The New York Herald Newspaper, May 8, 1854, Page 7

-desire no more — THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS. ae Continuation of the History from the Herald of May 7. CHAPTER Il. ench Revolution—Proposed Transfer of Colonies to the United States—Search and Impressment— Retaliatory Order of France—Exception Regard- ing the United States—British Orders Against Neutral Trade with the Enemy—United States Government Upholds the British Claims—People Disagree with the Government—Jay Treaty, 1794— { False Position of the United States—Popular @p- ition—The Cause of Rupture with Franc-—Re- eal of Armed Alliance of Neutrals, 18°°—Great Britain Renounces Rule of 1756 in 1804. In 1792 commenced the great war «nsequent upon he French Revolution, in which x¢arly all of Europe | soon engaged against se republic, Englant vading the coalition. As ia previous wars, France, Holland and Spain were obliged to open their own and those of their colonies to the neutral trade, Breat Britain also conceding great privileges in her n. Atthe outset of the contest, France offered o form with the United States a new treaty of al- nee, which should secure to her the guardianship nd complete monopoly of trade of the French colo- es during the war; but the proposal was declined, bs involving too much danger. The prodycts of the Vest India islands, generally being carried to the Mnited States, were shipped thence in American els, under a drawback of duties, to the North of urope principally. Hamburg and Bremen were the depots whence all Europe was thus supplied ith colonial products. The manufactures of the ‘ontinent, received in exchange, were returned in the same indirect way to the West Indies. Though he vessels of the United States visited all the nds, the two small possessions of Denmark and Bweden, St. Thomas and St. Bartholomews, both free ports, became its leading centres. Beside the Vest India trade, the United States also enjoyed a large carrying trade to and from the Dutch and French possessions beyond the Cape of Good Hope, nd were allowed privileges by England in the trade pf her great monopoly associations, the East India nd Turkey companies; for, 9s we have noticed in e previous wars, Great Britain, though assuming, her enemies, that neutrals could have no le in war not allowed them in peace, was by no means inclined to practice or permit the enforce- ment of her own rule against herself. The im- mense armies raised in Europe, and the consequent neglect of agriculture, created likewise a great de- mand for our own products, so that the whole busi- ness of the United States seemed to be in carrying heir own articles, and those of other parts of the orld, to supply the wants of Europe, and returning he equivalent to those by whom the supply was urnished. The business was of course highly lu crative, and the prospect flattering. Great Britain the only other power that could be said to share he carrying trade with us. Her own commerce ac- tually fnereased very largely during the war, in pite of all the efforts of her adversaries, and our rade'with her decreased, although she gave some vantages to neutral vessels. In the commencement of the war, England re- newed her attacks on the belligerent, through the neutral, by searching the vessels of the latter for enemy’a goods. At the same time, the crews of the meutrals were examined, and those known or mere- ‘ly suspected to.be, or to have been, British seamen, were forcibly taken. Considerable numbers of Brit- ish seamen had, certainly, been lured into our mer- chant service, by the high rate of wages, but the rvast majority of those impressed from our vea- sels, amounting to several thousands in all, up ‘to the war of 1812, appear td have been American born ns, or foreigners adopted from other countries than Britain. The practice so annoying, England plead as her right, and as moreover absolutely neces- ary to the existence of her navy. The French Convention, retaliating the attack mupon French property found in neutral vessels, | adopted an order, May 9, 1793,that their armed veasels should pursue the same course toward British pro- perty in neutral bottoms; but by another order of May 23, they made an exception to this rale, near vy the same in effect as its total repeal, in favor of the vessels of the United States. The French were very friendly to the United States at this time, and hoped they would be induced by this exception, to force Great Britain to respect their neutrality, in favor of French property in their vessels. The ex- ception was also, in effect, an invitation to England to abandon or mitigate her illegal practises. In neither way, was the desired result attained. On the 8th of June, a British order in Council prohibited the carrying, by any party, of flour and meal to the ports of France or to any port occupied by French armies; and onthe 6th November, an- other order, secretly issued, so as to afford a good harvest to operations under it,authorized the capture of all vessels laden with the produce of French co- lonies, or carrying supplies of any kind to those colonies. The almost total destruction of a trade on the part of the United States, fully guaranteed by the law of nations, before allowed by Great Britain, and still encouraged as regarded her own colonies, ‘was the first notification received of this out edict. To give the order more efficacy, United States vessels sailing from British ports were ae to give security to go to a British or neu~ port. Meantime, the perplexity of Washington and his cabinet was extreme. The question was warml debated whether the treaty of alliance of 1778, which bound the United States to assist France, in defensive wars, inthe protection of her West Indies, oe pase fou to Sart be bed ach easy bid cular question, the general polic: of Tag hetirelity was letermined ope, ae etd clamation issued accordingly—an act which was de- nounced by the democratic or French party, as ille- galand dishonorable inthe extreme. (enet, the violent French Ambassador, endeavored to involve us in the war, although his government proposed to than that we should make our neu- tral rights respected. He commissioned privateers to sail from our ports against British commerce; but on complaint of the English government the prac- tice was promptly repressed by Washington, and com was afterwards given by our govern- ment for the captures so made. Genet remonstrated against the neglect of the administration to uphold dignity of its flag, and to protect Freach pro- rty in United States vessels—a point on waich he eet of the people certainly did not concur with government. The answer returned was that the custom of search upon neutrals, and seizure of enemy's property,was according tothe old and esta- Dlished ‘law of nations, and that Great Britain had never assented to the demands of the Armed Neutra- lity. Sosingular a doctrine, uttered by an American Secretary, exhibits the extreme timidity of the admin- istration. Firm and consistent, almost to temerity in all home concerns, the conduct of Washington Presidency, in regard to all outward relations, was weak and vascillating to the last degree. The weak- ness of the country neither required nor justified a course which only aggravated the dangers of a weak condition. The principles enunciated in 1793 were such as it was ge either government or peo- le could abide by, and it was only a few mouths a same adit tin od up ic ieee e antagonistic policy of an em! e reply of the astounded Genet to the commanication con- eying to him the new American