The New York Herald Newspaper, April 11, 1863, Page 3

THE REBELLION, Three More Reports from the Committee on the Conduct of the War, What Was Done at Bull Ron and | Ball’s Bluff. The Committee in a Fog About the West, ke, &e., be BULL RUN. ‘The Jot Committee on the Couduct of the War submit the fotlowing report, with accompanying testimony, in relation to the battle of Bull run, in July, 1861:— So long atime bas elapaed, and so many important events have occurred in the progress of the war, since the campaign which ended with the battle of Bull ran, ia July, 1561, that your committee do not deem it necessary to go very much into detail in their report, The tosti- mony they submit herewith is very voluminous, and fully covers all the points of interest connected with that campaign. They therefore submit a brief report, confin- ing their attention principa'ly to the causes which led to the dofeat of our army in that bate, ‘That which now appcars to have been the great ccror of that campaign was the fail- tue to occupy Centreville Manassas at the time Alexandria was occupied, in May. The position at Manassas controlied the railrcad communication in all that section of country. ‘the forces which were opposed to us at the battle of Bull ran were mostly collected and brought to Marassas during the months of June and July. The three mon us’ men could have made the place easily defensibie ayainst any force the enemy could have brought aga’ost it; and it is not at all probable that the rebel { rees would have advanced beyond the line of the Rappatsuncck bad Manussas beon occupied by our troops. ‘The «at cause of disaster was the delay in proceeding agaist tho enemy until the time of the three months’ men was 80 nearly expired. In that respect the move- meat wes made too late rather thu too soon, and the onemy were allowed time to collect their forces at Manaa- sas ane to strengthen the position by detensive works. The veasun why the movement was so long delayed is shown, to some extent, by the testimony, to which your commiti¢e would direct the attention of those who desire | vo examine that point And when the movement was finally determined upon, much was needed to render the troops efficient. There bad been but Little time devoted to disciplining the troops and instructing them, even as regiments; hardly any in- struction had been given them in reference to brigade movements, avd none at allas divisions When General McDowell reviewed eight regiments t gether—the only in- stance previous to the battle,so faras the evidence shows, that even that number of troops were manmwuvred in one bouy—be was charged with desiring to make a show. Geveral McDowell was instructed, verbally, by General Scott, to prepare aud submit a plan of operations against the enemy at Manassas. This plan was cousidered im Cabinet moeting, and agreed to; and the 9th of July was fixed upon by General Scott as the day when the army should move. ‘ ‘The plan of General McDowell was to move out in the direction of Centreville, und endeavor to turn the enemy’s right with a portion of his force and destroy his communication by railroad with Richmond, He asked that a certain number of troops be given him to operate against the force which it was estimated that Beauregard had under his command. He was assured that the enemy bel: w should be kept occupied by General Butler, who was in command at Fortreas Mouroe; and ‘that the evemy under ton, in the Winchester val should be held there mneral Patterson. Some days ‘vefore the battle, upon expressing some fears in regard to the force under Johuston being detained by Patterson, he ‘was assured by General Scott that ‘if Johneton joined Beauregard he shouid have Patterson on his hee!s,”” The movement did not commence until the 16th of July, @ week later than the time first decided upon. rhe transportation was deficient,and General McDowell haa to depend upon others to see that supplies were forward- edtohim in time. The march was slow, one reason being that, since the attair at Vienna, near Alexandria, and at Big Bethel, near Fortress Monroe, a fear *‘maaked batteries” caused hesitation in regard to ad- vancing upon peints concerning which there was @ wantof information, There was some delay on the march in noeoe ye r of: the want of complete discipline among some of troops. They were not sufficiently ander control of officers to be provented from leaving the ranks and straggling. The ailuir at Blackburn’s Ford, on Thursday, the 18th, being more extensive than General McDowell had or. dered, drow the attention of the enemy to that point; and, in consequence of the preparations they made there to meet any rae of heyony ee McDowell turo their ition in'that direction, it became necessary to adopt Peotlier line of operations. General McDowell deter- mined to make the attempt to tura their , and steps were taken to secure the necessary information, It was not until Saturday that the information which General McDowell desired was obtained. He then issued orders for the troops to move the next morning. the 21st, some at two o’clock and some at half- past two. The division of General Tyler was in the ad- vance, and was ordered to proceed directly out to Stone Bri and take up p sition there. General Hunter's and General Heintzelman’s divisions were to follow, and when they reached a road leading to the right, about a mile in advance of General Tyler's camp, they were to turn off and proceed in the direction of Sudley’s church and endeavor to turn the cnomy’s left. The movement to the right was intended to be made under cover of Ge- neral Tyler's force at Stone Bridge. But there was myvch delay in the movements of the troops that morning. Tyler’s divifion did not pass the point, where Hunter's and Heintzelman’s divisions were to turn off, until after the time designated. Some of the troops were delayed for three hours, affortling time to the enemy to discover the movement ana make preparations to meet it. Notwithstanding these disadvantages our forces were successful during the fore part of the day, although Beauregard had been reinforced by some of Johoston's forces from Winchester. Qur troops wore very much fatigued. ‘The day was exceedingly warm, the roads wore dusty, and they had been some hours longer on the march than had been anticipated. In the afternoon ad- ditional reinforcements arrived from Jobnaton’s army ,and suddenly attacked our right and threw it into disorder. About the same time two of our batteries (Rickett’s and Griffin's) were captured by the enemy, aud our en- tire force began to fail back in great confusion In to the capture of the batteries, it appears by the testi- movy that they were ordered to take an advanced and ex- posed position, and were not sufficiently supported. Not Rong after they were p'aced in position a rebel t appeared in their immediate vicinity. Captain Grifin states that he took them to be rebews from the first, and directed one of his lieutenants to open upon them with can- nister. Hut Major Barry, chief of artillery, coming up just at tho