The New York Herald Newspaper, April 27, 1855, Page 1

; 1 t | ' 1 ‘ ~~ at Tae me | | | . WHOLE NO. 6818. MORNING EDITION—FRIDAY, APRIG 27, 1855. INTERESTING EUROPEAN NEWS BY THE ‘STEAMSHIPS SAINT LOUIS AND AFRICA, ‘The Loss of the Steamship North Carolina, THE TURKISH VIEW OF THE FOUR POINTS. Recruiting in the United States for the British Army, The French Emperor's Exposition of the Cri- mean Expedition, &., &., &. THE NEWS BY THE ST. LOUIS. The steamship St. Louis, which left Havre om 11th ‘instant, arrived at this port yesterday morning. The St. Louis left Cowes at 8 A. M. on Thurs¢ay, April 12, and arrived at Sandy Hook at 12 midnight on the 26th April—passage 13 days 16 hours. Bhe brings 20@ tons merchandise, French and Swiss goods, and 75 passengers, among them are Madame de Btankovitch, nee de la Grange, MM. Morelli and Mirati, of the Italian opera, engaged by Mr. Niblo. Her news bas been anticipated by the arrival of the Africa at Halifax. In consequence of there being a general holiday at Havre on tte 10th, the Louis did not leave that port until late in the day of the 11th. Having taken on board her English mails and passengers at Cowes, she left for New York at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 12th. ‘The United States mail stesmship Hermann, Captain ‘Higgins, en route from New York to Bremen, arrived at Southampton on the evenirg of the 7th instant The American new screw steamship North Caroliza, from Philadelphia to Liverpool, has been lost in the English channel, by coming in contact with the ship Robert, which left Liverpool for New Orleans on the Sth instant. The Robert came in contact with the North Carolina about thirty miles west of Tasksr light, striking her on the port side, forward of the fore riggiag, which caused her to fill immediately, and she sunk in about ten minutes, The captain and twenty one of the crew ‘were taken on board the Robert and conveyed back to Liverpool. The remainder of the eleven men were seen in the boats alongside another ship at daylight Beyond the lors of her cutwater, the Robert sustained little or noinjury. The collision took place at 1 A.M, onthe Sth instant. The American abip Jobn Rutledge, from New York, arrived at Liverpool on the 6th instant, having lost two ‘men overboard and suffered from bad weather on the 10th ult. Arrangemente were being made in London ani other places for the purpose of testifying respect to the Em- peror and Empress of the French, when they arrive in England, on the intended visit to her Majesty. Ata court of the Common Council in London, it was deter- mained to provide an entertainment euitable to the dig- nity of the city, to be held at the Guildhall, to which the Emperor and Empress are to be invited. Letters from Athens contain deplorable accounts of ‘the progres of brigandage in various parts of Greece. To such an extent bas it proceeded that some foreign influence of a detestable character is supposed to be at work, General ce Ja Marmora was about to establish his head- quarters at Genoa, from whence the embarkation of the Piedmontere contingent will proceed as rapidly as pos- sible. Colonel Kelly was a prisoner at Sebastopol, and was slightly wounded, Capt. Montague was also a prisoner, ‘but was not wounded. There were alarms on the 24th aud 26th ult , but nothing important took place. It was expected that the fire upon Sebastopol would open in the courze of that weeks The Wanderer of Vienna, of the 5th, says:— ‘The Consuls-General of France and England, who have returned to Bucharest, after & prolonged absence, hoist- their flage on the 25th ult., ard thus indicated in official etyle that the diplomatic relations between those aes and the government of Wailachia were itab- ed. j Instructions of the Ottoman Plenipotentiary at the Vienna Conference. The Paris Pays gives as to'lows the text ot the instruc- ‘tions with whic! & Ottoman government has furnished rs embassador at Vienna, as to his conduct ia the con- ference: As soon as your Excellency anaounced that Prince Gortcbaboff, in the name of his government, had accept- ed the four guarantee points, with the interpretation as- signed to them by the three Powers, it was notitied to your Excellency, by order of his impsrial Majesty, that ‘ou should attend the conferences about to be opened, Yat that pou should discuss the questioas rained weesly ad referndum. The conditions of the future peace are in fact of too vital imp rtance for the Sublime Porte to permit of their being decided without the greatest circamspection and the maturest reflections on cur part. It will only be after @ long and minute examinatioa of those cozditions and ‘the questions of right connected sith them, as likewise of the elements of tueir practical application—it will only be when everything bail have been concerted with our alises, that our plenipotentiary at Vienaa can be Turpisbed with precise and dednite instructions Never- as it is requisite tvai your Excellency should suceinct instract:one, to which you ca your language as the occasion ‘may require, to you the bart Hoge indications:— hen the time shall have arrived for givin: a com- plete definition of tte four articles, and crawing up ian for a treaty of peace, the Sublime Porte having tl Feateputatie right to be heard bozh on the priacip! that constitute its basis and on their practical cone quences, it is indispenrable tha: this plaa should be sub- mitted to our consideration before it shall be propoed fer her acceptance, and that we should first ig with the allied Powers, with the view of ar at one common resolutions. vil ifs mode of proceeding is too patural to admit of a oubt respecting the adhesion of tho representatives of those overs on thi sad) Nevertheless, by way of additional precaution, and to obviate any future miaua- cerstanding or aumteulty, your Excellency will on this at enter into formal ‘explanations with Count Baol, rd Westmoreland, and Baron Bourqueney,and you wil transmit io us the result. Let us now proceed to the four articl ed. = the first it would be incumbent, when abolishing Russia’s protectorate over Wallachia and Moldavia, that the right: granted by the Porte to theve two Principall- w so to Servia, sbould be established ic one or. , and placed under the guarantee of the great On this article there are numerous otver im- ant cbservations to be made, which deserve the at- Rention of the Tn the the first place, they sheuld not be le‘t under erroneous impression, which ap- pears to exist, that a real protectorate La: above men- er been Russia by virtue of treaties concerning the eaten province, All that resalts from those treati ‘may be reduced to an arsurance given to Rusia, th the institutions established in these proviaces should be neither mocified nor destroyed. But under the pretext of neighborhood snd similarity of religion, Russia, as is well known, without the allglitest respeat for exist- ing agp and bag ie vs Loeb wn! snetge ments, 6 mere! in ber own © eatisty her ora private interests, the condust of the Russian consuls, in arrogatin ty as Janey ‘and Bucharest, is therefore meet that the should be clearly defined and explained, so that, with- ‘out at all interfe with the internal vondition and ad- sninistration of the Principalites it may confine itsel Spore to securing their privileges from destruc }, and their institutions from encroachment. It is equally essential to constitute the prerogatives of the | med igri deren provinces, so that they may not indirectly trench upon the sovereign rights of the Porte. For the reat, fartuer and more special instrac- tions will be sent to your Excellency on this last named With respect to the second article, concerning the question of the Danube, Russe, by her assamption of hts appertain: are the Sublime Porte on various bt or) points ot the river, bas given rike to numerous and serious cifficulties as to its free navigation. It