doctrine—for it re- versed all our former sentiment and ice—was not fabs Boe erg which is scarcely matter of ‘won It been customary to abuse this mis- sive and its author rather too ingly oi Our historians see nothing but the indignity to the gov- ernment. The letter was ne jaent, and not unreasonable with all its severity, and not inaptly illustrated the true policy of the at ‘The high-handed outrage of the British order of November 6, and the practices thereunder enforced, excited the utmost indignation among the people o! the United States. All parties were united in the demand for retaliation. A sentiment so unanimous and spontaneous in the masees was better than the morbidly cautious conclusions of the administration, and should have been fully responded to in official action. Jefferson, in March, 1794, laid before Con- grees a report specifying the causes of complaint ainst all the belligerents. The complaint against wiand was virtually for extending the right of search and reizure, from goods contraband of war to is not contraband, and to persons. France had offended in a lesser degree, in her procee lings agninst British property found in American vessels, the exception in favor of American vessels havin, ‘been withdrawn, upon the prohibition by Haglan of the carriage of French goods in United States vessels, and the submissive attitude assumed by our mment. An embargo on our vessels b false been laid in the portsof Frauce. So our timid policy between two had placed we were also complaints against Spain and Holland, | fe flo a parla g share in a prey ob- | tained without expense or danger. The House of Representatives was well disposed to second the wishes of the A papoose was made, but not » British | roperty in the United States sul to confisca- ion, 28 indemmity, if not othe made, to our | merchants, Madison bg aes resolutions suspend- | ing all intercourse with Great Britain, which passed | the Howse by the large majority of twenty, but being ¢ied in the Senate, were defeated by the cast- | ing vote of John Adams, the Vice President. The ereantile community and the public at large would | we fully sanctioned the extreme measure of war, for which a party was exceedingly clamorous, | The President was finally authorized to lay an em- bargo on all British vessels in the United States, | which he did, accordingly, wy proclamation, March 24, to continue for thirt: 7 only, and sent Mr. Jay to England on a mi sion of peace, whieh, unless with very considerable sacrifice on our part, was a hopeless attempt. His arrival was hailed by the British merchants Sipeaed in trade with the United States and West Indies, who had become exceed- ingly alarmed by the operations under the order of November 6, expecting nothing less than an im- mediate declaration of war, and the commission of | a host of privateers against their commerce. France, on learning the mission of Jay, renewed its order excepting United States vessels from the | search for British goods, thus again offer induce- | ments to the United States to insist upon its rights | in the negotiation, and to Great Britain to recede from her ground. The four neutrals on the continent were, at this | time, rather slow about resisting the assumptions of | | the belligerents, as they were less affected than the United States, and were, besides, ssnersliy indis- posed, of course, to favor France, upholding as she was the cause of republicanism in Europe. In March, 1794, however, the Kings of Sweden and Denmark renewed by treaty the armed alliance of neutrals, on the same principles as the former one, <zoert that the Baltic was declared totally inac- ceasible to belligerent armed vessels. But these minor powers needed the strength of Russia. What Russia demanded of them previously to the opening | of the present war was, we ager the reiteration of this same principle of the inviolability of the Baltic waters against any outward armed vessels. The Jay treaty was signed November 19, 1794. Acknowledging she had committed some irregu- larities, unavoidable in such a war, Britain be ace to compensate our merchants for illegal captures, meaning those contrary to, not those under, the obnoxious orders. She justified those, and so did we. For what she admitted illegal seizures, we finally received about seven millions of dollars. The United States agreed, also, to pay for the Genet caL ree. “ Reciprocity and perfect liberty of navi- | gation and commerce were stipulated, but the agree- ment was trebly annihilated—once, by an indirect but complete acknowledgment that our ships should be liable to search for property of the enemies of England, which might be taken from them, she graciously consenting, in such case, not to take our property also found in our vessels. On the other hee her own doctrines would not answer for ap- lication against her. Oh, no! Prizes made ‘by ritish vessels were to be carried where the captors pleased, entirely free of search. The second nullifi- cation of the free navigation proviso was by a sin- gular definition of the contrabandism of war. Not content with specifying the usual articles—arms and implements of war, gunpowder, match, saltpetre, horses and horse furniture—the list is stretched to embrace timber for ship-building, tar, rosin, copper in sheets, sails, hemp, cordage, and all other arti- cles which may be used for the equipment of vessels, except unwrought iron and fir plank. Any of these articles found going to any enemy’s port are subject to confiscation! This is not ‘ovisions and other articles not usually considered contraband, may come, in particular cases to be considered such, jay be thereupon seized, though not, indeed, Sachacaied, but paid for speedily in their full value, with reasonable mercantile profit and demurrage; Which is simply to say, the trade. of the United States shall carried wherever England directs, and nowhere else! Did ever treaty before contain such definition of contraban ? The third anti-free navigation proviso consisted in the subjec- tion of the United States to a perfect respect for English blockade, the peculiarities of which system were, that not fortified ports, simply, but any length of continuous coast was put under meee upon paper, without a ship ent to enforce the block- ade, vessels disre; ing it being liable to subse- quent seizure. In regard to privateering, it should not be allowed, we agreed, in any shape, against England, from our pats, nor would we even buy the goods taken by er enemies’ cruisers. No commercial advant were given to remu- nerate these very ext concessions. procity of duties ‘on in their mutual trade was stipulated, m that we should pay the same duties in England as English subjects, and they the same duties in the United States as Ameri- can citizene—their tariff rates being very high, ours almost nominal. Spite, too, of her own doctrines, England would concede to us no such privileges in her trade for peace, as she found it convenient to allow in war. She would it us to send our be duce to her helpless islands, we giving her ships equal advantages in the co to and fro with our own, on condition that we should not export the produce brought from the West Indies to any part of the world. But the identical export thus inter- dicted, was what had ave been the leading ob- ject of our merchants. privil of even this jpered trade, was to be restri vessels of not over seventy tons, and to last for two years only after the conclusion of the war. This curious West India stipulation, being the twelfth article of the treaty, was. pen en masse