time, told bim that there were some of our own troops coming to the support of the batteries, and directed him not to fire upon them. The battery was accordingly twurvced in sucther direction, end almost immediate:y aftor this regiment of the enemy opened fire upon it, dis- abling the horses and killing aad woonding most of the atthe guns. ‘ihat completed the discomfture of troop, and the day which had opened on our success od upon a defeated and retreating army. A division under Cclovel Miles had been stationed at Controville, partly for the purpore of a reserve and partly to guard against any fiaok attack. The eoemy* did ai tempt a movement on our left, but were promptly met ‘and checked by our forces there. The principal canse of the defeat on that day was the failure of General Patterson to hold in the valley of . He had a force of about 23, men, while the force of the enemy opposed to him, according to the best evidence committee could ob tain, did pot oxceed from 12,000 to 15 000 men. General torson testifies that he was sxtisiied that Johnston had the zz i show that the troops became dissatisfied , main, only when they learned that their Banker Hill on the 17th of July was a re- e ‘an advance upon the enemy; that whilo supposed they were being led to the attack little, if complaint was made,and they were in excellent wo orders given to Geaeral Patterson, accomplished by his operations, That object was to pre- He ities T totes enough to beat the caemy ear! nstrations you yesterday, if not next week, make demot 0 as to detain hum in the valley of Winchester, But if he retreats tn force towards Manassas, and it be to follow ‘him, then consider the route via Keyea’s Ferry Leesburg, ac. General Scott had, the day before, conveyed to General tho intimation that General McDowell would Bunker Hill, remain! am , ‘On the 17th General from since Sunday, but a Na leare thrgugh Putiadelpbla papers (nat you have ad- the enemy amuse and delay you wit if lie ‘ ‘Khas far Geurt House, ‘The Junction to General Patter. FF wi the Pro 4 tows to win a victory. To this General Patterson replics om the samo day:— The enemy faim actively in forve caused General Tattorson testifies as follaws:— Q. During all this time you knew that General Beott cx. ooter' of you that you should either ¢ and beat Join of inchester, or in the or datatn him, ie the, valley event that Le should come dot aroute where yon could pot follow. nim, that you sl follow him via Keyos, Farry and Leestivrdt A. Yes, 2. And yet, when you were at Charlesiown, yon found yourse'f mot fo aconditton todo either, Now iny cuvst on NEW YORK HERALD, SATURDAY, APKIL I. 1863—TRIPLE SHEET. you not communicate f., here - . y Agta ya that. toleg am of the 18th, from General Scott, did not show that he stili decuned it was of the first umportance that he (Patterson) should detain Johateon there, General Patterson replies: . I looked upon that telegraph, aud #o did every gentleman er wings. 2» Hothing more uur lese than an exbivition of mn per. General Patterson also tortifies Q. You say you could have attacked on the 1Aii the necessity of inferred [rom the t General Soott that ho expected or required of you that you should do something in that direction. Why did yon not do ail that you could to detain hin without an ordert A. Because T could not go up thore without fichting. as I could T tat no reason to beliove that that ‘ot Writwen in the morning in reply to mine of 130 A. M., asking “Shall! attack?! General ight that day, and there was no more occaston (pr BY FOlNE Up And perliling my men without an ordar than of doing thing entirely uncalled for—met tne slightest occasion for it, "* 6 * # 8 8 If General Scott did not fight, and saw the necessity for my acting, I repeat it, was his business to give the ordes. In another place he testities:— > When you found you were in condtiion te detain Johnsion, was it not all important that that fact shouid ha been cominunicated to General Scott—not the fact that Johnston, but that you could not detain hi ength was insufficient for that, and that ho Jobneton, and you musi has not fall back agaiv, telegram w: ed, mM ene heliever ph itfty-Oith part of @ second that I could hold him. ae Goneral Patterson further testifies:— Q. You were not threatening Johnstem at Charlestown so ae lo peeven: bis jofning Beauregard at Manassas? A. No, Mx, 1 remained there because I was ordered to remain in @. Yount yw at that ume th erin: . You knew at it time that you were not oe: a obsiacle to Lin wong down o Manassas? “he ‘Perfcally f knew 1 had not the means to do it, G: Woy did you not commuuicate that fact to General Scott immediately? A. I did communicate my condition, and where I was, G When! A; On the 16th T wrote, him in detall from Bunker Hill, On the t7th I wrote again. And on the 18¢ GAve him ail the information nevessary, | And it was his jusiness to order me, not my busiiiess to make any further suggestions to him. Y. Did you communicate to him tainly. I bent three tel Q. On what day? A. telegrapht A. Cer- aa to nim On the setme day Sruing. Ttelageaphed htmniny condition, ahd asked init moruing. im my condition. and aske I should attack, ‘to have wont further information to him would have been rather impertinent, and he would have so considered tt a Q. Why did you not inform him that you were not then in condition te oller any obatacie to Johnston's joining Beau- regard? A. I would sidered 1t rather & reflection on him to have told him fe knew my position, General Scott testified: — But although General Patterson was nover specifically ordered to aitack the enemy. he was certainly told and ex- pected, even if with juferior numbers, to hold the rebel army in his fronton the alert, and to prevent it from re- enforcing Manassas Junction, by means of threatening ma- nouvres and demonstrations—results often obtained im war with half numbers. Instead of doing that, however , General Patterson came down to Bunker Ifill, remained there over the day when be bad been given to understand the advance wonld be commenced by General McDowoll: and early the next morning. without waiting to hear how far General Mc- Dowell bad advanced, or whether he had advanced at all, left the neighborhood of Winchester, where the enemy was, and turned off to Charlestown, where,as he himself gays, he had no means to offer any obstacle to Jobnston’s Joining Beauregard whenever he chose. Johnston at once ‘took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded him, and reinforced Beauregard in season to inflict a defeat upon our forces at Bull ran. Johnston started the greater portion of his forces from Winchester on the 18th; some of the testimony shows that a portion started on the afternoon of the 17th, Geveral Patterson, though only e twenty miles distant | from Winchester, and under orders to prevent the enemy from reinforcing Beauregard, did fnot discover that John- ston bad left Winchester until two days afterwards, when he telegraphed, on the 20th, to General Scott that re- inforcements had left there. In reference to deferring the attack upon Beauregard, wheu the arrival of Jonnston’s forces had become known, General McDowell says that the information that he re- ceived was too indefiniteo—mere rumor—and he could not toll how much credit to give it. The arrival of the cars during the night preceding the battle was not certain evi- dence of the arrival of Johnston’s forces; ior it was ex- pected that reinforcements would be hurried up to the enemy from every direction possible. And he had been assured that ‘if Johnston joined Beauregard Patterson should be on his heels.’” General Scott testifies on that point:— As connected with this subject, I hope I may be permitted to notice the charge mad inst me on the floors of Con- gress, that T about bis position as far Bi practicable Ho sent word to General Stone that there had beea @ mistake about camp of the enemy, thar !