The New York Herald Newspaper, October 30, 1859, Page 2

ai i i 2 & aie iM z .-9 E g = e EeeEg Hee nat impression 7 - sg a pry I think, bow- er 'T inferred this from the fact that ho had dono it Missouri, »ather than from what ho said. After he ‘Taddressot a few words to the audicaco in favor a contribution, reicrrivg to his conuition, to the death his gon, and the fuct (hat in his situation he had no ba- siness which hé could follow for his support. I beliove every democrat as well as republican present gave some- ing. oar the clone of the meeting I cordially invited him to take tea at my home. While there, at the fireside, I in- quired as to the particniars of bis, Missouri expedition. ‘Mrs, Giddings also put questions. 1 fully expressed my own opinious as t tho crimes of slavery, the right of a slave to his liberty at all timos and under all circam- stanoes. JT did not express us radical views as I had done in . “Such is net my babi. Tbis I presume is the ES i Al g) we were thas engugei his. carriage came, and he left me. ‘These are the ouly times I ever saw lim, Neither io his lecture nor in his conversation did he say one word as to his having any associates or assistants,orarms, nor uid Speak of Virginia, or Harper's Ferry, or of an organiza- tion, or of a provisional government; nor do I believe ‘that any men, save bis associates, had information on those subjects; nor dol believe he had any established plaa of action when he was in QOhbio; but this 1 opinion merely. I see the telegraphic Tepresent that some one informed Mr. Brown or somebody vise that ‘J. R. G,”* had taken three hundred dotiars stock, &c. it wiil hardly be supposed tbat I would reply to sach an intimna- tion from an anovy mous writer, directed toan anonymous ‘This report will gain nofavor where am known. fo man will there believe Lever gave three hundred dol- lars to Capt. Brown or any other man. I did, however, understand that Brown was in the West; that ne led the party which rescac«i Doctor Doy, who had been kidnapp: Kansas and taken t Mirsourt. That was a subject ia which J took a deep interest, and undérstanding that be was fn want of money, I gave three dotiars to his son. I think there was not a day from the tme that Brown’s son was murdered ip Kansas to that of his capture at Harper's Ferry, that I would have hesitated to give bin whatever money I bad if assured that be was iu want. Bot I little dreamed that ‘his three dollars was to i outa military expedition with arms, ammunition and men, cap- ture Harper’s Ferry, effect the conquestof the Old Domin- ion, strike terror to the Executive, aud imperil the govern- ment. Stephens, who was sat w refuse giving an- swers relating to me, I beve no recolloctiou or knowledge whatever. He may huve seen mo often, may have spokea tome. When I icft home the capture of Brown had been known some few cays, but I had beara oo intimation that any man from that county was with him. And now, bay- ing stated the facts, T would gay that if Gerrit Sinith and men contributed’ money and arms for Brown and his party, with the full kuowledge that his inteutions were just as Brown himself states them t bave been—that is, the liberation of #laves without the shedding of blood otherwise than of those who endeavored to hold the slaves: in bondage—they certainly offended against no law of Ohio, or, 80 far as my Knowledge extends, of any other free State. Mr. Smith is an intelligent Christian gventieman, who knows his rights and understands his duties to God and mankind; and if he does not know them better than his assailants, he ought to be sent South and hanged when ‘there. I have been pained at seciug the efforts of editors and sensation committees representing Mr. Smith as guilty of crime, and about to be sent for by Governor Wise, of ‘Virginia, to be taken 1 that State for trial. -These things have exhibited an jee in this Christian land that [ little dreamed of. Indeed, the tdea that a man, if guilty of a violation of law in New York, must be sent to Vir- ginia for trial, #s but an illustration of those. minds who, though living'in the free Sutes, look to the South for reli” gious, moral and political direction: They had better Study, and know their awn rights before assailing those of their fellow men. To them I would say the lovers of liberty are informed on this subject. The time for fright- ening men has gone by forever. Such menare behind tne age. They may be compared to those whom Swedenborg says be met in the spirit world, whe, aittonugh they bad ‘been there twenty, thirty, ad some of them forty years, had not found out they were dead. Having disposed of these extrancous considerations, I re- call the attention of the audience to the remote and proxi- mate causes of the recent emeute, These causes consist of series of cespotic acts on the part of those who have wielded the executive, the legislative aud the judicial powers of the government during the ast tweuty five Years, These acts are not lews—they are violation of nw. They are not constitational—bat violations of the constitution; not in favor of life, liberty and bappiness, but ‘destructive of their rights. These a ‘acts have aroused the spirits of the people, aad there is in serious truth an “tr-epressible conilict” now in progress. It i4 that irrepressible contlict be- tween freedom and slavery, which bas been progress for centuries. It is one of thd revolutions which never go “backward. Our statesmen bave misapprehended the phiio- gophy of free governments. They bave attempted to Tule a free people by brute furce instead of a just admin- tration of legitimate powers. They have preferred tue crime of slavery to the Gou-given ngbisof liberty. They have trampled tipon the r gnts of our {ree States to obtain political favor with the #lzve power. ‘They have stained the soil of our free Sex cent blood; men are cuptured in our N their limbs manacied, they are carri though our territory ia to the pottution of slay. and stripes—those tituted to, the on execraole merce in fiesh. The indiguavion of our people is awakened, io sume locatities it is jatense, Let No man mistake or belittle that feeling. tt has long be: foreseen. All reflecting men knew it must come. For fil- teen years Thave constamiy pointed it out w Southern men, and to Northern men: Recent events will increase B f pros. com and strengthen it| Let those ia power understand it cannot be trifled with. Let timid men keep eilent. gt demagogues no longer sneer nor threaten. | ‘The time for intimidation is gone by. All must see that if the cause of the excitement continues the excitemeat will not cease. But of the future I will no longer speak. It is written upon the tabletof Heaven. It is read in every countenance around us. All must see that the men now in power are incompetent to the duties of their stations. If they continne louger to guide the ship of State all mast be lost. Let them retire. Let the past policy of the go- verpment be abandoned. Let the despotic act al- Juded to be repealed. Let the free States be laced upon an equatity with the slave States. tour territory be corsecratel to freedom. Let us cease to maintain a piratical commerce in the bodies of ™mep and women. Let our federal government. be puri- fled from the contagion of slavery. Let us ve that institution where the constitution left it “with the States” in which it exists. I repeat, the people of the free States will it. They will not be mvolved in its crimes or its dis- ‘Our emancipation from the slave power must come; and, in the words of my illustrious and lamented friend, John Quincy Adame, let me say, “it will come—— swhether in peace or in biood | know not; but, whether in peace or in blood, iet it come.” Population of Arizona. Dr. Machebeur, the Viear-Gencral of Sant ‘been applied to by the delegate to Congress { Fé, having Arizona Territory, to give