The New York Herald Newspaper, May 24, 1877, Page 3

NEW YORK HERALD, THURSDAY, MAY 24,:1877.—TRIPLE SHEET, EMPIRES AND KINGDOMS OF EUROPE AND ASIA. ‘Map of the Continents from -Gibraltar to Yeddo, Showing the Relations cf British India and Russian Tartary to the THE EASTERN WAR England’s Interests in the Conflict. CAN HE INTERFERE ? India as a Military Base Against Russia. HER FINANCIAL RESOURC Is the Anglo-Indian Army Available? A RUSSIAN ATTACK ON INDIA. England Can Fight Russia With ‘> Her Treasury, If the only object of the war now in progress in tho Kast was the bringing of Turkey to a sense of ber true position in the European family of nations, and tho consequent securing for her Ubristian snvjects the rights enjoyed by all civilized peoples, then it would Mot bo difficult to Jocalize the conflict. Indeed, there ‘would be little trouble in persuading the great l’owors to unite their forces for the accomplishment ot such a vory desirable purpove. But behind all this mask ot religtous and humanitarian zea! los the deep dosign of conquest and the estabiishment of now political rela- tions in the regions adjoining the Bosphorus. Judging frota the peculiar policy of England with regard to the etlorts at adjusting the status o: the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and the saggestive remonetrancos with which the Porte was plied by the diplomatic represent” atives of Great Britain during the recent sussiun of tho Conterence, England has moved hor Turkish pawu just one sqaare too tar tn opening the game that must de- cide whether she or Rassia shall dominate in the far Past. UNGIASH INTRRESTS IN THE Kast. Haglund may endeavor to avoid a collision with Russa regarding this Bastern question, but her most vital interests are involved in it and she cannot look OF us a neutral While her great rival for the Empire of Asia is settling it without any respect for whut she considers ber rights we au Asiatic Power. The scat of war Jor the present embraces the Turkish territory in Burope and Agia; therotore it is reaconabie to suppose that if Engiand intorteres ber force will be applied to limit, f not to prevent, great Russian successes in both regions. What this force consista of and the mapper of its employment decomes, then, the main question to be considerod, siuce the opening of the Suez Caoal through French enterprise the Mediterranean bas assumed uo iniercet for Englund whieh it did not beforo possess, even though Gibraltar and Malta repreacoted the way sin- Hous of her commerce in tnat sea, The currents of Wate with the far East bave been diverted from their | oid lines around ‘Africa and Cape Horn into the moro direct one via Suez and the Red sea, It bas been one of the favorite dreams of English statesmen to control beyond question every route icading to India—first, because Englana’s supremacy in thut country demands such ® sceurity, and second, because her oxclusive trade required that every precaution should ve taken to guard against the rivalry and enterprise of other nations in that direction. !t was proposed to construct a rajiroad {rom the coast of Syria through the valley of the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf, and also directly eastward to India, by which England would establish the most rapid means of communication with ber Eastern possossious; but, owing so the difficulties of ‘he country, the enormous cost of the work and, above all, to the decided opposition of Russta, the scheme was abandonod. It was chiefly in furtherance of tbs idea tbat England entered into the Crimean war, The Russians were threateniug Turkey, and the independence and inviolability of that State wero necessary to the success of the great railroad project. Therefore England threw ber whole force into the war for the protection of ber interests, which sho deemed were seriously menaced by any Russian success. The trath 16 that, although Russia euffered severc.y in that coptest, her growth eustward and southward toward British India was not seriously checked. Indeed, its dnection was simply chauged for