@ Was WOll posted In 4 woud Mad Crnooaled. and walked Lar | ther oreo: | Not ta rom seves o'clock 19 {he knorping & body ot rebel riflemen was discovered to the right of Cal, Deve » iu the direction of Conrad's kerry. Captai. ftinie brivewith hig company advanced towards them, when they fell back unti they re:ehed a diteb, under cover of which they halied and opened fre upon our men; they | Were soon driven out of the ditch into a cornfield, whore they obtained cover behind gome stacks of corn, Another company was ordered by Colonel! Devens to the support of Captain Philbrick; but before they reached him gome of dered to fall back to the main bi dy. About eight o'clock Colone! Devens determined to (all back to the bluff, where Coionel Lee was, which was done im perfect order. H@thon 1econmoitred the woods to his right and loft, and, 'y moved forward to hig former position. weea cight and nine o'clock the messenger of Colonel Devens returued {rom General stone with instructions w him to remain where be wax and he would be supportes. Colonel Devens testifies that it was oiiher then or soon after that he was told that Colonel Baker waa to come Over and take command. He sent word to Genural Stone that he was discovered by the enemy, bat could still hold his pogition, About ten o'clock the measenger returned with this message: —Very well; Colovel Baker will come and take command.’’ Colonel Devens states that while waiting further in structions he directed bis adjutant to ascertain the amount of the force with him; the was twenty- eight officers and six hundred and twenty-five men. sent once or twice to the river to ascertain if movement upon. Mi v2, he, been, tn formed of the reinforcement sent thither from Winchestes, though urged to do ao by one or \bers of the Cabi” apt Bow, it was, at the foeaptl of Bek news, too late to 6 troops from the attack. benides, 19 the movement at first, we bad all bece and sanguine of success. id it is not true that I was urged by any! uthority to ‘the attack which was commenced as ¢! think, as the of fo Bore W , BALL’S BLUFF. ‘The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the following report, with the acoompanying testimony, in ri te tbe battle of Ball's Slut fy ot On the morning of Saturday, the 19th of October, General McCall, commanding a division ia the vi ‘Washington, moved his entire command, under from Goneral McClellan, to Drainosville and ite immediate borhood. A portion of his torce was moved some miles veyond Draincaville, and within eight or ten miles of Leesburg, but was recalled to Drainesville, by order of Geueral fe » about sunset of that diy. e entire division of General William ¥. Smith was also sent out within su, distance of Generai McCall. * General McCall testifies that he was directed to make Teconnoissances in all directions, for three or four miles from Drainesville, noting larly the character of the country. About ten o’ on morning he in- ‘McCiellan that he not be abie to get through his work that day, and received, in reply, «If you finish in the morning, return.” On Sunday, the 20th, General MoClellan directed a tele- gram to be sent to General Stone, at Poolesville, of which the following is a copy furnished your committee;— Recelved r 20, 1861, from Griffin. Grneral McClellan desires me to inform you that General (eCall occupied Drainesville yesterday, aud is still there; will send out Mg me to-day in all directions from that point. General desires that you keep a good at upon Leesburg, to see if this movement effect to drive them away. Perhaps @ slight demonstrat on your part would have the eifect to move them. A. V. COLBURN, Assistant Adjutant General. Brigadier General Stonx, Poolesville. On Sunday afternoon General Stone moved some forces to the bank of the rivor at Edwards’ Ferry, ani crossed over one or two companies to the Virginia side, but very soon recalled them, Colonel Devens, of the Fifteenth Massachusetts, testifies that he received from General Stone, about one o'clock on ‘Sunday, the following ordér:— Heapqvartens, Conrs or Ons: Pooixsvinix, Oct. Covoxxt—You will planse send or the two new tatboats now there opposite the island (Harri- RV ATION, , 1361 son's) transferred to the river: and will, at three o'dlock P. | M., have the island reinforced by all of’ your regiment now on'duty at thecana! and at the New York batiery, The ickets will be replaced Jasmuchtiselis there, the companivs of the Nineteen Vory respecifuily, your obedient ser- vant. ASP. BTONE, Uriuutier General Colonel Cuances Devexs, Commanding Filteenth reginent Massachusetts Volunteers, About dark a verbal or¢er was sent to Col. Devens to send Capt. Philbcick, of his rogunent, with a small party, across the river from Harrison's island, with directions to push out to within a mile of Leesburg, if possible, without Deing discovered, aud then returo and report. Captain Philbrick accordingly crossed, with p@rhaps fifteen or twenty men, at a re where he hed crossed some time previous!y, when be had discovered that the river at that int was hot picketed by the enemy. Me landed at the Toot of the blurt ‘opposite Harrison’s Island known as Ball's Blufl, ascended by @ path that jo! to tue top, and proceed- ed to reconnoltre as directed. Before Captain Philbrick returned General Stone sent the following despatch to General McClellan, a copy of which was furnished your committee: Huanaquanrens, Auuy or uy Wasuixaton, Oct. 8), 1861, rnow P feint of crossing at this ‘this Pr a Reo'p oounartL ‘in ten mintives, h of senate n over in ten minutes at eac! SS ver al Q P. STONE, Bri jeneral Gor General MeCum ee re es in Philbrick pushed out some distance from the , and then returned and reported that they had dis- covered a small camp of the enewy that did not appear to be very woll guarded. This report was sent toGeneral Stone. Colonel Devens testifies that about midnight he received the following order from General Stone: — Hxapquantens Conrs, oF Onservation, PoocrsvitLe, Oct 20, 1861-105, Pe Mf SPROIAL ORDER—NO. —. aeitlone Deve games 9 te Harrison's Talend with ‘compan! ment, and proceed prise amp of the Spemy stavovesed by Captain Philbrick. in directign, of Leesburg, The landing and mares will ani 3 Colonel Lee, ‘Twentieth, Masséchiuectts Volunteers Immediately Colonel Devens departure, occupy art son's with four companies or his regiment, and ‘cause the four t to be taken across the Roiat cf departure of Colonel Devevs Une compan: sorene (0 the heighis on the Virgin ure. to cover hia return, jo mountain heviizers will be akon silently up the ter. ‘and carried i. ©} side of the island, under the orders of Colone! Lee, 8 - Colonel Devens will attack the camp of the at day: break, having routed, will pursne them as anne deems t, Abd will destroy the canny, if practicable, = jureing, He will make all to 6!’ -vation. poss. owe Fy; will, unde.» \etre m ite com ppuret . aged hy Devens to Dr:vent any ‘ an pr net Teby per propery, y officer oF com for or plunder ET ee oe Clan F- er Gem’ ig! Devens and out in the direction of the supposed camp. reaching the point to whieh the reconnottring part; ort nt before had proceeded, it was discovered that what bad been taken for A camp was a ingle row of trees, the diin light of the moon ehining between them, below the brunebes, presenting thy Hanes of a row of tents. Col, Dewens hed advan oreo to within aboot a mile of Leesburg. ity moa there, and pro ments were coming, and what Colonel Ey orders to Colone! Perry, and have them there at to await orders tuere: to have the remain have acomfortable breakfast, and x in the morning. Late in the night—tt might have been between two and three o'clock in the morning—I sent a cautionary order to Colonel Baker, knowing that volunteers make too much noise some- times, to have that regiment march with silence ana with un- loaded guns. From that time 1 sent him no order. General Stone testifies that between eight and half-past nine o’clock, when Colonel Biker was with him, and they had discussed the whole matter for some time, he gave him @ written order to take the entire commani of the right at Bali’s Bluff. That order, with a communication from General Stone to Colonel Baker, sent some time later, ‘was found upon hu body after he was killed. The two papers are as follows:— Reapauarrens, Cones or Onsenvation, E ¥ amyl Oct, 21, 1861. ing in I can give you all the pies urna tase fornia regiment to Con Si paige roused ear); ie be in Fendiness to mere at seven o-clock front of ‘Iii brigade, or retire the re Devens, now ou the Virg cretion, assuming command on Golonel, your moat obedient servant. CHARLES P. STONE. Brigadier General Commanding. Col. B. D, Baxee, Commanding Brigade. HEAnguanrars, CoRrs or Onservation, Eowarps’ Ferry, October 22, 183/11 ‘am informed that the force of tue enemy is told. If you can push them you may dd so. ‘a strong position near Leesbury, if you ci keep them before you, avoiding their batteries. If vA Leesburg and take the Gum Spring road you will not follow far. but seize the Orst good position to cover that road. Their design is to draw us ou, if ghey are obliged to retreat as Gi , where they caa be reinforced from Manassa. trong positio frequently, sothat when they are pushed ¢ on their flank. Yours, respectfully and truly, BARES P. E jer aquvera! Commanding. Colonel E. D. Baxen, Commanding Brigade. the enemy's cavalry mado their appearance from the di- | rection of Leesburg. The two companies were then or: | ‘no appearance of the cne- | | | The moment T had Srrnlagrt coe oe came * those troops General at Washingeon thet ee kad frac opin ga wut tit ira’ now wholler 1 trieve, I @ ie MoGielixa, before went up. Ha |, (rera Mei er had tied or pul tate mune docpaich i diese uum of the Re Pe : Has that information to Gea. MoCialian, I eon. tined witharamtig the irons, watching carefull), 60 sate | uae the ory tor. thelr protecuon i necessary. borne time—1 entiuot tell how: long, for one takes but | tile note of time under such cireu noes, but apparently aa som a& & message could go to Washington and an anewer be eta Toturned (being carried byre courier on hurechack fourm! ee 5 rom, % " ‘orders from Glew, MoUierinn to this elect" I Light iatrenching if necessary’ You will ho Te intoreed.""” Pet the “if your mon will git? | came before the rest of the ‘espateh: and my unproaion la, though I will not be positive, that the words “at all haz ards,” were niacd in the direction to bold ail the ground on the Waewin hove have not possession of a single am sorr, mr . | telagrans' ak otherwise “of she Messorae eoutciad wha ta | division, You know the way in which I was removed (rom my command. I was ordered to report myself in Washin high: tt ™ a two ours ride; and ~oea & w'ngle paper of any kind I then left behind me. I make this explanation to show why it is that cannot spexk positively about the lan- we of despatches reevived and sent, why I cannot, per- rt Gane cive thelr exact words ‘Tlaaw all the dancer fu which mg troops were on the Vir. gin ‘at that time that Gen, McCall was oo} I Lt ny Povanenid wis Cm mer Yelegraphed'me io hold my position on tho Virginia aide [iacards, aud that Lsbould'be reiuforced, that he had saguot siato positively when it wae ibat I tel 4 to 1 Banks. But ‘now fs that just ae start- Prwhon the news of Gol. re ae Bawarde’ Berry. "I despaiched-& messenger to "brwade Gen, Hanke ment sen, eng ng Faces 0 the 10 Gea. my. jiom ta that when T to. Edwards? Ferry, and hed to Gen. McOtel of the re- Pulse ag scons coma Veena 12 Gen. Sade wi ae Ae me butat Jost in communicatin: with Gen. bey fond phen, sah F had not ‘of 8 « the com. ty were (I have never learned, I immedi- responded to it —"I_ have recoived' tne box, but no key.” What the despatch was have no knowledge whatever; but I presume that the despatches which came vi covered the same ground. T cannot state now, afler so long an interval of ume, at What hour I telegraphed to Gen. MeClotian urging that the reinforcements ahould be sent to Goose creek, on the Vir- ginia side, supposing all the ume that Gen. NcCail was not far Ol, ‘The response to that, which I think I received about 11 o'clock on Monday nigut, was the first intimation E ever re- ‘MeCal! had not all the time been near me. ‘That despatch informed me that no reinforcements could reach me from the Virginia side; but that General Banks would fy g f E reinforce me from the Maryland side. Q—liow tar was (ien” Banka from yout A.—He was about fourteen miles in my rear. Dad that tirsi despatch from Gen! MoClellan, promising Jou Temforcementa contemplate that they should come rom General Banks? 80; but at the 4. Yes, sir, 1 suppose time my idea was, that McCall was close by.me. ' And L was led into an error, late in the eveniny, by receiving « despatch from General Me! headquarters, whether signed by him or bis chiof of sia, Ido not now recollect. asking me {f there was a Now there is no such place as * Darnesville;”” & “ Drainesvilley? and paving in iny After | command, have on the Virginis#hore tf your |: ind tl at Drainesville, took i for gran ed that the operator had made a mistake, and had meant Meninesville instead of town,” which was the name of a place in Marylan d whith proved to be the plac» meant, T reptiec to that despatch to the best of my recollection, that there was a good. road from Drainesviile to Edwar Presume that that caused some misconceptior headquarters, because they undoubtedly Lad ** Darnestown” mm their minds when ry. telegray “ Darneaville;” justas I had.