The New York Herald Newspaper, February 19, 1859, Page 2

2 and use, of his patented gum, or compound, in the | rights eccured by the former. manvf ,cture of such goods, excepting the licenses of Hr Achinson & Runnyon, Pord & Co., and Onder- don; and Letson, above mentioned, Goodyear gre nts, sells and assigns to Day, “the full, ab- 80'sute and exclusive right, license and privilege “os wake, use and vend, shirred or corrugated goods; to use in the manufactare thereof all or gany of the machinery, or improvements mentioned and described in and secured by all or any of said * detters: nt; and also to use inthe manufac- ture of such shirred or corrugated goods all or any of the compounds, fabrics or ingredients, and me- theds of preparing such compounds, fabrics or in- gredients mentioned or described in and claimed by paid letters phant, for and duriug the said unex- pired term of said letters patent above enumerated, and of all renewals and extensious of the same. He also grants to Day “the like full, absolute and exclusive right, license and privilege, for the like terms and periods, to use all or any of the machine- ry, compositions or fabrics patented by said Geod- year, or which he shall obtain patents for in the Manufacture of India rubber hose, of the tented by said Day, air beds and air pillow: kinds, Day's patent boat, Griffith's patent cotton floaters and Day’s patent chairs and settee: ‘The extent of the first mentioned grant depends upon the meaning of the terms “shirred or corru- ted goods,” as used in the granting clause of the eed, and as understood by the parties to it whe: the grant was made by Goodyear and accepted by Day. That meaning must be gathered from the grant itself in the deed contained, if rom it the true and clear meaning can be ascertained. That meaning depends upon the construction of the deed itself—tor deeds must 5) for themselves when they are able to speak clearly and understandingly. The recital to the deed was made for the pur- pose of showing what was to be the subject of the grant. Goodyear states, as we have seen, that he owns the rights secured in the four patents enu- merated,so far as such rights relate to the manu- facture of “shirred or corrugated India rubber goods,” which were one subject of the grant, ex- cept the three licenses named, which were for “shirred or corrugated goods.” At ihat time, the whole right to use the vulcanized rubber in the qmanuiacture of all elastic woven goods and elastic cloth, except the “shirred or corrugated goods,” made according to the patent of March 9, 1844, ‘was in the Naugatuck India Rubber Company. ‘The first suggestion that occurs upon reading the recital is this, if Goodyear had intended that that nt should comprehend the exclusive right to use is vulcanized rubber and his other preparations in the manufacture of elastic woven goods and all writkled or corrugated cloth, whether made ac- cording to the shirred goods patent or not, nder the name of “shirred or corrugated goods,” he would have expressly included this right in the exceptions which he made. For it was well known ‘to him the right as to woven goods was in that company. ‘ It should be borne in mind that Goodyear had no exclusive right to manufacture any kind of elastic India rubber cloth, except suca as was manufactured according to the patent of March 9, ls44, and called “shirred or corrugated India yubber goods,” though he had an_ exclusive right to a certain kind of prepared or cure India rubber, which could not be used by any ‘one in the manulacture of any kind of elastic cloth, without his permission. So far as Goodyear was concerned, ali kinds of india rubber elastic ods, or elastic cloths, by whatever name known except the particular kind of India rabber cloth made according to his patent of March 9, 1544, and to which be had an exclusive right—could he made any one, unless the one making it should use, in the manuiacture of it, the particular kiad or pre- ration of ludia rubber material patented to hiw. tis not to be presumed thata grantor intends to grand more than he ha: grantee intends to re vay of gra to which he bas a full right without a graut. ‘The grant of rigat contained in the granting clause of the deed of the 29th day of October, 1846, was of an exclusive right, whica, at the time, was vesied in odyear, and not of anything to which Day had a right without such grant. It was of the Clusive right which Goodyear then had to make “shirred or corrugated goods,” with the licenée and privilege to do certain things, which would make that exclusive right more valuable; which certain things were, the use, in the manafacture of the “shirred or corrugated goods,” to which the ex- elusive right had been conveyed, of any of the ma- ehinery or improvements mentioned and described jm and secured by any of the letters patent; and the wse also, in the manufacture of such “shirred | i ‘ | judicially and beyond appeal decided that said pa- or corrugated goods” to which an exclusive right had been conveyed, of any ofthe compounds, fabrics or ingredients mentioned or described in s@d deters patent, f The terms of the grant, therefore, taken in coa- wection with the recitals in the preamble, without a resort to the subsequent portions of the deed to aid in their interpretation, import that what was grant ed was the exclusive right which Goodyear had by virtue oi his patent of March 9, 1544, to ‘shir- red or corrugated goods,” with the license aad privi- Jege to use, in the exercise and enjoymentof suche elusive right granted, certain other rightssecare te him, to make ths usive right more valuab/ This was the extent of the grant,as it appears from the language of the granting claise. Tins was what the parties mes the terms which they use so far as it respects “ ed or corrugated goo that was the extent of the grant. The otuer 5 tents of Goodyear were to be used only in ti manufacture of the “shirred or corrugated goods,” secured by the patent of March 9, Is44. There was no right given to use Goodyear’s preparations and improvements in india rubber, no r jcanized rabber in the manufactur articles, or ¢ ic goods, or elastic cloth: the “shirred or corrugated goods” made to the shirred goods patent. But, in giving an interpretation to a particalar eluuse of a deed, we must look to every part of it, in order to ascertain whether such interpretation is the true one; to see if inthis deed auy mo tended and enlarged meaning can be given t terms “shirred or corrugated goods,” as used granting clause, than we have already those terms, by the consideration of such granting clause, taken in connection only with the recitals ia the preainbie contained. ‘The deed contains several covenants ou the part of Goodyear. One is “that said Goodyear will not bereatter grant any right, license or agreement to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, to manulacture, vend or use corrugated or shirred goods, or to build, use or vend auy of te atore- gail machinery, or to use any of his com- pounds in the gianufacture of shirred or corragated goods, and will not himself mauufactare or import any corrugated or shirred goods; and in case of a vioiation of this section, (of covenants of said Day, hereinafter contained, shall not be binding on said Day.’ The covenants of Day here referred to were, that he would pay tarilf do other acts. it is claimed that this covenant is inconsistent with the coustruction already put on the granting clause, and consistent only with the construction given to it by the complainants, This covenant was entered ie purpose of relieving Day from the obligation of his cove- nants, in case Goodyear should do certain tings, the doing of which would be in Violation of the right granted. it was designed more efleevaaily to secure Day, in the exclusive right gr ed. The terius “shirred or corrugated goods” are used three several times in this coveaant. itis insisted that, as nsed in the two last instances, their meduing is different from that intended for them as used in the first part of the covenant; that in the last two in- stances they mean “shirred or corrugated ds made in a diferent manner from those mauutac- tured according to the patent of March 9, lst4; that they mean all India rubbef goods when made by combining threads or strands of yuleanized rub- ber with some textile material; and that such lat- ter goods were comprehended in the terms: “shirred or corrugated goods." it is admitted that the meaning of the terms as used in tbe first part of the covenant is “shirred or corrugated goods,” made according to the patent of March %, Is44. The argument is that the first ‘ot the covenant is, that Goodyear would not Eense any one to make corragated goods accord. ing to his patent; that that wus sutticient te protect Day in the use of the vuleanized rubber in mauufac- turing according to that patent, and that the later rtion of the covenant was intended to prevent Beodyear from licensing any ove to use his eanized rubber and compounds iu the manufactare ‘of other kinds of India rubber goods made by com- Dining threads or strands of india rabber with some textile material. ‘ ‘Aiter the most attentive consideration, we cannot discover anything in this covenant inconsistent with the construction which we have put upon the granting clause, All its provisions are consistent ‘with such construction. There are in the covenant foar several stipulations on the part of Goodyear. 1. That he will not grant any right or license, to any one, to manufacture, vend or use “shirred or corrugated goods.’ This confessedly refers to the exclusive right, which, at the time the deed was executed, Goodyear bad to the “shirred or corra- “ne * made according to his patent of March sad 9 That he will not grant any right or license to any one to build or use any of the machinery men- Bioned in the granting clause. Phere was ho ma- ehinery mentioned or alluded to, except the ma- elNnery used to make “shir ed or corrugated goods,” according to the shirred goods patent. Ths stipa- fatio® also confessedly reters to the goods made acco: Jing to that patent. 3. T.Net he will not grant to any one the right to mee any Of bis compounds in the manufacture of J ot corrugated goods.” The assigawent of viwake “shirred or corrugated ¢ = ap del the patentof March 9, M4, ad earry with it ay Dow right secured vy the pat ef June 15, 1844. disti patent were t ‘st from, and independent of, any The mghts secured by the latter | NEW YORK HERALD, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1859.—TRIPLE SHEET. The first stipulation | had reference to the former patent, and the former Tn thatstipalation the use of the latter ‘The object of the parties was, as is confessed, to secure to Da; »the grantee | of the former patent, in the manufacture of the | goods secured by that patent, the further exclusive | right touse the latter patent. Aud the intent of | the parties ia making this latter stipulation was to | secure that object. There is nothing in this ai lation to show that it had reference to any other object. 4, That import any © nothing in this spt were used in nd di them in the other patent only, In patent was not iaclude he (Goodyear) would not manufacture or orrugated or shirred goods. There is ulation to show that these terms ferent sense than that given to | stipulation. To apply them in this stipulation, as meaning elastic woven goods, would Tead to this result: If Goodyear should manufacture or import elastic woven goods, com- posed of threads or strands of common gum, which everybody has a right to manufacture and import, and Which never were a subject of controversy be- fore the settlement which resulted in the grant in question, then all the covenants which Day had ea- tered into would be discharged. Another covenant on the part of Goodyear is “that Horace H. Day, his representatives and as- signs, shall have and enjoy the like full, free aad exclusive right, license and privilege to make au use, inthe manufacture of shirred or corrugated goods, any improvements made, or to be made, by said Goodyear, or of which he, his representatives or assigns, may become the holders or ow or which patents haye been or shall be obtained which relate to shirred or corrugated goods, or the ma- chinery for preparing or making the sane, or the composition, staff or fabric of whieh they may be composed, or the machinery for preparing oc ti ishing such composition, stu! or fabric; aud also the right to use such composition, stulf or fare in the manufacture of all the other @ 3 in the grants above enumerated.” Aud it is the provisions in this covenant are also inc tent with the views we have already taken rights granted to Day. iy x The subject matter of the grant in the first clause an existing thing, to which Goodyear had aa exclusive right, and certain rights to other existing things, the use 0: of the grant more valuab! the future inventions, imp Goodyear, secured to Day to the shirred or corru; and the hose, air beds, air pillows, boat and Griflith’s patent cotton tloat ter a full and careful consi ant, We can discover nothing in itinconsistent the construction putupon the granting clause. By the “ shirred or corrugated goods” mentioned in this vovenant, are meant U shirred or cor gated goods” to which Goody ad a exelusive right, such ag were made according to the patent hh, IS44; and the “composition, stuil or ‘mentioned refers to the material of which orrngated goods,” made according to that pateat, might be coniposed. jthe first covenant on the part of Day is, that he will pay to Goodyear a tari of three cents per squire yard all shirred or corrugated goods to be made or used by hun during the term of said | patents (the four mentioned iu the recital to the deeds), or any of them, or of any rewewal or exteu- sion thereof, or of any new {taken out on the | surrender of an old one. Then follows this stipula- tiou: “It being understood aud agreed by the ps ties that all shirred or *orrugated goods of any kind, made or used by sad Day or his assigus, shall be considered as madegand used under this agr ment, and subject to said tarit! or assessment; cepting from the operation of this clause, however, all shirred or corrugated goods made with strands or threads of native or common gum, when such goods may be manutactured by said Day for the se of competing with such goods; and when by him for such purpose he shal! not be liable to pay any duty or assessment thereon.” In order to pu proper construction upoa the stipulatiqns contained in this covenant, and to un- derstand their true meaning, they should be cou- sidered in connection with a@ covenant on the part of Goodyear, in which be agrees that he “wiil, at his own expense and cost, prosecute all and every person, or persons, or bodies corporate, who shi ve, to the injury of > he use of the privilege hereby granted allor any | of the patents above ename ferred to, by | the manufacture or sale of shirred or corrugated goods; and that he will, with all due diligeuce carry on such prosecutions to final judgment against each and every violator of the same, or watil it shall be of the The provision as to ements or patents of '$ patent Tents so Violated us aforesaid are not vatid ia law.” | It is claimed by the complainants that this cove- nant on the part of Day, when taken in nection with this latter covenaut on the part ot Goodyear, + clearly shows that the parties were dealing with woven goods, or some spt sof goods not made under Goodyear’s shirred goods pateut; particular- } ly when those two vover: are considered ia | connection with another covenant, wherein it is niutually agreed that in the event ot any other per- | son manutacturing, vt importug, or ng shirred | or corrugated goods, 1 guods as | are mace with su vr come mon gum, such lly used by woven sus: | pender makers, and thereby materially impairing | the profits which would accrue to Day when in the | exclusive enjoyment of the privileges granted, that then the tantis agreed to be paid are to ceas There wus grauted tue right to at Jeast two kinds | (“shirred or corrugated goods.” 