The New York Herald Newspaper, June 26, 1852, Page 6

ee eae THE GREAT IND RUDEER CASE, MR, CHOATE’S 8: HORACE Tt. DAY United States Cirenti Court. vu £ OF NEW JEKABY Before Judges Grier avd Dickenson h i Tawa, 1352, After Mr. Dredy bed uded: Mr. Cnoare said— It dus, may it od plese your honore uae probable wishes of (he Cour 2 counsel for the defendant shou cy 2s may be, o Gistribution beiwcen their of argue moat, to the end thar, i ile, sepear avoid anticipating a one another. Under that arrange vent, it will not devolve oa me to address myrelf, ut ia any dogree of detail, to tho numerous and apperently very difficult ques tions ooncersing the originalit y, and priority of tho plaintiff's parents, ravel ® dolla tion of the testimony of witnesses, and of masses ang classes of witnesses. f credibi tiea and probabilities, contradictions, that the ¢ find irreconcilable, and tbe argum been closed, aud to which we bave listened, so much | to our instruction. the Jast ) or three di has been maiuly ted That duty of the de- yemed by my Io ty with all tho fondant’s counsel will be perf nd able associate, whose f acts of the case, to go no far trust, eminently qualified forthe dis duty. [tis assigned te me o and coolly, and temporately, some and most respectfully, but most cart mit, on behalf of wy client, that e this case, this bill be di that he has a sacred, and, standing as he now does, highly ap preciated right, that the plaintiff be required to establish every part of his claun by the verdict of a jury, under the direction of a court of law. This iz imy pert of the task, which is now to be attempted to be performed. [ will not deny that, with my client sitting before me, ifthe Court please, that it would have afforded me, in a different state of health, and under ether circumstances, no ingon- Fiderable gratification if I could have indulged in a Word or two of reply to that long aud bitter series of snecrs and sarcasws wiih wach my learned friend on the other side attacked the cluims and character of my client He, himself, seems to be badly awaro how he has pursued Mr. Day where- soover and whenscever he has presented himself, or has boon presented by the testimony, as a seeker oras & finder in this departwent of the useful arts. All that, however, may it please your honors, I have to leave, and with great pleasure, in referring to my associate counsel L may be permitted to say, that best reply to the openivug argument on the other side, will be found to be an elaborate examination and e itiom to this Court of all the evidence, a part of which is printed in this record, and a part of which (and that by far the larger) remains untaken, because Mr Day was advised by his counsel that the merits of this cause would not be finally considered and decided in this case: tho best reply to the commentary of » friend will be found, I believe, in that examination of all the evidence by which Mr. Day’s pro- tensions, a8 an inventor in this department of art, should be vindieuted firmly and resolutely by my associate counsel. I take my leave of it, say- ing only that I have seen nothing in it bearing on Mr. Day, from the beginuing—nothing in the pro- cocious inventiveness of chiluhood at fourteen—no- thing in that litde experimental portable furnaco— nothing in the maturer business life or personal character of a man, now come tothe middle age of life—that warrants slauder in court or out of court, or even an unfriendly commentary. I see nothing in that evidence but the siory of a man—perhaps of a rate of talent, of force of will, and of character a good deal above the average, and of a generosity jarge, and unintegrity uuiouched, whose attention was directed, by a mere accident—as happonsin the whole history of inventiou--to this particular iin- ovemont, at a very carly period of his life, who aa subsequently given bis youth and tmanhood—a fortune—many thoughts and many hopes to the realization and importanee of that line of enquiry, and of whom I am sure it is vot extravagant for me to say that we sbould have, all of us, from anything and everything anticipated, a priort, that he was at least as likoly to lay lis hand upon this golden key as apy of (hose who have been ro long und so ear- neatly in search of it. I take my leave of it, may it please your honors, and of all this part of the case, and J commit him to a far abier defence, if defence ho needs. We have the honor to give the Court a very early notice, and I do not by any means say that it would be the sole ground of resistance to the prayer of this billin this », that the plaintiff has strangely neglected to try to establish his title at law; and that, for the reason that he has neflected 80 to do, according to the settled course of this Court, he is entitled to no injunction at all. Cer- tainly, may it please your honors, | appreciate the urgent deeire of this Court to terminate such # con- troversy as this. 1 believe | am speaking very ingly fr my associates, and certainly for my client, when I express my entire concurrence in this desire of your honors; aud | hope the Court will allow me to have the honor (with the respect they know I en- tertain for them) of adding that there i obj even bigher and wortbier than to terminate this controversy ; and that is, so to conduct it and so to close it, that every man’s rights shall be found by him to bave been secured according to the dune courre of law—to ascertain and secure bis rights ac- cording to a due course of law For this it is, as T bave heard, that courts are constructed, and j judicially administered. — If, ther it turns out that that direction, which we must earnestly crave this case may take, should a Jittle prolong a con- troverry which hus been wasting the defindant well as his antagonist. 1 submit that it pot the fault of Mr. Day, but of the system of law under which wo live. Has my client been responsible for the prolongation of this controversy heretofore? J pray your houor's judgment in saying 80? In 15 re broke out a controversy, and suits were ivetituted ogainst him. That con- trov reservation or equi spoct of veation, or by poe science I believe, and I trust we can establish. Of that settlement, Mr. Goodyear by his associates, into whose hands he has suffered himself to b placed, has been deprived of every particle of co sideration, benefit, und advantage, they brea ing every covenant, bereaving him of every part of consideration, by which, as a wan of sense or of self respect, ho could have ever been induced to enter into. What was to be done then? Should he not bave gone back to the labors of his former life, not only from _necessi from the geueral law of the land? To thi I The plointiff brought their actions agai brought among others an action of cove when that action arrived in the due order my client was ready, aud he won that caure. nother my client was again ready, and the net. He made @ thiid effort to com toke trial, & mo terwa Maesachusetts. and Mr. Justice Sy that that application, then end th ab unreagon The result ment of thie hearing to this day according to our measure, read action was c le one this bill in eh: + hot whole morits of the facts, but acd ciples upon in ¢ and will be decided by this he therefore, say that Ido think, muy honors, that Mr. Day bas been r y 3 and ction, which shall prolong thie if the di unnecessary protructian of that it will not be his fault justice requires this ca and protract it @ little later t fear that the yoaliness of an American judicature will regard With the loast particle