The New York Herald Newspaper, March 29, 1860, Page 2

2 HANDBOOK OF THE HIGHER LAW. Natural Law and the Contract ; of Government. ‘The Constitution Confers no Le’ ,a) or Moral Rights, Phe Duty of Disobedieace, Rosist- ence and Destr oc tion. OATHS ARE OF NO °A0R,AL @BLIGATION, Executive Agen tsC rimimal if they Obey Thom, Slavery Never Had @ Constitutional Ex- istence Here, &e., ‘We give to-@ ay further extratt: from Lysanier Spoon er’s work op/ “The Urwonstitutionality of Slavery,” the iource from whence Seward and all the other black re publican le: ders bave drawn ‘their ideas and argamerts Yor years) past, cmd whieh points out most logically-ecd @onclusiy ely the object at which they ars all aiming ~ Rey ate WHAT IS LAW? Bef ce examining the laxguage of the constitutica, i regar’ ; to slavery, let we obtain a ‘view of the pri by W rtue of which law erises oat tf those constitutions and compacts by which people mgrce to establish govern- me ot. * To do thia it is neceseary to Aefwe.c the term Izw. Popu- “Yar opinions are very loose and‘tndefinite, both esto the rue definition of Jew, and #Je0¢c to the principle by vir- tue (f which law results from*ue compacts tr contracts of mankind with each other. : What, then, ia law ?—t'tat@law, T mean, which, and which only, judicial tribmets are morally tound, under s)) circumstances, to declure ead sustain ¥ In anewering ‘this question I shall attempt to show that Jaw is an intelligible prigcipte of right, meecasarily result- ing from the nature of mon, and noterarbitrary rule, that can be established by mere will, numbers or power. Blo determine whether this proposition be correct we must look at the generalgignification of the term law. The true and generat meaning of & is'tkat natural, per- maxent, unalterable priticiple, which ‘governs any par- Ucular thing or class of things. Tho prizciple is strictly ® noturad one; and the term appties*to every nataral prinetpic; whether meatal, moral or-physical. Thus we Epeak of the laws of mind—meaning'thereby those natu™ yal, anivcreal and necessary principles; according to which windects, or by which it is governed. We speak, too, of the moral law, which is merely an universal principle of oral obligation, that artes out of tho watere of men, and thelr -Tolations to eneh other, end to other things—and is ecnsequently as uma. terabio as the nature of men. Andi is solely because it is unalterable in its nature, and umiversal in its applies tion, that it is denominated law. If it were changeable, partial or arbitrary, it would bono law. Thus we speak of physical laws; of the laws, for instance, that govern ‘the solar system; of the laws of motion, the laws of gra- vVitation, the laws of light, kc. - Also the laws that govern the vegetable and animal kingdezns, in all their varicus Wepartments; among which laws-may be named, for ex- ‘ample, the one that like produces like. Unleas the ope- vation of this principle were uniform, universal and ne- oeceary, it would be no law. Law, then, applied to any object or thing whatever, -wignifies a natural, unalterable, aniversal principle, go- verning such object or thing. Any rule, not existing in ‘tbe nature of things, or that-is not permanent, universal fand inflexible in its. application, is no law, according to ny correct definition of the term law. ‘What, then, is that natural, uoiversal, impartial and ‘mfiexible principle, which, under all circumstances, ne cesearily fixes, determines, defines and governs the civil é é o 4 * We NEW YORK HERALD, THURSDAY, MARCH Of contract, upon those whe are parties to the contract, { * qbich creates the goverument and authorises it 10 pass rules and statutes to carry out its objects.* WHAT TT DECLARES UNLAWFUL But natural lew tries the contract * , peeved ment, and @eclares it lawful or unlawful, ol Wry or invalid, by the same rules by which it tries all cther contracts between man and man, A con- tract for the establishment of government, being nothing Dubs voluntary contract between individuals for their mutual benefit, differs in nothing thas is essential to its validity from any other contract between man and man, or between nation and vation. If two individuals enter into ® contract to commit trespase, theft, robbery or mur- der upon a third, the contract is unlawful and void, sim. ply Decause it is a contractto violate natural justice, or ‘men's natural rights. Jf (wo nations enter into a treaty tbat they will upite %! plundering, enslaving or degtroying third, the treaty ia untewful, void and of no obligation, eimpty because it is contrary te justice and men’# natural rights, ©x the same pring pic, if the majority, however large, wf the people of s country enter isto a Contract of government, called a constitution, by which ‘they agree t aid, abot or actom- plish avy kind of injestice, or to destroy or invade the natural rights of @iy person er persors whateoever, whether such perssus be parties tothe contract or not, this contract of government is enlawful end void--and for the fame reason ‘€2at @ treaty Setwoen two nations for a similar purpose, or @ contract of thesame natare between two individuals, is unlawful end wold. Such a contract of government has no moral sanction. 