the time. A/ter the war of 1854-755 the mareh of the Russian armies began to take the direction of Khiva and the Central Asian territories which lio between India ava the Caspian Sea. There sho absorbed into ber vast empiro im- mense areas of desort ond mountain, which, (rom being a barrier to her own progress, have become ove to any Dation striving to attack ber (rom thatside, Bog- lana's direct railroad line from the Levant to India is now an impossibility i Rusaia desires to waka it #ach, aod there ts pot the slightest provability that the Czars will ever afford their enemy any facil:ties for sironguy- ening her position in the Basi. These conditions ren- der the Suez Caual of extraordinary importance to Englund, (t ts her only bighway uow opea /rom the Mediterrunoun, and she is resolved to guard uw she can from being closed agatust ver, Any vue glancing at the accompanying map will readily Perceive the chormous saving of distance ef- focted by the caval over all the other avail. able routes Uf it wero possible, therefore, that England could ve cut off from thig line, the dis. advantayes at Which sic would be pluced with regara tu ciher aspiring Powers would be incuculable. — Lu- stead of seuuing her Woops And Ler trade through the short and safe route via Gibraltar, Malta, Sue ani Aden, sue woul be compe to send boll around the great continents of Alrica or South Ameriea, exposed Lo the numerous dungere of the ocean nod to the possi- ble risks of war, Masta Would couse to bave ts pres- ent vaiue (6 ber, ape Gibraltar Would assume again its trove a menace to all Southern kurope. Tho interests of Bugiund tn the setticment of ihe E D question ure Luerelore of extraordivary mag- aud (bese sue Will @udeuvor to deiead with her last man aud bust Sutil HOW ENGLAND CAS INTERFERE Even i Turkey bals to manta herseit against tue Kusswns Engiand must, as a measure of selt-preser vation, take uy the quarrel aud Ugbt it out. Althougt there is a Cousimerable anii-war party in Enylana to- day uuder the Jeadersti) of Mr. Giadetone, ite strength Will BOL #usiaio Lhe pressure Of waAtionsl inter the first growt saccesses of Lu Asia Minor” will rouse the whole le to & seuse Of the necessity of Zugland has (wo ceutres whence su miiury power wgainst Kussia, These are the British Ibianus and India fue former represents, of course, the great Source of autuurity, of tnaucial streogeD, the naval force and the rst available mittury power. ‘The latver ropresents vuly a miltary strength which is available iu 4 eecondary degree, Lui is greater in mag. Bituue than the Luropews under certain uighly im. bie conditious, As the ally of Turkey Kuglauad furnish from her European centre the war « cap direct ber penses, the most formuable fleet in the world and ied from 40,000 tu 50,000 good suldiers. Ar: Engiish sobsidy in tho Turkish treasury meany the creation ul a lurge army of irregular troops dravin from the Asutic domiuivos of the Sultan, abuouwat supplies. vf arms add ami daition lor these jorees aud beavy artillery for the deieccs of the Turkish strong. holds along the Danubo and in Asia Minor, supplics | than ridiculous, Seat of War and to Each Oth athe Se aay: Redkant figaunst L Bic ih sotin (au ~ oy pacing, i tee an Se ub KEN e <i Mant ereC Polack Dr ty wwho revels i rf to-day cannot of coal for the Turkish fleet and other necessaries for au active but delengive warfate against the armies and navy of the Czar. The Engtish fice will :mmensely incrense the naval strength of the Tnrks and perbaps control in « large degree the inter creuco ot other maritime Powers, such as France, ltaly and Germany, in the quarrel, "The Kugitsh army drawn from the ers, The infantry so! cheese and ..oudon por by to-morrow ho willoyen get cnoug and water to stay bis hun Requi commissary genera! trequulit most unlooked for supplies, While in British Islands would ‘not alter the conditions | siguments of woollen comlorters and ilupnel bits | of the war very much, because it will | wore sent out by the good ladies at home, represert only the addition ot sts owa number | and