of judicial disfavor any man, because, mending where Mr. Day stands, in litiga- tion for all heis worth and for ali tis hopes, be earnestly deaives that tribuval, which be under- Btands to be prescribed and preterred by the law. I have etill less to fear that be will lose or suffer for that right in the slightest degree, because & newapaper editor, here or there, can be found to have made, in the progress of this trial, some unguarded or intemperate rewark. What a right it would be--what a mockery and not aright—it it were held upon such tenure as this! Tcome then to the narrow duty which is devolved close They tell us that their bill is for an infringement; and sometimes they tell us, as circumstances pinch, that 4 cover it if @ bil! for the specific perfor One of the couneel, in one stage of bia argument, i quite sure itis one thing, and another, in anothor tage, would perhaps be quite gure it was another. ‘The trath is, We aro to look in no disrespect or in no irit of rarcasm to the record itself. In the first place, thon, if your honers please, we respectfully submit that if itie te be tukeu and tried as a mere bill for & perpetual injunction upon a ent right, for an alleged wv by the defendant, it should be tried ond ‘the ordinary court and that undoubtee!y Lill is to be regarded. ¥ 9 the honor to sub- mit that it is perfoetly el t the plain # not enUtled to the injunction he *, for the reason that be hae totaliy neglected even to » npt to es- tablich his right in a court of law. tcreforo tubmit, and [ have to wek your honor's attentian to tho proposition, that it is entirely according to tho ancient and uniform urse of chancery, tbat ina. much as the plaintiff hos neglected every opporta- nity to try to cetabiirh bis title at law, he oan now ed him ehher et join nor pr ’ to the Chance alternatives ior will be, CHARLES GOODTEAB. | ed | he settled in good fuith, without mental | isy, intending | tolive and die by that settlement, as upon my con- | t aspect in which the | If to try the right, aw, or according. as I think T shall beable toshow, to the later practioe under the circumstances, to | the Dill at onco and altogethor. Wo shall of , stain many groands of defence against s bil, but of this first, and, for my parps: | chiefly. ¥ co » that until that Little conve: ation (w ¥ perbaps be within tio reeulloc | of the Court) bet wen the counsel at the iginal proposilion was aunounced—if it had not © for that, | confess 1 vbould hare understood nt the general rule for which we contend, was en- ly beyond contention anyw and that goae tal rule we have always understoud to be, that a Court of Chancery, at ite fiual Loaring, which is the | singe at which ‘this debate now comes, on a cause when the wer denies t A Court of Chancery will never per Dill, so framod_and 60 met, unill the plaintid dave established bis ticle at law, unless it shall bo made clear and evid the Chancellor, there is no questio the parties. The evidence of wh tial nature, may be subinitted to a trial by jury. 1 suy again, if your honors will permit, [ shoa!d have ed (hat that proposition would bave aot with learned persons. Tdo not stop here to move any question ia regard to tho trancendental powers of the Court of Chancery. That is not the proposition to which I mean to add myself. But I had supposed that whatever may be the powers of that tribunal, (and they are ample in Englend.) Thad suppesed it hud come to b rule, that on the | universally asa geners ing, when tho plai : stage of the cause to obte swor denying the equity—' thing in the world but a mere ordinary injanction upon a ps tent right—I have supposed i courte that no injunction w Court, on looking into the doubtedly that there is no matter of fre dence, That proposition, however, it scome is likely to undergo dissent from the other side I feel bound therefore, may it please your honors, bofore [ ad- dress myself to these spéci dl ciroam are to be relied on in the nature of an estoppal, ¢ 1 be had, nal arly and ux the evi- extreme desire to have the ground firm under my foet at the outset. As tothe extent and limits of stand it, exactly this, with those conditions, that the Dill merely for'an infringement of the patent, the answer denying the equity at the final and the plaintiff having taken no measures at all to obtain an injunction at un earlier stage, it is a matter of course that the tion is refused until the title shall have been established at law. Now, may it please your hon- ors, I shall of course indulge veel in only a brief resumé of all the parties. They are, indeed, all the bench, instead of pausing to read them, I refer the Court to the brief, and content myself with sults. Now, your honors, will undoubtedly have remarked in the text books , and sometimes even in the prepared proofs of learned counsel at the bar, that a very great confusion has arison from not. suf ficiently attending te the particular stage of the cause in which the motion comes to be made, and the determination of the Court of Chancery comes to ke invoked; and it seems to me entirely indis- ypensable in order to prepare for comprebending the decisions which appear, on the face of them, to be by scores and hundreds a reproach to the law, a stumbling block to justico. In order to approach that view—whieh, | apprehend, will reconcile every inte in the law, Aa extract a beautiful, con- sistent and rational system—1 ask your honors, in order to prepare for such a survey of the cases, to allow me to submit that there are three stag epochs of a cause in which this motion fora’ tion comes on by right; and that the application is disposed of by the Court in every one of these suo- cessive stages, under rules and considerations appli- cable to the particular tage. We are here. to-cey in the third stage; but, in order to approach the rules and considerations which, as we suppose will be new applicable to this particular epoch of the case, allow me to glance at the rule of each in its order. The first stage where this motion ever comes te be made, is upon the Will, and before the answer or evidence, even in the form of an affidavit, be iven by the defendantin the cause. I do not mean to say (hat it is necessarily before and prior —, but it is distinguished as bcing upon the bill before an answer unencountered and unembarrassed by anything like opposing proof on the part of the do- fendant. In this stage—and it is to this stage I decm that nine out of ten of every authority that wil! be referred to in the eourse of wy argument, will turn out to be referable in this stage—it is granted with less difficulty, and under fewer conditions than ever after in the pro- f the caus on in this one it is by no sa matter of cou Even in this one, more than a patent m shown Even bere some length of time of mn. or if that i is been interrupted, the parties’ right, or otherwise, must be shown, in order to sus- du conditions, by su) tainit; bat in th it iscomparativel, it is g' y ly unt f a further order from the Court. The plaint own rdi- nazy diligence, which is always agreeable to a Court of Chancery: and, theref as IT have inaemuch as itis temporary ouly; inusmuch as i only for the purpose of tuking iuto ¢ and taking care of a subject matte 3 tion in smuch as the Cour! iY moment to be stage it would be com- and, if we do not take great care, brought Ty cas ein danger of transferring books and cuses, jicable to this stage alone, to a later stage, in | app areiok it will be found that other considerations The next ctage in which this motion for an tion