2: confers no rightful Guthartty upon those appointed to administer it. It confers no legal or'moral rights, and tmpeses no legal or moral ebligation upon the people who are partics to tte The only duties whith any one cam owe'to'tt, or to the government established under color of tts authority, ame disobedience, resistance, destruction. TUDGRS MUST DECLARE TNO @ATHS VAD AGAINST IT. Judécjxl tribunals, stiting “under the authority of this tmlawful contract or constitidion, are bound, equally with aher-rnen, to declare #, and al unjust enactments passed by the government in pursuance of Xt, unlaufel cnd votd, These judicie! tribunals canmot, by accepting Ofte under a government, rid thomselves of that parcmount obligation that-ail men are under, to éeclare, if* they declare anything, that justiceis law; that gcvern- ‘Toeat can have no lawfub pewers, except those with which ‘if Bas been invested by lawful contract; and that en un- 4owful contract fer the establishment of government is as ‘walawful and void as any other contract to do injustice, No oaths, which judicial or other eficers may take, to car- “Ty out and support qn unlawful contract or comctitution \ Of government, ere of eny moral oBiigation. It ieimmoral (0 take such oaths, and ti is criminal to fulfil them. They are, both in morals end’ law, like the oaths which indi- vidual pirates, thievesand bandits give to their -confede- rates, as an assurance of their fMelity to the purposes for which they are associated. ‘No -man has any meral right to sssume such oaths; they impose no obligetion upon those who do assume them; they afford no mera! justi- fication for official acts, in themselves unjust, dene in pur- suance of them. WHERE OUR CONSTITUTIONS ARR NOT BINIEKG. If these doctrines are-correct, then those contracts of government, State and national, which we call constitutions, are vold,-and unlawful, so far as they purport to authorize (if any of them do autherize) any- thing in violation of netural justice, or tke natural rights of any man or class of men whatsvever. And all judicial tribunals are bound, by the highest obligations that can rest upon them, to declare that these contracts, in all such partioulars, (if any such there be,) are void, and not law. Aed all agents, legislative, exeoutive, judi- cial and popular, who voluntarily lend their aid to the execution of amy of the unlawful purposes of the govern- ment, are a8 much personally guilty, according to all the moral and legal principles, by which crime, in its essen- tial character, is measured, as though they performed the same acts independently and of their own volition. Such is the true character and definition of law. Yet, instead of being allowed -to signify, as it in reality docs, that natoral, universal and inflexible principle, which has ite origin in the aature.of aan, keeps pace everywhere with the rights of man,as their shield and protector, Dinds alike governments and men, weighs by the same standard the acts of communities and individuals, and is paramount in its obligation to any other requirement which can be imposed upon men—instead, I say,of the yighta of men? Those: rights of person, property, &c., ‘which ore human being bas, as «gainst other human be- ngs? : Tehal! define it to be simply the rule, principle, obtign- ion or requirement of natural justice. IT 18 THK RULE OF SATCRAL JUSTICE. ‘This rule, principle, obligation or requirement of natural Jestice bas its origin in the natural rights of individuals, Feeults necessarily from them, keeps them ever in view ‘as its end and purpose, secures their enjoyment, and for. Dids their violation. It also secures all those acquisitions of property, privilege and claim which men have a nata- val rigbt to make by labor and contract, Such is to true meaning of the term law, as applied to {ihe civil rights of men. Andd doubt if any other defini- ‘tion of Jaw can be given that will prove correct in every’ or neceesarily inany possiblecase. The very idea of law ‘originates in men’s natural rights. There is no other stan- @ard than natural rights by which civil law can be mea- seared. Law has always been the name of that rule or prin- ipie of justice which protects those rights. Thus wespeak of natural lav. Natural law, in fact, constitutes the great body of the law that is professedly administered Dy judicial tribunals; and it always necessarily must he—for it is impossible to anticipate a thousandth wart of the cases that may arise, so as to enact @ special law for them. Wherever the cases bave wot been thus anticipated the natural law prevails. We thus politically and judicially recognise the principle of Jaw as originating in the nature and rights of men. By recognizing it as originating in the nature of men, we Wecognise it ag a principle that is necessarily as immutable ‘and as indestructable as the nature of man. We also, in the same way, recognise the impartiality and universality of its application. THE MGHER AND INFLEXIBDE OBLIGATION. ¥, then, law be a natural principle—one necessarily ro- @ulting from the very nature of man, and capable of being @estroyed or changed oniy by destroying or changing the mature of man—it necessarily follows that it must be of Bigher and more inflexible obligation than any other rule ‘@f conduct which the arbitrary will of any man, or com- ‘Dimation of men, may attempt to establish. Certainly no wale can be of such high, universal and inflexible obliga- tion ag that which, if obseryed, secures the rights, the safety and liberty of all. Natural law then is the paramount law; and, being ‘the paramount law, it is necessarily the only law; for, Deing applicable to every possible case that can arise teuching the rights of men, any other principle or rule that Ehould arbitrarily be applied to those rights would weceesarily confiict with it; and, as a merely arbi- trary, partial and temporary rule must of necessity be of Jess obligation than a natural, permanent, equal and uni- Verea! one, the arbitrary one becomes, in reality, of no @biigation at all when the two come in collision. Conse- ently there is and can be, correctly speaking, no law ‘Det natcral law. There is no other Pprincipte or rule ap- Plicadle to the rights of men that is obligatory, in compa- Figon with this, in apy case whatever. And this nataral Jaw is no other than that rule of natural justice which wesults either directly from men’s natural rights or from och acquisitions ax they have a natural right to maké, or oe Grom such contracts as they bave a natural right to enter ato, ve WHAT CONTRACTS If