an estimate of the population of the county 6f Dona Ana, whieh forms th territory, writes as folk under date of Septen On the east sso of the Rio Grandt, ia Dona Ana. Las Cruces. the new settleuents of the several farms on the river, the population cannot be Jess than two thousand inhabitants. Of La Mesilla and/all other villages on the west side o ‘the Rio Grande, for @ distance of about forty miles, accord ing to the estimate of the very reverend Dr. Ramon Ortiz Vicario avd Cura of El Paso, who had spiritaal jarisdic- tion over the whole of the Mesilla war. for early wenty years, population is over seven thousand in- tone . From the Rio Grande to the Colorado, counting besides , Tubue &e., all the families: and men, engaged in the several tionrisiling mines of the Territory, the new Bettied on the Gila river, the: San Pedro, in the valley of the Satta Graz, aod in the vicinity of the stations of the Overland Maul Company, the preserved. by a mail ever, vrobably. "Bo long ax si tein ec} it an Saorang ‘alone, the im andthor light,and volun. dtarily: turn their faces from ft:-— ee Oct. 15, 1859. Yate Connor, At a meoting of the Class of 1868, held this day’, the fol- fowing resolution was adopted Reevived, That we, as a a fo hereby abolish the college iuetitution kuown tr ho Burial of Euclid, not support | FOREIGN WAR AND HOME DEFENCE. Reflections Suggested by Recent Military Events. TO THE BDITOR OF THE HERALD. ‘We live in a fast age—an age of progress. By the aid of steam and electricity the press spreads before us every morning intelligence from all parts of tho world in such ‘abundance that.{t is no easy mattor even for a man of loi- sure to keep up with the news of the day. Events—maay of them wholly unlooked for—occur, aro reported and dis- cussed in the papers, form the topic for goneral conv orsa- tion for a fow days, and are thea forgotten or passed over to the future historian as affairs accomplished. This ig particularly true of tho military events of the last five yoars. In 1856 and 1856 the war with Russia was the subject of general interost, All c:es wore directed to the Orimea, with an occasional glance at the Baltic. Tho brillant battle of the Alma—that rash aad ill-advised blunder, which was ‘‘maguificent, but not war’—tho charge of Balaklava, the bioody struggle of Inkermann, the frightful suffering in tho trenches bofore Sebastopol, the storming of the Malakoff and Redan, and tho bumiliating failure of tho British doot before Cronstadt, fillud the public prints, and were the subjects of conversa- tion in every circle. Searcely had peace been concluded, when the interest excited by the war with Russia was superseded by the iuserrection in India. People forgot tho Alma, Balaklava, Inkermann and the Malakoff, in the contemplation of the inhuman butcheries of Lucknow, Cawnpore and Delhi, and the offorts of England to re-establish her ascendency Im India, and to wreak vengeance on the brutal cowards who vied in outraging and murdering helpless women and obildren. ‘Tho war in India was crushed out, and the year 1858 closed in peace. Thero was nothing to indicate that the yoar 1859 was destined to be made memorable by aay great military achiovoments. But on the first day of this yearthe political world was startled by a few significant words uttered by the Freach Emperor to tho Austrian Ambassador in Paris. Both parties protested that there was no cause for alarm—there was no immediate pros- pectof war. True, Austria, France and Sardinia seemed to be making warlike preparations on a rather extensive scale; but wo were assured that no war was impending— they were merely keeping up their usual and necessary military establshments—nothing more. Nevertheless, in May Austria invaded Sardinia, and “by the act of Austria war existed” with France. Suddenly the French army, equipped and instructed to a degree of perfection never before attained, was thrown into Italy. In the course of a few weeks the Austrians were defeated at Ma- genta, driven at the point of the bayonet through Lom- bardy, and dofeated and almost crushed at the fearful battle of Solferino. The reading public had become so accustomed to the exciting news from Italy, and looked so anxiously for the reports by the last steamer to give mst to their morning papers, that there was a general feeling of disappointment when it was sudden!y announced that the betligerents had concluded an armistice, and we wore to read of ne more ba:tles for at least a month. The peace of Viilafranca, which followed go quickly on the ar- mistice, oxcited no little indignation, because the two Em- perors had seen fit to terminate the war in their own way, and as abruptly as it bad commenced, Whether the peaco will be durable, or whether the curtain has only fallen on the first, soon to rise on a second and more tragic scene of the drama, time only can determine. CHANGES IN THE ART OF WAR. In either event, tho breathing time thus allowed may be profitably employed by us in reflecting on the events of the last few years, and in endeavoring to gather from them usoful lessons for our own guidance. History has been said to be philosophy teaching by ex- ample, and the recent experiments in the military branch of that philesopby are full of instruction for all who will rightly consider them. The long period of peace between the great Powers of the World which followed the fall of the first Napoleon, had led many | visionary persons, numbers of peace so. Cieties, and the like, to believe that the time had at length come when wars were to cease upon carth. All «uostions of diepute between nations were to be settled by negotia- tion or arbitration. Heuceforth the warriors occupation was gone. The events of a few years have dispelled all such illusions, and shown that nations are as prone now ‘as ever to appeal to arms for the settioment of their difll- alties, and that the improvements in the science of war which it was supposed bad fallen into decay, as relics of barbarism, have been silently advancing pari passu with the improvements in other sciences. ‘It has taken tho ‘world some three thousand or four thousand years to per” fect the organization of that/strange implement of power, @ regular army; but as more intellect has probably been devoted to this purpose than to almost any other that cao be named, it is not wonderful that great perfec- tion has been arrived at.” The best intellect of France, it would seem, has of late been especially directed to the Perfecting of this mighty engine, this “ strange implement of power,”’ and has succeeded in making it a wwer of strength for ber, and a terror to others. Whilst ono great Power stands forth #0 perfectly armed at all poiuts it is not safe for others to be off their guard. England, more nearly interested than we, did not wait for this pause in the clash of arms, afforded by the peace of Villafranca, to reflect on what it behooved her to do. Is can scarcely be doubted that the question of her foreign policy had quite as much woight as had the question of parliamentary reform, in the defeat of the Derby Ministry. As soon a8 Parliament met, under the Palmerston-Russell Ministry, we flud the latter question postponed to a more convenient season, and the question of her national de- fences loomed up, and becaine the question of the frst importance. The debates in Parliament, and that more sure index of public opinion, the press, betray, if not fear, a very decided feeling of appre: 4 whom the Goo « spoken out bol 3 6! abd in 1804 and i8¢ trating his fore of the 4 Beem (0 1 of the Fren I aie tively, by | then’wo opp 2 tis, rela. now as she was us 80 well pr exsful rest INVASION ? ARE WE FRE Is there anything iu our position to oxempt us from all danger of invusiou? Are our means of defence so ataple and perfect as to deter any powerful nation from attack- ing us? Ifso, bappy