by the United States. Cur trade to the British East Indies was limited to the direct voyage, and otherwise curtailed. By this treaty the United States completely aban- doned the true ground upon which she had started as anation. Our Declaration of Independence, the Arti- cleg of Confederation, the constitution and the few laws enacted under its authority, completely repudi- ated the venerable abuses of the European systems. We stood upon new and anomalous principles. Com- merce, instead of being burdened here by prohibi- tions, restrictions, taxes, stamps, excises, or held by overgrown monopolies, was free as the air. To the musty code called international law, framed upon monarchical ideas, and to subgerve monarchical in- terests, we were in no wise amenable. The French republic spurned it; 80 we should have done, instead of respectfully referring to its authority, as our offi- cials did, in su; a invasion of French and American Dane. rights and proprieties of our position were doubly enforced by our geographi- cal Trolation, and by character of our govern- ment and le. What a glorious start for a com- mercial people! And how easily might the advan- tage have been conserved! We had but to set forth our position in its true see gee and Ce A we needed but to tell the world that we, offering all the same immunities claimed for ourselves, meant to enjoy in ite fullest sense our naturat right of free trade. "If, in so doing, we should interfere with the supposed interests of others, it was the fault not of our position, but theirs—not of natural methods, but of human passions. Our object is 5; and while other nations consider themselves and us at peace, we shall not submit to a disguised war upon our interests by one nation, nor consent to be forced ourselves into ‘a state of negative hostility against another. If one nation will make war upon another, it must doso upon its own strength, and not by seek- ing to reduce its a through a general Peabo fn the day of our utmost weakness, such a decla- ration would haye been respected. Overlooking their dislike of republicanism, two-thirds, if not all, of the Continental Powers would have given a most willin; sanction to that principle of non-interference wit the affairs of others, the contempt of which in regard to the continent, was their great occasion of hos- tility with the particular republicanism of France, and of the long disre; of which in European olitics, they were quite tired. Beyond England, Indeed, thers was not a power which did not desire to see the rights of neutrality established uj the broadest basis, But if Burope would not yield, why, then, it was better to go to war for our principle than to sacrifice it. This principle was the essence of independence, and without it, we were, as the French always told us, in abject servitude. It was, then, to be seen whether we should be independent in reality, or reduced back to full colonial depend- ence, a condition far better, in its worst aspect, than guasi nationality with practical dependence. And if the price of a fall national existence was, to be driven from the ocean, it was better to accept the condition, and turn all our efforts inwardly, than to use the indulgence of a wretched trade and de; flag under the surveillance of an ocean-tyrant. Hut the truth is, that at that time none of our statesmen seem to have comprehended the true posi- tion of the United States. They were not aware of the extent to which the revolutionary doctrines really eeparated them from inh and were too anxious to secure European favor by conforming as far as they could to eh we systems and preju- dices, and assuring the Old World that the change had not been so great, after all. They were nervous in the idea of being associated in the European mind with the French destructives. Even Mr. Jefferson, whose renovating doctrines were more radical, and his general ideas of the real nature of the Revolu- tion more comprehensive than those of any other of our statesmen of that time, failed to recognise our reel position, or, with his time-serving spirit, was corte to take it in its full extent as the basis of his olitics. “f The grand error of the Jay treaty was thus per- petrated. Thenceforth, we became amenable again to the false maxims before repudiated—tiable to be a party now in the numberless contentions arising out of them—to be subjected to injurious regula- tions on all sides; and, iu order to escay ve- niences mace legitimate by our consent, to be forced into “entangling elliances.” It was now impossable to escape the mesh of European polities, ‘These * The stipulations about contrabendism search, the surrender of her encmy’s property, the dis- of peutrals, generally, while alte: | not yet fail to | our vessels by the Directory. The consequences of | gether to the benefit of England, without the shadow of possible advant to the United States, could further difficulties with other powers, and even with England herself. The very | delicate arrangements about our policy toward her | enemies, (and we should never have known any | power as the enemy of another,) were liable to oc- | casion perpetual misunderstanding, either from acci- | dental or unconscious infringements, or from varying rules of interpretation. Ony pusillanimity also en- couraged her to further encroachments, and invited others to imitate her example. We incurred the guilt and danger of bad faith in breaking the treaty of 1778, to which we yet rigorously held France, in which we Soemeusied. pasrection to French pro- perty in our vessels, e ineurred justly her dis- pleasure, and suffered the natural result, in the re- vival against us of the decree of search for British property, and in the seizure and condemnation of | a false position were felt’ at every step. We got more and more involved in the web of European difficulties, and, standing on their ground, had to use their tactics. Nothing but another war, a “second struggle of independence,” could relieve us, and that was inevitable from the day the Jay document of renewed vassalage was ratified. It is certain that no public measure on the part of our government was ever so unpopular with the people as this treaty. Unbiassed by the doubts and tremors which agitated the administration, their quick appreciation of the real results of this docu- ment condemned it, in the settled convictions of two- thirds, perhaps a much ter proportion yet of the American people. Indeed, alarm and indi na tion at the surrender of our undeniable ri, fh . seemed to be almost a universal sentiment. Meet- ings against it commenced in Boston, where the ad- ministration was in peatisniae favor, and where: it was never, on any other occasion, disagreed from, and spreading to all other cities and chief towns, even to the villages, rolled up a tremendous weight of public opinion to the capital. Jeffer- son led the Steet attacking the treaty with all the weight of his forcible invective, us crouching, submissive and incomplete. The Repre- sentatives shared the full sentiment of the people. Positive friends, the treaty could be said to have none. Its warmest advocates could hardly favor it but as a cheice of evils. The surrender of the north- west posts was a grand salvo to our wounded pride. Anxious as he was for , Washington hesitate1 much ere he decided in favor of the treaty. His in fluence, alone, carried it through the Senate, and was barely able to effect that resujt. Such a mill- stone would have sunk the administration of any other man to the lowest depth of political per- dition, The