will be mecenssry for us xplain on our side oarobservations respecting the means of both se Spe | the naviga. ‘tion of the Danube, and maintaining int the righ’s of ‘the Sublime Forte slong the banks of chis river. ‘The third article relates to the revision of the treaty a 1, with han Be of toner bd reed if the Ottoman empire more c! with the \- end to the predomi im of Europe, >; [testy Sy nonce of Russia in the Black ‘The Sudims Porte, te! we friendship which the display of einser Sree Power sist be ‘owing om her in this mstier, a ie Magy t oan ae jesirot virtually terminating ussian pre- penderan ‘i ce “put it ts at the same time the daty of the blime Porte to take good heed that ‘he revision of the treaty of 1841 be not couched in terms capable of in- Hloglor en ite rights of sovereignty in the Kosp>orus ry Ganelles, or over any other part of ite territory atety of the empire might possibly be on- Ganzered, Finely, on arriving at the fourth articls, rincy tha Tepose and welfare of all the subject# of the Orcoman empire are of paramount interest for the Sublime lorte, it Yas for this object assure’ to all sub in the moet solemn and public msaner (he the rights and privileges accorded to them by tie Sulta ‘ho were the predecessors of his ren’ Ma- Jerty, as likewise thoze recently covceded by bis gracious impesial wil and pleasure. ‘again declaring before all the world that bas no intention whatever of en- croaching nue or diminishing those rights, his imp-riai Moajerty doubts not st the same time that, on the part f the allied and friendly Powers, they will continue to object of the highest importance that wbat- ros the internal acministration of the subj of the empire should not be the subject of an: tien not compatible with the inde lime Porte (am independance whic Powers have declared their wish to protect againat the encroachments of Rursia.) Itison that account that the Sublime Porte will, in concert with his allies, reject any attempt on the part of Prince Gortcbakoff to obtain the intertion into the treaty of peace of any guarantyiog clause whatever by which the full integrity of its inde: pendence may be exposed to encroac suient. such being the general views of the Sub ime Por'e con- cerning ‘he four articles in question, his imperial Maje: ty’s pleasure is that they shall serve as a guide regulating your Fxgellency’s conduct, and it is for this erd that these instructions have been communicated to you. British Recrui ‘Frome th ing in the Unit States. London Times, April' ll.) The comments of the American Jovroals upon the schemes said to be adopted in the States for raising a foreign legion in aid of Our operations against Russia, furnish some remarkable illustrations of trans-Atlantic character, and give considerable insight, if the repre- stntat'on can be altogether trusted, into the views of the American population, as well as into the opiaions -Waintained with respect to the war. The recent pro- ceedings of the Know Nothing party will have given the reader a general idea of the distinctions subsisting be- tween one great class of American citizens and another —between the native born Americans and th numercus immigrants who, from all coun| ° rope, have been poured year after yesr into the United States, It would certainly have been thought 4 curious speculation some time ago to inquire what response was hkely to be mace if these classes had been severally invited to eplist in the service of Great Britain against Russia, but to such inquiry we now seem to get some reply in the reports anc observations before us. It is rai’ that amoug the native born citizens of the States there really exists a strong Russian feeling, or, as we un- deretand the expression, a positive sympathy with the cause of Russia, as opposed to that of the allies. On what grounds, or by what arguments, such a pra‘erence could be justified we sbould, if we gave crecit to the as- sertion, beat consi‘erable lors to compretend, but we murt needs eay that we disbelieve thefact. We can cer ta‘nly imagine that Russia, as being in rorespect a rival cr comp: titor of the United States, ma fa gerced with less jealousy than is, perhap position like our own, and it requires no great effort to understand the alluremerts which a goveroment like that of the Czar might be able directly or’ indirectly to put forward. It bas always been the essence of Russian policy to bespeak connivance by offering concessions, and, as the Awericans would naturally entertain less apprehension of tke aggressions of Russia than would ke feit by European States, there might be less to ceter them from entering {uto her views. To there con: sideration’ we might aad. perbeps, that the small dick- erings injerchsnged between Yenkees ani Britishers might easily communicate a smack of muliceto the Ame- rican virw of cur proceedings, but, when ell this has been said, we feel entirely persuased that the real and genuine feelings of the American people—Anglo Saxon in blcod, larguage and institutions—must be in unison with our cwn, and that the true rympaihtes of the States rust needs go with their own flesh snd blood, fighting for hberty against deerotiem However, omitting this point, we are nevertheless as- sured ?bat, in spite of ali alleged Rusrion tendencies, there was a considerable disposition among the native Americans to take service under ozr flag, if judicious messures bad been devised for bringing such a result to panes. In the first piace, the failure of the ‘filibustering’ expeditions _re- cently projected bad thrown loose a number of adventu- Tous spirits, who were ro esger for martial occupation that, if it were vot procurable in one place,.they would accept it in another. besides which, it is said that the ge- nerul unstesdinesa of the people, their addiction to no- velties, ard their constitutional love of excitement, would bave insured alarge supply of recruits. Nota word, however, is mentioned about any rympathy with the principles at stake; on the contrary, it is intimated that the motives actuating the voluntcers would be bas- ed neither upon prospects of s recompense nor any par- ticvJar feclings of amity, but would be ccnfined maialy to curiosity, pugnacity, and the desire of change. A\ opportunity would be oflered of seeing foreign lands and something lik fighting at the same time, and this temptation would have been sufficient. would have been glad to exhibit their coura; sources cn a field s0 favorable for display us the Crimes. 01 the non-native or immigrant portion of the populs- tion we sre informed that the ist aloue would be likely to stand aloof from the enlixtment office, even the natu- x91 combativeness of their race being overpowered on this oerasion by their hostility to England. The remui ing constituents ot the clars—Germats, Holsteine: &c,—would be well disposed to the service—all the m #0, incees, from the late pressure of the times, Io mspy of them landed with few detinite prospec sub-istence, and as among them there would be a con- siders ble Froportion of men trained more or less to arms, the reasonable offers of a recruitng agent would be very willingly embraced. It seems, indeeo, from what we reac in the American journals, as if that particular class of men which it wae the ebject of our Foreign Eniist- ment bill to eprol existed in greater and more disposable numbers in the United States then anywhere else, and that the place to fin? tra:ned soldiers of the continental armies csailable for fcreign sexvice was undoubtedly ameti Scme ciscrepancies of opinion ceem to prevail as to the resuits already in evidence; but, upon the whole, there appears, we think, very lit gon to doubt that, as for as the temper of the peor 8, & strong legion could be raised in the United states for co op-ration mst Russia with exceediogly little cifficulty. ‘It is apperent,” indeed, says one paper, ‘that 10,000 men could be speedily