are we. We may then look with in difference on the gigantic preparations which other | Powers have made, anu are still making. We may go on to bny and sell and get gain until our wealth is equalled | only by our corruption. But it not, it is duo to onraelvas, | und to the great cause of free institutions, to put oor house inorder, If there en a doubt on the subject, we should at least give it the most serious consideraion. | And, whilst doing #0, it would be well to dives ) ofall the errgpace avagant ideas us by the val We do not propose at this timo to ent consideration 01 these questio: To do 80 wanld le: into details and’ statistics which would extend this cle to an unwieldy iangth. Nor do we consider suc examination ne y;, for to us the true auswers to the questions we have asked are so clearly in the negative that to assign our reasons would be to enter on the demonstration of what we regard as a self-evident pro- | position. We only propose to submit some r ous Bug gested by recent military «vents, and to assist, if wo can, in removing some iuspressions which we must regard as erroneous, it is our deliborate opinion that no other nation under the son, claiming to be a great Power, is so expose to invasion as the Coited States. We are not alarmists. know that we possess vast rasources—that our people © jutelligent, brave, and hardy, and that many of them are familiar with the tise of firearms ; and we do not be- lieve these is that nation on earth that can subjugate us. But we do believe that either England or France eoald deal us a blew which would do us infinite mischie’, impede Our prosperity for years, and degrade us, for atime, in | the eyes of the civilized world, What England and France | Combined ean do, we do not like to contemplate. STEAM ANNIMILATES DISTANCE BY STA. If neither England nor Franes bad recently exhibited | their power to make war successfully at a great distauce from their frontiers, we might, by contrasting onr own i naval and miltary preparations with theirs, easily show | that they conld make war upon us which would be most disastrous, But both of them have, within the laat five ears, given signal proof of what they can accomplish. ithont any yery good and sufficient cause, so far us ap- to the uninitiated, they made war on Russia. For the reduction of Sebastopol wlone France transported 1 the Crimea. more than 300,000 men and 490,900 horses, ‘with all the heceseary equipments and supplies, including field and seige artillery, siege tools and implements. That ‘yast army Was fod, clothed and paid as well and as reg: larly in the Crimea as ff it had been stationed in Pacis. So perfect was their means of communication that it is said even the private soldiers reecived jetters from their avd friends as regularly as if they had been stat in France. The force which Engiand contri- buted to that war, though great, cannot be taken as the measure of what shecan do now. In the jong period of peace which followed the campaiga of Waterloo, her military and naval establishments hat been greatly reduced, snd suffered to fall co some extent into deeny. The experience acquired in the war with Russia opened her eyes to the necessity of cultivatiog more carefully the art and means of war, and she is at this time far better prepared than she was in 1854. No sooner wes peace made with Russia, than Eoglaad hension and uncasiness at the dangers which threaten | | them. England has ‘sven all that France has done” to Austria, and, liko Moab and the frightened son of Zipper, she seems “sore afraid of the people who abide over | against her.” And ber propiiets of the press, move $ | plant thao Palaam, have not hesitated to come forward | aud “Curse me this people, for they are too mighty for | me.” Fortunately, some of the wisest of her statesmen, | seeing that the of the State i not likel | ‘was called on to put down the mo rebeDion that bas ever osourred: ‘The Herculean efforts which she made to fires of insurrection in that distant empire, the numbor of troops and quantity of material she ted to Iu. dia, aud that, too, whilst she was sending a itilo expe- dition to » Bre too need more than a reference. professedly unprepared, in an a ae ee £3 ee ae & powerful naval expe carrying q feeling @ notwithstanding the entente is not at all probable efforts to perfect their naval te, are now vastly superior to ours we knew, to tent they will carry them it now locking for the arrival, English stoamer, which it is six or seven days, and troops with their arms 3: it cs @ superior naval force. ‘ith these facts before our eyes, own rations, cam avy int ability of either England or support navel pigs: <4 Our "ports, our principal cities, destrey our’ yards seme of our forts, and in a short, sharp os infinite mischief. In the discussions to which the of an invasion of England have given It Geems to be ad- mitted that the abiity of France to tafe the in vasion an BU- cousfully dopencs on’ her ity to obtaia command for a few wocks of the British’ Channel. @ocomplished, it is admitted that there is little or ‘to prevent the French army occupying London and the} ipal points ‘on the coast, and destroying her dockyard ant arsenals. ‘Tho subject is ably treated in an article ssid-to have been written by Sir Howard las, published im the London hsp Review pn July pigs year, eal 3 of 19 conten, vasion of England 4 Jeon in Ts0L6: he says:— 34) zw OF AN ory oe or Soyer e present proposed fs based on Be et Ay avoid the obstacles which, prevented the success of the first. It is so simple that a chilé may under- stand it, while no man li has yet sug: ested by what means it i3 to bo ‘dofeated. in a few years France will possess forty or fifty sail of the line, all of the first class and all propeliéd by steam. She will then have available even a larger number of fri- gates, and from sixty to seventy steam transports, each capable of carrying at least Pia persons. * “If in this cont y she were to content herself by blockading our harbors, destroying our mercantile ports and sweeping our richly-laden ships as prizes into her harbors, she might do us infinite damage, and bring a frightful extent of misery and ruin upon our population. But the blow would not be fatal. pvicrad within three montbs, certainly within six, we should be more than a for her on the ocean. With our trade destroyed and our mercantile seamen idle, there would be no want of sailors. Every public and private dockyard would be at work, mght and day. Every engineer's shop would be turned into @ gun factory; every ferryboat and river craft would be strengthened and fitted with a gun, large or small; and in some shape or other we could easily put 10,000 guns on the sea, with 150,000 men to man them, and would again be safe. This the French know as well as ourselves, and this is precisely the form of the problem which they are prepared to accept, and believe that they can solve to their own advantage, ’ They are not equal to a lengthened contest on the ocean with us; they know that to be successful the campaign must be short, and they only consider the ticet as the battering-train which is to open the breach through which the troops may march to meet us on the shore. If the French can obtain com- mand of the Channel for three months, or even three weeks, they can easily land 200,000 or 250,000 men on our shores, ana this accomplished, thore is absolutely nothing to hinder them taking ssion of the capital. The question is not so much what we could do when tho disas- ter happened, and wo were fairly roused to struggle for existence, as What we are likely to be able to do to pre- vent eofrightfal a sontingenoy, trom securing: * * * * ‘All this reasoning is based on the assumption that France,and France alono, is to undertake the task of chastising the insolenco of England; but it is by no moans clear that this will