truth is, Washington was not in the habit of apa ee largely the commercial as- pect of our politics. His policy looked rather in- ward. A race for supremacy on the ocean was not within the range of his views. Though wishing to secure the esteem of other nations, le was not par- ticularly anxious to enforce their respect. It is true, he did (reed advance the nation in the eyes of the world; but this was owing, inferiorly, to his estab- lishing a government of order out of apparent chaos, and superiorly, to the payment of our ee foreign debt, and the extrication of the new government from a slough of financial embarrassment. In point of respect to our tenacity of rights, and energy in repelling encroachment, we had most decidedly lost ee in that administration. The government ad acquired abroad a character for imbecility, which was supposed to be an inherent vice of the system, which if so conspicuous under a head like yashington, must leave it perpetually defenceless against all outward attack. Between 1795 and 1797, France disjoined from the alliance against her, and after a brief neutrality united to her own cause, Holland, Spain and the Italian States. Prussia and some minor German States became neutral, and the Emperor of German’ signified his desire to resume the same position. It was certain that the Republic would not be humili- ated, and as sure that our course would be the occa- sion of more trouble yet. In September, 1795, Adet, the successor of Genet, and a man of milder spirit, presented to our govern- ment, in anticipation of the ratification of the Jay treaty, a remonstrance, insisting on the mutual du- ties of neutrality. His position was impregnable. Of what account was it to France to consider the United States friendly or neutral, if she did not maintain a neutral’s rights?) Why should she wish the Privilege to embark her property in vessels of the United States, when these sunk from the rank of the safest to that of the least safe of all modes of carriage? United States vessels were bound, when- ever met with French property by British armed veseels, to give it up without the slightest attempt at defence. French vessels were free to fight for either their own or for any American goods on board, according to the treaty set aside by the United States. Adet’s communication was unan- swered. He made several other appeals during the year 1796, and after a year’s effort, was ‘at last, in November, honored with areply. Mr. Pickering, the Secretary of State, succeeding Jefferson and Randolph, who had retired chiefly on account of their non-agreement with the foreign peticy, of the administration, in his answers acknowledged that the Shige Cet 1778 did expressly stipulate that free bottoms Id make free goods; that, therefore, we were at perfect liberty to carry British goods without any French interference. But this was not to be taken as a rule, altho per force, a genial rule. "The ‘great, ohject of ths r force, a gen 5 ol of the ry peion that other stipulation was in the ties would q it, and that be found to ipon against their claims it must be upheld by the united force of the two countries. But, says Mr. Pickering, this stipulation is ‘an exception to the universal rule;” so that though French vessels may not touch British property on of American vessels, British eemsela may oer take French Property 80 found. The treaty of 1778 is simply a disqualifica- tion of France to uphold her rights, and we ng nanimously enforce the sacrifice. We discover the intangible and code, denominated of na- tions, a law-paramount overriding the soleran cove- nants of nations with each other; but we discover, also, that it nullifies only a part of such Ack relieves us of the performance of our stipulated e! gagement, but it leaves the other party fully bound totheir part of the contract. Certainly this was very crooked reasoning for a gallant and fair- minded soldier. France, and the countries in alliance with her, were endeavoring now to shut out British goods from the continent and from their colonies. A prohibition made by Spain, in 1797, frustrated a number of American voyages from England to Cuba. March 2d, 1797, ice ordered the seizure of all neutrals having British goods on board, the goods to be condemned, the vessels paid freight and demurrage, and released. This code to be re- pealed as soon as French property in neutral ves- sels should be protected by the neutral or respected by the belligerent. There was very littleseverity against neutrals in this decree compared with the a Bay England, which it was designed to re- iate. In February of the year 1797,.England effected a commercial treaty with Russia. Trade witheach other's enemies was fully guarantied, the only ar- ticles contraband of war being warlike instruments. So, Great Britain had not, after all, one system at one time in regard to neutral subordination. She was very mild to Russia, because Russia would not yield to what the United States had accepted. Compare the above lone exception to the complete freedom of trade, with the bloated dimensions of contra- bandism in our treaty! Yet, if we mistake not, the Jay treaty promised us equal privileges with the most favored nations. Did, then, the definition of contrabandism given to Russia, supplant that ac- corded to us? No. Now came farther fruits of the Jay capitulation. Incensed by our willingness to derive profit from the sacrifice of her rights, and our virtual alliance with England, as a disguised belligerent, the French Council of Five Hundred, in January, 1793, proceed- ed to the extremfty of ordering the ‘seizure and con- fiscation of any vessel containing any article of Brit- ish produce or manufacture. Under this and other decrees, we paid for our bad faith to France, in the amount of six hundred and fifteen vessels and cargoes sapere prior to 1800. Victorious on the continent they had determined to force the United States from its false position, or to overbalance all the advantage that was hoped therefrom. The con- tingency of resistance they did not contemplate. If the United States crouched so abjectly before Britain, the would not invoke the hostility of France, triam- phant against combined Europe. There was no fear in insulting the United States. Our envoys were re~ jected, and were told that even the privilege of nego- tiation must now be purchased by the loan of about $6,000,000, besides a douceur of $250,000 for the indi- vidual use of Monsieur Talleyrand. As a farther per- suasion, it was added, that Austria having just been humiliated, England would soon be crushed, and then we migbt expect the same fate. Of course, this line of affairs pleased England, and she actually encou- raged us onward with the hope of her protection. To guard a fleet of our merchantmen sailing from England, with British merchandise, in 1798, she acta- ally sent a ship of the line and two frigates to convoy them to the coast of the United States! Thus did the wolf become the protector of the lamb. To recede from the ground we hod takes, would have been war with England, and a fresh violation of fai The people discerning where the line of forbear- ance due on account of our own injustice, terminated, sustained the government zealously in repelling what was aggressive in the course of France. The Irene’, party was thrown into a powerless winority. Jif ferson complained of being pushed from the fire round of public faver completely into the s).ade. Jad this crisis beem deferred to tl period of the next Presidential contest, it would have secured John Adams a triumphant