“Draines- ville” in ‘my mind when I saw ‘Darnesville” in the des. patch. But’ that is not very important, only to show how errors will creep in. Tibink that by this statement I must remove any unplens- ant iupre-sion with revas my imp! rly exposing troops: Toumutter at Edwards Kerry. since f acted under ihe 1a- ssrtuctions of my superior officer; and also under the impres- sion that our forces uncer Gen, McCall were near us on the Virginia side of Edwards’ Ferry. Q. How happened it that you failed to make thisetatement, concerning those orders, on your former examination? A. Because I did noi deem it proper to give of the orders of Colouel Baker proceeded to Harrison’s Island, and finally concluded to send over troops to reinforce Colonel Devens and Colonel Lee. One of the witnesses states that Colonel Baker was in doubt for atime whether to recall ‘the troops already over or to reiniorce them: but, Kpos hearing some one on the Virginia shore call out that they needed assistance, as the enemy were coming, be deter- termined to reinforce them, ond proceeded himselt to the Virgimia side, and assumed command. Colonel Baker di- rected the forces to cross at the point where Colonel De vens and Colonel Lee had crossed with their forces. . ‘The means of transporting acow at Ball’s Bluff was ex- coedingly limited. Betwgemthe rison’s island were only le of tI of boats, was taken from the Maryland to the Virginia side of the island. 4 The on the Virginia side was at the foot of a Sephari etme” oriree Y way, and on i. Cleared! apace, or field. Gordered by woods, which affordet acover tothe enemy, until within a short distance of where our t1 oops were formed. Colonel Baker, according to the testimony, arrived on the field between one and two o'clock, and at once to form @ line of battle the ticid at the top of. the bluff. ‘The amount of the upon our side was between 1,700 and 1,800 men, ‘of about one- half of the Fifteenth Colonel Devens; to attack—some of the i between two and threeo’olock, others at three at first heavily,on the right of our line, moving along towards the ceutre and left, where the hardest aeons eee ‘our committee do not deem it necessary to go into the detatis of the action. It —— for over two hours, our troops contending most bravely against greatly su- pertor numbers. Cvlone! Baker fell Between four and five o'clock, having been most consjicuous for his bravery and almost reckleas «: . When he fell the line to waver, and some portions of it gave way, before the destructive fire of the enemy. After the death of Colonel Baker the command devolved upon Colonel Cogswell, of the Tammany regiment, who proposed to attempt to cut through to Edwards’ ‘erry, which was assented to by the other regimental command- ers. Upon attempting a movement in that direc- tion they were met by & Mississippi regiment coming trom below, whi opened a most destruc. tive fire upon them Our troops gave way, and retreuted down the bloff towards, the riv: The ‘was about dusk, 8® that our troops were somewhat con- coaled by the busbes on the side of the bla. The enemy continued to fre upon them from the top of the blu, The men attempted to excape to the island in the boats and by swimming, being exposed all the time to the fire of the | enemy. ‘The flatboat was soon riddled and sunk; the life: boat drifted down the stream, and the skiffs were lost, Many were shot while in the water; others succeeded in ewimming to the isiand; some few, uncer cover of the darknes#, succeeded in escaping along the bank of the river, and finally reached our lines, But the greater por- tion were Killed or taken prisoners. In relation the operations at Fdwards’ Ferry, under tue supervision of General Stone and the immediate com- mand of General Gorman, as there was no serious Og bting there, it may pot be necessary to go much into detail, The crossing was commenced about duybreak by the forces utder Colonel Dana, of the First Minnesota regi. ment, and was continued until sume two five hundred men were crossed over that day, means of crossing was very limited, as at Harri- son's —a consisting of three or four flatboats or scows, propelled across by poles. The piace of landing ‘was very good. and covered by our artillery on the Ma. ryland §\ ‘There were no important demonstrations made dy our forces on the Virginia side of Kdwards’ fer- ry. Some reconnoisances were madefor a short dis- tance, aud one regiment of the enomy seen, probably the Mississippi regiment that arrived on the field at "s Bluff, near the close of the action there, Goneral MoCall’s division had remained at Drainesville all of Sunday and Sunday night. General McCall tes- e’clock— Atte o'clock Monday morning I reported to him (Gene. ral McClellan) that cers whom I had consulted Teported to me that they would finish thelr work im two hours. 1 sent that ex to General McClellan at six o'clock, and got his reply, dated at eight o'clock, 0d, ef hte guewe be ne aa lock” T finisied. ine and tem o' Ordered the froope the to be ready to and a8 soon ae the work was Gaished T reirned to’ tay camp under Both General McClellan and General So 'all testify that the movement to Drainesville was for the purpose of re connoitering the country in that direction. But General Stone received no intimation of the object of the move- ment On the comtrary. the language of the despatch of day wel! load him to believe that the movement had refereuice to driving the enomy from Leesburg. The despatch contained no intimation that General ‘wis to be soon withdrawn from iirainesvilie, He was di- rected ‘to keep a good lookout upon Leesburg to see if this movoment has the effect to drive them ‘ibe away. Perbaps a slight demonstration on your part have the effect to move them.’ General Stone demonstrations both at Edwards’ Rail’s Bluff, and promptly notitied General what he bat done. He sent that information on night, and he testifies that he reocived no intimation General McClellan a8 to what he should do, whether to continne the demonstrations or not. and received timation that General McCall was not cloee at come to bis rm-TY until oe eleven o'clock ‘doy night. @ very general impression among: west men at Kdwarde’ Ferry during Monday General McCall would come to their assistance; and . | Stone testifies that he cautioned bi, artillery about Sring upon any troops that might show themselves in that di- | faction Yee they might re op b our own forces. to chat matter Geperal McClellan testifies as =Do you remember whether or not you informed nid Cueneral Bove) of ihe wit. d-ywal of Siaith and MoCall to weit former positions? A.