be the case. Sho is not yet quite ready to undertake it single handed; but if the coa- lition supposed to cxist on the of last April between the Emperors of France and Russia, bad really taken place, and their fleets had appeared together in the Chan. nel within a mouth or six weeks from that period, they would certainly have numbered twice as many guns as we could have prepared; and no conceivable amount of either skill or courage on our could have evabled us to hold the command of the Channel for an hour, or to Prevent that army which is now in Lombardy from Innd- ing on our shores. in such a case they could certainly bave entered London in less time, and with as little loss as they encountered on their entrance into Milan. “Even it we might have shut our eyes to the fact before, ‘we canuct, after the experience of the last few months, be ignorant of the perfect state of preparation in which the French military establisbments always exist. Though there is no doubt Austria precipitated the war before the ullies were quite ready to yet in & month from the oatbresk. of hostilities an army of 150,000 mon were brought from the interior of the country, aad were actually in possession of the enemy's capital, ia bpite of the exertions of an army a8 numerous aud better prepared than themselves, What has been done once can be moré easily done again; and if avy one will take the trouble to sketch out any plan pf campaign which 200,000 men could ‘undertake tp Englarfa, He will easily be able to calculate our chhnces of successful resistance,”’ (Pages 142, 3 and 4.) CAN WE GUARD THE ATLANTIC? No rational man, we presume, will contend that wecan guard the Atlautic more effectually than England can tho Channel. Provably if we were duly notified of the intend- ed invasion, and allowed time to prepare, we would ba roused tu put ourselves in a proper state of defence, But war is not now commenced in that way. It 1s sudden and swift. Thethunder follows tho flash of lightuing—the de- ciaration of war may follow the flash of the canaon. We certaimy have no right to expect that we will be warned by a declaration of war before the trst blow is struck. We have ourselves given an example of our disregard of that formality. Did we declare war against Mexico? Our troops entered the disputed territo- ty—Mexico resisted—we defeated ver in two battles, and then Congress, dodging the formal declaratin of war, re- solved, that**by the act of Mexico war exists’ Who knows when some other nation, following our example, may declare that by the act of the United States war ex- ists? Might not England at this time, for instance, declare that by the act of the United States in taking military pos- seesion of the Islanc of San Juan, the title to. which is in believe, is not a that the accom pl: neral of the army, who has espatched to that distant point, will settle this, as ogher difficulties. amicably, and give another proof that when difficulties arise he is the man on whom the nation can rely. But there are other suppositions less improbable. Suppose, for instance, that Engiand or France, or both, should guarantee to Spain the a of the island of Cuba (which we are bound to have) .vota very im- probable supposition, aud then suppose that isiand to be molested by a band of Hlibusters from our coast—cer- tainly not ap impossible event—might not either or both of ub Powers declare that by the act of the United States war ¢ aud send the declaration to us by an army prepared to commence the campaign. The article in the London Quarterly Review, from which we have quoted, goes on to snggest a plan of campaign for the n of England. A few aiterations in the para- graphs we have extracted, and in the plan suggested— ehanges of numbers and in the names. of places—would render it as applicable to the United States as it is to Kag- land. We have no inctination, even if we had the ability, ‘to suggest @ plan of invasion for our enemy. Thero are officers of the government whose especial duty it is to investigate that subject and to snggest. the best plan of defence. They are doubtless »vetter qualified for the Proper performance of that duty than we are to offur ‘useful suggestions on those points, But we may be sure that our weak points are as wel! known in Loadou and Paris as they are in Washington. ¢ admirable maps of our cuust prepared by the Coast Survey are no doubt carefally preserved in the War oflices of England and France. And when the time comes our enemies will, no doubt, find the heads to conceive the plans of campaign and tho forces to execute them in 4 way that we will find it diffi- cult to preveut. MILITIA IN THE FACE OF DISCIPLINED TROOPS. Before adopting the paragraphs we have quoted, and the plau which follows them, to the United States, we should make one material chunge. We should strike out all, or nearly all, that is said of the number of regular troops we could place in the fleld on asudden emergency. We say this certainly without any intention to disparage of undervalue our litle army, Whenever ealled, it has done, and is now doing all, aud more than all, that could rewsovably be expected. But it is wretchedly small, and souttered a frontier of vast extent. In the event of war, we must of necessity rely chiefly on the militia, volunteers and new levies. No doubt they would in tine make admirable troops, bat long before that could be accomplished we would have — suffered greatly. Many a home would be made dosolate, because of the loss of men f sh from the pursuits of civil life shot down in an unequal struggle with troops. thoronghly disciplined and trained to war, or who died of diseases contracted by exposures ‘hich they were unused. Many of the most distress 8 of our war with Maxi: co Were the deaths of buyoreds of brave and gallant men who rallied uncer the standards of their conntry, eager for the fray, but who, ignorant of aud unused to the bard. ships and exposure which awaited them, sickened and died, and were tumbled by scores into long trenches for heir final resting place on earth. Iu ove very essential element we should be wofully deficient. We mean in engineer and artillery troops. These arms are, we belicve, regarded by military men a8 specialities requiring long aud fal training. Pes, died happens that this ts precisely the cescription of ec should greatly need. We have an extensive coast, dotted with numerous forts, seme completed, others in the courge ot construction, and otbers again only plaoned. The mode of arming and dofending these forts hus undergone pou changes within a few years. Indeed that branch of the art of war may be said to be at present in a transition st-te. It is of the utmost impor- tance that we should ai. them with the most efficient weapons and. guard them by troops. thoroughly trained in all that pertains to their defence. But we have at pre- gent no well instructed troops to guard and defedd them. ‘We say none, becauee if we have any their, number is so fmail in comparison to what we would need, thatthoy may be omitted in the estimate. We know that we havo by Jaw four regiments of artillery. When our afmy was much emaller than itis now, President Monroe, whose ex perience at home and abroad had taught him. the impor: having a comparatively large foree of woll in ou having at least four reg’ {those troops, and we have them now by law jaw, like some others, is adead letter, Thos regiments are artiller: i ne. More than fo’ fifths of the companies y armed and equipped as fi try, and serve as such on the frontier, Many of them have never geen a fort, or fired aheavy gun. Without proper gar- risong our forts, which haye been goustgucted at Yast cx: up. For, once iv the hands of an euemy who comman ed the sea, it would cost a fearful expenditure of life, mo- ney and time to retake them; and if we succeeded indis- lodging the enemy, the forts