re-election. Bef ore 1800, it had passed, and the re-action occuried, The French were surprised at the sudden turn, of onr gov- ernment; they wanted no war with th’ country, to which they were really greatly attached. They only Tegretted that we had not shown fn equal spirit to- ward England. The treaty of Paris, under pre- mier-consulship of Napoleon, ‘was signed September 8, 10 9 compensation for illegal | the other Ne Seeman eRe Se ptures 4 the Principle was re- | eT iat ee tet the frecdom ot merchandise,” pting contraband , 2048, Which should inelide only warlike aud milly, FY stores. the injurious decrees were repealed. The encroachments of Englund having Tetely somewhat annoyed the commerce of the Nor. ‘2 Powers, ly of Sweden, the Emperor of Ra * sia and King of Sweden,in August, 1800, notified xn courts of their intention “to restore, in its full independence, the general right of all nations to convey their ships and merchandise fieely, without being subject to the control of the powers at war.” mber these two powers com- pleted theirconvention reviving the Armed Neutrali- ty, on essentially the same principles as those of 1780. ‘The right of search was denied, and contraband oods limited toarms, ammunition and horse furni- ure. This convention was to be the basis of a sys- tem for the protection of all the neutral nations’ of Europe, who were invited to become members of the league. Denmark and Prussia, the other Baltic powers, readily acceded to the confederation. A fewmonths after this, the treaty of Amiens puta period to the war. In the course of the same year,1801, the British ministry, reversing its previous claims and practices, declared,and the Admirality decided in full confcrmity, that neutrals did possess the privilege of imps to their respective countries the pro- duce of a y belonging to an enemy of Britain, and of their peering: it tothe enemy herself. Thus the war closed with a retraction of the princi- ple with which it had been opened—a principle, in- eed, quite as often retracted as asserted by England—and the government and mercantile popu- lation of the United States flattered themselves that a great cause of mischief was forever removed. CHAPTER Iv. ‘The Great War of Napoleon, 1803-15—United States, the Carriers of Europe—Moderation of the British at First —Neutral Trade Denounced in 1805 as ‘‘ War in Dis- guise,” and Atiacked—Great Paper Blockade of her Enemies! Coasis—Berlin Decree—Our Natural Aitianc with Napoleon—Madison’s Review of English Preten- sion:—Monroe Treaty—British Orders in Council Against Neutrals, 1807—~Chesapeake Affair—Napoleon Extends his System\(o all Neutrals—Portugal Repudiates It— War Upon Her~England Keeps Open the Baltic—Milan De- cree—Embargo Laid by the United States. After a mere breathing time, the bloody banner was again, in July 1803, unfurled, and the war con- tinued to extend until, besides the great arch ene- mies, were successively involved, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Portugal, the lesser German States, and even Denmark and Sweden. Nota single neutral was left in Christian Europe. The Mussulman, now enjoying his share of the luxury, took his very lonesome siesta, unable to comprehend the cause of the commotion, and swore by the beard of the Prophet that it would be dangerous for him to venture into the ring. At the outset, when the belligerents were few, and the neutrals many, Engjand, with the old desires in her heart, but the fearof an armed neutrality—a vision that had twice disturbed her in her mind— put forth her claims with regard to search and seizure with much moderation and respect for the rights of neutrality. No more trouble, thought the self-gratulating traders and politicians of the United States. Send out your hips, all you have, and build as fast as you can. This isa great war, and you will have a great deal of carrying to do in con- sequence of it. As of former times Europe must receive her colonial produce, and return her manu- factures to the colonies, and we shall have the greater part of that business to perform. It was so. We became almost the entire carriers for France, Holland, and Spain. Our own produce was in great demand also, not only in all the West India Islands, but in different countries of Euzope, and, as the war progrepsed the demand increased. We were getting rich, there was no mistake. We should soon be very rich ifthe ability of Europe to purchase should continue; and we believed the British principle of 1801, or as Mr. Pickering would have called it, the “exception to a universal rule,” was to last for- ever. It was on that precise point we were mistaken. The principle was but a relaxation of another princi- ple, which it contradicted, however, full and plump. What one principle called black the other principle assumed to be white. But black and white being both colors, one principle was as good as the other. So, of a sudden, when Rurope had got pretty well entangled, and neutral consequence was becoming “small by degrees and beautifully less,” and when the neutrals left in Europe had become pretty thoroughly impressed with the dread of Napoleon's terrific progress toward continental dominion, the sharpened optics of England made a dis- covery. The trade of the United States af- forded assistance to her enemies, therefore the trade of the Ugited States, or rather neutral trade, was nothing more nor less than “ War in Disguise.” Certainly her practice should have made: her some judge of war in disguise, and certain it is, she did her- self resort immediately to a real war in disguise, in the suppression of the assumed one. It was suddenly | in the early part of 1805, that the oft-entombed and oft-resurrected rule of seventeen hundred and fifty- six was vomited from its grave, as a fit spirit to in- tensify the horrors of the general confusion, and to | hasten the acme of the worst confounded. | It came in the same mode in which a fox is accus- tomed to introduce his presence in the midst of an | unsuspecting barnyard community—as suddenly as | possible; and, of course, its appearance created quite a censation, asin the parallel case. There was great surprise on American quarter-decks, and great | consternation in American counting rooms, and | every body was soon convinced that a very material change had occurred in our prospects. We should | in 1804. It had suited so well the British government, that it was ready overtures for its renewal, ended, Jefferson, sure of the popular support, with- out which he was the last man to move a hair's breadth—for the popular breath was all the political animation he ever sed, active thinker as he wae—thus assured, plainly and decidedly rejected the overture. That was a more dafigerous step than it yy, ould have been for Washington to reject it, origi- nap Vs for it is harder to get out of a false position, | oneé ,“0Ur foot is in, than to leap out before you are there. But had Jefferson not repudiated the mistake of Wasa, "eton, he would have merely left the 9 some other, 94 Overboard, eventually, it wou to go. ’ In April, 1596, asa colleag.1¢ with England, in ‘be attentvt to settle the din negotiation, s wpending meanwhile the aut act of non-inter course. . In May, the Br ‘tish order im council was issy declaring’ the en ie coast, from Brest to river Elbe, in a iwtate of blockade. A sli privilege was allowed to neutrals, of continu- ing their trade at 2 particular point of the in- terdicted coast, if not ooming from or return- ing toan enemy. Napoleor, baving humble: sia by the battle of Jena f the