—Ttliok I did. Genorsl Stone (Fobraary 27,186), after stating that topon bearing othe death Of Colon! Baker: he sproseedod pcb fen eee, she full extentof the disaster vce determined to withdraw the troops at Edwards’ Ferry, woisfles as follows:— thatT could go myself quicker than orse and galioped down may superior oflcer which he bad not himself pres iqusly pub- lished or authorized me to use. The moraing that I caine be- fore your Com: was instructed at McClellan's headquarters that it was the desire of the Genera! that of. cers ecving westizseny before tue committee shuuid not state, without his authority, anything regarding his plans, his orders for the moven.ents of troops, or his ordera concerning the position of troops. That covered this case, Q. Did you understand that to apply W past orders and transactions as well as those to be ex in the fu- turer A I did; use I could nut know. and did not know, what orders to others were given cotemporaneous with those T receive). and 1 it create wrong impressions by siving the orderaT vad received trom my commanding 6 time produced cotem- Taldied, when giving rhe orders from If had made my testit be-ore, that I could not ay commending general except auch 8 he and ived_ no’ inf whatever consernin General au) that it was bu a simple thing in cont with any might be makin, transport i crossing trogp Min gt your foring portallan, me time Pas Chea rad e same. e e for information ofthe enemy, and [ should think that despatch tnust have reached me about era: McCleilan asked what meags of had. 1 re- plied to him by N's the number and character Of the boats at cach croasing—et and at Har. Fison’s Island. General McCle!lan testifies in reference to thé crossing of General Stone’s forces inte Virginia: — Thave no Po ee ee events that occurred su’ to the opers- fi Monday—tho arrival ot Sorat Banks with nis foroes, the arrival of Genoral McClellan, and the final withdrawal of all our forces to the Maryland side of the river—are fully sct forth in the testi- mony herewith submitted, and your committce do not deem soy comments by them to be necessary. In connection with the battie of Ball's Bluff two points remain to be considered: First, whether a crossing was justi@able under any circumstances, considering the very insuflicient meuns of ‘tation at the command of General Stone. Second, whether the ferces under Colonel Raker could and should have been reinforced from the Virginia side of Edwarda’ Ferry when it was known that the troops under bis commaad were engaged with the enemy. In regard to the first point, all the testimony goes to Prove tbat the means of transportation were very inade- quate. The testimony of General Stone would sectn to in- dicate that while he was inclined to deom it suilicient, under the circumstances under which the movement was made, be left much to the judgment of others; and this much Can be said for him, that he received uo intimation that & movement acroes the river would be expected from him, of would be justified, until the day bofore (Sunday) ft was actually made. And the reasons that he had for. supposing that other forces were within a short distance to render him assistance are set forth in the previous por tion of this report. In reference to reinforcing Col. Baker, the testimony is very conflicting. There is ne question that it was known ‘that the forces at Bali's Blulf were ergaged with the enemy. The firing of musketry was distinctly heard at Fawards’ Ferry, on both sides of the river. Th> only question is whether reinforcements should have boon seat under the circumstances, and whether there was any sufficient reason why they were uot sent, Gen. Stone tes- tities that he received a» intimation. trom Col. Baker that he needed reinforcemevis he received Jittle, if any, inform tion from Co}. Baker iw reference to the condition ‘and progrogs of affairs at Ball's Bluff, and he also testifies that, even if reiniorcements had been needed, they could nothaye been sent up on the Virginia side; that the enemy bad earthworks and batteries between Edwards’ Ferry and Bali’s Biluif, which would have made it ex- tremely hazardous, i( bot impossible, to have sent any Feinforcements by that route. Some of the other witnesses Others testify most positively poe toes far as erny ee ne judge, there was no ob- stacle whatever way our troops i on the Virginia side (rom Kaward’s Ferr; Seat ok Tt cannot be denied that had reinforcements @rrived nt Bail’s Bluff from Edward’s Ferry negro | that your committee refrain from expressing + tive cyinion upon that poles, bus allow oudh one 00 fests hla ~ omnes from the tcstimony they have been able One other subject remains to be considered before 33 to that subject, but have submitted the testimony without comment upon their part, had it not been ter the offerte that have been made by many to hold them responsibie for all that bas taken place in referenee to the arrest of the of their invest! concerning the in course: ir eauses oi the disaster at Ball's Bluff they obtained testi- both the military ly to them all, whieh, without ex- capacity | ru i 3 z fayette. The immediate cause of bin arrest koow, 'y were satiefied that the information whi | they bad furnished to the department had in ail proba- n i | dnstten. ry of directed arrest General Stone immediately, and Lafay ard to Fort ete, ‘The order was carried into exeou- yon the same eveuing. the adminiatration of bis department, aud to make as full & statemout to the commiitee as be considered necessary. bid —- together with all the testimony, is here- with submitted. It is due to General Stone that” your committee should Btate that it appears, from the documents before your Committee, that immediately upon his arreat he demand- ed that he should be jurniahed with a copy of the charges against him, and be allowed the opportunity of promptly meeting them. Why his request was not granted your comunittee have never been informed. B. F. WADE, Chairman. DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST. ‘The Joint Committes on the Conduct of the War sub- it the follow! , with the accom) teati- sadugy in rolatlan'i tho Depertmeat of tho Weat—= Mony necessary to enable them it @ com fe sive report in relation to the sdudingotration of ire in the Depa: of the West, mofe particularly while under. the stirs of Feces John C; Fremont. Com. ‘polied to romain in attendanoe upon: sessions, they were unable to visit tho department tn order to take tho testimony of. witt there; and they did not feel willing to call idm 20 great a distanos tis witnesses whose testimony was to fully eiuci- date all the facts, as-their ices were cop tantly re- quired in the tield, ’ Thr ir investiga; is our cominittee have strict to the rule .dopted by them from the the attendance of those in the military” ice only when no deiriment to the public intereste wor! result from a temporary absence from their commands, Wuen grees its session last summer, many of those who had been most actively engaged in the operations to which your committee desire. to direct their attention had been ordered to other parts of the country; some were in Tennessee and Missi sippi, some in Arkansas, some in the Army of the Potomac, and others in the Departmentof the South under Genera! Hunter. Such testimony as was within reach