when during the cholera season the | to that of the Turkish forces, and will only weigh eo | f nncl belts were needed the troops bad Much and no more tn the scale aginst Russia, ho | a@ glorious supply of pjckles aud yooseberry jum, It 1s, old and patriotre idea tn England that one Kagiishman is as good as ton Frenchmen or twenty Russians 18 now pretty well exploded, breeetloader hax re duced ull European troops to « common level, so that it, instead of 30,000 English suldiers, the same number of turks wore brought into the field the condition of things would remain the sane for Turkey, and in perhaps, useless to discuss why affairs will recur every time a largo b Lroops are inactive foreiga service. 3 due to too much red tape, ott ous action between the ‘aiffere many do not hesitate to attribute it inexperience that grows out of running groove, Anyhow, tt 18 only necessary t history of recent campaigns iv be cou the military art of organtzation the Brit ger y successtul a presont, by the addition of an equal number to tho Russian armies from the immense reserve furces of that Power, AS to the munner in which England cau direct ber THE ANG YY European forces, saval aud military, against Russia, In British Indi st Mobs tere can be but ttle room for « ov. A Baltic | “lation reputed to be devoted to the fleet to watch the Russian ports during the open vause. Maoy of this form of belicl are gon would probably limit tho opera forces of tho Czar to the defence ot impression cau now be made on Russia in that diree- tion. by a hostile fleet. [be wars of isb4 and 1470 have proved how little can be accomplished by the best iron Clads ugainst 9 torpedo guarded coast, Very much the same coudiions prevail on the snares of the Riack woll ug in thoso of the forces under the eusi-independeut native prince idea that, inthe event of England tak Turkey 1b this war, a vast and irrosistit rors, buL no of the Commaudor of the Faihiul. There be coliccted in India and marched westward w the Perhaps it w er. in white bread, calculate that ot “hurd tack’? sitions on the y have resulted iu tho the Crimes the Englah troops wanted snoes and stockings, large con- this ‘condition of British y it is ody of ome 8 want of harmoni riuenia, while to that peeultar too long in one o turn to the vinced that ish st Tis not yORCE univeday pop Sultan and his in the ranks of the aauve ary belonging to the Emprass of India, ag coptrul of the | is @ popular ing sides with ble army could | Seu, the tmportant Russian ports being If | be Well to cousider first relations between t svoured aguinet foreign fleets by — vorpetoes, | native princes and tho British government in 1 botn fixed and locomotive. Indeed, it ts & | belore Making a too burried estimate of the miliary question with such naval con- | forces that could be assemoted for the assistance of the | strucior uy Mr. o: England, | Turks. whether the murine torpedo has not rendered tho building of grout iron-clady a useless expense. Thero 1s no doubt that Bugland’s tleet of fast cruisers called minerce vesiruyers’’ are highly effi purpose for which they aro intended, Their great Speed is the best provwetion against the beavier bus | Siower iron-clad ships and thoi twonster guns, while {he rule of the English in Indja is th ueror, ho hialter bow the governmen nooal 1 under the guise of Liveral Part of the British E destined by its masters as a produ Urst instavee, aod second, alactures of Sianchester, anes 2 UL rut sent tor the | | aitMer case the balunce would bo preserved as it ig at | | | | | | | | ! \ field and IP gives them absolute control of the seas 80 f yo | The Feveoue is wrong irom tho vast mierchant tar an enemy 18 concerned, But | India by a process of taxation Russia vas 20 commerce tu ve destroyed bY such ves: | on Che principle thay i a man seis. 00K In Z | be Wii die--(hat » irom er heves: | what ts demanued of him if he wishes t Foou and the other necessar ag an element of jor a markot at of the con i may seek to titntions, Ine Lal 18 spec revenue in the tor Horm quarrel 1 inust bo regarded ay