famous Berlin decree, the fire# in the his continental system retaliatory of the ab: order, It declared the entire kingdom of G Britain in blockade, and prohibited at trade, by any parties, thither. No vessel from England or her colonies direct, should be admitted to the continent. This decree to exist in force until Englaad should acknowledge the same restrictions to govern the rights of war upon land and sea, and withhold war from private property and persons not military, and until her blockades were limited to fortified places and invested with & prone force. This measure of Napoleon was indeed, abstractly, as extraordinary a violation of the rights of nations as that of Hng- land. But, if not justified absolutely, it was at least greatly palliated, by the fact that England had be- gun tl ost barbarous departure from the prac- tices o' nary warfare, and that law of nations she 80 hi, respected, but like others obeyed only when it was convenient. She had attacked the universal liberties of mankind, and the cause of Napoleon became, therefore, to the extent of resist- ing these encroachments, the cause of all nations. On that ground he based his acts, as not violative of previous treaties between France and other jie and solicited the united support of the civi- ized world. Several allied powers at once adopted his scheme, and he was finally supported in his effort by France, Spain, Holland, Prussia, Russia—by the force of the Continent in fuct. Some of them, it is true, came into the sys- tem through fear, and felt anything but sympathy for its author; yet, apart from the overshadowing terror of the name of Napoleon, there could not have been a power upon the Continent which would not have heartily wished his effort success. ‘Io have i as against the assumptions of and merely, would have been an act of national suicide. The people of the United that many believed it would be ineffec have at first little to say inst it,as it was not put in force against them, in the expectation that their government would cause its neutral rights to | be respected by England. Jefferson hin: pathized most fully with the effort. Solicitous in the extreme for peace with England, but determined yet to sacrifice none of our rights while sensible of the weakness of the government, he saw in the suc- d have defierson despatched Mr Monroe, the Minister nities by thorized of the to make, itsett, proposing that it should be continued until two years after the war should be t to | italy, Austria, | our domestic system of import and export, the inse curity, to say the least, on a vital point, and the sanction thus given to the Jay preces with the probabilit: of the treaty beii poleon,and the adv: acting cur just dem: resuming our true pe that Mr. Jefferson mad neceptance of the treaty m' have no faith that it woul to which the course ‘ying on the coasting or irom trade with any sh England was herself de- intercourse. That fs, you shall trade oaly — if Tam shut out, so shall you bes June, occurred the affair of the Ches- te, the unauthorized extension by a of the right of search and impress- i vessel. The amende honorable, | by « rensation, was promptly offered; and seeing the auxiety to have it Jettied, Jefferson | linked it with the other affairs, about which there was less eagerness on their part, and refused to to any terms but those which conceded all ovr claims at once. led, however, | and Madison afterwards accepted the separate com- | pensation for the Ch outrage. In October, a proclamation of the British was issued, ordering a general search for pan a | subjects in foreign vessels, and their impressment wherever found. Jealous of the exception made of the United States by Napoleon, from the operation of the Berlin decree, the British government issued an order, on November 11, 1807, declaring the ports of France aad her allies and of their colonies, and of all places from which Great Britain was excluded, in a state of blockade, and that neither should any trade be allowed to or from them, nor any vom- merce in their productions, except sach as might be carried on by England and her con‘ederates. On the 25th November appeared an order oxpla- natory of the erder of November 11, permitting putral trade to the places interdicted, on condition vessels first entering a British port, paying duty there, and obtaining a license, This made to exceed what would be often the the cargo, though the retaliatory actions of France and America nultified its operation, In the summer of 1807 Napoleon was busied im ng the Coutinent into the support of his un- 1 system enunciated in the Berlin decree. ely under his control havi d to put it in force, and some profe | joining, it was decided in September | the system should be extended toall neutral powers, as its object was to enforce the rights of neutrals. Portugal, under the influence of her old ally, Eng land, refused accession, and in October war was de~ clared against her therefor, and her terri | the reigning Prince flying to Brazil the kingdom afresh on that broad anticipate him in Denmark, England sei: | Danish et, and thus kept open the Baltic and | north of Europe to her trade. On that account, al- | though the United States had as yet failed to answer ctation of protecting its neutral rights, and ench interests therein involved, the decree as still left unenforced against them, as its opera- tion, so long as England had the freedom of the | Baltic region, would be but to give its whole trade to that power. So the United States was allowed to | share it with her. By the treaty of Tilsit, in July, } neuti cess of Napoleon’s policy of distressing England | Prussia and Russia had become Napoleon's allies, into terms, the grand and only means of accom- | and, by a secret article, it is said, were bound to the plishing his own object. His whole course was | support of the continental system. afterward shaped to the affording such indirect aid | i December, Napoleon issued from Milan, in to Napoleon, on this point, as might yet not involve | Italy, his celebrated decree retaliatory of the British us in the war of material forces. Ina case where | orders in council of November. It repeated and ex- the interests involved were such, and the antagonist | tended the grounds of the Berlin dec prohibiting such, we cannot see that there was impropriety or | all trade, by any country, with Great Britain, or her bad policy in seeking to gain our end through the | allies or tolontes. All vessels su itting to search check of forces already opposed, or that to the by British force, entering a British port, or paying extent in which our interest. was involy- | any duty to the British government re (raterstay es- ed, an alliance, direct or indirect, with the | pecially to the order of November 21,) ‘werk deslereal party whose success would have been our own, was | to be denationalised, and to be Hable to capture as | deemed safe on the one hand, and necessary. never get very rich under a system like this. England was not just now much afraid of war on | the part of the United States. She knew the navy | raized by John Adams against France had been dis- | mantled by Tom Jefferson, whose. reforming zeal had substituted the brilliant device of a national de- fence by dry docks and gun-boats. She had herself attained complete centro! of the ocean, having an- | néhjlated the combined navies of France and Spain, | 2: d knew she could easily drive. back er extirpate | the swarms of United States privateers, should they | venture to issue forth against her commerce. As | she