is brought, is before the hearing, but a: | interposi fan answer by the defendan ter the exbibiti opposing proc chooses to ral t inj ayplicuble to this stage differ somewhat from the last, and they are found regularly aud gradually creasing the difficulties in the way of combining them. Still, the court will observe that even bere inasmuch as the i inasmuch as tho plaintiff distingn ¥ an extraordinary degree of diligence, in- asmuch as the suit may be dissolved at any moment, the Court grauts it, even in this stage, with compa- ra ive facility. however, unlike the rules nd cireumeta to the earlier stage, exclusive pd must be shown as a inst the de answer; or, if a lon ive possession cannot be show hen shown that on that possession being di i aptly procecded to establish w. ‘The injunction in this il, as I fa bave stage; but yet comp Now youswill find 1 confidently relied ¢ ide, for doct: vely casy t >t t your ed op by the otlier si but it be ous stage, where it is comparet casy to ob- tain aa injunction; but as there been au ex: cluvive a interrupted possessi two years, ring of the ¢ Lhe T understand that a | 18 ripening into rules bave come to rega+ Your | r. It arrests the labor of the defendant in this field for the whole lifetime of the patent, instead of being merely & provisional and temporal interposi- tion of this Court to tuke care of the subject-matter until a law suit can be determined for the erests of all whom it may concern. Instead of keeping it for them both to await the determination of a suit, a perpetual injunction thie day granted, is itself a determination of the cause, “fints et fructus,” whether the ‘fruit’? be bitter or whotbor it be sweet for him to whom it is distributed. And, ac- ccrdivgly, may it please the Court—and if] seom to state this proposition too sirongly, it is enly be: cause we bave been aided and attended with the rources of eounsel whom the Court know and es. teem, that I am ak dently to advance the proposition. J | perfectly clear that it has grown to be the settled urse of ¢ , that on the final hearing, which 2 thus con’ x. | the plaintiff ha* prepared for by no earlier ap- plication, and on a bill fromed, as JT am now aesuming this to be framed—an ordingry bill upon a patent right, it is a matter of éoui vd hall soon ebow your honors—I_ appr | bend, if ary to contend for it with any zou) that I do not overstate the sition, it has come to be a matier ani pected that in this stag til the plaintiff eball have established bis title at law, on injunction ie refared, of course. | ‘Twenty years ago, or perhaps ten or fifteen y | ago, Lebull find the authority for showing that th otter branch of the rule has been eettted, although yerbaps upon lees authorit reason, that if the plaintiff has neglected to make motion at an earlier stage, when he might ve Cone if be bas neglected it on the fing ofs hie Lill, hae bain still and put the defendant off his guard } Le eball retura the bill, with Jowve the | —if Le has doug nything until tae defendant hagex- stating what I understand to he their undoubted re- t to bo a matter of | tho | ances #hich | extracting the case from the general rule, I feel an | the general rulo, that general rale being as T undor- | beating, | injaoe- | upon the brief; and acting on the suggestion from | ' | honor is | everything bere. The situation of the parties im this en fas ebanged entirely from their situation | in the former stages. The effect and purpose of the injunction now, are different from the purpose and ellect of junction in any former period of the application, If an injunction is decreed here to- duy, may it please your honors it is decreed for omit, that in this stage it is | but upon em equal | plaintié, at thie late day, to osiablish his title at | pended the labors of aaumeiad and ten | | illustrate, ifp | our text boc | in the | of it to which atroution bas not beon paid. | wright at on the coming on of his anewer—it | thousand dollars of money, to acounulate fa fir the triat of the conse at ull—if the plaintiff sha! have Jain, as here be has, stock etill, without » motion for an in- junction on the preliainary etoges, de Court of Chancery bas settled the dootring that it will noteven in tho bil to give bim auatberchanco,bat will 4 mise it, ofcourse, and leave tho plaintiff te his remedy. 1 shell epoak t both branches of therele. 1 have enid that an injunction at tho final hearing is, of course, perpetual. It is perpetual, or itis nothiag. On this point let me tura to some of the most ap- proved writers upon this subject. I first-refer to my brother Curtia’ exoellens work upon patents, it the slightest atiention t@ the authorities upon the brief, sll better to the memory of the bench, inakes it cortain thst av injunction hore is nothing at all, or it is an, injunotion for ever. Bee, then, 4f your honors please, how earnestly we foel ourselves called ypon to take the benefit which is loft for us of the iule for which we contend I wish to repoat my proposition again, in ordor ta leave no condition Tn thas couverzation which arose, at the commencement of this trial, references were made by the most emi- nent counsel, to the cases in which it was thought, the right to an injunction had not boen previously established by a suit at Jaw, Such was one aspect of the telegraph cago, with whieh ono of my learned friends and myself wore connested, in Boston. Such wae the cuse, in the same grows oause, in another of its branches, tried by your boners, By the consent of parties, any thing may be done to vary the direc- tion. These cxses, as your honors know, involve uistters of pure ecience, aad it was thought better, for many reasous, ot to commit the cause to another tribune! for the hearing of w jury, or at jeast inexpediont to withdraw it from the decision of the bench. Those cases did not turn en such ts as thie—whother Marl had beon guilty of ony. ‘Chey did not turn upon whether Coltias ved himself, or is en honest It did not pery 8 turn upon whether Pratt, ia this caso, is corrobo- rated by ten witnesses, or oloven witnesses, or whether Heyward was a dreamer. They do not turn upon such considerations, or upon such evi- dence; ard your honors will bear me eut in saying that half an bonr’s exhibition of the witnosses on the stand, under the cross-examination of counsel, and under tho gaze of twelve laymen, would reveal the truth more certainly than many Inbors of days und nights upon artificial technicalities, that are embodied in these records. They were a to- tally different class of considerations; and therefore it was that they were drawn to- gether to the Courts of Chancery, but subject to that qualification, 1 bave the bonor to repoat, and we feel that we are here in some measure certainly respecting this Court and our opponents. and ourselves too much to declaim about the jury trial, but we are here upon what we deem aa im- portant, and, perhaps, to the defendant, novel aud moet important point of practice. Now, I move no question at all with regard to an abstract power of u Court of Chaneory in this behalf. On the contra- ry, Ido not deny that power, asI shall show b; the great Chancellor Lord Cottingham. I shall find him at the samo time that he is administering this rule, temperately and exactly—I shall find hin asserting, as your honors will assort. the very bigh- est tone of doctrine with regard to tae abstract power ofa Court of Chancery in its theory; but whot I will say is this: there are practical limits to this great power—this power held and wielded in