more formidable in ap- 5 pearance (ban in tact, and will vrove if used against | Salt, are thorefore taxed in india, aad the popuiatt Russia as ineficient a2 it would be expensive to Kag- rice of is existence, aud in the ts crowded us! country land, belore now deiied of tho ied deets of Eng operations in ihe Baie dur atmost eflurts J and France. The 1804 wero little better The vast armaments of the allies cer- slong the cous Aud AS Cubs does Le © Iraia of weuith tor ernment; t Fthe higher aud suburdinate p tainly vurned a few ¥ anu but. | | puarsund | 8 but in the main ept at strike & blow at Russia's hat Powor 1 and aad tne | tion sa towns like | a# 4 provis stopol might sufter again from a bom- | spon court oneo bardinent, Sut such a destruction of evea the cities of | why: 20. RELA an enemy would be as barburogs as it would prove us’. | drawu by k Oe less. Tt would not stuy the Ade of Russian rictory in | total reve +knowi gariaand Armenia, [ts cifects would be entirely | forty-two por cedt, the suit tax thir 1, and Would inc biy result in ci - | the opium tax ' Inaking stration aguinst [nat from these thes iterus cent of @andie intiniely more | the whole But a8 laud tax, THE VALUK OF AN RNG cMRE. it bas reached its coupiry cua When ed of ag such ag that | bear no more than | ou it, for it av now 1b uterlerence 0 ally weak | rages annually about the ally for one of otuer of the bellig s hot dis. | total custume revenue ol 4 1 turd the conditions of the coutest to any appreciable | Suit tAX averages $1 18 por eutire popu degree. Engisod’s navy bemp of litte service to Tur- | and nin t OF AL uvsoiule necessary of koy, bet army, as stared before, would i | \w to the upium tax, Whicu produces nearly one- tuck 19 the ecule. Lei tt be supposed, Lowever, that | li!th of the Briuse revenue, it will eense to ve burden ant army corps 1% ianded on the coast 9! ku- | sume on the Indian pupulution when British pockots are sacrificed to Britisu conseic ropewb Turkey, say «t Varna, 1 would probably be employ cc coluly tor the deieuce of Schounmla aud Varna | fore, Nittle prospect thut Uhis tax aud trac agains issida advanee from the Dobrud } doued, Out of (he total revenues the ox Wiih Evgiish guns on tho sortiveawons and F | as follows, und it ts Well to mark the ite xunuere 1 work tuem a doience of such a posiion as | esiablisnment, ee Scuoumla inigos be prolonged, but it would be absure to say that the altimate result of the con test Would ve other than a Russian victory. Num- | bers Would ted agwiuat valor, especially w the numbers would exbibt an dqual courage avd Nn wvility 10 sustain the fatigues of war, Eng laud bay (ried campaigning in European furkey betore now aud the Lospitals o Varua and elsewbere told thu tale of her fortunes Av urmy corps druited from } the home army, which ‘# usually comlortably sheltered and well fed aud cloiuou, placed 10 active service in a country Where the exiremes of temperature combived with other digeuse-produciug conditions aro daily ex periebved would soon decimate such a force even il it Was itted physically to sustuta all tbe fatigues privatiobs of ordivary active service, The B coramissariat departineut was never a sucvers; strictly #peaking there 18 no such departiueut organized 1 ad- cordauce with tho (rue militury idea of maintaining an army well and eveuly supplied. 1¢ ts always a cuse of Toust veel wnd vlum pudding or mioUldy Derk end, areal. The actual revenue being. adl'or (be last three Thi4-7 ‘8 the doflcit Add to this the expenditure rendere the prevailing iamine aud the an necessity wnder the circumstance works, Which will certainly foot to £6,000,000, and it 16 easy to see thoi | den must be on a country tat hus LO) aliies uf imisgoverument, . tis wail to examine a little further 5 On th up trou Is, there HW be abut peaditures are L),000 £45,174, 000 has been :— Wd NECEsKATY LY ounts exponved of A publig reiiel £5,000, 000 the bur. (ue peu- a ay. 4 inte this aues- | thinned by death. tion of the financial burdens and resources of India betore considering the possibility of drawing