furnished; and no question can be enterta‘ned as to the general ‘excellence of the soldiers thus'to te ferthcoming. The courage, intelligence, and activity cf the Americans are well known, and taore indefatigable energies which hurry them over 9 whole continent in quest of excitement or occupation would find ample scope in the contingencies of such a war that row raging. On the other side, tte Ger- an immigrants, having been, for tbe most part, ioured to military discipline, possessing in some ee cases, probably a practical knowledge of arm, and being generally of mature age and vigor, would sapply exactl the class of troops which are most ia request at present. It is rot that Great Britain is dertitute of men or that the sources of recruiting havo been exhausted by a twelvemonth’s campaign. Op the contrary, our recruiting proceecs most successfully ; but it heppeus that, whereas soldiers are wented immediately, it takes two years or #0 to form a soldier, and to transform the willing lad into the robust and disciplined soldier, We should bave little difficulty in raising 60,000 men for the year 1858, hut they are wanted for the year 1855. As the cause itt which We are fighting Js a common one, there can be no reason why we abould not accept the co operation of ctbers wherever it can be lawfully obtained, and, if the Americans can show us the way to take Sebastopol, we should te quite ready to learn, and to give them every credit for the lesson. THE NEWS BY THE AFRICA. ‘The Cuvard steamship Africa arrived at her dock at Boston at a quarter past § o'clock yesterday moraing, making the run from Halifax in thirty-one hours. She was just too late to save the early train for New Yerk, the mails therefore leave in the afternoon, reaching New York early this morning. Soon after leavirg Halifax, a cabin passenger missei £600 sterling, and it is supposed the money was stolen. On tbe Africa’s arrival at Boston, no communication was allowed with the ship, anda general search of the pas. sengers took place. ‘The robbery on board the steamer amounted to £500 sterling in gold, also Bank of England notes and jewelry —making in all about £1,5¢0 sterling. The property belonged to Mr. E Collingwood, one of the passengers, and bas rot been recovered. ‘The English papers contain very little news additional to that telegraphed from Halifax. A despatch from Dover, dated 13th instant, atates that the Neptune, 120 guns, Rear Admiral Cochrane, with twelve sail of the fleet, were moored in Dover Bay, awaiting the arrival of ‘the Imperial visiters from France. The Expedition to the East. The Moniteur of april 11 contains the following ar- It is the incontestable right of a great country like France to know the truth when it interests the honor, the security, and the power of the State It is the sacred duty of a strong government like that of the Emprror to make known the truth when silence is not imposed by the patriotiem of that public welfare. The expedition to the East, its causes, ita object, the mili- ‘tary operations prepared to support it sreat present facta for discussion previously to becoming pages of his- tory. Thst these facts mey be usefully discussed and ae- riously judged, we shall now expose them with the moet scrupulous exactitade. This appears to us eful. Public opinion is prompt to take len into error m the midyt of emotions ore of which each day it experiences » The best way of reassuring itis to enlighten it. How was theexpeditim to the Eaet conceived’? On wher and data wis its = formed? What were uses that modified it? ‘hy tdid the Anglo French army land in the Crimes, instead of acting on the Danube and makicg @ camdaign in Bessarabia’ How the Jong resistance of the besieged in besiegers? rpore examining in the we shail only documents, bre we to ex erence of theardour aud heroism of tke ich are points which we first part of this task. Im this examiain; deal with acknowledged fects, anthent truths of science and of military histor ‘The imperious and decisive cirou Frence éraw the sword after a forty years’ psa Russia, ‘not being able to premacy by the terror of her pro: toools, attempted to awe her by force. She tore up trenties, invaded a territory, disdained and throatencd Furope, Her armies occupied the Prinsipalitien, were advencieg en the Danube, and marked out alran!. atations fer # victorious march over the Ba’ k: 2%, Tne mirable spirit displayed by the ‘urkish mation did not suffice to disconcert this plan, Rusia, it is true, found an unexpecte* obetacle in the heroi.' devotion of a peo- ple whom she had thought sunk in decay, and the re- sisfance of which made it remember that it had van- quished Peter the Great. But the struggle was unequ: The whole world, panting with emotion, anxiously awaited the result, Germany, halting between the customa of fhe Holy Al lance abd its dignity, could not make up its mind whe- ther it was ‘o suffer any longer the arrogance of that domination which weighed upon it, or whetber it was to 's war from the West tht the sig- e was given. Fieuce and England, loy- ally united, did not hesitate to sen! their armies and their fleets into the East, there to defend the integrity of the Ottowan empire, the respect for treaties, the ba- lance ot power, avd the civilization of Europe. ‘Tke firm will which presides over the goverament o ¢ our country, and which had resolved upon this war a a ecessity forits honor, baving in vain attemptel t Frevent it by an honorable conciliation, then drew u instructions for the illus:rious Marebal to whose hand .the sword of France was to be intrusted. These in structions, which bear the date 12th af April, 1864, contained the following pas: ** In placing*you, Marshal, at the head of a Freac army, to fight at acistance of more than 600 lsaguc frem our mother country, my first recommendation i: tohave acere for the health of the troops, to spare them as much as possible, aus to give battie only after having made sure first of, at least, two chances out of three for # favorable result, The peninsula of Gallipoli is adopted as the principal point of disembarcation, becanse it must be, as a strate. gical point, the basis of our operations; that is to say, the place darmes for our depots, our ambulances, our provision stores, acd whence we may with facility either advance or reembark. ‘Ibis will not prevent you on Jour arrival, should you deem it advisable, from lodging one or two cevisicps in the barracks, which are either to the west of Constan:inople or at Feutari, As long as you are not in presence of the enemy, the spreading of your treops “apnot be attenced with incon venience, and the presence of your trocps at Constanti- nople may produce a good moral effect; but if, per- chance, after having advanced towards the Balkans, you thould be constrained to beat a retreat, it would be much more advantageous to regain the coast of Gali- poli than tbat cf Constantinople, (or the Russians would bever veniure to avance from Airisnople upon Con- Haptinople leaving sixty thousand good troops on their right. If, revertheless, there sbould be the intention of forti- fying the line from Kara-su, in front of Constantinople, it should oply be done with’ iho intention of leaving its cefence to the Turke alone, for, I repeat it, our positioa wovld be more independent, more redoubtable, when on the flanks of the Ruesian army, than if we were block- aded im the Thracian peninsula. The first poit established, and the Anglo Frenoh army oxce united on the shores of the Sea ef Marmora, you oust concert measures with Omar Pasha and Lord Rag- tor the adoption of one of the three following plana:— Jather to advance to meet the Russians on the Dal- . Or to seize upon the Crimea. 