the actual administratioa, are perfectly defined. These limits ure perfectly defined and exactly with- in contiol, and it is just'as clearly settled, and by aslong, and wide, aud uniform’ a concurrence of »racticé that while your honor’s power to grant the Injunction is indisputable, though the heavens sliould pass that gigantic power, has been wielded With a temperatencss, and dignity, and security of rights which should always accoupaay and regu- Jate the adininistration of s power so large. Now, ina few words for the proof:—Ist. I stand here to Chancellor pre-ominontly, (Ist Paino, 446, Sullivan and Redfuld ) Ho thou proceeds to one vory ia portant cousiderstion, ve longer now navel, aod that is, that ons own legislation nankes no distinotion in theiy bebalf; and let ume ad?, that that learned Jude is epewking to an appliontion im an earlier and cusicr etape of a motion for injusotion. Now Iwi fun your attention, 944 question has erivon upoa the accurney of the citation, for one moment onty, to Book Third, page 91, of Statetes at Large. ‘The firat seetion i ion declaring sll monopolies to be void, The fifth section spoaks, nevertholoss, of | the rights of patents. Then f arguethat the second | section means to sey that the commen law of tho | raim shall declare, in avy given and coutroverted ease, Whother is & patent for navelty or a monopoly abolished by the firet section of the act, for the lin- | guoge is substantially this. Aly oonstrnetion is this —the firet. soetion abolishes inonopolies; the fifth section declores that a patent fora now ii i alogal right; and that loaves it a subj f debute whether the grant of a patent is valid, or whether the second section eroota a ature by which the commons of England will chat that qnoa- tion shall bo determined However this inay be, county follows the law. Now, what is the meauing of thé waxim, that equity follows tie law? In this case, IT apprehend, it mears thnt it shell rofer te the common law of the realin to determing in its own tnbunals the existence of the legal right, and, that dene, then, by its own peculiar and characteristic pow chancery lends its uid to protect the alleged right, until itean be dotermived whether it isaright ornot, to protect it after it has been ascertained to bea right—prorection, uot aseertainment protection, ard not ® mere enterprise to resolve & riddle of it, ea murva cancelarit. 1 submit tothis Bench that these limits mad marks are the demar-ation hetween those two great auxiliary institutions, rly and admirably defined, and are ac- ‘ig to all our ideas of right and justice. What wo desire better, if wo were dreaming of an- other Utopia? What better institution could we desire for the determination of a right—a right do- peudizg upon the credibility of that man, or on the memory or source of fancy of this—a right depending upon the judgment of experts, or on the interpretation of grants—-what so appropriate asa jury of twelve honest men, presided over by a leamed judgo? When the case bas passed from the first stage, or after the billis filed and answered, what so udmirable and so perfect as the transcen- dem! power of chancery, which secures tho right forerer to him to whom the law has already ascer- tained it to belong? Finally, the language in every cast in the law, is a concurrent demonstration and ilwtration of this very doctrine. Every adjadked cast, nnd the learning of one of my associates has enabled me to place, chronologically upon the brief bofire your honors, a series of judgwents for one hurdred years, beginning in 1766, and coming down to 1819—every adjudged case, from tho beginning, snrounces this very doctrine of adjudication. There is tao case of Hardwicke. ‘There iathe areaice case, becuse living at a later period of the Lord Chaa- celur Livingston, in the third of Merrivale. There is Cottingham, whose learned decisions on the Eng- lish bench bas sufficed for all later cases. I thore- fom respectfully submit, may itplease your honors, thst the goneral rule iz placed beyond ‘a particle of costroversy, and it will not bo in this court that thit general rule willbe brought isto question. I sbiu'd learn this doctrine very incomplete, if I did no’ remind your honors of oné cxemplification and aplication of it, apparonuy newer, but yet perfect: ly certain, ard that is, if it turns out that the pleia- nif asks for no injunction till the final trial, if, at the firel trial it appears tothe court thet he has been guilty, in their judgment, of laches in not claiming it inhi bill, before the final heuring of tho bill, will na be retained to allow him an opportunity then to ge back to lew, but will be dismissed as a matter of cairse; and that hag been settled, if your honors pkese, by an adjudication in the first of Benou, fF say that there has never been adjudicated a case reported on the law, undorcircumstances like these, on whica an injunction at the final bearing has been ordered by the court; not one adjudicated case —not one! Aud we live under the two hundred and sixtieth year of the Chancery of England, and under the sixtieth or seventieth year of our own. There have been innumerable objections to consider- ing these questions. I have called to my aid the : of the counsel for the pans, T have ad- sed myself to the learning of my associates, and bestowed on the investigation as much time, and as much capacity of research us I could employ, snd I repent—quite aware of tho responsibility under which I say it—thero was never such a case adjudi- cated against me in a Court fof Chancery. The Court here suggested that the Wheeling Bridge was quite euch a case. To which Mt. Choate replied:— Ve stand in the specific ease ofa patent right, and in the discussion on this point, I shall found my re- marks in part upon the cireumst thet itis a patent right. Itseems to me that it may stand to some extent upon the distinction, if your honors please, on which Livingston, and ,in the ninth of Johnson, was devided. was beld, Tt and it is exactly a principle whieh I re cognise, and wh I contend for in this, that inaamuch as the controversy in that case did not (urn in any degroc upen matter of fact fit and proper, and needful, to be examined by & ji but only upon the con: ional right ofa ve grant; and this caso of the Wheelisg ge isa question of a constitutional grant da State. We ure contented, ifthe Court pleass, to advert to this ease to which they have mace re- fe ce. so far as to say that it proeeeded spon a tion between Legislative grauts where the maiters of fact are supposed to bave first bron earo~ fully uppreciated by the Legislature, so *nat there <nothing left fur ‘substance but the ceastitution- a pra biay I be permitted, then, if the please, to return, and confining nyself to the fure the Cowt—a bili for the. Dengerene of ayatent right—to subsuit that, ir the history of the law, no such injunction has ever beon_adjudi- cated at a final hearing. In 183), Lord Cotting- bum. in the case of Milman & Craig, while be ro- coguircd the power of the Chancery, declared that he knew no case in which it Fad ever beon exerted. I take it that will do for Chaacery on Pateats down to 189, and ask my learved friends on the other ide to produce a case adr fo my proposition from 1859 down to this ti . Woll, they will say they bave given us sone, and this will admirabl. is thing move, the confusioninto whic ometimnes Wil lead learned counsel proparation of their ar; 3 for bore is a reference, on the firet page of the pl 3 brief, to some ten or twolve authoritics, every