had perfected a system of blockades without | ships, she could spare as large a portion of. her fleet | from Enzope as would be necessary for any opera- | tions against the United States. They could gain no | assistance from the French, whose career of victory on the land could not compensate the loss of the ocean. The remembrance of former submissions, too, encouraged her, and as Washington and | the stern Adams had quailed before her, she felt very little respect for the martial spirit of the philosopher ef Monticello, She was yet more emboldexed by the consiileration | that with her the war wasa struggle for existence— Napoleon's success xould be ber destruction. She hoped, by (so es ad all, trade with the countries | alk d with Nap , or in subjectioa to him, to oc casion such distrees as shoud disjoia them from his: not entirely justifiable. To have thrown the force exercised by Napoleon in our favor, whatever we thought of his ulterior objects, out of account, | would have been egregious folly. The pinion of England’s bonds by Napoleon was, in fact, the only leverage by which we could raise a claim of ours even | to the attention of England. We seemed, indeed, to | do some things apart from France: we sent ambas- | sadors to arrange the form of a treaty between us | and England. But what was the real basis of that negotiation? Napoleon’s armies on the Continent. England, finally, drove us to war. Nobody can imagine, though some talked of including both | France and England in the manifesto of hostilities; and we had abundant reason, too, to complain of | the ‘injuries of the former—that we would ever have ventured upon that contest, except that the broad shield of the giant was sure to catch near; all of the blows dealt by the common antagonist. The strength of Napoleon was our own marrow, and we but talked of doing things in opposition to or in disjunction from him. The fall of Napoleon made this fact so sensible to our government, that, in spite of all the achievements of our army, and particularly of our pet navy—which were, 4 eed, most creditable—it set about, in trembling anxiety, to secure any sort of a peace which should not sur- render more than England had claimed before. But Mr. Jefferson, though disposed to make use of the ratural aid derived against our enemy, through Napoleon's “tools an’ the. Begiish ‘party, dubbd fa ix »” 88 al him, unless they were natural tools. Belt’ was too much the Sse of Tom Jefferson, in every act of his political life, for him to play second part to: an} man. Why, though he ed not array himsi against Washington pele Aca he contrived. to start a party in opposition to olicy, at the very outset of administration. Where there was another road he would not even follow in the track of another man, lest the other should lessen. his own credit. He used Napoleon, or attempted to do- so, as much as Napoleon wished to use him, and. went just so far in seconding the aims of the despot as was to: se- cure his particular regard for our interests on. the other. He understood well, and abhorred, the ulti- mate objects of Napoleon.. Every instinct of his democratic nature revolted from the idea of a uni- | versal monarchy; and the contempt with which he regarded the fame of the warrior extended to. the | French Emperor, as the chief murderer on the | bloody list of heroes. | Meanwhile, the negotiation was dragging ite slow length along, embarrassed with all manner. of. diffi- culties. ¢ demands made by Jefferson were broad and in a really national spirit. The right of search and impressment must be expressly renoanc- ed, the new theory of blockades abandoned, and no restrictions left upon our commerce, except as re- gards the usual contraband of war. Our.tlag would thus practically become what Napoleon justly re- garded the ensign ofevery nation on the sea—an ex- tension of its territory, proclaiming wherever float- ing, the authority supreme over all. beneath it. While the negotiators were sweating through their embarrassments, the Secretary of State, Mr. Madison, in the summer of 1806. wrote an examination of the British doctrines relating to neutral trade. No man was better able to refate the sophistries of the an- tagonist cabinet than this great and.pure states- man. Of the work, his admirer, Quincy Adams, : “It will hereafter be considered a standard treatise on the law of nations, not inferior to the works of any writer upon those subjects since the days of Grotius. ‘There is, indeed, in all the diplo- | matic papers of American statesmen, justly cele- brated as they have been, nothing superior to this | dissertation. ‘Lhe Monroe treaty was finally campleted and sign- ed, December 30,1806. So fan as itwent it was mainly satisfactory, though not what we had a right to denand. Bat its provisions generally were infinitely superior to the terms of the Jay treaty. ide propert® of the citizens of the United States, indirestly to the colony of any enemy of Great Britaia, the net duty paid in the United States, after the drawback, to amount to at least one per cent ad valorem. In the same way the colonial nzo- ducts might be transmitted to any part of Eurape, cause. Being the sole mistress of the sea, she conr | poying at least two per centnet duty after drawpack eeived the id idea, also, of mono commerce of the-world, farcing even the enemy to open his ports and colgnies to her ships. was the extent af her arzogance. q | concession was warding. Beside the total interdiction of our trade with the French —colonias, without any y vious not and the immediate ° tice of impressreent ffom~ our vessels had been eta Camee from the commencemont of the war. ‘1 March 1, 1803, and August, 1504, there were 1,232 applications for the release of Amer- ican citizenry, thus kidnapped. The Américan people—it was they, not parties, which ™o"ved--exasperated at the audacity of these wrong, called vehemently upon the government for redreste The general cry was, let there be war. ‘The ¢ities, the mercantile or British class directing theit ‘sentiment, it was which took the lead in this poptwar movement. Jongress went as far as it dared. That hedy felt ‘never more patriotic, but war, under the cirenmstan- ces, it felt, and the administration felt most sensilly of all, would be very injudicious—in fact, decided medness. The Senate, therefore, unanimously re- solved that the course of Great Britain was an unpro- voked how and anencroachmeyt upon our na- tional Independence, and requested the President, moreover, by twenty resolute to ix timid Senators, to dcmand—that was the word—to thunder in the ear of Britatn a deraand for restoration or indemnity. Variovs proposals were also made in both houses for aud anact of the former character was finally adopt- ed; but the members wero induced to leave the mat- terto the management of the exccutive, wift felt de- irons to t effect of iation. *" a compensa! pact ot ibe dey teety bad expiord izing the | inthe United States. Favorable terms were obtgined also in regard to paper-blockade. But the great On the subject of search and impressment not a fraction was surromdered. The ouly allusion thereto was in an informed paper, signed by the British Plenipotentiary, offgring the re | assurance, merely, that, without in the least derogat- all vessels found therein engaged, the prac- | ing from the principle upheld by Engl: promise to be very guarded in its ex: claimed to have been for some tin . ment, beside being liable at favored us, to be withdrawn, | explicit assertion of the very \ ject to have renounced, to suit