3 Or to lund at Odessa, or on any other point of the Russ au ecast of the Black Sea, Ir the first csse, Varna appears to me the most impor- tart point to beoccupied ‘The imfantry might be taken there by sea, and the cavalry more easily, perhaps, by land Un no acsoant ought the army to go too far from the Blace Sea, so as to be al in free communication with its fi In the second case, that the occupation of the Cri: the place ot landing must first be wade sure of, that it may tabe place ats distavce from the enemy, and that it may be speeaily fortified, so as tocerve as @ point d’- appvi to tall back upon in case of a retreat. ‘The capture of Sebastopol mus: not be attampted without at least half a siege train, and a groat number of sacks for earth. When within reach of the place, do not omil seizing upon Balaklava, a little port situated about four leegues south of Sebastopol, and by means of which easy communications may be kept up with the fleet during the siege. Ip the third case, my priccipal recommendation is never to divide your army; {0 march always with all Jour troops united, tor 40,C06 compact amen ably com- Mmanced are always an imposing force; divided, on the re nothing. pelled ou sccount of scarcity of provis‘ons, to divide the army, co so in such manuer as elwaya to ba able to unite it on one point within twety-four houra. If, when marching, you form different columas, este bheb a common re)!yipg point at some distance from the enemy, tbat none of them may be ettacked singly. If you drive back the Russians, do not go beyond the Danube, upless the Austrians enter the lists. Ss a general rule, every movements must bs concerted with the Englisch Commancer-ic-Chief, Lbere are only certain exceptionol cases where toe safety of the army michi be concerned, when you might act on your owa resolution od bd be hd ° ° 1 place perfect confidence in you, Marsbal; Iam sure you will folicw there instructions faithfully, and you will know bow to add a new glory tothat of our eagles, From the ebove extract from the Empé@or’s instruc- tious to Marshel de St. Arpauc, it will be seen that Gal- iipoli was relected as the Irncivg point for the Anglo- Frecch army. We must dwell upen the grave conside- raticrs which ccurreiied that selecticn. ‘The first priveiple in a maritime war is to elect a meeting place sbeltered from the attacks of the eaemy, capable of being easily defended, of easy access for tho cisembareation a ture to allow t tin of operstions, if compelled to do so ; teilure, to find support there and a refuge on board the fleet. ‘ihe peninsula of Galipoli offered every advantage for goo maritime war. Situated at the entrance of the entiance of the Dardanelles, it could be easily provi siored by the Sea of Marmora, ano by the Sea of Thrace A chief reason drawn from the respective situations of anc Turkish armies pointed out the neces- g posression of that point, The Russians, pg the Danube at Rustchak, in advancing on ple, ond in leaving to their jeff the Turxish for- tresses, and even Corstantinople, might be beforshand with us there, and cut off the rptreat to our fleets en- gaged in the Biack tea, here was a great danger there which the foreright of the allied governments knew how to guard sgainst in time. Anotber consideration also pointed out the necessity of occupying Gallipoli. At the time of the departure of the erpedition— that isto say, in Apnl, 1854, it was apxiourly asked whether our troops would arrive in time to cover Constantinopie? A cefensive war appear ¢ then more probavie toan 4m offensive ove. it was the integrity of the Ottcman empire which was men- aced and already attacseo, and which we were about to detend, A battle lost by the Turks en the Danube might have brought the Russians in three da; march on the Bal- kav, and opened to them the road to Constantinople. The cceupation of Gallipoli entirely covered that capi- ta), The two allied governments uadertood thata Rus an srmy, even if it cecupied Adrianople, could not ad- vence on Constantincple, leaving 60,000 Anglo French op its mght flank, and this was provided for in the Em perer’s ivstractions, ‘Tb » every point of view, to be rrepared for every zculd advance without exposure, and we kept up our commoutications with Toulon and Marseille But searcely hed the Anglo-French army arrived at Gallipoli when the scene changed. although the Rus- rian skirmishers bad been seen from Varna, the heroic ce‘ence of silistria bad stoppei the ardor of Prince Gort- schaboff, The struggle, instead of being carried into the beurt of the empire, was prolonged on the Danube with varied chances of success. The commanders of the expedition then thought they would have time to ch the theatre of the stroggle, and perhaps to save Silistria, but at al] eveots to joim the Ottoman army and to defend the Balkons be rl the Russians, having ther wings, £0 to say, protected by the fortresses of Sehamla apa Varn ‘This plan was as bold as it was prudent. It was in. , by circumstances and b; nee of the danger. If, in Silistria, the fall of which wi by Omar Pasha’s reports, the ‘ate of the Ottoman em- pire might depend upon a great betile. It was requirite jor the armies of France and England to be prepsred for it. There was their post, becauce there, perhaps, the itroggle would be decided, and ihe supreme decrees of fate be fulfiled. Events did not rei e Rus: ze these provisions. The courage of tbe Turkieh army and the pres of the allies suffic- ¢¢ to make the Russians raise and withdraw to the other sice of the Danune. never au enemy re- tires it offers a great temptation to the army before which it retires—samely, to pursue; but, when such purcuit may com promire an army, is more giory in remaining still ‘ban in advanemg. The Jove of giory murt Lever outetrip the bicdings of wiedom. What could the Anglo army have done b: tering a Cevastated country without roads, inundated by water, and infected with pestilential diseases? They would rave found, not victory, but destruction without a stroggk—ceath without a compensation. t bast id that after the retreat of the Russians ovr army w creadful catastrophe, to advance ur not, in fact, forget that fandamental poin!, that our basis of operations was the sea; to lose that was to risk sna ecmpromiseall.. itis zot only military rolencs but common renee which forbids 60, Avglo-French aad 60,000 Turke to acventure into @a unhesltpy, impracti- cable econtry; not having sufficient means of transport at our disposal, nor sufficient cavalry, nor reserve artil- iege pieces, nor depeta of provisions at Shum- ye, OF Silistria. rerourcer, indispensable to ® campaign, opjured upio® day at 800 leagues from home. ould have been lof in want of them. We rhonld have been Low ce & Russian army of 200,.00 men, which would bave awaited us on a firm foourg enitsown ground, or in retreating before us would bave led us ivtoecme still more dargerous posi- tien, leaving us be ovber alternative than an unequal Dattle or an imporrtble retreat, ‘A simple two days’ reecynoineanee in the Dobrudeehs, which cost us more than the most fanguinary combat, is & prcof-of what we ray. Generals not understand; the denger of euch am jerprise might have cosamitted nn ivreprrable error, and would bave compromsea—we do rot bestate to ray 20— the rerronsibility of command. ‘To maken campaign beyond the Danube and on the Prath possible, we repent it, the co operation of Austria was pecersary, Now, a government newer goes to war upers compelled to do ro by unayoiiable ciccumsauces, . | expected © more speedy result by It only goes to warif it can doso, Austria was not pre- pared at that moment. In_ breaking with Russia she wished to b9 certain of Germany, avd have 500,000 men underarms. Her dig- nity, her interests, the example of the Westeru Powers her to pronounce berself and act; prudence bade ber wait and collect her military forces, 8! hen her political alliances, before joining in the But what could the united Generals do at Varna after the retreat of the Russian army? Were they to remais an inactivity which would have led to