one of which is en authority applicable only to the second stage of a motion for an injur ion, and not oue of im referring, in the least degree, to the new and tiou on which we have yo pray the jodg- fore first stage: The third doctrino fe the plainti © conte which and other ¢t d upon (be eame brief, wered, if your honors please, by a little to wh they re- hing in teeting this may be ac- nt of Chane ive of ti ler for sbout a f the En jod in the ca nto they chancery be carried back 1 this y its | gainst F every system of every text writer, | dt lace e atte in Which he is tre ij copeurs in the dec as we have enun- ciated it. Curt , whom I have just bad the march honor to read, concurs. i } f mirable writer, at the pages set forth in, the brief, in terms confirms me; sv docs Vaniel, on high autho- rity; so does Drury, on i jong and patents May it please the Court, it ie this consideration that gives me a degree of pleasure, inastuuch as it enubles me, in the first place, perhaps to intimate an answer, good or bad, to the particular case to which your bonor called my attention—tbat is tho ense of the Wheeling bridge; ond, in the next place, this rule is fairly and pecessurily deducible from the origin and nature of chancery jurisdiction over the subject natter of patents. In this juris. diction chancery is not dealiog with | equitable rights, but with legal rights. The rights of both parties are wholly at law; and the right of a paten- tec is aright upon a doed, nud is a strictly legal igh is nothing buta privilege. The right of a ul trade in his calling, is law, jure natwe, but guarded by the rocial law. It is, then, a deduction from the nature and coystitution of chancery, in any jurisdiction rs over such rights as these; in allits jvrisdiction it follows the law; and although J do not mean to read from authorities to much extent, ] think it proper to read the Court one passage, ine acmmuch a8 certain important consequences flow from it, from an authority named in the brief, (ieinmarche, 157 2nd 806, geo. 2,) which sete forth that tbe privilege conferred by a patent is a legal a is only to be tied by tho common law of me preTeR—Will you read the passage? It is toned in the statute of monopolies Mr Cooave —J understand the eriticiem, Mr. Webster, you would put upon it, and J will take up thet point directly. Before | turn to the Statutes at Largo, lot mo fortify the just observation of Me. Heinmarche by Mr. Thompson, an American, bat a upon the brief, (Spottiswood & Bacon), and brought fiom him by appeal to Lord Chancellor Cottinghum, woo deliberately confirmed that practice. As I shall not return to that topic, may I not, before I demiss the subject, ask your honors if that case is mt this case. to this day, we never had any the plaintiff moved an injunction on the mtice t D ground that he was entitled to it, on this fin. At the discussions of last November or Octo- ler, notice was indeed given for the first time that in injunction would be moved for on the special frm of the bili, 1 mean to say it wasa bill for a specific performance; but it was not until! our friend jegan his opening argument that the plantif_moved ‘or an iujunction on the general rule of the ant of t party on the genera! form of this bill; aud your uoners will consider whether or not, under the cir- cumstances of the cnse, inasmuch as he might have done it on the coming in of the bill, or on the filing of cur answer; and you wil! entertain, and you will consider whether there was anything wanting to crtions to bring on the cause, whether or not May it please your honers, I fear 1 am attempting soniething teo much upon the general rale; but J must ask, iz this case withif it? Ibis said that it tLe one, two, or three reasons. Perhaps ly accompumied them in the argument of counsel. May L, before [enter upon it, offer ong werd of autbori >) It is i in the fi that this is not withio c 1 ty said hat 10 fis nue a ufringement of the patent, for a perpetu- al iojucetion, for an ordinary form, but is really and y abil! for the specific performance ofa covenant it is suggested. secondly, but not press- ed by my disereet and technical brother, that there F ps why a Jersey jury should not be Mr. Day; aud thir it is said, and wh ccommitred to the riend and associate, that there isno qui om se volumes fit or proper for the examination of s jury under the direction ofthe court — These are the three geveral grounds on and they claim that this ex- the generel rule. Now, in the first tracted from t is suggested that it is a bill for the specific once of a settlement, which settiement cstops the defendant from denying the validity ofthe patent. Itis pot really a ic performance of one or the other of the contr To this T answer, may it piease your honors, if it is os- tublished in poiut of fuct, this is ao perfect te ihe epernl rule, and thet if taken ssa bill for the speritic per- , ard if the covenants do on grcucd of fact , and are to be enforced, there is an end of Is it then ty be tuken to be a bill for cific performance of the contracts, but not a bul tur infringement? Con an injunction upon in- fringetment be moved for in the ordiuary form! And, Lo bill, cun it etand for a moment upoa the undisputed facts now before this conre? Now, Tam disposed to admit that, although perbaps it is not drown in the most artistic manner, afid from some policy on the part of the pleader, yet we do suppose, and we always have euppored, that it was to be pressed simply us the specilic performance of » co- venont, and f upon iny personal we cami to t and we lave u act October, upoe with nothing und mance of & covtrect, nd everyw to which sre, Where the hold ourselves ready to Your bonota may be aware that Bly. Day, counsel, or the greater nuia- t.d to come here nt- for a spec Lill we were hey € facta were at hund, to answer. under the advice of b Ler ot them, bazacty tended with evider 1 ability to say,“ f and to prove the long series pis to signelize bimeclt in the i the calling be had ebosen. Jt is under that advice, founded upon what we have al- waye understood to be the prayer vhe bill, that comes here to-duy unprepared to moct the case which a portion of my ned brothers’ argument presents fe We thought ica bill for a rus (0 meet. ecific performauce, and we so heard it reported from every source, and I refor for confirmation on point to the distinct subject of this prayer, aod that our admirable brother Curtis, now a Justice on the bench with yout honor, made an appli the Court to be heard upon that bill upon the nat it would give the Court no trouble to vestigate tne facts, but that it presented mat- tera of esteppal on which the controversy would t ve to terminate, and which would save them us any farther litigation in a court of law. Well, we have always co understood it, and if it turns out that we” huve misunderstood it, thon we are in danger of being fatally surprised. Ido not say that this is an artistically drawn bili for & specific performance. I know the learning of the man who didit would enable him to draw a het- ter bill for a specific performance! It seems to be a bill binding the defendant not to dispute the validity of tht patent. Jt states a settlement of a contro- versy between parties, ly covenants, but it does not prove them. Ii ihe Court will turn to the filth page Of the defendant’s record, containing their answer, your henors will find that it sets out, in detail, the juct of the settlement then and there entered into, and a great variety of covenants; that he promised to siamp