RECOGNISE, Natura) Jaw recognizes the validity of all contracts which men have a-natural right to make, and which jas- tice requires to be fulfilled; sueh, for example, a# coa. ‘tracts that render equivalent for equivalent, and are at ‘Be came time consistent with morality, the natural rights of men, and thoee rights of property, privilege, &., ‘which men have a natural right to acquire by labor and oontract. Natural jaw, therefore, inasmuch as it recognizes Be natural right of men to enter iota obliga. ‘ery coftracts, permits the formation of govern- ‘ment, founded on contract, as all our goyeruments profege to be. But, in order that the contract of govern. ment way be valid and lawful, it must purport t au ‘thorize nothing inconsistent with natural justice and men’s patoral rights. It cannot lawfully authorize government «te destroy or take from men their natural rights, for ‘Waters rights arc inalienable, and can no more be sur- wendered to government—which is but an aszociation of © Sndividuale—ihan to a single individual. They are a meceseary attribute of man's nature, and he can no more part with them—to government or anybody else—than | fo. Bot the contract of government | with hig nature itseif. mey lawfully authorize the adoption of means, not incon. aistent with natura! justice, for the better protection of men’s natural righte. And thia is the legitimate and true ebdject of government; and rules and statutes, not incon wietert with natural justice and men’s nateral rights, i” term law being allewed to signify, as does, this immutable and.overpuling principle of natu- ral justice, it has come to be applied to mere arbitrary rules of conduct, prescribed by individuals or combina- tions of individuals, self-styled governments, who have no other title to the prerogative of establishing such rules than is given them by the possession or command of sufii- cient physical power to coerce submission to them. SUPERSTITION OF THR PEOPLE. ‘The injustice of these rules, however palpable and atro- cicus it may be, bas not deterred their authors from dig- nifying them with the name of law. And, what is much more to be deplored, such hag been the superstition of the people, and such their blind veneration for physi- cal power, that this injustice has not opened their eyes to the distinction between law and force, between the sacred requirements of natural justice, and the criminal exac- tions of unrestrained selfishness and power. They have thus not only suffered the name of law to be stolen, aud applied to crime as a cloak to conceal its true nature, but they have rendered homage and obedience to crime, un- der the name of law, until the very name of law, inetead of signifying, in their minds, an immutable principle of right, has come to signify little more than an ar- bitrary command of power, without reference to its justice or its injustice, its innocence or its criminality. And now, commands the most criminal, if christen- ed with the name of law, obtain nearly as ready an obedience— oftentimes a more ready obedience than law ‘and justice iteelf. This superstition, on the part of the people, which has thus allowed force and crime to usurp the name and occupy the throne of justice and law, is hardly paralleled in ite grossness even by that superstition which, in darker agea of the world, has al- lowed falsehood, absurdity and cruelty to usurp the name and the throne of religion. OTHER DEFINITIONS CONTROVERTED. But I am aware that other definitions of law, widely dif- | ferent from that J haye given, have been attempted—de- finitons, too, which practically obtain, to a great extent, in our judicial tribunals and in all the departments of go- vernment. But these other definitions are nevertheless all, in themselves, uncertain, indefinite, mutable, and therefore incapable of being standards, by a reference to which fe question of law, or no lsw, can be determined. Law, as defined by them, is capricious, arbitrary, unsta- bie; is based upon no fixed principle; results from no established fact; is susceptible of only a limited, partial and arbitrary application ; pogses¢es no intrinsic authority ; does not, in iteelf, recognise any meral principle; does not neceagarily confer upon, or even acknowledge in indivi- dvals,apy moral or civil rights, or impose upon them any moral obligation. For example; One of these definitions, one that proba- bly embraces the easence of all the rest, is thie:— That ‘‘law is a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the mpreme power of # State, commanding what its subjects are to do, and prohibiting what they are to forbear.”— Noah Webster. In this definition hardly anything that is essential to the idea of law is made certain. Let ussee, It says that “Law is a rule of civii conduct, prescribed by tho su- preme power of a State.”” Whats the “supreme power’ that is here spoken of as the fountain of law? Is it the supreme physical power, or the largest concentration of physical power, whether it exist in one man or in a combination of mea? Such is undoubtedly its meaning. And if such be its meaning them the law is uncertais; for it is oftentimes uncertaia where, or in what man or body of men in a State, the greatest amoont of physical power is concentrated. ‘Whenever « State should be divided into factions—no one | baving.the supremacy of all the rest—law would not { merely be inefficient, but the very principle of law itself | would be actually extinguished. And men would have i Bo “rule of civil conduct.’ This result alone ts sufficient | © condemn this definition. $ Again: If phiyeieal power be the fountain of Iaw, thon j Jaw and force are synonymous terms. Or, perhaps, ra. ther, lawwouki be the result of a combination of will grows |” #1tts obvions that | higher or otber -autho results from natural law and the obligations of contracts; for our oon: stitutions are Dut contracts, and the legislation they au- | thorize can of course have no other or bigher authority tham the constitutions themee!ves, The stream cannot rive bigber than the fountain, te, posture as the idea of the divine right of J or apy other of the doctrines upon which arbitrary go- vernments have been founded. And the idea of any cessary or inherent authority in legislation, as such, is of course equally an imposture. be legislation be consistent , with natural justice and the natural or intrinsic obligstion | of the contract of government, it is obligatory it really | can have inthis coustry no | that which & And force; of will, united with a physical power sufficient to compel obedience to "t, but not necessarily having avy moral character whav ser, Are we prepared ',0 admit the principle that there is no | Teal distinction be’.ween law and force? If not, we must reject this definition, Tt is true the”, law may, in many cases, depend upon force asthe ineans of its practical efficiency. But ara Jaw and feroo therefore identical in their essence? According to this definition, too, aeommand to do iujns- tice ‘is ‘es much law as s command to do justice. Al! that is necessary, according to this definition, to make the Command a law, is that it issue from « will that is sup~ Ported by physical force sufficient to coorce obedience. Again: If mere will and power are sufficient, of thea aelves, to establish law—legitimate'iaw.—such law as ja- ‘dicial tribunals are morally bound, or even have a raorel right to enforce—thon it follows thet wherever will and power are united, and continue united until they are Successful in the accemplishment of any particular Objectto which they are directed, they constitute the only legitimate law of that case, and judicie! tribumets can take cognizance of ne other. And it makes no éifference,-om this principle, whether thie-combinetion of will ‘and power be found m a sing individualor in «’ commoaity of an hundred millions ‘of individuals, The numbers ‘concerned do net alter “he Tule, otherwise iw would be the result of rambers in” stead of “‘suprerae power.”’ It is, therofore. st{licient to ‘comply with tits definition, that the power te equal to the arcompiet:ment offhe object. And tho will aud Power of one rnan are therefore az competent to rake the Jaw relative ¢o any acte which he is able to oxecute, as the will apd-power of ‘zillions of men ere to make the ‘law relative to apy ects which they ere able to a200m. -plish. On this principle, thea, that more will and power are com- Petent toestablish tio law that is to govern an act, with- Out reference to the justice or injustice ofthe act itself, the willand powor of any single individual to commit. theft would be efficient to make theft lawful, as law- ful asic: any other act oP injustice which tho will and power-of commum'ties, or large bodieeof men, may be united'to accomplish. And judicial tribuaals aro ag much bound to recogmise, as lawful, any act of injustice or crime which the will and power of < single individual may have sucoceded in accofuplishing, as they -arc to recognise as law‘ul any act of injustice which large-and organized bodies of men, self styled -governments, may ‘acoomplish. WHAT IS A STATE? But, perhaps, it will be said that tke soundness of this , definition depends upon the use of the word “‘State’—and that it therefore makes a distinetion between “the supreme power of a State,’’ over @ particular act, and the power of an individual over the same act. But this addition of the -word ‘‘State”’ in reality leaves the definition just where it would ‘have been without it. For what is ‘‘a State?” It is juet what, and-only what, par ry ead power of individuals may arbitrarily lish. There is nothing fixed in the :nature, charaster or boundaries of ‘‘a State.” Will and power may alter them at picasure. The will and power of Nicholas, and that will and power which he has concentrated around, or rather within himeelf, establishes all Russia, both in Europe and Asia,.as ‘‘a State.”’ By the same rule the will and power of 4he owner of an acre of ground may establish that acro asa State, and make his will and power, for the time being, suprome and lawful within it. The will and power, also, that cetablished ‘‘a State’ yes- terday, may be overcome to-day by an adverse will and power that aball abolish that State, and incorporate it into another, over which this latter will<nd power.sball to-day be “supreme.” And this latter will and power may also to-morrow be overcome by still amother will and power mightier than they. “A State,’’ then, is mothing fixed, permanent or certain in its nature. It is simply the boundaries, within which apy single combination or conecntration of will and power are efucient or irresistible for the tame being. ‘This 4s the only true definition that can be given of ‘‘a State.”’ It is merely an arbitrary name given to the ter. ritorial dinits of power. And if sueh be its true charac- ter, then ft would follow that the boundaries, though but two feet equare, within whieh the will and power of a single individual are, for the time: being, supreme or irresistible, are, for all legal purposes, “es State’—end his will and power constitute, for the time being, the law within those limits; and his acts are, therefore, for the time being; as necessarily Jawful, without respect to their intrinsic | juatice or injustice, as are the acts of larger bodies of men within thoge limits where their will and power are supreme and irresistible. FALLACY OF THR OLD IDRA OF LAW. If, then, law really be what thie definition would make it, merely <‘a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power of a State,” it would follow, asa noces- sary consequence, that law is synonymous merely with ‘will and force wherever they are combined and in suc- | cessful operation for the present moment. Under this definition law offers no