antry for military streagth. or maimtaini army that now hoids tugia the following expenditures were and are neces: 10,950,000 over the “provious the amount payatie by India of £110,000, va alread} pays one-third of ihe total cost of mulu- ing the Brit t howe aud abroad, The ervice te in a tistactory avd unsato con a} ion, and tue increase of cost 1% almost wholiy spent in Bugl is While the increase of the cost of niajutay n India ts only 1.05 per cent, that of the onditures of India in Bngland has increased over nineteen per cent 1m 0 Evervthing, therefore, 1s dove for the benollt of nd to aie ber military power aud strengthen her t ure of the Todian Kwpire, and little or vothing tor the The bene ra tof the couutry that furnishes the money systeu of tho Indiun peninsula js ily subordinated to military purposes. Durt ven years India bax paid over £120,000,0 roads whieh have be ly wit to render the troops m eflactive against the population that supports and em. The best payiug road in Tndla, the Bast Tudlan, doos not earn its guaranteed per centage on its capital, and each of the mes bas ® debt which it t¢ unable to sustain ander the very conditions on which the monoy wus originally borrot fradi $ not flow along thesw railroad chuonels because they are not aligned as commurcial but as talitary roals.” The vital question of irrigation hag been nogiected until periodical, and, s feared, aunuai lauioes will become jar Tpdvan tony, present ful. condition certain’ porto India cad be traced ditéetly to the works fort which tenu to ii control of country. But, a being made to Stay the spread of th tho tuct remains that the cheapest drsp be made of a supertluous populativ: The Hin nnd remigns bunselt to (he grave with pbilose tranquility-indeed, (requentiy socking refug: ue horrors of tite. But, 1 fatalists, Imes yids Wo desperate re which, unless rf ts by nature @ fatalict IT AVAILABLE? » that the Hindoo does not Dis position with regard to vould be Au erroneons one Hindostan are thoronghly cognizant of the side of their loug ws the Brinwh fa a so long wilt Lad c 4 rapacity which uot the jess £ ” s oxereised under the abused name « vie base when: Sie Will Dover Ke power can be (el against tuch an ¢ There uro at presevt im Indin about eixty.two thousand British seliers and perhaps less two | hundred thuusaad « ie Bative j the ranks are f » men of man having 8 own veculiar bau nd bi custom. Such & Lure is tiv not homogeneuu enough for transportation to distaut seats of War vad would Jurnieh the poorest troops in the world for such & purpose, Dillerenevs ot aiflerences of food 19 Ladin | itary Asse h Ga eserved inder We pressure of disciplin Ghoorkas and other bili tribes dospiee U of the iow country, ubdivided into sections ¢ » euch thet to abhor ber Lodwa b if t irontier i now being app by that of the Russian Empire, but the vewtral ground is simply an pa ay Auglo-lndian ari Even if the distance betweeu the presout seut of v Indian frontier was not so great, and tm a Vebing area Was not obstructed as it is by maumerable ihe mere fact alone that in order to supply wy With the subsisience which it a firat ne . it would inve could be ima vlore, the Kurepean evnmtingent ts hbo to suffer irom @ Wont ul orgupization in war titac, bow much wore Wonld a foros udequate tor bbe purposes for WHICH it Was imtented suller trom defective arrange- Ments and physical dificulties! The transportation ot a British army trom ludla evycviand to Avia Minor a d the deserts to tudi ver lett Tndia to invade othi an event is not recorded im but no native army territories—at least su history. TRANSPORTATION RY SEA. with Jand’s powerful feet of transporte Indian troops could be sent by sea to the Persian Gull or tne Red sea, Could be—but such a movement on an ade- quate scale would not by accomplished as regards time and numbers tor a long period and without an enor- mous expenditure, Not only should the mon be trana- ported, batevery pound and variety of food necessary to maintain them. For tue occupation of Egypt a small force of Sepoy troops could ba