discourage. ment, and from which the prestige # our flag wouid in- evitably bave auflered? Neither miittary hoaor nor po- lition) interests allowed the Commander in-Chief to take such 2 position. Once »n this great theatre, inaction was out of the ‘Geontion, it was necessary to act, to show our object to troops, to compel the enemy (o fear us, toexcite the ambition of Europe to follow us by arouving its almira- tion and respect It was then only that a Janding in the Crimea was moote: An expedition agaia:t Sebastopol might hasten the dénowcment of the war. It had 4 determined and limited object; it might place im the hands-ef the alkes a pro- vince and a stronghold which, once conquered, would be & pledge ands means of exchange *% obtain perce. It was uncer the iniluence of those considerations that the Commanser-in-Chief conceived the idea and decreed the execution of the plan. This expedition having been examined at Paris and London as aneventuality, the Marshat St. Araand're- ceived then, not the imstructions—they couli not be given at such a distance—but the follo To obtain exa Russian forces in the Crimea; if not too consideradie, to land at a spot which mizbt ‘serve as a basis for opera tions. ‘Theodosia (now Kaffa) appeared the moat eligi- ble spot; although that point of the coast bas the dis- advantage of being distant forty leagues from Sebasto- pol, it nevertheless offers great advantages, Virst, its bay is vast and safe; it weuld hold all the veotels of the squadron and she’ vessels with provisions jor the troops, Secondly, once established oa thst point, it might be made a real basis for operations, Ta thus occupying the eastern point of the Crimea all the reinforcements coming by the Sexof Azoff and tae Caucasus could be cut off. A gradual cdvaace coald be made towards the centre of the country, taking-advau tuge of all its resources Simpheropol, the strategic centre of the peninsula, would be occupied, An sdyance would then be made on Sevastopol, and Probably a great ba'tle fought on that road. If lost, a retreat in good order on Kaila, and nothing is compro- mised; if gained, to besiege Sebastopol, to invest it com- | pletely, and its surrencer would follow as » matter of course in # short interval But scarcely victors, they perseived they bad no port to serve them as a basis for operations. ‘Then, urged by that invincible ios!inet of preservation which never de- ceive’, im all haste they advanced south of Sebastopal towards Balakiava, it was moreover, clear that the army could not maintain itself and live in aa enemy’ country unless in direet communication with the ftvet, Unhappily, those counsels were not followed. Be it that the Commanders-in-Chiet had not sufficient troops to take so long a jouraey in the Crimea, be it that they bold ani sudd coup de main, they resolved, a8 is known, to land at few leagaes only from Sebastopol. The glorious battie | of Alma at Srst justified their decision. But this compulsory and necessary return towards tue sea led to the avanconment of the northern heights of Sebastopol, the occupation of which alona allowed the investment of the place. Phe Anglo Frencn army was not, in fact, numerous enough to make a complete in- vestment. It war, theretore, necessary to limit it to an attack on the eouth side. To accomplich this operation the English took posses sion of the port of Balaklava; the Freach, seeking a point @appui on the shore to 'iaad thele provisions ond artillery, providentially found the port of Kamiesob, ‘The soldiers, who are never deceived, call it, m fast, the pert of Providence, Sebastopol, as is known, is not surrounded by battle- ments; it is rather a great intreashed camp, containing generally an army of from 15,000 to 20,000 men, already Frotected at the commencement of the seige by numer- ous earth batteries, and especially by the Ruesiaa fleet, which, well placed in the inner port, could bear upon all the avenues by which the allies could advance upoa the face, Pettis period, that is to say when the Anglo French army arrived before Sebastopol, the agsault might per- hops, have been attempted; but it waa already & hazar- cous enterprise, without sufficient arttllery to sileacs that of the enemy. Deubdtlers nothing was imporsible to an Anglo-French srmy composed of gentrals and mea like those who bave given such proois daring the last six months ia the danger, fatigues and sulterings of this long siege; but success alone coulc justi/y +o daring an atten ot. The first duty imposed by the re-pousioilities of com- mand is prudence, and pracence prescribed to the Com manders in-Ch.ef rot to attemot to assault with, at mort, an army of &0,000 men, pla-ed on a rock, deticieat cf ortillery or ammunition reservee, without being de fenced by intrenchments in the rear, aad with no other refuge bu: the ships. It would bave teen risking on a cast the fortune and fate of the expedition, and nothing must be risked at a Gintance of 800 lexgues from the mother country. ‘The coup de main ahich the Generais thought pcssible aiter the battle of the Alma having escaped them, there remained for them a reguler siege according to the rules ot miltary art. At the very onset ths Kussians took two most (ficaciouy measures, very regrettable for us. ‘The first was Prince Menchikoll’s atrategis move, who, instead of shutting himself up in Sebastopol, marched on Simpberope}, ana kept the field and free communica. ton with the besieged city the second was the energetic d¢cision of sinking a pertion of the of-war, which rendered entmy’s porr inaccessible to our fleets and gave some 500 or 6C0 guns, wita their sailors, gunners, to assist in tie defence of the town. Thus, although the town already presented a formida- Me row of guns, new batteries rose, as if by enchant ment, and our feeble siege artilery could not master the fire of the town, From this moment it becams evident to all that Sebas- tepol could only be taken after a long straggle, with pewerful reinforcements, at the cost perhaps of eangui- rary battles. This situation was grave. It was loosed vpon by the Commander-in-Chief with that calmness which elevates characters to the height of the greatest responsibilities. ‘This os the place to speak of General Canrobert and of Lord Haglan, as history will speak of them. Their part im tbis great scene has been worthy of the two countries whose swords they bear. Oppesed to immense obsta- cles, they measured ‘hem only to triumph over them by courage, perreverance, and devotion. ‘he aimy, supported by their example, suffered with: cut a complaint, exposed to ail the rigors of a terrible winter; having only poles ia the earth aud small tents to shield them sganst cold and torcents of rain, they mace every sacridce to the honor of their flag and to their couniry, and to the confidence they haq in. their chiefs, whom they Jearntto love and honor on the field of battle. ‘To appreciate fully the immense difficulties of the en- prise conceived and executed by the commanders, it may net be out of place, perhaps, toexplain in. what a regular siege consiste. ‘The siege of Sebastopal bas logy in our military teats of arms, To at a place which is not invested, when the ecemy, superior in number, can be revictualled and rein- forced in meo, ' provisions dnd munitions of yer, and when he bolcs the open country, is an act of audacitp which could be seriously attempted only by Fnglend and France united fer an object nesossary for Eurcpe. The siege of Dantzig has been much cited and admired ag ove of those in which heroiem, united with. science, triumphed over the greatest cifficulties of a for- midable and obstinate ¢efence. Dantzig, protectoi by the Vistula, whose mouth on the Baltic is shut by the fort of Veichselmande, was placed equally in conditions Little favorabse for a complete investment; but it was searcely any ane- | dwelt upom the importance of Thracian Ohersonesus as the base of our position for the defence <£ Conetanti 10- ple and of Roumelia, which was then the p2imarr object of our interventioa. The instructions of the Em- eror of the French to Marshal St. Arnaud, ring cate the 12th of April, 1854, exactly oke year ago. are directed in tho first {stance to this Gallipoli was the base of operatio®s, be cause, in the event of the cefeat of the Curks 0,1 the Danube, and the passage of the Balkan by a Rus sian army, that forse would have been outflanked by the al Med troops tm Thrace, and its march on the capital b *- come impossible., At the same time the possession o.