thempelves would Lape not exist—they would be masses of runs—and our le £0 to speak, would be left to us OUR HARBOR DEFENOES. ‘Thoro is, for instance, at Newport, R. £, an admirable work—Fort Adams—co the entrance to mmanding ont perhaps the best harbor on our Atlantic coast. It is at present o0- coupled by one company—probab company, we understand, is under some distant post in the West, ‘That he, like p might easily be seized ove who hes read — anything of tack and defence of pel dittieult would be the task lected this work at random might have inetanced. believe, but litle, if at all botter pb ge ae how which the United States many laborers in our ment, and thero wi ina very 4 paraded the streets ad they wore excited to acts bolioving there was dangor Treasury would be sacked by tho President of the United States for troops. The President could service an officer and fifty men, recruiting depot, If the distress had Severe as was protended, and thore had ri existed any design of the Treasury, such an adequate guard would only bave excited the mob to the attack, that handful of men would have been massa- cred a8 wretchedly as were the unfortunate Swiss grena- diers who attempted to defend the Tuileries and the rayal family of Franoe. We cannot believe that the people of this country are unwilling to provide a more adequate guard for our coast and Troasury than we now have. ‘What would be the succsse and ultimate fute of a hos- tile army landed on our coast must remain for tho present amatter of speculation. Our own views in rogard to it are no doubt widely different from thoso entertained by a large majority of our follow citizens. Thore is an abiding fuith in the country om our ability to hur! from our shores and utterly destroy any and every enemy who may dare to piace his foot on our soil. If a doubt is expressed on this subject, the examples of North Point and New Orieans are as constantly appealed to as the disgraces of Blaceusburg and the bur of the capital are ig- nored. But we may restassured the blunders of North Point and New Orleans will never be repeated. We wish we could say the game of Bladensburg and tho capital, but we cannot, We are not at ali sure that we are relatively beter prepared now than we were in 1814 to defend the capital of the United States. Thero is little or nothing to bar the paseage of a fleet up tho Potomac to Washington. ‘There is, we believe, a small fort opposite Mount Vernon, but we saw it stated in a Washington paper some weeks since thatthe fort had been long sinco abandoned and was falling todecay. When war is next made on us it will bo on a very different scale from that of 1812. We may then learn, when too late, what a powerful and well disciplined army, directed by a competent head, can ac- complish. The people of this country have indeed no ade- quate conception of the power of a great army. Tho arti: cle in the London Quarterly Review, from which we have extracted, containg some remarks so pertinent to this point that we are tempted to quote them—indecd the whole article is well worthy of careful study, POWER OF A GREAT ARMY. “Many persous seem to have an indistinct and undefined idea that because we are a brave and patriotic people, and never have been invaded, such an army could be shot down or destroyed by some process or other by an equal number of unorganized riflemen, for instance, or by the mere rising of the country em masse. Thoso who indulge in such fancies have a very imperfect notion of what an army really is. It has taken the world some threo or four thousand years to perfect the organization of that -trange implement of power; but as more intellect has probably been devoted to this purpose than to any othor that can be named, it is not wonderful that great perfec- tion bas been arrived at. In a completely disciplined army the minds and bodies of one hundred thousand men have boen moulded into the form of one great giant ofone hundred thousand man power, obedient to one will and acting with the unity and force of a single orga- nization. It spreads its antear everywhere, so that no- thing can approach it without being felt. Itcan throw the whole or any portion of its power on any point attacked, and when fighting it can use just such ‘Weapons as are most effective, and can reserve such pow- ers ag are requisite to insure victory at last. Such a giantvan move apywhere and over anything opposed to it, and can ouly be stopped by a giant as powerful as it- self. An unorgatized mob may tease, but _ cannot burt i¢; and unless in very superior numbers and in very favorable circumstances, there is no instance in history of anything like an equal number of guerillas contending succesafully with disciplined troops in the field. While the invading army are fresh and in junction, and there are no material obstacles to give advant to the defend- ers, it is in vain to look for a succeseful resistance, ex- cept from superior discipline or vastly superior numbers. ‘This it is im vain to hope we eball possess for a long timo to come. The nation that could put half a million of mon in motion in 1812, for the conquest of Russia, may do ‘B01 nearly similsr for the accomplishment of a far dearer object of ambition; and neither our habits nor our institutions render it at ali probable that we shall make the sacrifice, and undergo the inconveniences involved in such # process.”’—Pages 145, 148, If we are told that these are the views of a foreigner, a subject, who has no _ conception of what a free people can do when fighting for their country, we can only support the views of the subject by the authority of a perfectly competeat citizen of the United States. During the Crimean war the President of the United States despatched three highly accomplished offi- cers of our army to Europe, for the purpose of obtaining and reporting such information on military matters as might be usefu:. The report of but one of these officers (Capt. Geo. B, McCicllan) has-been published. It was prmsted by order of the United States Senate, on the re- commendation of the Executive, and is, therefore, given to the public with all the weight of official approval. No one well acquainted with the aecomplished author of that report needed any endorsement to give weight to his opinions. He says:— “It 1s believed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages Toust lead all unprejudiced persons among our country- ‘men te a firm conviction on two vital points:— “1, That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and proper one, which ought t> be completed, and with the least possible delay. ‘That mere individua! courage cannot suffice to over- come the forces that would be brought against us, were we involved ina European war, but that it must bo rendered managable by discipline, and directed by that constiumate and mechanical military skill which can only be acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose and by long habit. ‘upon tho ar Y a as in- | “Tn the day of sailing vessels the successful siege of | Sebastopol would baye been impossible. It is evident that the Russians did not appreciate tho advantages aflorded by steamers, and were unprepared to sustain a siege. “This sume power of steam would enable European nations to disembark upon our shores even a larger force | than that which finally ‘encamped around Sebastupol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and these fortifoations must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists. To repel the advance of such an army into fhe interior it is not enough to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can bring to bear against it. An invading army ot 15,0000r 20,000 men could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers, but when it comes to the cuse of more than 100,000 dis. ciplined veteravs, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its