY speaking, sick head- G ache s not a serious affection, and in many cases, according to the opinion “ of the most competent clinicians, it is best not to persist in ob- taining a radical cure. Headache being the manifestation of a diathesis, it is bet- ter to have it than many other!forms; whence the therapeutic consequence that, although sick headache should be treated, all disturbing action should be avoided. These short preliminaries render it com- prehensive that th® treatment of sick headache comprises three Indications: (1) the prophylaxfs, (2) the treatment of the painful attacks, (3) the treatment of the constitutional condition upon which the malady depends. Every one subject to sick headache knows one or more causes special to him or to her that bring on the attacks. Of these causes some are so commonplace that it is impossible to avold them, and others, on the contrary—among them fatigue and imprudence in diet—may be avoided. In many cases headache is due to troubles relating to accommodation or refraction; in these cases a remedy must be sought in the use of appropriate spec- tacles. % At the moment when the symptoms of a habitual headache manifest themselves the swallowing of certain exciting sub- stances, such as black coffee or an in- fusion of tea, may at times prevent the headache from coming on. Sometimes it is possible to stop the at- tack when it Is only just beginning. To this end inhalations of nitrate of amyl have been prescribed without very satis- factory restlts. Ergot of rye and nux vomica have also been glven without -any great benefit. Sulphate of quinine and other quinine salts are more efficacious. But the medicines in which the great- est confidence has been placed are anti- pyrine and caffeine. Antipyrine is taken In powder in the form of packets of one gramme; two, three or four of these packets are given to an adult in the first two hours of the attack. When admin- istered in time antipyrine calms the head- ache, even when it does not altogether remove it. - Caffeine should be taken pure, either in powder, in doses of ten centigrammes every ten minutes until the pain ceases; in a draught, or in a hypodermic injection. But none of the above means, accord- ing to Mr. Whitehead, Is equal to one ‘which he prescribes, and which he asserts has pever fafled him for twenty-five years. It is true that Mr. Whitehead is a surgeon, and that his remedy does not be- long to the arsenal of medical or modern therapeutics, though doctors of the old school made a terrible use of it, and it is still held in honor by the veterinary pro- fession. I refer to the seton of former days. This Manchester surgeon asserts that for twenty-five years past he has not seen a case of headache, whatever its in- tensity, that would resist the passage of a seton through the skin at the nape of the neck. § The last case treated by him was that of a lady who for six years past had never’| been three weeks without a crisis of such violence that she remained from twelve to twenty hours in a state of absolute prostration. Since a seton has been put in at the nape of the neck a few months ago she has not had a single attack ol‘ headache. According to Mr. Whitehead, the®¥seton should remain in place three months without interruption. Mr. Whitehead's method of procedure is only to be recommended in cases where the pain is absolutely unbearable. In all other cases the remedy is worse than the evil. As sick headache is the consequence of a diathesis most frequently arthritic, a general medical treatment would be de- sirable. A diet and habits calculated to strengthen the nervous system should be prescribed if the headache is the expres- sion of hereditary neuropathy. Anaemic and chlorotic subjects should take ferru- ginous medicines, and should undergo a hydropathic treatment. | Prince. “Schley telegraphs from Santiage he goes to Key West with his squadron for coal, although he has 4000 tons in a broken-down collier. (1) How soon, after arrival of Schley at Key West, could you reach Santiago with New York, Oregon, Indiana and some light- ers? (2) And how long could you blockade there, sending your vessels singly to coal from our colliers in Gonaives, Hayti; Nipe, Cuba, or else- where? “There is one collier en route to Mole, Hayti, from Norfolk, and another one has been ordered there from Key West, and others will be sent immediately. Consider if you could seize Guantanamo and occupy as a coaling station. Schiey has not ascertained whether Spanish division is at Santiago. All information here seems to show that it is there.” Sampson answered this as follows: “Answering telegram, first question, three days. I can blockade indefinitely. Think that can occupy Guantanamo. Would like to start at once with New York and Oregon, arriving in two days. Do not quite understand the necessity of awaiting arrival of Schley, but would propose meeting and turning back the principal part of the force wunder his command if he has left. Try to hold him. by telegraph. Watson will be in charge of everything afloat (about Ha- vana). Does department approve pro- posed action?” Later (29th), receiving no answer to the above, Sampson wired to Long: “Referring to my telegram of .this date, I urge immediate reply to my last paragraph. Failure of Schley to con- tinue blockade must be remedied at once, if possible. There can be no doubt of presence of Spanish squadron at Santiago.” Still later on the 2gth received the fqllowing dispatch from Schiey, dated off Santiage: A “Collier now has been repaired tem- porarily and able to make six or seven knots. Shall I endeavor to coal the Marblehead and Texassin the open sea and retain position off Santiago until coal supply larger vessels has given up * * * known what safe limit shall go there to Gonaives, Hayti: or coast near or near Port au Prince to coal * * occurring yesterday the Marble- head and Texas took a quantity of coal at a distance of about gwenty-five miles west of Santiago, which enables me to hold place until coal has been reduced. * * * force me over to Hayti to re- plenish * * * collier well equipped to report at Gonaives, Hayti, urgently needed to coal * * * chance occurs. for picket duty and communication. [ send Minneapolis and Yale to Key West. St Paul off Santiago still. Re- pairs of Merrimac machinery completed by the Brooklyn. St. Paul. May 26, captured British collier bound in with coal, .evidently for fleet, collier having touched at San Juan and Curacao.” (The omitted parts of the above are unintelligibiz in the original cipher.) Immediately npon receipt of this Sampson cabled to Schley: “Congratulate you on success. Main- tain close blockade at all hazards, es- pecially at night. Very little to fear from torpedo-boat destroyers. Coal in open sea whenever conditions permit. Send a ship to examine Guantanamo, with view to occupying it as a base, coaling one heavy ship at a time.” Just after this was sent Sampson re- ceived, in answer to his telegrams of that morning, the following dispatch from Secretary Long: “You carry out recommendations to go yourself with two ships to Santiago de Cuba. Act at your discretion, with the object of blockading Spanish divi- sion as soon as possible. Goodrich re- ports Guantanamo very weak. The seizure of it immediately is recom- mended.” * Sampson left at once for Santiago in vessel when Need another auxiliary the New York, accompanied by the English SurGeon’s New Method ofF CUinG Readache. Oregon, Mayflower and Porter. Under date of the 29th Schley cabled to the Navy Department: “Enemy in port. Recognized Cristobal Colon and Infanta Maria Teresa and two torpedo boats moored inside Mor- ro, behind point. Doubiless the others are there. We are short ‘of coal. Using every effort to get coal in. Have about 3000 tons of coal in collier, but not easy . {to get on board here. Ii no engage- ment next two or three days Sampson’s squadron could relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or vicinity of Port au Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachu- setts, Texas, Marblehead and Vixen and collier compose squadron here.” Sampson arrived off Santiago on June 1 and the rigid blockade of the en- suing month was inaugurated. Hobson took the Merrimac in four days later and sank her. Guantanamo was seized a week later and used as a base, the ves- sels coaling there singly, although often doing so in the open sea off Santiago.