° the Dardanelles secured our maritime commnnica- thens, which might otherwise have beew threaterted by the enemy, Toese preparations were pur:ly defensive, but our position in the war was still of a Cefensive ebaracter. ‘Tho force originally sont out consisted of about 40,000 French and 20,000 British troopes and the operations contexplated at that time were regulated hy the necessity of the cass and by the strengity Gf that army. We, therefore, hold, as the French sttement very ably maintains, that the occupa tion of Gatigoii was a wise and correct determination on the part of the allies under what were then the known snd anticipeted circumstances against which they had to provide. But befcre the month of May these ciroumstances had materially chomged. Tne Russian army had crossed the Danube, occupiz@ the Drobrudscha, and threatened the Yne of the Balkon. The success of this movement, ho v- ever, depended cn the capturo of Sitistria; and the gal- lont detence of trat place followed by the defensive treaty of the 12th of June between Austria and the Ports, turned the fortune of the war, The allied forces had meanw Russians taken Silisisia and continued their advance. But the Emperor the French had expressed io the strongest terms his resolution to avoid a march upon the Danube, and to abstain frorran expedit on imto the Danubian provinces, which could onty have produced the most fatal results, Jf our momory serves us, rather less than ten months bave elapsed’ since the British min- isters, and those who shared tkeir opinions, were expos- ed toa storm of obloquy because ‘they steadily resisted the appeals made to them to throw our forces into this perilous apa desperate situation It was felt, however, t! the allied governments, having entered upon this war, could aot allow their a>- maments to remain inactive, or negl-ct any means likely to bring the contest toa glorious termination. ‘Tuy ex- edition to the Crimea had been regarded from the first as one of the objects to be kept in view by the allied | Generals, aud when the whole Russian line had retreated across the Danube, and even beyond the Prath, the Tauric Peninsula was obviously the fittest field for the operations of the msritime Powers. ‘The Brench goverpment, however, appears to hare ex- pressed at an erly period ite pref-reace for Kaila as the base of operations on the Crimean coast, and something like a reproseh is cast upon the allied Generals tor nav- ing selected their place of land:ng aud attack elsewhere, Ivis on this point that we differ from the conclusions | at which the author of thy article im the Jonileur has arrived. The project of # lanciog at Kaila had frequestly attracted our attention, and was more than once adverted to in these columns ; . after full consideration, in which we nad the advantage of the opinions of some of the highest military authori- ties in Europe, whe were not con:uited by the Frenca Government. we were led to the convistion that, al though Kaila offered the great advantages of ‘auy poibt in the Crimea for the !anding and firs: eslablish ment of the srmy and for the fleet, yet that the position of this port presented almost ‘inseperaole ob stacles to our advance sgairst Sebastopol The great Geficiency of toe army waa, tnat it landed ia the middle of September, without adequate meavs of trans- port and with a feeble division of calvary, while it re- mained dependent for many necessaries on tho fleet. A march from Kafla upon Simpheropol would baue com pelled the army te enter upon @ hive of country sepa rated from the sea by a chain of bigh mountains, and exposed to flapk atiacks from the light troops of the exemy. To vndertuke such 4 march of 100 m les in the condition the army was in last autumn,-would have been an enterprise of the mos: perilous’ kiad: | Had the exyedition landed at Kaila, as some of toe | officers in bigh dommand were disposed to recommend, it woulg probably have been compelled to pasa the wn: ter there in inaction, and the alied governments would bave been roundly accused of treachery to the cau-e they professed to defend ; ia fact, they mizht, with far greater advantage have passed the winter in the Bospho- Tus. Buv it appears to ug tobe at the present time un. generoue and incorrect to lay the blame of our ficulties upon men who took a dicision which was ratified at the time by public opinioa and military judgnent throughout Europe. Moreover, one of tho very first directions given to Marshal 8t. Arnaud, in the even" of Lie invading the Crimea, was to seize the har. Dor of Bolaklava, and to maintain tue communications betaeen the arms and the ehips It in not, therefore, to the strategical plan of this campaigo, a8 adopted by the aived generals, that we PRICE TWO CENTS. Board of Aldermen. The Poard met last evening, Isaac 0. Barker, Eaq., Pre- sident, in the chair. THE REPORT ON THE NATIVITY OF TITER POLICE. On the reading of the minutes of the last meetingr Alderman Herrick moved to amend the minutes by in- serting before the report of “The ‘pecial Committee pointed to investigate the accuracy of the report made by the Chief of Police,” &e., the words,'“‘John H. Briggs, ove of the Special Committee.”’ The correction was ac cepted, the report being a minority report, and signed by Cne member of the committee oniy. We deem it unnecessary to publish the report, as it ia ‘mere recapitulation of the evidence taken before the ¢ Cmumiltee and already iully published. «,, MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS, Several petitions for the correction and remission of tax, \9 were received and referred. Communications were ‘i from the Chief Engineer of the Fire Depart- ment, with complaints ageinst several of the members. Referre'd to the Committee of the Fire Department. Tae report of the Cammhtee of the #ire Department torefer resolutio Wrelative to the election of Aesistant to the Pouw ot Foremen oftthat department, was adopted. Several pavers from the Board of Councilmen were re. ceived and referred. VETO PROM THY wrayon, The followimy communication from his honor the Mayor, enclosing an opinion from tks Corporstion Coun. sel respecting tiv want of power of the Board to appotat City Surseyors witout the signature of the Moyor, was read and ordered om file;— Mavon’s Ovriow, New York, April 2, 1855. ‘To rnx Hon. THe HOARD OF AObeRMEN:-» 5 mex eepectfully beg lo 1 psape wave to return hurewith ing in Your Board, appointing John think wdverse criticisms can ve fairly addressed, ‘The errors commited have occurred much more ia the execution of ihe plan thau in the conception 0? it. We regret that at certain times and opportunities a vigorous sttempt waa not made to defeat the rel eving avmy of the enemy: wheiens thie Freach statement admits that we had vo army of odservation at all We skere the universal astonishment at the maouer in which the riege hes been conducted—the ait. mot to cover upwards of 2G miles of works and approachys — the delay which occurred in the first. inetanc: when an aftack was possible—the neglect of all means to anticipate and destroy tbe works of the enemy, ris- ing, an if by magic, before our eyes—and the astovish- ing biinoness which ouffered the Russiaus to oscupy and fortify the Memelon, whicn ia the key of their posit’on, although it is situated 100 yards nearer to the French lines than to theirowa. Thess are some of the causes which have frustrated the siege, all of which may be summed up in one sentence—that the Russians have shown move science, strength, and invention in their mode of defence than the alltet forces in their movle*of a!