1. The right to make such goods according to | the Goodyear patent, when the strands or threads of rubber were of native or common gum. Aud, second, the right to make sueh goods according to such patent, with the additional ght to use im the making of them strands or threads of vuicamzed d according to the patent of June | 15, 1844. ‘There was also an additional right to use the patented machine to make such goods. Llese the + defendant claims were all the rights conveyed by | the tirst granting clause, | At the time of the grant, India rubber woven elas- | tic goods, with strands or threads of common rab- | ber, and which the complainants claim were incha- ded under the name shirred or corrugated goods,’ could b je without infringing on the | patent of March 9, 1x44, The exclusive right to { duke said woven goods was not in Goodyear to grant. The right was in the public From the covenaats lastabove ited, it appears, First, that Day was to pay taris on ali “stirred corrugated goods” inciided in the graat, tempted to be included. Second, that Goodyear was to protect Day in the enjoyment of ail rigts which had been secured to lnm by pateut and | granted to Da; did not his right to tar! Gn all goods made should cease. Third, that sume | time during the continuance of the it might ithin is | in the exclusive right to ua | bufacture shirred or corrugated goody" | which were composed of threads or strands oi com- | mon rubber, aud upon which Day had agreed to | pay tariff. Fourth, that in the latter event Day was to protect himvelf, and that wheu he did so pro- | tect himself by the manutacture of suck goods, to | compete with the like kind of goods in the marke’ he should not pay tariff ou such goods so made for such purpose, although he should continue to pay | tarifi on the other kinds of goods made m pursuance of the grant. \ ‘Taking the stipulations in these several agree- | ments in connection with each other, it is argued | by the complamants thut the par treating | about o goods under the nawe irred or | corragated goods” Ulan si accord- | ing tu the Goodyear Patent; that Goodyear could | protect Day by suits and by injuneti 80 that he | 1 } ot chas were wad could have monopoly iu the market of such } goods as were made accor patent; aad ming the period o , it might so | that there wou of “shirred or | ated goods” ina is or strauds of ) nrubber, upou w to pay tariff, | into the market, fd not be in | * the patent of Good, farch 9, | 1844, against which Day contd ne od by at could only be pro evted | ypetition, that such ki ert nt from goods made according to 4 ey were Woven gouds, or | sed of strands oF are sd is | standing of the parties, deed Was intended to secu’ to make this latter kind of good: of * shirred or corrugated goods sive right to u 2 making . the vuleanized rub patent, as well yl to Manufacture according to the shirred goods patent. The argument is plausible, and wad, would tend str yu OW that ti bave taken of the rights conveyed by th limite: The deed now under con after a long conflict between the parties, as to the rights which were secured lo Goodyear by his yp tents. ‘The stipulations conta in It were cu- tered into (Day recognizing te rights of Goodyear in the matters in controversy) with a view to a se vem of the controversy, and to fer to Day certain rights which Goodyear had by virtue of his patents. The right to wake elastic India rubber cloth, composed of thre sof common rubber, by whatever e called, when the same was not made according to Goodyear’s pavent of March 9, 1854, had not been in controversy. There was nothing to settle about that right. Diy had as much right in this respect as Goodyear had. The argument assumes, that for the making of this kusd of coods, to mannfacture which Day had e+ mach right ae Goodyear, Day agreed to pay a torif; that the goods thus manufactured the ewan sidered as being manufact the name of “ shirred or cor: such liable to pay a tariff, & be manufactured by Day for compeving w g00ds, thrown into the market by others. granting clause is too tion was executed ith suey | Nau 4 | ake any articles which by said befor | July, & w va ww the manafacture | of “napped cloths, c capes, mittens and gieves,” which were excepted during the | whole period of the grant; the right to use | such preparation in the manufacture of india ruby | After the expiration of such specific time the ‘She grants under the deed were for the longest period during which any of the four patents was to Continue, and for the additional time that any of them might be extended. Day was to have the benefit of all or aut ot them, and was to pay the tariffs as agreed, sv long as he had the beutit of one of the patents, thot sh the others tal expired } by lapse of time and not been extended. fhe tariff! was to be paid in consideration of beuelits re- ceived aud enjoyed; and the argument of the com- plainants leads ‘to this result. the shirred goods patent had been extended, and the vulcanized pa- | teut had not been, then if Day did what anybody else had a right to do without any permission of Good- year, viz., make elastic woven goods, or any kind of elastic India rubber goods or elastic rubber cloths (provided it was not made according to the shirred goods patent), with thread¢ or strands either of common rubber or vulcaviged rubber, he would be obliged to pay the tariff Protection w Day, in the rights for which he was to pay tariff, was the great object of the deed. He could not in the case sup- posed be protected by Goodyear, for the waking of such goods would not be in violation of any patent. And he could not protect himself by competition so as toavoid the payment of the tari’ as it re- spects the goods made with strands or threads of vulcanized rubber, for the stipulation ia regard to protection by competition is limited to such goods di} asare wade “with strands or threads of native or common gum.’ He would, therefore, be obliged to pay turit, although he was mot protected by Gooayear, und was without the power of saviug himeeli trom the payment of such tariils, by manu- factunng tor the purpose of competing with such goods. . A wore satisfactory construction can b the stipulations in the covenants just 1 oue that will nake sach covenants eutirely consis tent with the views alveady taken of the rights cou veyed by the granting clause, and inconsistent with the views taken of such clause by the comp! The parties were providing iu the stipuiations aot only tor a state of things winch might exist during the then existing patents, but also for a state o/ things which might exist when one of them should be ended and the others have expired; when the vulcanized patent might be exteuded and tie shirred goods patent bave expired, and alsy when the shisved goods patent might be extended aud the vuleanized patent would have expired. They contemplated a state of tings which at eit exists, When the vulcanized patent has been tended, and when all the other patents have pired. This being the state of things, the shirred goods patent hay expired, every one how has 4 right to make “ shirred or corrugated govds,” cour posed of * threads or strands of native or common gum.” | Butuo one except Day has # right to mah: such gdods of “threads or strands’ of yuicanized rubber prepared according to Goudyear’s patent oi dune 15, Isd4. Now, there isa state of things which the parties foresaw when they executed ihe deed and incorporated in it the above covenants and which they, by said covenants, provide for, Day now has an exclusive right to make “slurred or corrugated goods,” according to the directions given in the patent of March 9, Ls4i, when the rubber sands or threads are coinposed of the vulcanized rubber; and Goodyear having 0 patent for te vuleanized rubber must protect lin in that right; if he does not, the obligation on tie put of Day lo pay taritt ceases. Day holds now no exclusive right to make shirred goods according to Goodyear’s patent, with “threads or strands of ne tive Gy common gum,” but has a right to make sucl govds in common wiih any one eise; and ie is obliged to pay tariffs for making such goods “with native or common gum * duriug the existence of te extended vulcanized patent, for he so contracted by the deed, unless, in the language of the deed, ‘such goods be manufactured Ly said Day for the purpose of competing with sucl goods, ahd when so made by him for suck purpose he shall not be Viable to pay any duty or assessment thereon. ‘The vulcanized patent 1s now m existence; Day can now be protected by Goodyear, when that pa- tent is Violated by the use of vulcanized rubber in the manutucture of “shirred or corrugated goods.” ‘Lhe shirved goods patent has expired; when sucli goods are now to be made with “threads or strands of native or common gum,” Day canuot be protecy ed Ly Goodyear agaist the manufacture of such gocds, butii he makes such guods for “the par | pose of competing with the same goods” in the market, according to the stipulations in the deed above reterred to, be is not Lavle tw the payment of tarilis Wereon. On the Sti day of November, 1846, there were “articles of agreement” eutered into between the parties, under their hands aud seals, additioual or supplemental to the articles in the deed, wuleh articles in the first deed were to be construed and goyerned by the arucles in the deed of the said 5th of November, wherein they diflered or were incon- sistent, but in all other reepects the first deed was to remain in tull force. By the deed of the 5th of November, it was stipulated that Goodyear should procure and cause to be assigued to Day to be can- celled, the three several licenses to Hutchinson & Runyon, to Ford & Co., and to Onderdonk & Let. a Wineb {by the first deed, he was excused from. joing. Aud there isa stipulation that the re-assignment of suid three licenses to Day should be a condition precedent to the performance of any part of the covenants by him. in these iast mentioned articles there is also a covenaut by Day, that while Goodyear prowets him, Day, “in the exclusive right to imanufacture and’ vend shirred or corrugated goods,” ie, will retrain from doing certain things ther tioned, thereby showug that what the partie meant by the terns “shirred or corrugated goods was, the exciusiv right which Goodyear had tw manufacture and vend such goods, under bis patent referred toin the recitals of the deed first executed; for Goodyear could not protect Day in suc sive right unless he had in him snch exclusive right. the second deed, ex: 5th uted by the parties on the day of November, A.U., 1846, was entitled morandum of agreement,” and was to be aux to the two other deeds before mentioned. it ed a stipulation tor “a release from the ck Company of the right or license & entioned | i cor agreements Day is licensed’ to make.” After Good year had ol ibis vulcanized patents, namely, on the loth day of June, Isti, by a deed executed between him and the Naugatuck ladia Rubber Company, dated July 1s, is44, tor certain conside Yations it the deed uamed, ke granted unto said company the full aud absolute ticense to use any and wil Of his preparations of Jadia rabber and im- provements in the preparation of India rubber, for menuiacturing cloth or any other article of nv chandise, or any articles to which the same may be applicable, for and during the unexpired term or terms of eny patent or patents or renewals of pa- tents owned by tum, or in which he may have an interest issued or to be issued.) This absolute and full lieetise to the Naugatuck Company was also an exclusive ove. Goody covenanting tmt he would not grant to any other Laie a right or li cense todo what he had granted to the Naugatuck Company a license to do, There was reserve, bewever, in Goodyear the right, after the 20th ot f,to sell for a stipulated sum or pri gross the exclusive right of making, asing and vending his said pre ations and improvement~ for any specific pury prov ded that before such sale the Navgatuck Company should have the pre: emplive right to b mie the purchasers, at and for such stipulated price or sum in gross. Before this deed to the ick Company, namely, on the 24th of May, Is44, which was prior to th 1 patent, Goodyear had ass nydam the two patents for shi patent for the manufacture aud the machinery, This assignment was only for the time the patent had to ran, and not for any extended term. The right acquired b; Suydam, under this assignment, was conveyed bac e i he by a beaving date the 10th day of ay, L845. {here were certain exceptings in the deed of Goodyear to the Naugatuck Company, which limit- ed the operation of the yrant of “the use of any and all his (Goodye parations of imdia rab- be a linproven reparation of india iubber for manufacturing cloths, or any other ar- ticle of merchandise, or any artiele to which the rome may be applicable.” to such articles as were a ptions were of the right , which was excepted for a specilic time. ber s| Heht to vse said preparation in the manufacture of snch shoes was to be jn the Naugatuck Company. Th ‘ht to use the preparation of valcanized rub- der in the manatacture of the shirred goods, made ry to the shirred goods patent of Goodyear, was excepted so long as Suydam had the ex- clusive right to manniactare such goods. This lat- ter ytion is @ wor And whereas the suid if 1 has heretofore sold to D. 1. Suydam, of iy New York city, the right to manufacture shirred goods, the said right is hereby excepted from the operation of this metrument, in addition to the ex- ce Cd r ove : ed.” Sy this deed the Naugatuck Company had no ex- cluvive right to any of the cloths pgp in articles to be manufactured, whether the cloth was “shirred or corrugated” of not, unless Coodyear’s prepara- tion and improvements of india rabber were used insuch manufacture. They had by the grant an exclosive right and Jicense to the use of the prepw ration and improvements of ind rabber io any ar- ticle to oe the same was applied, with certain ions. except ratood what agreement,” that release from the Naugatuck Company of hep ae license to make any arti- cles, which b: before mentioned agreement Day ia licensed to make, shall be obtained and as- | signed to said Day, simultuneously with the execns tion of said articles.” This is importaut,as the complainants claim that it appears from the cove- nant in the “memorandum of agreement” referred to, in reference toa release from the Naugatuck | Cor pany and the manner in which it was execu- ted, that a more extended meaning should be given — tw the term “shirred or corrugated goods” than has been given to thém when considering the | granting clause of