permanent guarantee for the safety, liberty, rights or happiness of any one. It licenses all possible crime, violence and wrong, both by governments and individuals. The definition was obviously invented by and is suited merely to gloss over the purposes of arbitrary power. We are therefore com- pelled to reject it, and to seek another that shall make law lees capricious, less uncertain, less arbitrary, more joet, more safe to the rights of all, more permanent. And if we seek another, where shall we find it, unlees we adopt the one first given, viz: that law is the rule, princi- ple, obligation or requirement of natural justice? ‘Adopt this definition, and law becomes simple, intelligt- Die, scientific; always consistent with itself; always har- monizing with morals, reason and truth. Reject thie defi- nition, and Jaw is uo longer a science, but a chaos of crude, conflicting and arbitrary edicts, unkuown per- chance to either morale, justice, reason or truth, and fleeting and capricious as the impulses of will, interest and power. If, then, law really be nothing other tha the rule, prin- ciple, obligation or requirement of natural justice, it follows that government can have no powers except such a8 individuals may rightfully delegate to it; that no law, inconsistent with men’s natural rights, can arise out of apy contract or compact of government; that constitu- tional Iaw under apy form of government consists only of those principles of the written constitution, that are con- sistent with natural law,and man’s natural rights: and that any other principles that may be expressed by the letter of any constitution, are void and not law, and all judicial tribupials are bound to declare them so. \ora Though this doctrine may make sad havoc with consti- tutions and statute books, it is nevertheless law. It fixes and determines the real rights of all men; and its de- mands are as imperious ag any that can exist under the name of law. It is possible, perhaps, that this doctrine would spare enough of our existing constitutions to save our govern- ments from the necossity of a new organization. But whatever elee it might spare, one thing it would not spare, It would spare no vestige of that system of human slave- ry, which now claims to exist by authority of law.* *Tbe mass of men are so much accustomed to regard law a8 an arbitrary command of those who administer politi- cal power that the idea of its being a natural, fixed and immutable principle, may, perhaps, want some other support than that of the reasoning already given to com- mend it to their . I therefore give the fol. Jowing corroborations from sources of the highest autho- rit — cence is the science of whatis just and un- sti prttonrs ci principal clea ot tha te hte y ani ol w are ry x -—adatoe Y and wrongs. Justice is the constant and perpetual disposition to ren- der to every man bis due.—Justinian. ‘The precepts of the law are to live honestly; to hurt no one; to give to every one his due.—Justinian and Black- stone. Law.—The rule and bond of men’s actions; or‘it isa rule for the well governing of civil society, t0 give to — man that which doth belong to him.—Jacod’s Law ‘awe af arbitrary Sunnie and ane last of wi are cesentially and good, an: i every wns and in wil places where they are observed. © ‘Those. which are natural laws are from God; but those which are arbitrary are properly human and tive = ‘The law of natare is that which God, at man’s creation, ie x heeeal ne ee id not be chs —2 ‘she. | is an et W, ani “Abr. 886, aleo Jac, Lave Dict. ee ee TR qpAlines dectne Chett force from the law of natufe; and a on Fortescue, c. 17, also ‘sLawo | r Wy 29, 1860 ‘ARITTEN CONSTITUTIONS. Taking ‘4 for granted that it hasnow been shown that uO rule of otvil conduct, that is inconsistent with the nata- ral rights of men, can be rightfully establiched by go- Vet'ament, or consequently|be made obligatory as laws either upon the people or upon judicial tribunals—let us Lew proceed to test the legality of slavery by those writ- ‘ven constitutions of government which judicial tribunal wctually recognise as authoritative. LEGAL HULES OF INTERPRETATION. In making thie examination, however, 1 shall pot imsist upon the principle of the preced- ing chepter, ‘that there can be no law contrary to natural right; bet shall admit, for the take of the argument, that there may be such laws. I sball only ciaim that in the interpretation of all ‘statutes and constitutions the ordinary legal rues of interpretation {be observed, The most im- uge and extent, sccommotated to each individaal, ‘comprehending the whote community.—Slackstone’s ture on the ly of the Liew, ‘This taw of nature being coeval with maukind, and dic- tuted by God himself, te of course rin obligation toanyvether. It is bieding over al! the globe, in all coun- tries and at all times; no h mau laws are of any validity oonteay to this; and such of them as are valid derive force and all their authority, “against patura! justice, as to make aman judge in hie own cause, is void in itself, tor jura natura sunt immudabilia; ‘and they are legeslegum—(the laws of nature are imma- table—they are the laws of laws.)