own destruction; because, if with- out discipline and instruction, they cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot atford a Moscow campaign. “ur regular army never can, and perhaps never ought to be, large enough to provide for all the coutingencies that may arise, but it should be as large as its ordinary avoca- tions in the defence of the frontier will justify; the num- ber of officers and non-commissioned officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase, and tho greatest possibie care should be bestowed upon the in- struction of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. And such, wo believe, will evér be the opinion of those best quatitied to judge. DO CITT ‘8 EVER RESIST A VICTORIOUS ARMY? Very crude, and we think erroneous potions, are. enter- tained by many persons as to the course that would be pursued by our citizens—those vot regularly dra ted into the military service—in the eventof an invasion of this country. Ttis supposed that if any one of our cities were occupied by the enemy. there would existan ‘ irrepressi- ble conflict’ *between the citizens and the enemy’s troops; that the citizens would pursue a system of non-inter- course with the invaders—withhold from them provisions 4 otber supplies; that scenes of disorder and violence the people, driven to desperation, ‘That has not stances of cities being occupied by hostile the general result? When theFreneb army, under the first Napol public amusement, shops and private houses were for a time; but the inbabitants were assured that they were in po danger, that strict order would be maintained, and lite and property protected. A French soldier for robbing a jeweler of ‘a trinket was sentenced to be shot, the sentence wae promptly executed, and the next day busines and pleasure wero resumed, and Madrid wore its usual aspect. The jwhabitants of Vienna offered no resistance te the French army which occupied that capital in 1869. And subsequently, when tho French Emperor with his army was hemmed in on the island of Lobo, and it became necessary to em- ploy much labor in bis preparations to extricate him- self from bis perilous position, he fund no difficulty in procuring laborers ia abubdance among the inhabitants of the Austyian capital, It was absolutely necessary that the people should have money to procure subsistence. ‘They could not obtain it without employment, and they very readily. worked for him who could pay ‘them, and thus assisted in the preparations for the subsequent de. at of their own army at Wagram. Our own army oo- the capital and other citiesof Mexico, It is well known that the best feeling existed as a genoral thing be. tween the inhabitants and our troops, and the departure of the army gave much greater concern than did its en- tranee into the city. ‘These are but a few of the instances we might cite. It may be said that these instances oceur- red in despotic governmonts, thatthe people possessed no patriotism, oud that in our own free country the case would be diffrent. Happily for us oar own country af- sJord# no recent instance from which we can judge. But we peed not look back over a period of many years for an example. In September, 1777, Philadelphia wag in the possession of the Reyolutionists, The Declaration of Inde- pendence had been first roel 1 that city, and there r pat tho Kevoiutionary » NG a del by Howe, and the American the country. army u Wa od Did the patriotic Reraitan withhold Pasitdyncs Sod e enemy, or in any way ‘molest weil known that during the winter and Jowed the Americans endured the utmost Valley Forgy. Notwithstanding Sak Cngeaae American General authority ag by toree: abs itever does, we trust for the sake of humanity be conducted according to army in the field, and our cities occupied, the will sult their own intorest, as others have done, and conform to tho usages.of war, b submitting, until relioved from ua, it will the burthen of a foreign army in tho of military operations and if bee A should pursce a different course, and rise upon the invaders, they ‘would only bring destruction and ruin on themselves and the and helpless. For every suob rising, whether in town or country, would be looked upon asa riot or insurrection, to be stamped out by military force and “according the strictest letter of the law thet killeth.’? is would provoke the citizens to rebellion. disciplined army is @ model of good order; it can- not exist in disorder, Whilst occupying a particular seo- tion of country it would maixtain order, protect life and property, and encourage trade and amusements. True, the citizens might, and in all probabiliy would, be made to feel the war by the imposition of heavy contributions, but trade and business of all kinds would ‘be encours and protected, if for no other purpose than to enable the peo- ple the better to pay those contributions. Weare disposed to believe that if the city of Baltimore ware at this timo in the possession of an euemy, and occupied by a sufficient garrison of disciplined troops, the best citizens would scon admit that good order was better maintained, and hfe and property more effectually protected, than they have been for some years past, and the troops would hardly permit themselves, even if the inhabitauts were disposed to permit them, to starve. Or suppose New Or- leans and Mobile were occupied by a forcign army—and' that they might very easily be we have nodoubt—the en- trances to those ports guarded by an adequate naval force, and not a balé of cotton suffered to pass out except when and how the (pe pg what would be the re- sult? We have not the gift of prophecy, but we Have the light of reason and history to guide us to an answer. Tho first panic over, the novelty of the thing having worn off, and the peopie nding that order was maintained, life and property protected, and trade encouraged, business would be resumed. If ‘cotton is king,” the producer and pur- chaser are fellow subjects. It is well known, that many, perbaps a myjority of cotton planters, are in arrears with their commission merchants, on whom they are in the habit of drawing ‘‘on next year’s crop.’’ The commission merchants would be under the thumb of the invaders, It would be to their interest to receive cotton from their pa- trons as usua),and to sell itto whoever would Pry uiahest. If they thought and were disposed to act differently a indicious application of force would probably induce them to change their opinions and action. But we donbdt if much compulsion would be needed. We suspect there are many planters who “ could not resist the temptation” of a rise of a few cents per pound on cotton; particularly if payment were made in specie, Indeed, it is almost as essential to a cotton planter that he should be able to sect, as it is'to the manufacturer to be able to buy cotton. The planters might very readily excuse themselves by the plea of necessity. It would be absolutely necessary that they should have money—they could procure it in no other way than by the salo of their crops, and they would soon ‘send their cotton to market as usual. We mike these re. marks without the slightest intention of impugaing the an of the citizens of Baltimore, Now Orleans and bile, and cotton planters in particular ; tg) adduced only by way of illustration. New York. jolphia and Boston, and the producers of wheat and tobacco, would have answered quite as well to illustrate our meaning. SHALL WE BE ALWAYS AT PEACE, Our counwy has for so long a time been at peace with all first class Powers that it seems impossible to convince the people, or thgir ropre- sentatives, that there is apy necessity to prepare for war. Perhaps a lurge majority believe that the produc. tions of our soil are so pecessary to the commercial world that they alone will keep the ¢, We do not be- lieve it; for the