the deed first executed by the | parties. It should be borne in mind that in that deed, Goodyear, in addition to the rights which be Brant- | ed to Day, in reference to “shirred or corrugated | goods,” also rented him the exclusive right, li- | cense and privilege to use his compositions and fab- rics, secured thin (Goodyear) his vulcanized patent, “in the manutacture of India rubber hose. of the’ kind patented by said Day; air beds and air pillows of all kinds; Day's peas boat; Grif- fith’s patent cotton floater, and Day’s pateut chairs and setives.”” At that time the exclusive right to use Goodyear’s vulcanized rubber and prepara- tions and improvements, patented, in the manu- jacture these articles, was in the Nau- gatuck Company. Consequently this latter right conyeyed to Day would be of litle if of auy avail, unless a release was obtained from the Nau- gatuck Company. Goodyear, therefore, in that oviginal deed, after haying made the grants con- tained in it, covenanted that he would, at his own cost and expense, re-purchase and cancel all as- signments and licenses which had been before made by him touching the rights granted, except the three licenses to Hutchinson & Runyon, to Ford &Co., and to Onderdonk & Letson, so that Day should have the tull benetit of the grant. By that covenant (although the name of the Nau- gatick Company is uot mentioned) he, in effect, stipulated that he would obtain from that company 1 release of the right which they had to use his patented preparations and improvements in inaking any of the articles which Day was licensed to make. he covenant, in the “memorandum of agreement,” was not more extensive than the covenant in the original deed. It did not reqajre Goodyear to ob- tain of the Naugatuck Com Naty as much as he was vequired to obtain by the covenant in the original deed. By the covenant in the original deed, Good- year obligates himself to obtain from the Nauga- tack Company the right which they had to use his vulcanized rubber in the manufacture of “air beds and air pillows.” By the “articles of agreement,” “executed Noy. 6, 1846, the grant, so far as it re- “pects “air beds aud air pillows,” was annulled; snd the principal object which the parties had in iew in entering into the stipulation referred to in the “memorandum of agreement,” must have beea so to limit the duty which Goodyear was under by s covenant in the first deed, as to free him from the obligation to procure a release from the Nauga- tuck Company of the right to use vulcanized rubber in the manulacture of “air beds and air pillows.” There is nothing in either of these covenants rto | show what was meant by the parties , by the terms: shirred or eommugeed goods.’ But it is insisted by the complainants, that these ovenants should be takeu in connection with the release and assignment executed by the Naugatuck Company to Goodyear, of a license to use his prepa- rations and improvements, his vulcanized robber in the manufacture of corrugated goods, which li- cense, so released and re-assigned was, ata subse- quent period, transferred to Day to be cancelled, and was by Goodyear and Day cancelled. The re- lease was executed by the Naugatuck Company on the 7th of December, 1846, after all the deeds re- luting to the grants to Day were tinished aud com- pleted by delivery. After it was delivered by the company to Goodyear, it was by him delivered to Day on the Luth of February, l47, ‘The evidence derived from this release to Good- year, to show what was meant by the term “shir. ved or corrugated goods,” as used in the deed of grant, is extraneous trom the deed. It is evidence | subsequent to the execution of the deed, to show } what the parties then admitted was the import and | meaning of the terms “shirred or corrugated goods,” at the time they were used in the deed. ‘This evidence is legitimate for this purpose, ag other acts and uduussions of the parties which | took place subsequent to the execution of | the deed, such as the facts that Day never paid tari’ for the manutacture of any cor- rugated goods, except such as were made ac- cording to the patent of March 9, 1844; that Good- year always collected tarifls for woven goods manu- tactured by other parties, and the numerous other acts and admissions testitied to in the many affida- vits which have been produced, which go to show that, when the deeds were executed, the parties understood by the terms “shirred or corrugated | goods,” only such goods as were made according to the shirred guods patent. These extraneous facts are all proper to aid the Court in ascertainin, what the deeds realiy mean, when there are diiti- culties in interpreting their language, in conse- quence of ambiguities in the terms used.” But when there are no such ambiguities, such evidence ia not vesoited to. When there are no difficulties in in- lerpreting the Janguage used, the deeds must speak for themselves. Lut we feel disposed, in order to see whether there is anything in the release trom the Naugatuck Company inconsistent with the construction we lave giveu to the granting cluuse of the deed, to consider the release separate and distinct from the other acts and admissions of the parties, which ivvk place subsequent to the execution of the deed, vnd as it it formed a part of the deed, and looking atitso separate and distinct, and as if it werea part of the deed, we will give it our attention. ‘The release of the Naugatuck Company re-as- signed and transterred to Goodyear all the right, icense and privilege which the company had claim- ed or possessed under the indenture of July 1s, ind4, or by any other means whatsoever, ‘to use in the preparation of any shirred or corrugated goods, or of ludia rubber pipe, such as is used by Horace H. Day in his rubber pipe, such asis used by Horace H. bay in his patent hose, Day’s patent life chair and settee, and Grillith’s patent cotton tloater, and Day's patent boat, any of the improvements by said Goodyear claimed by any patent whatever, or of which he may be the inventor or possessor; and aiso any right which, by the means aforesaid, or otherwise, howsoever the said Naugatuck Jadia | Rubber Company may have to manufacture shirred or corrugated goods, or said India rubber pipe— such as is used by Horace H. Day in his pateut hose, Day's patent lite chair and settee, aad Griilith’s patent eetton floater, and Day's patent boat.” ‘the argument is, that this release, wade in pursuance of the requirements of the covenant m the deed contained, purported to transter to Goodyear a right which Ute company then had, “to use in the preparation of auy shirred ov corru- | gated goods” any of the improvements of Goodyear ed by any patents; also any right which they either “by such means, or otherwise, to jacture “shirred or corrugated goods,” that the‘ company, then, had no right either to use in | the preparation of the shirred goods, made accord- ing to the patent of March 9, Is44, any of the im- provements of Guodyear, claimed by patent, or to hianuiacture such goods according to said patent, and that, therefore, the right purported to be re- srigied was some other mght, and that such other right was the right to use said improvements of Goodyear, claimed by patent in the manuf elasuc rubber goods, or articles not made according to the patent ot March 9, 1844, which right then was iu the Naugatuck Company, and that et ubber gouds were included in and covered by the terms “shirred or corrugated goods.” it is apparent, trom the mdeuture entered into onthe Isth day of July, s44, between Goodyear and the Navgatuck Company, that the object of Goodyear was to divest himself of ait right which Le then had to use any and all his ag rte