yonr committee have taken, But they are fully aware that their investi- gation upon that subject bas beea far from complete: and they, therefore, present but a brief report, togethor with guch testimony as they have obtained. When the rebellion commenced, Missouri was one of the most turbuleat among those States which the rebel leaders sought to gain over to their cause by the conni- vance and troachery of the State authorities, and by the Presence of armed forces to operate upon the fears of the People. The number of federal troops in that region was ‘very sma! great portion of our troops stationed in the Territories anid at our military posts upon the Western (ron- tier, had been basely surrendered by Twiggs to the robels in Texus. St. Louis, the great commercial emporium of the State, was preserved from falling under rebel control gely nya prompt and fearless course pursued by Gen- eral (thea Captain) Lyon, who, not waiting for orders or authority, occupied the United States Arsenal when threatened by the traitor Governor of the State, and dis- persed tho rebel troops who were collected under the spa- cious name of State Guards, in a camp of instruction near St. Louis. ‘The difficulty under which our commanders there ta. bored in obtaining supplies of arms, clothing, &c., for volunteers, was far greater than was felt in avy other Part of the country. Distant from all the principal de- pots, ata time when the ability of the government was taxed to the utmost to arm and equip the Jarge number 0° volunteers culled into the tield, those who were, from ‘time to time, placed in charge of that department were compelled to act under the greatest disadvantages. Just previous to the appointment of Genera! Fremont to the command of that department, the state of affairs in Missouri bad become alarming. In every portion Of the State the rebel forces appeared, and assumed the offensive; all Beco the State they were committing their depredations, and Jackson, the Governor, bad ‘ap- peared with a large force of troops furnished by the rebel ‘authorities from Arkansas and Texas, in addition to those bene generals had collected a a finia tions tonnaen rel a large Ns Kentucky, &c., and were southwestern portion of State and Cairo.'at the mouth of the Ohio, eral Lyon, who was Jackson, with his superior forces, from getting possession of the northern portion of the State. In July General Fromont was assigned to that com- mand, to New Yotk city, spent some days, endeavoring to arrange for supply- ing his department with the arms, &c., which were absolutely requisite. He reached St. Louis on the 26th of July, General Pope, who bad been assigned the oom- ‘mund in Northern ern portion of the State, hud been calle iro, was Fremont first forced Cairo, as being the most small; but the enemy were led to believe, umber of steamboats and Pillow, who bad a force es at 12,000 men, was Missour!, was calling for troops. to ments for some time; Geueral Prentiss, pertant point, fn ie was, at the junction of tbe Otto and Miasiag ‘ovnt that went down from St. Loul far deterred from making the attack be had contemplated. Hi bie him to take the fleid; General Lyon, in the af ‘wl reinforce- asking for reinforcements. General the navigation of thove two rivers. Tho um: ber of that the remforcement was than it really was: Csiro being reinforced, Gen. Fremont at once took steps to send troops to the assistance of Gen. Lyon. The number of the enemy opposed toGen. Lyon was overwhelm- ing. It was supposed by many that he would retire defore them until he should meet Supports. He himself seems to have contempiated such a movement; for, after the affair of Dug Springs, he retired (9 Springfield, and General Sturgis testifies that at that time General expressed h:s convictions that reinforcements could not be sent to him. Upon reaching Springfeld General Lyon balted bis forces, and, after waiting there some four or five days, announced his intention to march out and attack the ene- my. What rensons influenced him in forming that deter- mination are not well established by the testimony. Some of the officers have expressed their conviction that he ap- prehended that the enemy, should he retice further from them, would fall upon his rear and orippie him, or force him to’ fight « battle under great disadvantages. His brave spirit, doubtiess, led him to meet the enemy he had gone so far to reach, and endeavor to inflict such a blow as would lead them not to preas very ciosely u on him. Whatever his reasons may have been he determined upon the" attack. The battle was tought at Wilson’s creek on the 10th of August, and, though the enemy outnumbered our forces four to one, our army was eminently success- ful General Lyon fell leading on @ regiment to the attack. His los at that time was most deeply felt. Dying as a brave soldier would wish to die, fighting for the cause of his country against those who were seeking its destruction, his example bas exercised {ta influense npon those who ave since won the glorious victories which have mide our armies in the West go illustrious. Lad distance. At Rolla they were joined had been started to their relief, but had been delayed for want of transportation. In ber Colonel Mulligan, who had been upon an to fall back before the forces of the enemy advancing against him under General Price. Colonel Mulligan made @ stand at Lexington, and prepared to resist them, send- for reinforcements. eral Fremont, upon hearing of Colonel Malligan’s situation, made arrangements to is assistance; but from various causes they were unable to reach him, and the enemy succeed. ing io cutting off his supply of water, he was compelled ou suspended Ip relation to the administration of Gen. Fremont much bas been said about the high prices paid by him for arms ‘and other supplies, the fortification of st. Louis, delay tn points threatened by the enemy, jue assumption of authority, &c. Your com- mittee can but briefly notice those different points, on ac- count of their imability to obtain full evidence in relation tbem. least, appears to be established:— coy s ‘This much, at Fremont the deo, Ht that the department was very deatitute of supplies of all kinds; 10 arms engaged by Gene- Fal Promont (or the soldiers in his bi department were di- verted w the Army of the Posomas-the object. of the it then being to collect and equip at Washington a8 soon as could possibly be done, rendered {t the more important that other arms obtained. Yet with all that General Fremont i proper to do, his department long felt the ade. quate supplies: Jn reference to the fortifications abont St. Louie, Gen. government has bad {ts ageots to ex- for that work, as well as other con- ‘racts—your Committee forbear expressing an opinion. bility furniebed some of the grounds upon which his ar- | post had been made, bat the not Jearn welll more than a year afterwards w the immediate ©: s arrest at the Lime it w nate sof | ened by the ener those points threat. | committees have the | that Geaceal Fremont | fo (ar viden :e before them, thoy any