the shirred goods of bis manufaeturo ; that he promied not to manufacture outside of the license which he took, to pay tariff, and to keep an ac- count upon the amountmanufeetured. It statesthe settlement, and it states the covenants, and there- fore, a5 1 understood from that part of this form, it jen bill for aspecific performance. Se it may be taken, may it please your honors; but, then, a spe- cifie performanee of what? 1 have the honor re~ spectfully to cubmit, in the first place, thut it cannot be mainteined, for an instant, ag euch a bill; and, i the next place, that it presents no matter, accord~ estopped. under any construction of tho bill, frow the right of litigating this eause in any court: It is a bill for the specific performance of what? Why, ingle one ing to the rules of Chancery pleading, to the notice | of thie Court, under which the defendant is to bo | keep an account ‘anton Mistiiieaenie | epecintly and expressly excepts from bhi ihe bill, aud the complaint of Cho party in the world bat what ho has dene outs | couse ; and therefore | repeat that it is, beyoud ad; ciey Whatever, then, as @ bill for the spavitio yerformance of the covenant contained on page 45 f the defeudant’s record, and of nothing olee ia the Now, thon, turning’ back from that covenant to page 7 of the p) Ws bill, your henor will fad (hat they ask thet the defendant may render hit ao- count of tbe articles mado, &« ; except where such lncia rubber was made ander the licomto—bhad is to say, bere is a cot lemont with a half dozen covenants by Dry; one that be will keep acoount books: another, that be would do nathing outside his livense; ano- ther thet he will stump his goods with Goodyvar's name, &o, &s. And, then, they suc him not for anything about the tariff—not for failing stamp the gowds—not for keeping no acoount bi —ihey #ek him not tor an account of anything he does under the license, and T speok advisodty; bas they desert all that, and go straight and square to au inquiry into an account of whist be docs oxtaide the hecnse, proceeding manifestly and fully npou the covenant, ard there we are. May it please your honors, if this is now to bs turned into aud treated as a bill for specifio performance, is there any longer apy fixity of meaning to language? Here we are upon a bill for the spocifie performance of that ono single covenant. Now, T ack your honors if it can be pretended for aa in instant, upon the fuots, that a bill for a specifio performance fi oc that, cav be maintained en the evidence before this court. Resorling, then, to the terms of the cove- nanuton which they preceed to try this caso, the Court will diseerm that it is a covenant while Good- year’s protects Day in tho exclusive right to nanu- facture and vend shirred goods, not to manfas- ture anything but shirred guods, except what ho is licensed by Goodyear to do. It covonamts that while Goodyeur protects him in the exclusive r to manufucture shirred goods, ho will not many ture any other articles tuan he is licensed by Good- yearto do; and now the question is, whether upon that covenaut the plaintiff! can maintain bisclaim. 1 need not say it is incumbent on the plaintiff to shot that ho has so protected Day exactly and substan- tially. While he protects Day, Day shat] not do anything he isnot licensed to do. They complain that be hasdone something that he was not licensed todo. Ofcourse, then, itis incumbent in them to aver and prove that ho has, during some period while Day hasinvaded his branch ef mauufactures, be has protected Day in the manufaeture aod sell ing of shirred goods. Now, does the plaintii! in his bill aver any such thing as that? Not a word of it. Of course, he caunot offer any proof that bo has done it; for he cannot offer proof of anything he has not averred. On the contrary, the defendant denies it explicitly ; while the plaintiff meets the denial without a murmur and without a proof. “1 sue you,” says he, ‘on a covenant by which you agreed to manufucture nothing but shirred goods, if 1 would protect you in that manufacture by all my power. But J forget ta aver, ond I totally fail to prove that [have thus protected you. I oltre yeuswith manufacturing ut of your license, aud I toMy fail to protect Fone Let us look at the evi- dence of the facts a little, concerning a bill for the spesionerfbemencs of such a contract as this. In the first place, then, it is conclusively established, that the plaintiff did not protect the defendant in his branch of the manufacture. There is an end of the plaintiffs bill. 1 am trying my client to some extent as well as his case. And whenI regard the spirit in whieh this bill was drawn, and the general courtesy of manner in which my learned opponeut opencd upon my client, I shall not, unless Iam ad- mionished by your honors, deprive Mr. Day of the privilege of exposing to this bench the equities of this case, and all the facts Bp which they are based. They sue him because he has brokon a cove- nant; that while they protected him ho would not mavufacture out of his license. They do not aver that they protected him; they do not prove it. In the first pluce it is conclusively established by ver- dict and judgement, that down to tho first of Janu- ary, 1849, two years and three or four months, Goodyear bad not affurded one moment of the protec- tion contemplated by the covenant fur which we paid him $5,000, aud for which slone we bound ourselves not to tiansgress the limit of the lieonae; net a par- ticle of protection for two years und four month:. Your honor is too familiar with this point to be re- ferred even tothe record. The issue upon the seventh plea was directly upon the allegation that he had not protected him, and the jury found, ef course, that from 1846 to the institution of the suit, which was on the first of January, 1849, that he had not protected him. That would seem to be an end The time has becn, **when the brains was out the man would die, and there an end.” But let us trace this point a little further. What should the plaintiff allege in such a posture of facts as that? Should he not aleastever tbat down tothe first of January, 1819, he had not afforded the stipulated protection, but that aftertbat timo he woke up suddenly to some senec of bis duty to protect—and should he not t to prove it? Tas he made au averment of any suc! protection? Certainly net. Then he cannot of- fir apartele of proof, it ho hada volume of it. The snswer denies this pretection. pnd the pre- suunption of evidence, I take it, may it please your honors, is, that a state of things that has lasted for two years and aebulf, continues till the contrary is shewn. That verdict, therefore, remains unencoun- tered by any particle of evidence This court has before it competent aud sufficient evidence that, down to this hour, the plaintiff in this case has not afiorded a particle of protection for which we stipulaced, before the ist of January, or after the Ist of Januar, But it docs not rest there, if your please, for in the next place, does not that verlict go a good deal deeper thun this?) The court avers that the verdict om the geventh issue fiads, not merely that Goodyear did not protect, but. con: nived at the infringements of other persons with Mr. Da3's business If the court will allow me to turn to tho 74th puge of the Record, and to call their at- tention to the seventh plea, they will find it con- cludes, that anissue is taken upon it, aud then the difendant says, “protect this defendant,” &e. And ontbat issue the jury affirm th. truth