of “India rubber, and improvements in the prepara- tion of india rubber, tor manufacturing clots or any other article of merchandise, or any article to which the same may be applicable, for and dariag | the unexpired term of all patents issued to him, hearing eny date whatsoever, and for and during the unexpired term of any other patent or patents, or renewals of patents, owned by him, or in which he may have an interest,” and to vest the whole right | be then had to such use in the Naugatuck | Company. His object was to give wo all right to such use, and substitute the Naugatuck Company in his place, they performing certain things asa consideration for such substitution. This being the object of both parties to the indenture as is manifest from the indenture, itself, such a construction should be put upon the instrament | as will carry out that object. The exceptions in the indenture in favor of third persons, by which the operation of the general term of the grant is somewhat limited, were not. made for the purpose of reserving in Goodyear any | portion of the right granted, and which, without such exception, would seem to be included in the ‘enerab terms of the grant. The general terms of the grant are “a full and absolute license to use the ting granted, for manufacturing cloths or any other article of merchandise, or any article to which the same may be applicable.’ Goodyear | gave the company the ig it to use vulcanized rubber in the manufacture of cloths and any article to which it was applicable; aud as it was apylica- ble to bis patented shirred goods uader the descrip- tion of “‘cluths,” and also uader the description of “articles ofgmerchandise,” &c., he thereby gave the Naugatuck hie ee & right to use threads or | strands of vulcanize rubber in the manufacture of his patented shirred goods. But this they could | not do so tong as Suydam had the rights ed n; 80 long as his grat was in force. ite had | xclusive right to manufacture “shirred or cor- ght ‘| vanyy of this deed, in order that we pa Goodyear and Day meant should provided ip the deed, entitled by virtue y understand what } ve done when they | “memorandum of rugatad goods,” according to the patent of March 9, 1e44, for the anexpired term of that oe | alls | With the priviege to use for said anexpirar Goodyeare: oiber improvements is such manu | facture. | use in the preparation thereof ( gods,’ | the Exclusive But this did not inclade the whole right which Goodyear had to the use of his vulcanized rubber in the manufacture of the goods made accoi to the shirred goods patent. A valuable right still re- mained in him. It is necessary, therefore, to look at the exception to see if that right was reserved to him; éor if it were not so reserved, it passed to the company by the terms of the grant. A That exception we here again extract:—“And, whereas, the said Goodyear heretofore sold to D. L. Suydam, of New York city, the right to manu, facture shirred goods, the said right is hereby ex- copied. from the operation of the instrument, in ad- dition to the exceptions above mentioned.” No- thing is here reserved in Goodyear. Something is excepted in favor of Suydam, The “said right is hereby “excepted.” What is the “said right’ which is so excepted from the operation of the general terms in the granting clause? The “sai right is which Goodyear has heretofore sold to D. L. Suy- dam, and nothing more. It is therefore in this con- nection necessary to see what was sold to Suydam; aud when we have ascertained that we shall know what was the limitation and exception to the gene- ral terms of the granting clause, We have already shown what was sold to Suy- dam. His rights under the grant from Goodyear would expire on the 9th day of March, 1858, hey could continue no longer. The grant to Day was for the unexpired term of any of the patents enumerated, and forall renewals and extensions of the same. It was, therefore, at all events, to continue until the 15th day of June, 1858; and, as the vulcanized patent has been ex- tended, the term of the expiration of the grant is not until the 15th of June, 1865. The grant to the Naugatuck Sompany was also for and during the unexpired term of all patents issued to Goodyear, bearing any date whatsoever, or owned by him, or in which he may have an interest, whether isssued or to be issued, and for any extensions of the same. It is claimed by the complainants that the grant in the Naugatuck Company was not for any ex- tended term. When we come to the consideration of another point made in the case it will be shown that this grant carried the extended term. ‘The detendant claims that when Suydam, on the 10th of May, 1845, re-conveyed to Goodyear the right which he had, Goodyear received the recon- veyance in trust for the Naugatuck Company, and that {rom that time the right of the company to use the vulcanized rubber in the manufacture of “shir- yed goods” made according to the shirred goods patent, commenced and was vested. But the neces- sities of the case do not require a determination of the katter question. From what has been made to appear, it is_mani- fest that, at the time of the release executed by the Naugatuck Company, they had aright to the use of the vulcanized rubber “in the manufacture of such shirred or corrugated goods as should be made according to shirred goods patent, atter the 9th of March, 1858,” which nght it was important to Day to have cancelled, in order that he might have the fuil benefit of bis extension grant, and that the release was obtained from and executed by the Naugatuck Company, with the view, among other things, that they might be divested of this particu- lar right, and that the same might be cancelled, so that Vay should have the full benefit of his grant. In the investigation of the question submitted for decision we have had occasion to examine with much particularity eight several deeds executed b; Goodyear, namely: the deed to the Naugatuc! Company, to Hutchinson & Runyon, to Ford & Co., to Onderdonk & Letson, and the four deeds to Day— the one to the Naugatuck Company having been executed aiter Goodyear was divested of the right which he granted to Suydam to make “shirred or corrugated goods,” and the remaining seven having been executed after he was reinvested in the right which he had so granted to Suydam. ~ When the deed to the Naugatuck Company was executed he had a right to convey to them the exclusive right and privilege he thereby granted. The terms used in the deed did carry that exclu- sive privilege; and they were suilicient to carry the whole and exclusive privilege to use such preparations in the manufacture of cor- rugated goods or cloths made after his shirred goods patent, aud would have carried such whole privi- jege if a prior right had not been outstanding in favor of Suydam. ‘Therefore the exception in the deed. And the question forcibly suggests itself to the mind, why, if Goodyear intended, iu the deeds to Hutchiuson & Runyon, to Ford & Co., to Ouder- donk & Letson, and to Day, to convey a license to use vulcanized rubber in the manufacture of elastic woven rubber goods, he did not use the terms which he used in the deed to the Naugatuck Com- pany, instead of using the terms “ shirred or corru- gated goods?” The reason is obvious. It is because he had no right to convey a license to his vul- canized rubber in the manufacture of elastic woven goods, the entire and exclusive right to them being om the Naugatuck Company. Butas at the dates of these seven deeds, he had the right to the “ shirred and corrugated goods” granted to Suydam, with the right to use ip the mauutaciure of such goods his preparations; the A he granted to Suydain, having