reasoning by_which they reach this con- clusion is not very logical. We produce so much that is absolutely essential to the rest of the world, or in other ‘words, we are so rich in what is necessary to others, that we necd take no precautions to guard our wealth. Quite a different conclusion may be drawn from the same pre- mises, viz.: Our productions are so necessary to other na- tions that they must and will haye them; therefore we should take every possible précaution to guard and pro- tect them securely, 80 that we may be able at all times to trade with otbors on fair and equal terms, and never, by expoeing ourselves, tempt others to attempt to impose on us injurious conditions. Nations, like individuals, some- times allow their pussions wo get the better of their reason, and lead them to sacrifice their pecuni- ary interest to the attainment of some other ob- Ject—the humiliation of a rival—the gratification ‘of ambition—or it may be that baser passion, tho gratification of revenge. When no such passions prompt others to make war on us we will enjoy the blessings of Peace just so long as it is to their interest to be at peace with us, but no longer; when it is to their interest te make war on us then they will make it. And there are many questions the settlement of which may involve us in war. The United States is at this day one of the great Powers of the earth. Tho period of our existence as an inde- pendent nation has, 80 far, been coincident with a period of unexampled progress throughout the world. Within a wonderfully short time our population has increased more | than tenfold, and some of the causes which have contri- buted to our rapid growth have wrought very essential changes in our—we had almost said geographical—posi- tion. The application of steam to the purposes of ocean navigation, and the wonderful developement which that application has received within a few years, have as effec- | tually changed our position relative to Europe as if by Omnipotence our Continent had been moved to | within a hundred miles of the French and Bri- tish coasts. This change must soon, if it has not already, effect a very material ‘change | intercourse with European nations. It has involy interest more closely with theirs; and no matter how de- sirous we may be to ayoid entangling alliances with fo- reign States, we cannot divest ourselves of the responsi- bilities which devolve upon us as the great republic of the world. We are destined to play a greater part in tho world than we have yet played, and we should prepare ourselves to perform our part in’a manner becoming the great republic. We can afford it—no nation better—and we should do it. Our commerce extends over every sea, and we are bound alike by honor and interest to protect it. The provection of our maritime rights bas already in- volved us in war with England, and may at any time bring us into collision with either France or England, or both. Our policy and interest as regards Cuba, Central America and Mexico may at any time entangle us with other nations. ‘The condition of Mexico, immediately on our borders, is and hag long been a scandal to civilization, snd calls loudly for friendly intervention. We do not seem disposed at present to undertake the protection of that State. Other Powers, particularly those to whom she is largely indebted, may may not be so in- different to herfate. But according to our interpretation of the Monrue doctrine, we cannot permif any Ea- ropean power to interfere there. If wo will neither in- terfere ourselves, nor permit others to interfere, it re- quires no stretch of the imagination to perceive that wo may very easily come into collision with the policy of other nations in ‘that quarter, ¢ MANIFEST DESTINY. Nor does it appear that we are very anxious to avoid collisions. We are au acquisitive people, and have a wonderfully strong proclivity to acquire new territory and extend the area of freedom. Manifest destiny clearly in- Oicates (so We may gay) that we should possess Cuba, and perhaps other rich fslands couvenient to our const, and we are disposed to hurry up and assist in the accomplishment of our manifest destiny. Nor are wo content with aoquiring the, territory of other nations; we want their subjects also. We delight to proclaim that our Innd is ap aryinm for the oppressed of all nations; and we invite tnern to come to this house of refuge. They can not only help to build onr railroads, dig our canals, clear our forests, Uli the son, and farnish us with the mechant- cal skill necessary to enable us to compete with other Rations, but more and better thaw all. this, they can vote and help to carry elections, Let them come, then, and be naturaiized, or even imtimate their intention to be natornlized, No matter what obligations to thelr na- tive States they may have left untulflled, they may return home if they will, it may be to induce ‘others to escape when their governments need their services, but the gov- eruments which havé nurtured them from infancy to man’s cstate may notexact of them the performance of their unfuifiiled obligations; they are our citizens, and wo are bound to protect them. if there were no other ques- tion calculnted to bring us into collision with other nations, ‘this one alone of the rights of our naturalized citizens, as interpreted by many of onr politicians, might at any time embroil us with almost any pation of Europe. We wish that some of those among us whose especial duty and privilege it is to provide for the common good and welfare of the nation would turn their attention to the careful consideration of the sub. jects on which we have touched. But we have little, hope that they will; they have quite other cceupations, Tho prospect before us is anything but encouraging. Whi'st other nations are striving to strengthen themselves, some among us seem to be doing all they can to weaken ourselves by encouraging andjpro- moting internal dissensions. In our section of the Union certain politicians who have solemnly sworn to support the constitution and the laws of the land have discovered a higher law—something above the constitation—which impels them to proclaim an ‘irrepressible conflict” with the inetitutions of another section of the Union. Others, by way, we suppose, of applying a counter irritant, insigt that the African slave trace shall be reopened. Some are writing endicss and intolerably tedious casays on “squatter sovereignty,” or disquasing the merits aud demerits of the ot have altaya bear in favor of strictly speak- ve ‘s vor of a = ing, revenve tari Pieper dn eh ures of, and: compare, vur and exports, - fase hat t teal od ec reaull. Serial ome banedirmgn tebe mage of the North has always sucoumbe Framount to....., Our exports of domestic produce for the same POTIOE)WO.s.seeseeeiecsereecrerereeeseeee 48,161,008 727,166 $56,677,7 virgin soil of the most prolific fe: tility—mountains groam- ing under the pressure of the viaiacainnein of Coal and iron sufticient to supply a world, but yet, although rich im internal wealth, we are poor in pocket. ‘Devise a plan which to rully devetope our abundant resources, andin lees than ten years this nation would be the richest nation om the globe. England bas reaped more solid wealth from her coal and iron than from the untold millions extorted from the East. Neither Franco or Englund consult the interest of forcign nations to shape their revenue laws: they only consult their own, They Jovy duty upon all things tending to the protection of their own industry, Judicious aud wise laws help to create a demand for their productions, which in return brings the precious metals that enrich both the nation and the people, Mr, Buchanun, in his inaugural message, ri an alteration of the tariff'to afford the great iron interest of Pennsylvania a slight protection. This would have afforded the