—Hob. 87. Mr. Christian then adds:—With deference to these high “authorities (Blackstone and Hobart) I should conceive than in no case whatever can & judge oppose his own pate and authority to the clear will and declaration of His province is to interpret amd og the mandates of the supreme power of tho State; ani if am act of Parliament, if we coula suppose such a case, should, like the edict of Hered, command all the al ee ae corte of he Fiala, Se judge ought to resign his office rather be auxiliary to its execu- tion; but it could only be declare void by the same le- gislative power by which it was ordained. If the judicial power were competent to decide that an act of Parliament ‘was void becauee it was contrary to natural justice, upon an. ere hh beg Td Lords tbig inconsistency would be consequence, that as judges they must declare void, what as they had enacted should be valid. The learned judge himseif (Blackstone) declares in p. 91, if the Parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know ef no pewer in the ordinary forms of the Constitution that is vested with au- thority to controlit, It will be seen from this note of Mr. Christian that he concurs in the opinion that an enactment contrary to na- tural justice is intrins’ the principal, if not the only difficuity which he secs in carrying out that doctrine, is one that is pecular to the British constitution, and does not exist in the United States. That difficulty is the ‘‘inconsistency” there would be if the House of Lords (which is the highest law court in England, and at the game time one branch of the legislature,) were to.deciare, in their capacity as judges, that an act was void, which, as ilators, they had declared should be valid. Ani this is probably the reason wi admitted that he knew of po power in the ordinary forms of the (British) constitutfén, thet ‘was vested with authority to cont an act of Pariia- ment that was unreasonable (« But in the United States, where tive are vested in different bodies, and where they are so vested for the very purpose of having the for- oop check upon the latter, no such inconsistency ‘would occur. The constitutions that have beeneetablished in the United States, and the discussions bed on the formation of them, all attest the importance which our ancestors attached to a separation of the judicial from the executive tive department of the government. And yet the beuefits which they bad promised to liberty and justice from this separation, have in slight only, if any degree, been rea- ized. Although the legislation of the country gene! bas exhibited little Jess than an entire recklessness of natural justice and constitutional authority, the records of the judiciary neverthelees furnish hardly an lastance where an act of a legislature has, for either of these rea- eone, been declared void by its co-ordinate judicial de- partment. There bave been cases, few and far between, im which the United States courts have declared acts of State legislatures unconetitutional. But the history of the co-ordinate departments of the game governments has been, tbat the judicial sanction has followed the ive act with nearly the same certainty that the shadow follows the ubstance. Judicial decisions have consequently bad the same effects in restraining the ac- tions of eeeecaes thek Rataer have in restraining the motions of bodies. ‘Why this uniform concurrence of the juiiciary with the Jegislature? It is because the eeparation:between them is nominal, pot real. The judiciary receive their offices and. salaries at the hands of the executive and the legisiature, and are amenable only legiglature for their official character. They are 6 entirely iudepenéent of the le at be ah ge highest interests are liberty and Jeet ») and entirely dependent upom those who have too many interceta inconsistent with Wberty and jastice. Could s real and entire separation of the judiciary from the other departments take place, we might then hope that their decisions would, in some measure, restcain the usurpations of the legislature, and promote progress in the science of law and of government. Whether any of our present judges would (as Mr. Chris- tian suggests they ought), ‘resign their offices”” rather than be auxiliary to the execution of an act of ¢hat, like the edict of Herod, should require all the chil- dren under a certain age to be slain, we cannot certainly know. But this we do know—that our judges have hith- erto mamifested no intention of resigning their offices to avoid declaring it to be law, that ‘-children of two years old one under,” may a Bane Lanes from _ pa- rental protection which cir birthright, and eu! for life to outrages which all civilized men must nc as woree than death. To proceed with our authorities:—Those human laws that annex a gage eatin dd To a ite moral guilt, or superadd any freeh obligation ia the forum of conscience to abstain from ite perpetration. if any human law should allow or enjoin us to com- it, we are bound to tranrgress that human law, or ise we must offend both the natural and the divine.— Blackstone, vol. 1, p. 42, 43, sions depends entirely upon the rulee of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, and agreements between these several com- im the constractign also of which com- we have po other rule to resort to jut the law of nature; (that) beirig the only one to which 7 — pope maa are equally subject.—Blackstone, +P. Thode rights then which God and nature have estab- lished, are are life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually invested in every man than they are; neither do they receive any additional strength when de- clared by the municipal laws to be in Ne. On the contrary, no human bas Pecist fore a com- Blackstone, or destroy them, ala Bon Orhane mit some act that amounts to a forfciture.—, vol. 1, p. 54. By the absolute rights of individuals, we mean those which are so in their primary and strictest sense ; such ag would belong to their merely in a Btate of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it.