een conveyed back to him, he intended in these seven deeds to grant them a new extension, This was all the right granted so jar as it respects ‘ shir- red or corrugated goods.” The licenses to Hutch- inson & Runyon, Ford & Co., and Onderdonk & m, were free licenses to be meres connect- edly or separately. The grant to Day of the 29th of October, 1846, was of an exclusive right, but subject to the right previously granted to the last- named firms; wiuch last mentioned rights, by the articles of oe ment entered into on the 5th day of November, 1856, were by Goodyear to be cancelled, as a condition precedent to the right to hold Day to the covenants which he had entered into. It there were any doubt as to the meaning of the ternis in question, as understood by the parties at the time the agreement of the 2th of October, 1846, was entered into, and as used by them in that agreement, such doubt would be removed by acon- sideration of the deed of the Sth of December of the sume year. This last mentioned agreement was executed by both Goodyear and Day, under their hands and seals. It was made after the several free licenses which had in the year 1545 been executed to Hutchinson & Runyou, to Ford & Co., and to Ouderdonk & Letson, were delivered up to be can- celled; and the very day they were cancelled, at a time when, after the cancellation, there were no outstanding licences in favor of any one of them to manuiacture “shirred or corrugated goods,” accord- ing to the patentof March 9, 1854, the grant to Suydam before then having been re-assigned to Govdyear. It appears expressly by the first deed executed on the oth of November, 1846, and entitled “ Arti- cles of Agreement,” that such articles were to be additional or supplemental to the articles entered jnto on the 29th of October of the same year, which articles, in the deed of the earlier date, were to be constrned and governed the subsequent “articles of agreement,” wherein the: might differ or be inconsis- tent, but in all other respects were to remain in full force. And it appears expressly by the second deed of the said Sth of November, and entitled “Memorandum of Agree auxiliary to the two preceding deeds. And it is to be inferred that this deed of the Sth of December was executed for the same purposes for wi two deeds of the 5th of November were e. It was made for some purpose, and if it were not made to place the subject of the grant beyond all doubt and dispute, itis difficult to conceive of a rea- son why it was made; for init there are no addi- tional grants made, and no additional covenants on the part of Goodyear; and by it Goodyear was not absolved from any of the covenants which he had previously made. Day entered into a new cove- nant, and was not absolved trom any of the obliga- tions of the covenants previously entered into. ‘The agreement of the Sth of December recited that Goodyear was the owner of the four several patents already mentioned, and possessed the sole and exciusive right to the same ¥o far as relates to the use of all or any of the patented articles, in the preparing and manufacturing shirred or corrugated ouds, except the three said several licenses for the same, which were simultaneously therewith to he assigned to Day to be cancelled. It also recited that Goodyear had agreed to assign to Day the “sole and exclusive right to make, d and sell to others shirred or corrugated good: This is its exact language, and is substantially the same as that used in the granting clause of the feed of the 29th of October, in46. ‘The object of this deed of the 5th of December was to fulfill and carry into full execution the agreements which Goedyear had before made, to assign to Day the “exclusive right to make, vend and sell to others to be used, shirred or corrugated goods.” Goodyear, in full execution of the agreement re- cited, granted and assigued to Day, and Day ac- cepted, the sole and exclusive right, license and privilege for the whole of the United States to use ihe machinery in any of the recited pateuts de- seribed, and to. make and vend the shirred ar cor- rugated goods in said patenta mentioned, and to ‘nainel, re a aration of the shirred goods mentioned in the Pa 't), the compounds ana fabrics in the letters nt described, for and Ry 3 hea bed yd the any extensi erect; a xe Tare ‘com tov use in the manufacture of the shirred goods specified, all improvements in the composition, fabrics or machinery mentioned, or new composition, fabrics or machinery made or to be made, and for which Goodyear then held, or ap! therealter hold patents. It is clear that the a xclusive right to make “shirred or corruga- porn ated and assigned by this deed, va right to make such goods as are de- seribed in the patent of March 9, 1844. The lan- guage of the graut is, “the shirred or corrugate, Pas in said patents mentione “There were po shirred or corrugated goods” mentioned in any patent ept the patent of March 9, 18t4 The parties considered that grant to make “sbisred or covugated goods” according. to the patent of March 9, 1544, was a comulete fulfillment of an agreement to assign the ex- by the provisions in | ent,’ that it was to be | clusive rig] is very pluin that the meaning of the terms“shirre: or corrugated 5,” as understood and used by the pa: to this deed, was the elastic rubber manufactured acéording to the patent h 9, 1844, and in that patent denominated “4 ted or shirred India rubber goods,” and that n other kind of elastic goods was meant by the use these terms, But, before leaving this part of the case, it shor be noticed, that the general conduct of the ties has been in accordance with the views tal by the Court of the agreements of 1846, and abovs for yy, until a comparatively recent peri (the fall of the year 1866), never made any clai that this grant of right to “shirred or corrugate goods” included gnything more than the right any other than thé shirred or cot ted goo tented by the patent of March 9, 1844, with the ther right to use in the manufacture of the same other patents. It is true that for along period h was in conflict with Goodyear, denying the validi of Goodyear's patent, the validity of which, un his hand und seal, he had acknowledged ; and d nying, also, the Coy or binding force of covenants which he had entered into, During t! conflict he was manufacturing the “shirre corrugated goods,” after the manner of the patent of March 9, 1844, and was using in such man facture, the prepared India rubber, pate: Goodyear. He was also manufactut woven rubber goods not made according to the! shirred goods patent, using in such mannfactare| Goodyear’s prepared India rubber. The open cone flict between Goodyear and Day terminated in Sep- tember, 1852. The decision of the Court in New Jersey brought it to an end, That decision was that the patents of Goodyear were valid; that Day was bound by his covenants; that Day had no right to any use of the Goodyear patents, except what he aacuieee by virtue of the agreements between him nd Goodyear, executed in 1546. Immediately after that decision chet abandoned the manufacture of elastic woven rubber goods, and sold out his looms for weaving the sume. Soon after he trans. ferred to the Congress Rubber Company all the rights which he had to make “shirred or corru- gated goods,” which rights subsequently became revested in him. And at no time from the decision of the Courtin New Jersey, until the full of 1866, did be or the Congress Kubber Company, which succeeded to all his rights, make any claim that Goodyear had transferred to him any other right than the right to make the “shirred ‘or corrugated described and mentioned in the patent of arch 9, 1844, though during