iron interest of that State a chance to set its works in operation, and called into occupation thousaads of operatives. But the South demurred, Northern demo- crats caved in, and the President’s recommendation fell to the ‘ground. Is it to be wonderod that Ponnsylyania, democracy wavers in its fate! You touch the pocket und you touch a tender point; place facts and figures ‘before them, and. bythe application of a litle common sense they will find the correct rolution. They care more for their dollars than for niggers. ‘I dare to maintain that if tho wise and sage policy of Mr. Ba- cbapan bad. prevailed, Pennsylvania wena, haye been sayed to the democratic party in spite of all the Forneys in creation, for the State is democratic at heart." * ‘Again: The President recommended that ‘the -—publie works commenced upon our lake frontiers be completed, ‘The estimates were made by the Board of phicall Engineers, and in copformity therewith the ee tho Comniittee on Commerce introduced a bill appropel- — ay amount of about $1,400,000, But, » the South demurred, fought the bill tirough both sessions, and Northern democrats caving in, the President’s recom- mendation fell to the ground. Now, sir, all of our North- western States are deeply interested in this. question, We bave a lake trade rivalling in amount our entire commerce, It amounted in 1856 to six hundred and thirty” millions of ‘ictlars, gfving employment to: near sixteem hundred steamers and sailing vessels (of oyer four hun- dred thousavd tons burthen), and thirteen thousaad sailors. Mr. Buchanan understood and appreciated te importance. He treated the question upon a broad na- tional basis; and fayored a policy that. had reccived the attention and support of former democratic Presidents, but especially and upon the largest scale that of Gen. Jacksen, But Southern ultraism, et by Northern democress of soft proctivities, combatted the sagacity of we. Buoha- nan, and the result is a defeat in some of oar \weat- ctl ey, where heretofore demooracy has always pre- vi . Ihave heard a United States Senator from South Caro- lina make an eloquent appeal to the Senate in favor of a large appropriation for a Southern Navy Yard. He ap peared to be utterly astonished that there should be any opposition to so reasonable and patriotic a request; but yet that same Senator would not vote a dollar to protest the millions of property at stake on our lakes, and the thousands of lives there exposed for the want of pi harbors of refuge. The misfortune is, it strikes an, thes these important matters are discussed and treated ag party measures, and not as questions of great national import. We bave in our national Legislature more politicians than statesmen—more law than common sense—more ab- stractions than practical business capacity. One remaing to the democratic party, and, I may say, to country, at this juncture of our political and is—the common sense and correct feeling of the masses. This i foreshadowed in the wise and_ patriotic course lately initiated by that respectable body of men, the “Vigilant Associntion.” If sustained, ag it should be, by the patriotic and honest men—not alone of the democratic party, but of all parties—it would parge our public offices of roguery and corruption, pat an extinguisher upon the dangerous and damnable heresy of “irrepressible com- flict,”’ its originator, aiders and abettore, and engender @ new era in our glorious republic. ‘This, Mr. Editor, acon- summation to be wished, may seem far off; but, sir, in- dustry and perseverance in a good cause may accomplist, A NEW YORK MERCHANT. much, News from the West Indies. ~ DOMGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS AT JAMAICA—AN AMERICAN SLAVER IN PORT—THE OLD CITY oF PORT ROYAL—WEATHER AND PUBLIC HEALTH— RELIGION, ETC. We have received files of papers trom the West Indies dated at Kingston, Jamaica, on tho 11th of October. ‘The Colonial Standard contains the following interesting summary — We are happy to be able to state that the three hundred Chinese laborers—whose presence in Kingston, under the idea that they were euttied to a bonus of ten pounds each in lieu of areturn passage, we mentioned in our last sum- mary—bave all of them returned to their agrienitural om- ployment, and are once more usefully at work. No one paid the bounty demanded by them, and they in no in. stance insisted on it, thus showing that they were perfect ly aware that they were not entitied to it. The bark Laura, prize to H. M. 8. Archer, arrived at Port Royal from the coust of Africa, on Sunday, October 2. dt is understood that the cause of her having been sené down here is, that when by beg sbe had hoisted Mexi- car colors, and therefure it has become ne: to send her to a Mexican port for condemnation. She had, we believe, no slaves on board when captured, and ts beyond all doubt an American vessel. Some interesting facts in connection with the destruction of the old city ot Port Royal by earthquake, in 1692, have been brought to ight by some divers who have lately visited this port, and who have taken occasion to visit the autinetiie ruins of the venerable and much abused city of old. The favorable weather last reported continues to pro- vail in this district of the island, and we believe generally along the south side, We are’ happy also to learn that some congenial showers have fallen on the north side. In this neighborhood the weather has been remarkably pro- pitions, ‘The public bealth, although not as favorable amongst the lower classes as could be desired, has nevertheless not been marked by any very serious fatality. His Excellency the Governor bus igsued a proclamation convening the Legiaiature * for the despatch of business’* on Tuesday, the Ist of November. The Bishop of Kingston bas commenced a ecrics of copfirmations throughout the Diocese. On Saturday, October 1, the Right Reverend Prelate confirmed 136 young persons in the Cathedrat Church of Spanish Towa. Her Majesty's steamer Basilisk, six guns, Commander Phayre, lett Port Royai on Saturday evening last. for Fal- mouth.” The Basilitk will bring up one company of the Second West India regiment wod leave the other com- pany for the protection of that place ical SAAS AA Superier Court—General Term, SOMETHING ABOUT CITY CONTRACTS—THE EXTEN: SION OF CANAL STREET. Oct. 29.—John 8 Giles vs. Willam B. Crosby ant others.—It appears that in 1848 William B, Crosby. John Beekman, Henry Remsen, William Remsen and Frede- rick Schouchbard petitioned the Common Council wo ex- tend Canal strect to Walker street, and widen Walker street fev" ve feet w Rutgers street, As an induge- ment for the Comroon Council to pars an ordinance for the proposed improvement the above named defendanta deposited with the Comptroller their bond for $20,000, oa the conditions that in case tho improvement was not confirmed by the Superior Court, the $20,000 were to be applied to the payment of the expenses ‘incurred i. the matter of the improvement, and the city would bo hold harmless of expense, Mr. Giles was solicited by the par- lies to assist in accomplighing the said improvement, a bond given by the above named defendants to Giles for $10,000, provided that such was by him neoes- sarily expended in accomplishing the extension and widening, and the improvement made in with a map then on file in the Street Commissioner’s Office. Subsequently the Common Council. made a slight alteration in the original map, leaving tho small gore formed by Centre, Walker, Baxter and streets, aa extended, and continuing the street into East poses wer instead of dnding at Ruugors street. Tho d ‘ ject 1b the payment of the bond upon the ground that the small gore at the commencement of the extension at Contre street was not taken as shown in tho original map. ‘The plaintiff contends he has substantially the contract. Decizion reserved,