of the plea. If, then, it be suceessfally estublished, not merely that Mr. Goodycar has not protected the defendant in this ¢: but connived at the cominissicn of in filngements aimed and pointed at Mr. Day, thon I k the court whether the third’ covenant ned in Goodyear’s original settlement with bas or has not beew broken on his part. If a great deal deeper than a mere huge from 9 covenant to protect, for it dis- charges every one of the covenants in the setile- ment from beginning to end. The language of h nt is this—that “said Geodycar will not any Ti , OF agreement,” jury > firmed that he did uufacture of these goods by other scus, in Violation of bis duty to protect, it is for i of this agreement, in this third shall by ho agreement, assuming form of acd nant on the oue aking under the denomination of eove her, that he will by no means aid or t, or as far as in him lies, permit anybody to in- terfero with Mr Day in the exclusive monopoly of + uiticle which it was the objevt of one paity to li, and the ether party to buy I submit, without siep further, on the mere verdict of the jury, tis fer your honors to sny whetherthat ean nob he the end of the ease. T do notknow thatit may not be snid that action may have been teken on demurrer. J will dent fraukly with the Court. I will not say but that Ihave to show whether or not the plea is double, and issue is taken op the whole, which kes vermont, and whether there is an opel on both averments. Howe that may bo, the evidence, a good way beyond this. 4 the ergument ot the learned coansel to odyear inay not have afforded down to the Ist of January, 1319, § if. he bes afforded him protection since t time, Day’s covenant is stilibinding I shall our honors please, whethe praver of very thin, of his ih w m but [am now about to ad only submit it—and not, in point of tact, Teast protection to Mr. Da submit this proposition leuve it to the judgment of the Chaneelior: if it is tobe tuken, ng it must be, to be conclusively estab- lished, that tor two years and some months, tho plaintiff did not protect Mr. Day at all; and ifit bo further uo, that thereupon Mr. Day, deprived of the protection for which be had bargained, was dri- yen from the business in which he had stipulated to be protected, and forced to enterinto another branch of the monufucture, I bave to submit that it ie nota resconeble construction, that after all that, Mr. Goodycar may wake up and demonstrate an offer of srotection, beginning two years after the covenants Kind been made, ond-then insist on driving Mr. Day pbock again, after be had invested himself ia an- other, into the business in which he agreed to pros tect him, but in which be did not protect him, and from which his waut of protection compelled Mr Doy to make bis escape. Js it pot an inevitable ine terprotation that Goodyear, within some reasonable meaning of that word yohybd see ia to protect Mr. Day from the first, is to a the protection, and is to continue it constantly, eflectually, and zealously; ud unlesé that is done, Day ig not bound at. allt And therefore | eny, if your honors find that Good- year has neglected to aflord protection for two years and a half, and thet the consequence was that Mr. Day was driven from the business and obliged to enter into another, it is for your honors to say, who- ther it is not a monstrous construction, & terrib to injustice, to claim, that efor that, Mr. Goodyoar muy set nhout tendering that whieh he has filed to oxtend to him till that covenant has beon stove dead for two years and & half, until ho shal Lave beon driven i doing business under it. 1 sabuit that construction 38 unreasonable to that too | be contended for a single moment, and, there- the will call qu on me only to of this interruption Court t in con fore, simply for the specific performance of » xinglo, of all the covenants coutsined on Day's side of the fottioment. Ttprays on account not of what Day baa done under bis licenge—not that he does not pay dewicr tad more voverable name—a great lawyer, in al (he fields of the Inw, a great patent lawyer and tho tariff ; it compleins of him not that he doos not | show. f none, cote) tau, by tho vee= | Qiot of the jury, in point of evidence, Mer. Day waa encountered by & conpotitioa, fostered into life by | | | that hedoos that want of protection, whi | not stump his goods aecerding to the anatase \ abandep ny-miiahecerapetiolSine:te rork be stipulated to be allowed, and protected, to do, and forved him into another; there. fore, Leay, that the effect of it is, afvor thy inter rop ion of two yeurs and a quarter, wholly to dis charge My Day from this contract. The language is, bet whilo Day is preteated he shall do nothing lee but this—that is, while be is contiaually pro- tected by w protect Loginuing at the first, or wilbin a reesonable © after making the agro ment; protection steadily, effectually, and oo tirually enforced—i of & protection withheld till he is drivce from the market, avd oompoiled, the best way be ¢ to find anether: end then, fitfully, ea Prtclously a intermitting!y resumed; and thusdrice im backward and forward, this year in oa thing, sod bext yoar in another thing, at the sule will and pleasure of Goodyear himself’ Now, I think that this construction is aided, not to say conclusively forced upon us, by w settled doctring relaung to toasters of epreitic perfermancs—for example, it is ® feritiar doctrine, thet i€ there is avy unfair neglect, or laches, on the part of a plaintiff, he shall vot have the extraordivary aid-of a Court of Chane cery to compel the performance ef his own side of @ covenuat Ard ngain, if there has been a change of crroumstances, aiising from any cange, or if arise fiom the conduct of the plaintiff himself, there has been # great change in the circumstances of the mrtics, aftor the contract was originally made, and fore the time whew be applied to a Court of Ghan- cery to compel its performance, he must submit: hig case to an action at law to recover damages. [take it, therefore, for granted, if the fact turus out to be esteblished, and Lam now about to see whother or not it is osteblisbed by the evidenos, that im oonse- quence of this want of pretection, Mr. Day, who, at the time the settlement was mado, was doing a perous business, in which he songht to be protected und ecourcd by the contract itself, was, within the time to which the verdict in this case extends tho runt of protection, that is to say, bofore the first of Fonnary, 1849, completely driven from that employ- mont, #90 compelicd to abandon it as if he had been: hunted from the State ot his adoption, and com- fo a to adopt another, for the first time in his ife. If we show you, upon the evidence in the re- cord, that such was the fact, 1 should hardly thiak the learned counsel would coulond that that oove- nant could again be revived into life. We place that matter, if your honors ploase, beyond a par- ticle of controversy, by the evidence we introdues. In the first place the verdict establishes it. I have heretofore ealled your attention to the seventh plogs but that upon the secend plen ig anissue on the question whether or not so ruinons a competition supervened, that the profits and business of Mr. Day were materially impaired ; and the jury found whut we have hore averred to be true, and the same jwy established the fact that Goodyear gave hin uo manver of protection for two years and a quar- ter; end the very same jury, on anothor trial, established that probable, natural, and material fuct, that, for the want