~ (ack. No coubt, the difficutiies of the besiegers were but so were those of the be- sieged ; ana the highest achievement of the art of war is to taxe advantage of those difficulties for oneself and to turn them to the disadvantage ot the enemy, Agreciog, therefore, in the mein with this French etatement as to the strategical operations of the campaign, we cannot aseent to its defence ef the technival operations of the siege. ‘Fseems, onthe contrary, to have turned out that the allied armzes. are weakest precissly in those scieati fic departments ou which we relied with the greatest confcence; and, having oxhausted the skill of our ea- gineers, it is now ated that the armies have the rescurce of taking the field, We sincerely hope that thie decision, which we have uow strenuously adco- cated for more than a month, hes at last! een taken; but without more energy cf command and vigor of ia vention than have hitherto been shown by the generals it in imyposwiblo to carry on successful warfare. She Manifesto and the Vienna Conference. [Poris (April 11—6 P. M ) Correrpondence of the Times. ] 1 reat event of to-cay in Paris is the article in the Mcniteur, the eense of which I was euabled to giveiaa few worcs yesterday. It will be followed by anotner, equally if bot still more interesting, on the politica, aa this is on the military question. The art'cle is generally attributed, amd I bave some reason to suspect with truth, toM. A. de Laguerroniere, but it bears evidant marks of having been toushed by the hand of. the Km- peror, particularly in the sciectific or technical parts. ‘That the tose of this artic’e is warlike cannot be coubt- €4, but the impression projuced in high polit ters ie, that the plan of military operations bit! Jowed is about to be modified, otherwise the vastness of the uncertaking, as against Sebastopol, aud the saperi- ority of the Russians io position and maderial, would baraly be dwelt onso much. AsT observed yesterday, the Cesire 10 disengage, or rather cover, the. respunii peesible, however, to take position on the river, between the fort which sbut its mouth ard the city, thus to in- tercept the commupications with the sea and to invest the ‘Ts 1s wbat took place under the command of Marshal Lefebvre. Neverthe! although this place was iaclos €4 within our Imes of attack, notwithstanding the vicin- ity of the Emperor Napoleon, who covered the siege with @ DuMmeoVs army, ent ralysed the attempts at relief of Prussia and Russia, the resistance of Danizig was pro- longed for fifty one cays ot open trenches, Subsequent- ly, atter the retreat from Moscow, this city, occupiad by the Frereh, jitulated only after a defence of one year, ands combined attack by land and sea. We migat mul: titly examples, but these will suffice to prove than tbe Anglo Freneb army basdone 1 the Crimea all that could be expected from its courege and the skill of its chiefs. if Jost, a retreat ia good order may be made on Katfa, end rothing is compromised; if it is gained, siege 1s laid to Sebsstopol, which may be completely savested, avd its eurrepcer obtained at the end of a short happily, there counsels were not followed. was that the generals in-chief had not troops suficioat for mabing this lopg course in the Crimea, or that they snticipeted a more specdy result froma baidy and un- expected coup de main, 1! esolution was taken, as is bnown, to disembark at some leagues only from Sobas- topol. The Exposition of Louls Napoleon, [From the London Timer, Apr 1z ‘Tke clear, though elaborate statement of the military operations of the allied armies ia the East, which has Leen published by the French Government ia the Moni- teur, will be hg 4 7. wy ied of had world. Ne in- tense interest, for ‘mpesor o! ie French pays a rot undererved homage to the force and justice of public opinion, by submitting the whole course of a compaign and an expedition not yet concladed to theeri- ticrsm, of France, to the hnowledge of our adversary, and to the judgment of foreign mations. We confess that we ourselves bave perused this remarkabie document of pativfaction, which is increased by the unexpected @iscovery that the strategical opicions ex- ec in this 1 iat — the ogre of 4 jenti im every * save one, the views ontertaine: the French goverpment and its as Our own knowledge of the of the art of war ist, We certainly were quite uncon scious that the very same points were those on which the cabinet of the Tuileries relied for the success of tne per ut, Late 45 18 apt to be the case inthe conduct of militery affairs, many unforeseen dificulties Lave arisen, and the result has not yet been equal to our acrifices and our ne we remais unshaken in our cenviction that the main strat movements of the last campaign were perfectly sound, and that, io ‘act, Bo others could reasonably bave been attempted. Our renders may remember that considerably before the eceloration of wer, and when our fleets ha, goae up to Beicor Bay, inthe winter of 16574, we couviausliy bility ef the Fmperor is mavifest throughout; ani the faults in strategy that have been committed are to be imputed to others than himself. ve may, I suppore, assume it as correct that the ia structions, of which re givon, were really ccmmunicated to Marshal rnaud; they will tell oa rmy, and there is little doubt they are intended to do +0, but it would have completed the idea given of the forethought and judgment of the Emperor if the Mar- shel alive to confirm them. Ihave said tnat the article is consicered as intended to prepare the army and the naticn for the transfer of tho operations to some oiker place, and opinion is merely divided as to the lo- cality. ‘some believe the theatre will be in another part of the Crimes; otbera that the troops will emback and pro- ceed towerca Odessa, and that the war will be carried on in the southern provinces of Huseia, under the direction of the Fmperor himeeif. Iam not aware th on bas come trom Vien ever, that few imdeed expect any good from the con y news.of a kind t> be relied Imay mention, ho: B. Wadsworth oue of the City Scrveyors of this city with- out my signature, ane to refer to oh praying optaio of the Counsel to the Corporation hing the grounds upon whieh my obje ds bi opittion of the cours mon Council have no pi eept ed pomination o: respectfully, nt City Surveyors, ax 6 Commisrtoner of Strout FERNAWDO WOOD, Mayo: Law Devs women, City or New Yoru. Orrios oy Counsen Dean Sim—I have recstved y opinion whether the Co tion of the Street City Surveyors, t ur note requesting my vn Counetl, without the womina. Jommiss'ones, have the right to appoint nd have cho honor to reply : Phe 19th section ot the stended chartér of 1849 authorizes the C mon Council to establish othor tioned in that act; and in p Common Vouneil, by the ge 1849, estebliched the Buresu o* partment of Street Commissioner. Tho he pa ments, by fection 20 of the act of IMY, are ausnoriaed to inate and, by and with the ccisent of the Board of Ald men, to appoint the beads of burtanx. although by th dinance none of the City Surveyors ure denomimated as the heads of the burexux, { them possess tb and ma; therefore, im m, ch ‘are prohibit from transacting any exeoutive businers wha’ approving or rajecting nowination» made to them; and I ain therefore of orinicn that they am ot authorized to ap- Point City Survayers without the nomination of the Street be bureau of City Surveyors not baving d by the ae pposed that the Com- mon Counvit possexs # y, under that portion of All shall, but the provision is no longer in fore Jed by the act of 1861, pege 1,02. pect fully