Deliere i | i i A E i D them mirposes than those for called him for troops to be sont to the Bass, ate forces 1 t Promptly, and only failed to render over which Goneral Pre 2 attention to the buildi ‘Whoever ts enti to the cred joying svole means of wi not to be denied that Gen. Fremont perceived to Fo- gult from them. Our briliiant vietorics in the West will poe Ayala testimouy to the correctness of his judg. Fespect. But that feature of Gen. Fremont’s administration which attracted the most attention at the time, aud which will ever be most prominent among the many points of interest connected with the history of that department, is bis proclamation of emancipation. Whatever epinina may be entertained in reference to the time when the pe of emancipation should have been inaugurated, or y wi authority it should have been promulgated, can be no doubt that Gen. Fremont at that carly day rightly judged in regard to the most effective means of subduing this rebellion. In proof of that it is only ne cossary to refer to she fact that his successor, when trans- ferred to department, issued a laination om. bodying the same iple, And the President, ag Com- mander-in Chief. Army and Navy, bas applied the the same princi all the rebellious States, and few will deny that it must he adhered to until the last vestige of treason and rebeltion is destroyed. ‘The administration of General Fremont was eminently characterized by earnestness, ability and the most un- questionable loyalty. In the exercise of the almost un Iunited power delegated to him there was no evidence % of any tenderness towards treason, or any failure to a4 aasert the dignity and power of the government of whi he was the representative. ‘The manner in which that power was exercised was to be judged by the resulta, and the policy of continuing bim. in command was a matter for the authoritics above him to determine In order to pronounce a final judgment upon all the af- fairs in the Western Department Jmuch more information is necessary than 1s in the-pussession of your comm ‘gre. ‘They have undertaken merely to state what seems ¢ borhe out by such testimony as they have boen able to .- obtain. B. F. WADE, Chairman, Z. CHANDLER, JOHN COVODE, GEO. W. JULIAN, As the testimony which the committee submit in rela- tion to the Western Department is 80 incomplete, the testimony of 80 many witnesses, deemed material by the whole committee, being wanting, the undersigned decline to conour in the above report, and, for thomsclves, prefer to submit the testimony without comment. D. W. GOOCH, M.F. ODELL, IMPORTANT FROM CENTRAL AMERICA. Ib The War Between Salvador and Guatemala. Formidable Alliance Against the Former. PREPARATIONS FOR IMPENDING BATTLES. The Seizure of the Property of the ' ‘Pransit Company. THE CHANCES OF AN ARRANGEDIENT, ‘&e., &o. &o, We have very interesting news from Central America, Bince the recent battle between Salvador and Guatemala, 10 which the former was victorious, a triple alliance of Guatema'a, Nicaragua and Costa Rica has been formed against Salvador. NICARAGUA. Generai Jerez is said to have entered Nicaragua from Salvador, with four hundred soldiers, and is waiting near the border for reinforcements from Salvador, Jeres will be remembered as a prominent general of the Nicaraguan army, who was entrusted with a mission wo, Salvador, with propositions for uniting the States of Cen- tral America in one confederacy. President Martines, of ‘Nicaragua, accused Jores of exceeding his powers, and Fepudiated all he had done. Jerez immediately took ser- vice with Salvador. Two thousand Enfield rifies were recently sent to Costa Rica from Guatemala. Four hundred Nicaraguan troops, under command of Gea. Kacratch, have been sent to hold Jerez in check. No ea- gagement had taken place at latest advices. Martial law has been proclaimed throughout the republic. Men were being pressed into government service; mules, horses and materials of wag were being seized for government use. Cordon Island, at the mouth of the Realejo river, has been fortified, six guns being mounted. A forced war contribution is being levied and collected. Several American citizens at Granada city have been imprisoned in their- houses, and a guard placed over them, for refus- ing to contribute. Similar casos have gccurred at Leon, Rivas and other places in Nicaragua, GUATEMALA AND SALVADOR, A battle was iought about seven weeks since in the south of Guatemala, between a portion of the army of that republic, under command of General Carrera, Presi- dent of the republic, and some of General Barrios’ (Pre- sident of Saivador) troops, in which the latter was victorious, putting the Guatemalans to compe rout, killing a good many and taking a large number of pri- soners The goverument of Salvador attempting to get possession of Honduras, and will doubtiess sneceed, as they are nssisted by the influence and 2 through her consuls and minim ters. rument now, wad matters have been :n a very mixed state since General Guardwia, President of public, WAS assassinated (Rome abe months since). As France is about to take possession of Mexico, Eng!and is aimin, slice of the continent lower down, a8 a crossing place to the Pacific. Active war pre- rations are going on in Guatemala, Salvador and Costa \. ‘ THE SEIZURE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE TRANSIT COMPANY. ‘The Central American Transit Company's steamer San Jaan, lying at Granada city, was seized on the 240f March. tain George B. Slooum was taken from the imprisoned, the United States fing hauled down and the Nicaraguan flag raised. Captain Siocum en- wered a protest against the seizure of his ship and his be jog deprived of his liberty and rights. The only reply he could get whea he demanded the cause of his unjust de tention in prison was that it was by order of the military authorities. Ho was released and the ship given up on the 21st of March, on the ship giving bonda im the sum of 000. Ina letter from Mr. , Kogtish Consul at , o& gentleman in Granada city, Lie fwlowing pas- ‘fo wil es by thin (the seizure ofthe sr ope ty of the Central ) that the vovernment of Nicaragua bas at last decided on strong measures, and Thope they will stick to it. Mr. 1 is private t the American Minte- ter to Ni ua—Mr. 'T. A. Ciay—and it is suid exer- cise consi le influence over him. The Central Ame- rican Transit Company's river steamer Niceragua, lying in the river, was se! about the same time SKIZURE OF THE STEAMER CITY OF KIv 4a, On the 11th of March, at three o'clock P. M., tie Pore Governor of San Juan del Norte (or Greytown) i. 1ormed ieee the company at San Joan. that The nailed up and pat curaguan over them. steamer Cit Saraguan H06 red end ber fag nlro hauled down sod’ we Nicaraguan iy Captain Wood immediately tote tho steamer and sae sn eee, wee Wonk het en Py TY ti haul Sr pempet hogs rad au matics were to the the company could with difficulty be taliatory measures. Chief Rngineer Piace and tendent Fletcher deserve mach praise w efforts with the government the emplvyes to preserve order apd s ,