that period other par- ties were making and selling woven elastic goods contaiving India rubber, cured or vuleanized ac- cording to Goodyear’s Vulcanizing Patent, to com- pete in the market with the “shirred or corrugated ‘oods” manufactured according to the patent of larch 9, 1844. ‘The deed of the 24th day of May, 1858, executed by Goodyear, purported, for the consideration of one dollar and other valuable considerations, re- ceived and to be received by him, as in said deed is provided, to sell and convey to Day (with an agree- inent to confirm the same within three months from the 15th of June then next, by such further deed of conveyance as said Day might deem necessary) the full, absolute and exclusive license, right an | privilege to make, use and vend his (Goodyear's) \ invention of vulcanized rubber for the term of the then Chetan patent, and all extended or renewed. terms of said patents as the same might or could be used in the manufacture of all braided, woven, ce- mented or sewed fabrics, or such as could be cover- | ed, or protected, on one or both sides, with sub- | stances other than rubber, and in all sinooth, elas- tic shirred goods. And it was provided that the terms and conditions upon which the license was to held and ener a as to bonuses, not exceeding in the whole the sum of $30,000, and the tarilf not ex- ceeding five cents @ pound on the product should be fixed and determined by Nathaniel Hayward | and Thomas A. Jenckes, whose award in the pre- mives should be tinal, and should be made within three months from the 15th of June then next. Ou this branch of the case two questions are sub- mitted for consideration: _ 1. Js this deed sufficient to convey the equitable right which it purports to convey ‘(it being adinit- | ted that it did not purportto carry any legal right), Hayward & Jenckes not being shown to have acted as in the deed is stipulated, provided at the time it ‘was executed the equitable right which it purports toconvey was vested in Goodyear? 2. Was the equitable right which the deed pur- ported to convey, at the time it was executed, 80 in Goodyear*that he could, without the concur- rence of any one else, iz equity convey it? If either of these questions is answered in the negative, then this deed can have no effect in conveying the | eer right, purporting to be transferred. | We will first turn our attention to the second question. | Goodyear had the right to convey what the deed ported to transfer, unless he had, prior to its ‘ution, parted with that equitable right. It is ‘d by the defendant that before the execution of this deed, Goodyear did part with such right, to ‘ the Naugatuck Company, by the deed to them heretofore mentioned. eis also claimed that he Ree with the right by. other deeds, wh peen produced inevidence. It will be suftivient to dispose of this question to consider only the deed to the Naugatuck Company. That deed gave the right which it transferred, “for and a 9 the unexpired term of all patents issued to him, bearing any date whatsvever, and for and during the unexpiredterm or terms of any other patent or patents or renewals of patents owned by him, or in which he may have an i | issued or to be issued.” If by the term enewed"? is meant “extended,” and if the term is to be ap- lied to patents “issued to him,” then it will fol- ow, beibideane as Day had full knowledge of the rights granted to the Naugatuck Company, Good- year had no right to convey what the deed of the 24th of May purported to convey, and that Day, by that deed, acquired no new right which can be pro- tected in a Court of Equity. The parties appear to have used the term “re- newed’" synonymous with the term “extended.” ‘Thus, in the deed of the 24th of May, 1858, the grant is, the use of the invention of vulcanized rubber, for the term of the then present patent, “and all extended or renewed terms of said patent.” ‘The then present patent was to expire within twenty- two days. There was an application then pendins for an extension, which was afterwards granted. It ' is evident that the parties did not intend, by the | term “renewed,” to provide for a reissue of the then present patent, which would expire on the Lith of June, but that they did intend, by the term “renewed,” the “extended” patent which had been then applied for. Tue Patent Office also use the term “renew” as synonymous with the word “extend.” Hence, in the extension of the vuleanized patent which was made on the Mih day of dune, 1°58, the language of the Commission- er is: “1, Joseph Holt, Commissioner of Patents, by virtue of the power vested in me by the said acts of | Congress, do renew and extend the said patent for the term of seven years from aad after the expira- tion of the first term.” The tecm “renewal” of | patents was used in the grant to the Naugatuck Company. It was not necessary to carry the right to a reistned patent, fur said right would be carried. * without ner this teri terms synonymous with the v e necessary to carry the right in an exten and to carry such latter right the term was mtrodiced into ‘the grant. ‘The case of Wilson ys. Rossean (1 Howard, 646) has been referred to to show that the term “renew- ai” should not receive the construction which we have given to it. The question in that case arose upon the construction of a covenant executed on the 28th of November, 1829, that in case of “any improvement in the machinery, or alteration or ré- newal of either patent, such improvement, altera~ tion or renewal shail inure to the Lenefit of the re- spective pa interested.” At that time there was no Jaw authorizing an extension of a patent beyond the original term of fourteen years. Tie first act that authorized an extension was passed in , 1832, Subsequent to the passing of this act of 1836, the patent was extended; and the question was, whether the extended patent was included in the terms of the covenant. ‘The Court in giving their opinion, use the term “renewal’’ as syno’ with the term “extension,” when they say Uiat “at the time this covenant was entered into, there we no provision in the Patent laws authorizing 29 teusion or renewal of the same beyond the original term of fourteen years. The firet act providing { it was passed in July, 1832.” Tha langnege of that act, in speaking of an “extension,” isto protong or renew the term of a patent.” And the langnuge of the 18th section of the act of 1836, on the subject of the “extension” of @ patent is, “that it shall be the duty of the Commissioner to renew and extend the patent.” The Court in th: se opinion that the covenant in question should be con- strued as having been encered into by the parties with reference to the known and existing rights and privileges secured to patentees nnder the general of the government establisiied for that par- that the covenant was ontered into “with reference to the established Jaw” as it then was; and that the parties did not intend to provide toe any possible change that might be made in the law. The Court, therefore, in that case, gave 8 constrac~ tion to the term “renewal” with reference to the law as it then was, there being at that time no law Mim naitaong to the renewal or extension of patents, It is claimed, also, that if by the term “ro 4 was meant an extended pa iM ft tid Sct tian the extension of « patent which had been igsned Goodyear, but only to an extended patent which wos owned by him ‘withont ued to lin. The langnage of the grant is: "Por and daring the unexpired term of all patents issued to hin, te ing uny date whatsoever, aud @ nhexpired term or teva of auy of patent or ra- uewals of patents owned by him, or in which he The may bave an interest, issued or to be isued.’