submitted. R. J, DILLON. Hon Frrwanvo Woon, Mayor of New York. 0 WORKS. Alverman Herrick offered the following resolution:~ olved, That) the officers of the Croton Aqueduct De- ry nt are requested to institute an inquiry, and ascor Tumen or superintendents upon the work ‘on the Eighth avenue, who are paid 1 city tr have oxnoted. soli- borers under their charce. a8 a gift or gratuity, or for the purchase of watches or otber testimonials; and thet the oflicers of the Croton Department sre hereby requested to dismiss from their employment any such foreman as shall be pri to have levied, forced loai bscriptions or coutrit to have improperly ceceptsd any gifts of mouey or valuable tokens) from the hands of the poor laboriug men upon that public work, Alderman Herrick said that the rystem should bs put a stop to, and he could state, without meatiouing the name, that the Al’erman of tlle Twentieth werd knew of a similar case to that aliaded to in the resolution, In answer to a call for name, Aliermaa Herrick an- eweree J K. Pali Alderman ©, H. Treker said that he knew of a case where a man bad beew presented by the workmen with a watch valued at $125, but it was given him by ther own volition. Alderman DRAKE said he knew what Alderman Tucker slluded to, but he (Alc. D.) also knew that Alderman C, H. Tucker, with some friends, went into the house of a man on Sunday and orank agin sling, and then came Gown to the Mayor's office aud informed him of the fact. Aléerman C. H Tvcxen could not permit such am as- éertion to pass without pronounciog it false. Aldrman Deaké—I can prove it, and the man that say What 1 etate is false, I pronounce to be a liar. Alderman WaxrwaN came to the reseue by speaking in favor of Mp Hall, and said that ifa present was made to bim, it must wave have been given voluntary by the men urder bis charne Alderman Hereick said thet be knew that men whose faroiiies were quartered in the Almshouse during the wioter, were obliges to pay these superintendents on the public werks $1 eacb on thelr second receipt of vages; that the money was exacted ostensibly to buy. a watch for the superiutendent, and the moment the poor men pay their dollar, they are turned out and new men taken i nd thus the tax is leviedon each new man until the work 1s completed. Alcerman W. Tucker hoped the resolution would pass; Le believed that this system was earried on in ali the de- partmente, snd be thought it would be wel! to pass thie reeolution, and follow it up by similar motions respoct- ing tue other departments. . Alderman Howaxv-would not oppose the resolation, though he could not see what good it coulddo Ae thought they might turn nearer home and make sach inquiries. ‘Alcermn Voorut:—Did you ever get any ? Alderman Howarp—Not the first red cent. There never was any one thought him worth it, though he had kpown & member of the Common Council who received & presentation worth $800 or $1,0(0. ‘The resolution was adopted, THE INSECURITY OF ELDRIDGE STREET PRISON. A communication wast received from Sheriff! Orser, stating that he hac on several occasions called the atten- tion of the Board to the necessity o: mating addi- tional security and alterations in Kidridge #treet jail. ‘The recent escape of two prisoners from that building forced him again to urge the absolute necasaity of mak- ing the prison more secure. Referredto Commitiee on Repairs and Supzlier. VAalRNTINE’S MANUAL. A resclution of the Board of Councilmen, awarding the sum of $1,000 to David T. Valentine, Clerk of the Com- mcn Council, as ® compensation for the masterly per in which he has. edited the New York Manual for the current year—zeflecting the highest credit on the autber, both as a compiler and historian was nanimous- ly concurred in “S4M,’? INDIGNANT, WANTS MORE POWER. Alderman Brices offered the following: — Whereas, The Special Committee has been grossly insulted and their power defied by Wm. MeKellar,, Mr. Matecls chief cler ® e and they aro hereby empowered to investia and cory ranch of the Polics ticn. Alderman Herrick asked was bat? Alderman Bricas—I move its adoption Aldermen Kxity moved that it lay on the table. Alcerman Howakp seconded the mation to lay on the it intended to pass. ble. ‘The motion to lay on the table was put and lost, by a of 12 to 6, Alderman Herrick Tony ee thet after the preamble ir McKellar ought to be re- they ebould insert that “ primanded, and be ashemed of bimeeif.”” (iaughter.) Alcerman Krily hoped that neith-r she resolution nor amendment would be adopted. He had hoped thet. the committee bad gone far enough. H» submitted that Mr. MeKelar bad not offered any. insult to the commit- tee; he hed arewered every question that the committes were empowered by the resolution of tnis Board to.mak, He had only refused to respoud to irrelevant questions, Alderman Herniok 6ai0 be never saw a.commistee #0 ger for power, but he thoaght they had got power enough alreacy. Aloezman k kLLyY moved that the resolation be referred to the Law Committee, Alder Voonnis moved that it be referred tothe ence, or that Russia will yield on the question of . mitation of her force in the Black Sea, or that she will recognize the right of the Powers who re no terwitory ki those thozes to call upon her, who has, to reduce her forces, It is thought certain that France and England will persist ia demanding such imitations, and that on this no concession will be made, When neither party yields, ‘of course the Conference must break up, and there are ople heve who confidently affirm thst 'M. Droayn de ’Huys willbe in Paris on Saturday or Sanday, but aot with ponce, 1 know only of one person of omimence who. inel:nes 10 an opposite opinion, but I do not knor the reason of his holdin, The Turf. UNION COURSE, 1. I. ‘The race announced to take placo yesterday afternoon, between Angeliae, Union, and May Fly, was postponed on account of the weather. At the hoar appointed to stert, a great number of persona were on the ground, and were quite disappointed when it was ascertained that the horses would mot start. A few of the gentle- men present offered to make up # purse for the horses to trek for, rather than return without witnessing a race, The owner of May Fiy wan willing to start, but ‘the otbers refused, A match was made at Woodruff’s yesterday afternoon, between g. g. Mark Maguire, and bay mare Angeline, for $500 aside, to go as they please, three weeks hence. Obituary. Hon. Samuel Sprige, formeriy Governor of Maryland, deo on Prince George’s county on the Zlet inst, agree seven p three years, Almwhoure Committee. (Laughter. ) Alderman KaLLy accepted the amendment, which being put, was lost by a vote of 12 to 6 Alcerman Hexeick’s amendment was put, and lost by a similar vote, The previous question being put, was, carried by a vote of 1) to 7. derman WAKkkM4N moved reconsideration of ‘ne questen, be oid not deem it proper to be on the cords. for bh, #8 & lawyer, would acvies Mr. Mok that he was justified in refusing to seswer thoze evant questions which had been put to him. Motion to recor sider was lost, ORDINANCE RFSPECTING THE SALE OF OYSTERS aaa i offered a venturing tere effect been | ibition of selling oysters @ summer m0! take place ey of ely fastend of ae of , ae ordered @ city ordimence. Adopted, ri Co ae the Board adjournad te the Betore Hon. Ju: ma APRIL 26.—Allen vs. ‘us Vanderit and John heriff —The plaintif! in this caro obtained am ia- pat To against Mr. Vanderbilt, restraining hign from “ porneerion of DoOd in ioe nine wen the co er te pests motion was tnie to dissolve. fhe injunction, The Judge gran order dissolving on the ground that Mr. Vanderbilt pit pumas of the ks (wih tho pale Nn t Pasi papers do not abo & eee yat ronsos ib tor retaicicg the injunction. United States District Court, Before Hon. Judge Hail. Avni, 26.--The Grand Jary, of watch uather C. Carter, Faq., wae foreman, were & rotndy day, for tue trans aceon of baring’e