employed, the change of climate being slight and the general bubits of the men being little dissimilar to those of tbe Nile Vatley. But to send such troops to the snow covered plateaus of Asia Minor wotld be to send thom tu inev- itable destruction. Fancy a party of shivering natives of the lower Gangos Valley keeping guard at Kars o¢ Fraeroum during the early spring or late au tumn, to say nothing of the winter time. It would be about as wise to seod # Laplandor odwell ow tke shores of the Victoria Niywnza aud expect him to survive the change of climate, But there are bill triber yn india that are accustomed tw the nows of the Himalaya rang dare as hardy ka 1b mountain . Certainly, bat these nen Whom Eogland will not dure to dratt from their ative territu apd particularly to serve agaiust a Power that is as mncb familiar with Ubese fuine tribes, thoir louniugs and desires as tbe Sritish themselves.’ Viewing it in any way there docs vot seeiu te land being the remotest possivility of Bug 4 ie 1 y00 men westward from india under umstances, unless, indeed, they are European tr Butin the face of the now weil Kuown fact that Kussia bas an ariny ready to make a counter move in the direction of India can Kugiand spare one of her white soldiers from his post? Itie gut iikely that she can DOUBTPUT, LOYALTY OF TAH NATIVE PRINCES, But there w another yrave reason for nun-imterter- once with her Indian army, which must govern Eng- lund to-day, It ithe presence in India gf alarge number of native chiefs and princes whose loy@lty 18 more than dou al ‘Toese semi-independent VWereigus have cousiderabte forces attacbed to their standards, and in gate their armies number man tor man with True, many of them are Monam- ipathize With the cause of the Sultan, npens enthusiasm, and home oppor yowhen th present t! shape aa they would it Hug! s involved in war with her powerlal peighbo 4% Who knows but the active agonts of the Czar been among these doubtful aubjects: ess of India and by promises succecded 1a yinpathies, “Eugluad is, therefore, powerless with ber Indie army acaiost Shi, UOT Lhe troops of that Power olther approwch Near to oF Cross we As this 1s not r yet awhile, i until the Purkish scarcely a probability that farmy in india, AN FOR hb LAND. make an offurs in that direc. able to si tho t favorable ¢ Lins aud bot distance very WHERE ald she aN however, | tron, all the troops must be transported by sea lo Suez, | tueuee through the canal to the shores of the Levant, “ ‘© they would be landed and ac dto the Turkish | toreos covering Syria and the roads leading to Ray pt | aud the Bospuorus, tt is highly improbable that an | Angio-lndion urmy would be landed at the mouth of | the Kupurate: the bead of the Persian Gull, | be the between such @ iapding 4 nd tho at of war i$ more tb | twice the distauce of that t uv the Syrian coast | point in Cen a diinor. Bosia cu army material could be are te Fr sported in wagons, and all suppnes should go on cuinel back, by Which an \tamense amountol time would b Tuging a contingent of, suy, 00,000 Sepoy the hill tribes Of India, ft woukt occupy fa months belore such a force could be put Jin Agia Minor under the most favorable circumstauees. Ths would bring tre army a territory where the climate is ex- xinuiog of Winter, when 1@ miseries incidental to te and fovd, Then the uid bo wholly unfitted R Whose equip: maintain the freezing blasis en ir troops or trained ¢ able the them to snows aud that sweep over the plateaus of the headwaters of the oven umn Euphrates, ‘The whole thing 1s, then, practically im- posible for England, She cannot reach the seat of war by an overland march through Afghanistan and Pe und to send hor forces by soa is almost equally dificult, even if all the other conditions are favoravle. (nh ny case nothing ean be dove toward using the Apglo-Lodiao army im 1877 A RUSSIAN ATTACK ON INDIA Wille Bogland car ovly with the utmost diMoulty avd rikk Use even @ stall part of ber ladiau army against Russia the arthies of the Cear ure siowly bug surely oveping ® Way southeasiward to india, Ta