of that very protection, the pone of his business had been matorially impaired, but they could not find from the form of the con- tract that he was obliged to abandon that omploy- mentand enter another; and I am now about to add to the proof of the verdict, the evidence upon this point, by avery brief allusion to it. We shall show you this, by the testimony of thirtoon witne though I am not about to read even their name: will state the result. We proved by this body of evidence, uncontradicted by one scrap of proof in this whole case, that this failure to protect Day, shown by the ji to last till the Ist of January, 1849, bed the effect of fostering a rainous competi- tion, which compelled him to abaudon the business of making and vending of this form of shirred or corrugated goods, and compelled him to withdraw himself to another branch of the enme business. We equally find, coincident exactly with tho period of time to which the question refers, this revolution in bis employment—as prosperous and as well co: ducted a business as a Jorseyman ever carried on * in his life—eompletely destroyed, and himself en- tering upon the introductory stages of a new busi- ness, diiven thereto by the direct consequence of Goodyeur’s act. Now, the goneral result of their testimony is this:—That, at the time theso coves nants were entered into, Mr Day was engaged im the manufacture of that form of shirred or corru- gated goods, which we call suspenders; that his suspenders were the best in the market; that he krew how to do it well, and was doing it well; that it was a prosperous and profitable business, and this covenant was made to continue him, with the same success and prosperity, in that employment; that after the beginning of 1847, immediately after, as we find by the verdict, a compotition sprang up, by which large quantities of the same description of Sees but wholly inferior in quality, were rought in ruinous competition into the marr ket; that his business immediately began to de- cline, the competition continued to increase, and that down to about the time when the Court gave that verdict, this want of protection was continued; that at the commencement of that suit by Goodyear on_ his covenant, the original business was destroyed, and a new one was beginning to grow. Now. sir, there are thirteen witnesses upon your honor’s brief, whose title to crodonce is undisputed—they are found upon pages 18 and 19 of the brief we bave placed in your hands. Now, then, independent of any direct connivance of Good. Jeur, independent of any evidence to show whoth or not he protected Day after the verdict, which hae been the ground they have been arguing; we aver a failure to establish such a protection, (and prove it bythe verdict) for such a length of time, and tho confequences of itare such, that it beeomes inequite able that that covenant should be revived aginst him by any worthless offer of protection by Good- year.” Even, therefore, if this bill alleged, and if the case showed, protection, ufter it was too late, this Court, I appreheud, will not allow this oove- nant so torun buck, and operate so fitfully, and by intermi tance, and so to stop when Goodyear chores, withbelding protection to Day, till Day is rerishing, and when be is pretty nearly ready to die, putting his finger upon his pulve, und letting in we tittle air anda liste light, in the form of pre- tection and then call oa him once more for hiz ce- verant. I submit that he cannot thus play upon Dey os upon a pipe. This would be something worse than the celebrated letter ef Dr. Johnson. It would be the patron of the drowning man who with- holds assistance, and does net encumber him with aid while heis deowning, but who waits till he is drowned, and bestows it upon bim at the Corouer’s Such protection is not stipulated. I am ling, muy it please your honors, with the proposition on the other side, that although there wasa failure to protect, for two years and a quarter, still it they could have proved that after the expira- uion ot that time, the protection vo long forgotte: was continued, then this covenant would come win to Hierand I have submitted that it is a ‘iy unreasonable interpretation of the cove- nant; for, so long a neglect of protection had itionof Mr Day, and deprived hiox of what protection was te give, and had driven him «substitute somewhere else. Bat T have not quite done with this part of the ease. IfT mistake iiot, there 1s & yew in which this pretended proteo- » placed before the Court; or rathor the piotection of the real plaintiffs whom I am protty will appear to your honors ina ity and deformity of injas- w.in determining whether this failure to protect for such a length of time, and aftor these consequences have followed, should, or should not, preclude Goodyear from afterwards setting up a late sa reason for reviving tion he hed temporally Task your honors to tako notice of one ance of great importance in the proof, and if the court please, that thesy very coy who thus take advantage of Goodyear want of protection, to fill the markets as the licensees of Goodyear, holding outetanding licenses at the time when be mado his covenant, aad whose licenses he agreed to get up; that after it was ace »ged that they would surrender tho licenses out. ling, and stop working by the first of January, every man of them, in direct and gross fraud on the covenunt with Goodyear, and, through Goodyear with Day, set to work to manufacture the raw mae terial or the fabric for suspenders. Daring the two or three months which was left for them to work ing though the day time, in which they might still work, was jent to use up their raw material, they roceeded at once to change their entire course of bor, to manufacture in unusual quantities, by extraordinary means, by doubling the number of their hands, by devoting the hours usually allotted to rest, by turing day into night, that thoy might tuin night in to Day, doubling the quantity of their performance, so that, in point of fact, up to the first of dune, 1847, they had succeeded in accumulating von their bands, by the labors of three months, more material for manufacturing than they hw accumulated in two or three years beforo—the grossest and the lowest fraud upon the contract they had just made wich Goodyear, for tho benofit of Day, that it ever fell to my lot to expose, And yer the men are the mon for whose benefit this hill in Chaneery is prosecuted to-day, and these very in this way operating in fraud of their own con- tum Goodyears want of Psat into ® ruinous compotition upon Day. ‘These are the very mep Who core here and say that his covenant pre- vente him from doing another b » aftor they bad driven bimirom that in which he was to have heen p ‘The covenants wero, that while he is protected in making suapenders, he will do nothing end these men, in fraud of their own agree- drove him from thot business, aud thea say he is still bound to do nothing clse. IC thore was over an estopel ginvted on such a demand, thy should think. inet be its lowest degree. Another proposition is, that afler these loensess agree! to surrender their licenses, in the fall of 1546, pyd inadequate protection, the covenant, whose anim destroy et and to do no moro work afior the first of January, 1847, they prooceded to enact a gross finn upon their agreoment, | #0 thoy procaudad to desert their or al conrae of doing their busi+ nm by force hioh they crowded wore work and more resulta into thove tires tha they am the ad dune for two yous be J propose i aa or.