Jefferson. His own mind being decisively m: np, he fought wt, as it was, a empty foran to submit. it to the Senate, and in no wise enjoined upon him by the constitution; and he, therefore, at once sent it back to she Amori- con negotiators, specifying the =jtal want, and sug- gesting other amendments, which he dyeeted them o Rhe vessels of the United States | were allowed to carry European goods, if bona | Engli h property. Sweden was now the only neu- tral power remaining in Europe, (except Tt Al and the effect of this act, had not the United at the same time withdrawn their vessels from the ocean, would have been, in connection with the late British orders,'to annihilate their entire foreign trade. Sweden was the only country to which they coul@ now go, and if a vessel were on the way to Sweden, and were met and searched, as she surely would be if met by a British armed vessel, wherever found afterward by the French, she would be seized for having been searched. From the couutries at war, the cross edicts made the ejection total and | thorough. It seems almost impossible to believe that the world should have submitted to the use of such dia- bolical agencies in the contest of two single Powers, for the war was but that all through. It reminds as of Milton’s conception of the fighting angels, —— up the mountains, with all their | of woods | waters, to cast at each other. It was infernally mag- | nificent. Lucifer himself was not more reckless | than these leading combatants. England pet | all the complaints of the neutral Powers, and Napo- | leon replied to the prayers of the suffering mercan- tile cities of France and Holland that ‘ Britain mast be humbled, even at the expense of throwing civili- zation back for centuries, and returning to the ori | nal mode of trading by barter.” Whether the ulti- | mate aims of Napoleon were or were not exclusively | selfish, to England belongs the responsibility of in- ; troducing the system of the unwarrantable exten- sion of the claims and practices of war; and that system it is a question, if any other | resistance could have made by the parties as- | sailed, neutral and belligerent, but turning the same’ ‘weapon upon its author. As soon as the orders in council of November | were received in the United States, it was seen that some ultra measures were unavoidable. The ad- ministration was as little reconciled to war as ever. Restrictions upon British trade in our or re- | taliation upon their ships, were measures | suggested. But Jefferson considered it best if oar | ships would be captured abroad, as they would have been now, rte. wholesale, they were better kept at home. at would save the ships and avoid gny more collision, and would, besides, afford effective aid to be og of Napoleon, as the British must feel the effect inthe want of naval stores and some other articles usually obtained from. this country. So, an embargo was recommended, for an indefinite period, upon our trade, and was forthwith adopted, (Dec. 22.) aly two Senators eae Quincy Adams, and Mr. Bradley, of Vermont}. rom the Eastern States supported it. The commer-- cial party was most violent in vituperation of the. act and its author. It was, indeed, a most absolute invasion of the rights of trade, and astonished Brit- ish statesmen, used as they were to bold exercises of power. But we do not see that anything better was to Le done under the circumstances. The desire of the merchants to be allowed to send their where they pleased was preposterous. The have hest known their own interests; true, were blinded wy political fury, and willing to the sufferings they endured from the upon the head of their own government. Ui the combination of the orders of November ané the. Milan decree, with the parties supporting them. worked up to a state of almost maniacal it would have been like launching our own ships ins. maelstrom to have sent them upon the ocean. ‘The embargo distressed our own people; but there | woald have been distress of a more di rous sort | without it. It was a period for commercial distress, and escape the misfortune we could not. But it was. not without eflect upon England, as its copes would have it. There never was atime since the colonies weve independent that a suspension of trade. between them and England could be otherwise than. most seriously felt by Lugland. No man was a bete ter judge than Napoleon of the character of any such measure, and he commended it in the highest ». as did Talleyrand and all the statesmen of the French court, a3 a most effective agency in the suj of the mon object of Europe and the United Beaton, | The ish party here even attributed it to the in- | stigati of Repaieon. But we have the palpable evideuce that it was the occasion of great and | discontent among the merchants of England, that it was the cause of riots among the laborers in Bir- vgham and other cities, that it highly embarrassed. inistry, and but for the awful nature of the, might have utterly ruined the advocates of a rsh policy towards America, Mr. Brougham de- elared in Parliargent that England had. her best market by the most egregious folly, and sacri- ficed it to mere whimsies respecting abstract rights, Had the act been thoroughly the effect vould have been yet more But it was very extensively Violated, in especially to ‘the West India trade. theee islands, as some desired, been excepted from the embargo, we gould still have enjoyed trade only in a very curtailed degree, as the to Eurepe with their produce, and back manufactures, would have been cut off; and we could neither And ourselves market for the one nor supply of the other. We should, beside, have beem veted by England trom the French islands; , the designed effect upon Great Brit- would have been entirely thwarted, te o endeavor to obtain, Monroa was greatly piqued, propriety of making the embargo total. The viola- and regarded war as the certgin consequenc the tions of the embargo were effected undor cover of rejection, He essayed the anprotsiaing task; bat the coasting trade. Ample power was given fresh difficulties, as detaijed onward, had, mean- Pres dent, by various amendatory acts, to stop this time, been added to the old causes of em- «buse, and Humerous suits were brought into the berrastment, and Mr. Coaning hyuntly informed bim ted nN concerned to that assumed the liberty of being displeased at what it rezarded fis Very generous COntessions upon its own part. entire or partial non-intercourse with Great Britain, | The rejection of the treaty has been considered by many, even by Mr. Jefferson's advocates, as a great blunder; but cesuists may find room for debate on | in horror of the public frown. He enforced extensive | bargo as fara he dared; he allowed it to ngland the | Togulaiing even | tides; sud, bewoqa Ube Wwo, tg qoaiagh expand that another negotistion, on the hatis of a re} treaty, was totally insdmissitie, in fact, the B, administration seemed now ta no wa effect any treaty with a governmen' | that point. | Teking into view the realiy } limitations which the treaty conceded Ei Hight to impose on ous commicrye, courts against the offenders ; bat Jeiferson was ofraid to make full pse of the authority given him, ‘The spectre of a Sp sunk into a popular min harraesed him; he was appalled at the e movements of the opposition. They were ¢: - ing repidly under the pressure, aud might yet swell into aimajority. The Union might be raj q himecli viclently deposed. No man ever loved the popular approbation more; no man was bd en be, iN iF cd safe degree, violated—for the danger was