—Blackstone, wil. 1, p. 128. The principal aim of society (government) is to protect individuals in the enjoymentof absolute rights which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature, Dut which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual arsistance and intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows that the firet and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individu. als. Such rights ag are social and ive regult from and are posterior to the formation of States and societies; fo that to maintain and regulate these is clearly a subse: quent consideration. And, therefore, the principal view of human law is, or always to be, to explain, tect and enforce such tg a8 are absolute, ta themselves, are few and simple; and then such rights as are relative, which, arising from « variety of connections, Will be far more npmeroug and more complicated. These eae iain? a nh inated ‘the hs - one a ant lenomi natu. ral thery of hakind: This Basaral ib ‘con- sists properly tn a power of ag one thinks fit, witheut any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature, being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of to man athis creation, when he endowed hin with the faculty of free will —Blackstone, tol. 1, p. 125. Moral or natural rty (in the words of Burlamaqui, ch. 3, ¢. 16) is the right whlch nature gives to all man. Kind of disposing the of 1) person and moet legitimate institution. And yet writers generally, who acknowledge the true will nevertheless, when theory of ronment and faq, diacureing mailers of legislation pri i i I 2 H minority, and plandering pot forth for tae & RIPL ° i ~ aw Portant of ‘inese rules, and the one to which it Will be receesary. constantly to refer, is the one that all “aoguage must be construed “strictly” in favor of nP‘coral right: The rule is isd down by the Sapremo Covurt of the United States in theee words, to wit:— “Where rightsare infringed, where fundamental pria- ‘uiples are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresietable clearness, to induce acourt of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.’ SLAVERY HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL BXISTANGE. It will probably appear from this examination of the Written constitutions that slavery neither has, nor ever had any ccnstitutional existence in Dis country; that it has al- ‘ways been a mere abuse, gustained, in the firat instance, merely by the common consent of the strongest party, without any law on the gubject, and, in the sec- ond place, by a few tn¢onstitutional enactments, made ia deBance of the plainest provisions of their fundamental Jaw. of government, viz: that a man must eonsent to give up some of his rights in order to have his other rights pro- tected, involves a absurdity, both legally and politically. , It is an dity in 'aw, because it says that the law must be violated in in order it , because a man’s giving up one of his rig! whatever to promote the protection On the con‘ , it only renders him less fending himself, and consequently makes to him in tho situation his rights, and thus cheapen: character all ia rights in the 8 of he ueke aesietance. would saying that a man must tied behind him in order the reat of his body against an enemy, as there is saying that @ man must give up some of his rights in. ordei ena, protect the remainder, Lets men have e use of both of his hands, and the enjoyment of all his rights, and he will then be more competent to his own de- ; bis rights will be more by those who otherwise be disposed to invade them; he will want lees the assistance and protection of others; and we shall need much less government than we now have. Protection of the protection of them, at the price of giving to the association ta violate the equally ‘Bese. ‘was nor ever will be voluntarily formed. Yet all our go- vernments act on that pri ;and so far as Mey act upon it, they are as usu aad as any governments can be, If a man his proportion the cost of protesting all the of each of the of the association, he thereby acquires a claim upom the association to have bis own rights without diminution. ‘The ultimate 2 rig! velope themselves. natures and faculties, tives to his own. And tnat he do not as and well being. faculties will su kindness of bis fe! *United States va. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 390. Hints and Suggestions from Cerrespom- dents. THE OPBNING OF MADISON AVENUE. A correspondent, who appears to be quite enthusiastic om up town improvements, in a long communication, frbich the crowded state of our columns forbids us te publish, in speaking of the desirability of immediate as- be #0 blocked up with buildings as to form a decided stand and jer against the accomplish- ment of improvements that no can venture to say ez & i 5 i & 3 g § i ‘become a business thoroughfare, 1a sense of the term, whilst the Fifth avenue or bp scog ted} undoubtedly be devoted to private resi- dences; but it Macison avenue remains closed, it is ver: questionable whether the Fifth avenue will afford a - ciently large number of sites for the class of mansions which ought to adorn it, fusing the Park. Haeviog only one side from Fifty-ninth to 116th street, it will not give facilities for the erection of residences which may be termed second clas; for, probably, the class of mansions ‘on that line will each occupy lots varying from fifty te one hundred feet frontage, allorging scope for grounds somewhat similar in style to the palatial residences in the vicinity of ‘i fi a ~ mpiod Sees Madison avenue must opened for purpose of affording scope for residences of a second class in a locality which will at once besome fashionable.”” THE BATTERY PARK, A correspondent calls attention to the well-known fact of the disgraceful condition of the Battery, and says :— “ That it would make a hy yea for a base ball id; and if the Common would appropriate that purpose, two or three of our metropolitan clubs stand ready to beautify and put it in repair, THE CUNARD STEAMERS. A correspondent, writing from Quebec, under date of March 14, gives the following in regard to the Cunard line of Atlantic steamers :—‘ On the 6th inst. the General laid befire Soo Homes bis ag gard to ts with intted ‘States and r countries, and et the same time meved for an additional subsidy to ae Sepeen eo . y posed 000. He stated that a large pre: portion of anetey trade bad been diverted to the United ites in Consequence of the large subsidies granted the Cunard line; and in order to secure her share of the West- ern traffic, it was absolutely necessary for Can#ia to sap- port the line connecting with the and other public works of the acknowledged the necessity of 1d to vote the $400,(00, ly iven that that sum would be sufficient, and more might be demanded next year. The ments, it was argued, were wholly States, while Canada bad only the glory of carrying mails. Another argument the subsidy was confident e: tion of a Bi y the ment of $250,000 to the same line. The matter brought up again, and after warm debate the bill passed | its second reading. So there is littie doubt of the result. NEW JERSEY PATRIOTISM. A Dill has reoently passed the New Jersey Senate, and | ‘Will goon become # law, entitled an ‘‘Act for the punish- ‘ment of crimes.”’ The new law is a supplement to an act approved April 16, 1846, and provides:— 1, Thatif any pereon or persons shall, within this State, get up or enter into any combination, organization or con- Spiracy, with the intentand purpose of making or attempt- Sayer ta Sune etaar Bean other State or Terri- in! States, or in plotting contriving any such invasion; or ‘shall Erowingiy forsiah posh (cnfeek an, coe acon wile any way and wilfull; suck, combination, mf i C4 THE DOUGLAS FRELING IN WISCONSIN. A correspondent writing from La Crosse, Wisconsin, der date of March 18, says in regard tothé hue and ‘that is raised about Douglas’ popularity in that and Joining States, thas it is ‘‘all talk, tall, talk, got teat fits S48 i f i THE ATLANTIC TELEGRAPH CABLE. An “‘epgineer’’ correspondent thinks that “as mush in. genuity s required to construct ‘taking up’ macbinery | ae was required for ‘letting down’ apparatas.”’ { He proposes ‘‘achain or cable, to be wound and un- | wound by machinery independent of the oabie’s under. Ham | cylinders, the chain or cable to be | wo Dattoa, , with an wp win the Katte on 5 ‘when checked, will close tly on all | ment to be wound aud-anwound alternately, the wholenet | work of taking up is completed and we wish to recorer it same ar! ment will let the cable down again. ‘The steamer would be at rest, if posable, while letting Cown the clam; im raceing oneration?; also at rest ip raising it in lowe peravions.”? | watch at that time. The Two Murderers Under Ey amination, ~ INTERESTING AND IMPORTANT EVIDENO Cleari Johnson, alias Hicks, Identified, Some of the. Property Found on Jackalow lie tifted as Captain Leete’s, Re, Ren Rae an THE E. A. JOHNSON TRAGEDY. - The Examination of Johnson, Alls Hicke—His Identification as a Hand o Board the Oyster Sloop BE. A. Johusoi é&e. UNITED STATES COMMISSIONER'S COURT, Before Kenneth G. White, Esq. Manctt 28.—The United States ve. Wm. Johnson, alias Alb W. Hicks.—This morning the United: States offices we denzely crowded by a large concourse of persons anxto to bear the investigation of this extraordinary andmj terious case. The prisoner was conducted by a cindaite route by Deputy Marshal De Angelis and some-ott officers, They bad a carriage at the door of the Tomt in Centre street, whilst they conveyed Johnson | ¢ of the female’s side of the prison, where avothor carria ‘Was in waiting, and he was then driven up Leonard stre to Elm, and brought in through the Law Library, fro which he ascended by the Judge’s private entrance: the United State District Court room, where, in cons quence of the immense number of partons present, 1! examination was held. ‘Mr. Dwight said the prisoner was now in court, and * asked the Commissioner to inquire of bim. hié naw inform him of the charge against him. ‘The prisoner was directed to stand up. d ‘The Commissioner—What is your name?- Prisoner—Wm. Johnson; my right mame is Aibe Hicks. Mr. Dwight—Albert Hicks or Albert W: Hicks? Prisoner—Alber! W. Hicks. Q Have you anything to say respecting this charge? Prisoner—T have nothing to say. P Mr. Dwight then asked for the issue of a warrant affidavits submitted and under the following section section 8, chapter 113 of the United States Statutes Large—which provides, ‘That if any person shall up the high seas, or in any open roadstead, or in any have basin, or bay, or in ‘any river where the sea ebbs & flows; commit the crime of robbery in, or upon ay sh or veasel, or the lading thereof, such person shall be‘ Juadged to bea pirate; and being thereof convicted bet the Cireuit Court of the United States for the district. which he shall be brought, or in which he shall be fou eball suffer death.” ‘Mr, Dwight said that the last offence with wh prigoner is charged, amounts to the same Penalty, and presumed that the counsel for the prisoner would ‘objection to try him on both charges. Counsel for the prisoner acquiesced. Mr. Dwight observed that it would be unnec make & formal opening, and he would at once proc call testimony for the United States. TESTIMONY FOR THE PROSECUTION. Benjamin M. Nickerson deposed—I am master John R. Mather; I know there is gueh « vessel as th A. Johnson; when a mile and a half below the li ‘us down to the water's edge; T found it necessary to ship, and put back to New York for repairs; the’ e f ie Hi aice He i r Ps ig G 5 bid i fee i fies if mR yk | aries i fi é i Hid ge =a i pane # i Sy : Fe» t e i: nu Hs i ii fi i £E Hi es i i | i frit “i ty tne ie ay it i e i 4 shies <i H i i $ F F SF EEF ie Ik plete fal Fl Hy a £ F BCU nH ee ii | zt ou 8 if Henry Seaman fourteen years; papi oi knew her yawl boat; saw it at | office; it was shown me b; one of the harbor polf dey after the verre! was rr r’ Sey ten reg ae know the watch on it, and by the snap; Before he ailed,'a week last Tuesday; 1 for the captain a year to have Squires’, in the Rowery; A south Ricbmond, Staten Island; showed the boat witness, George Neild! a I live at Port || sare Bot ee aes de 8 Be tx o'clock Wednesday morning, a week seo; mar com ng towarde me; he bad @ b’g beg,