New Britain Herald Newspaper, July 26, 1929, Page 10

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Supreme Court Decision in Mc NEW BRITAIN DAILY HERALD, FRIDAY, JULY 26, 1929, 0ok Case Invalidtaes 1,493 Laws Signed Illegally Full Text of Ruling Handed Down | Necessitating Special Legislature — Mas: Corp. al. 2 Gray trolling pr mus tends to exercise this high sovereign right by clear and express terms or by necessary implication, leaving no doubt or uncertainty respecting such “Following is the full text of the Supreme Court opinion in the c ]?h)\ B. McCook et s wState of Connecticut MeCook et al:, I to First Judic ced from Second afpn and I «Petition | th t@ be paid the owners of I oy the State pursuant approved June maned, brought to i New London Coun ll!ul'k'('!‘ to a quash the | cer pgsed to empensation t State’s Special based we quo designated by th State a. nd is printed among the Special Acts. If the pur- pose of the Act is to provide for the aecuiring of land for th sanatorium at E judicial foot ot a spec on re and alleviation of a \thin the state afflict: > 18, without in for the 1 s the | the t feor the appointment of a committee to determine the just compensation t be paid for the land taken but prays-that the amount to be paid to the owners of the land be deter- tined. The judament tes that the gtion came to the court for the ap- pointment of a committee to deter- mine the amount to be paid the own- s of the land and the appointment the committe2, together with a specification of their dutics. 2AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STHE ACQUIRING OF LAND «FOR THE TUBERCULOSIS SSANATORIUM AT EAST +LYME Be it enacted by the Senate #and House of Representative %in General Assembly convene w Section 1. The sum of thi & five thousand dollars, or *much thereof as may be ne &sary, is appropriated for the = purpose of acquiring, by co 4 demnation procecdings or other- @ wise, for the site of the tube wculosis sanatorium at «Lyme, land located at » Lyme, bounded and describ * follows . . . 2" (Here follows a detailed =cription of the land). Section 2. The governor i “ authorized to appoint an attor- aney at law for the purpose w carrying into effcct the provi- = sions of this “ Approved, J “« Claim wThe petition merely recites the Ez. sion and occupation of c nd and ‘buildings as the si Bberculosis sanatorium, an institu- + ed by the State 1925, Not' Eminent Domain tdon used and ope; for the benefit of the public of the te; the terms of the Act, the loca- n of the land described in th & adjoining the land of the State and that it is necessary for the use of e sanatorium; the appointment by e Governor under the Act of an attorney for the purpose of carrying Mto effect the provisions of the Act and that the attorncy cannot agrec ith the owners upon the unt to he paid them. The demu petition raises most of the qu i ontained in the reasons defendants-appellant mphasis upon Act is not an nt do- nt of provi- e Act to carry glons of the Ac purports to be out t ascertai the Act or by cedure designate Just cor Iand. thousand may be g‘z J mum of the aw: tion proceeding famed. While pointment of Purpose of of the Act it am a procedur orize him to ment of a comr ehurt to detc fation to be paid fo “Consideration m support ¢ tention that th than an Appropri: analyze this Act, we find in two coer hat it says by nec gmc which the defendai ct must a ert by cxpre 7 dion. These distinzuish it appropriation ac s an Act in the power of eminent specified purpose of t outt : to the | intent. It must o appear by the act that they recognize the right of private property, and mean to re- spect it; and under our co tional provisions for full com tion to be made to the o 3 Not Conformable to C mitiberus In the Act \Axnu(w"\:”r sity arises charged e fomoighy ik ‘recting in lo il i nation sanatoria tment of such | ZPPEOPE i /i\d amount appropri meeting the exc act or in the general law. This falls short of the indispensable require- ment that the statute must conform to the constitutional requirement. Appealing to the unknown re- sour of the State does not prov de the just compensation which the act must provide. Constitutional provi- sions must be followed; they cannot be ignored. In Conn. River R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, ete., 127 t pe 5d, the court cient that the statute which ng of the prop- uld provide for t es s in the ordinar ng by condemnation or other- of deseribed land for the Tu- much therco Public Manifest Statutes, No. 2638 and The land for which the ap e Act before us > additional area anatorium at public purpose is s the tests we ap- wecticut College for Calvert, 87 Connec- the purpose is pub- ntal in its nature and administered for c without di e legislative appro- pecified publ cquiring by condemna- a fully d k f land Purpose rsu Coun- ty Mass. 3 he ment of manner, od be paid out of the treas- y of the Commonwealth and au- ze the Governor to draw his ant therefor;—But in the stat- ute before us there is no pl the faith and credit of the C 1 priation of the gen- its treasury and no > Governor to draw ment of ‘he by whom it d Ith, no appro fund its own power of Under the ger ture deter- sity for the r of eminent do- s it has power to of the of any s authority, by directing tl ken for the union pas sta tion shall ke paid for from the carn- ings of the Tr nd Greenfied R: road and Hoosac Tunnel, and appro- priating for the purpose of th a sum not ceding nine thousand > dollars to be paid out of those carn- ings. St. 1878, c. 277, probably be sufficient to meet and inguish all claims for damages for | taken, falls short of satisfy requirements of the Con: that the owner of the property for the use of the public shall a prompt and certain compensat) ithout being subject to a i unreasonable delay The act does not\ make another statute providing a procedure for obtaining compensation a part of it directly or by reference. No any general law of the ribing the method for ascertaining Jjust compensation. Generzl Statutes, Section 5186 is not applicable. In Thomson v. New Haven, 100 Conn. 604, 606, the claim was made that the charter of New Haven did not give the right to condemn and there- fore the city must proceed under Section 5186. “This,” we said, “is a mistaken theory. Section 5186 is not a statute of ge n, Its applicatiton is in ter the condemnation of land for the particular purposes set forth in cer- tain other sections of the statutes, each of which is identified by its number. If this section were a statute of general application pro- viding procedure for obtaining compensation in condemnation tion actions and thiz Act by refer- ence made its general procedure ap- plicable to zll actions taking land by eminent domain no question could rly made that the Act failed ing a procec for ning the just compensation. Attorney Without Authority ssioner. “In the present determined the qui xtent of deciding that ther necessity which justified th : grant of r made. It did not, as it oce lly does, go further and desig- particular source from be drawn, or the defendants’ proper- ties and rights as being subject to appropriation, and thus, either di- ctly or indirectly, pass upon the ion of a taking of the waters of Stony Brook, or of an appropriation of the defendants’ properties.” When the property to be taken, or its location, or source, is designated within reasonable bounds, the legi lative designation is final. The cise of this power is political in character. “This determination is conclusive unless and until it is suc- cessfully attacked for unreasonable- n bad faith or 8L} , 89 Conn. 671; ioners v. Johnson, supra at page 159. Eve; taking in invitum of private property is subject to judi- cial determination whether the tak- ing fall within the prescribed limi- tatio vhether in truth i d upon public necessity casion for the exercise of power, the exigency of the occasion, and the necessity are for the Legis- lature, as well as the determination of whether the public wel quires or justifies its exar when the taking has been ordered the fixing of the comy tion is a judicial question. Enfield Tall Bridge Co. v. Conn. River Co., 7 Conn. 28 “The charac- teristics of such an act of appro- priation are known and well under- | stood. It must appear that the gov- ernment intended to exercise this high sovereign right, by clear and express terms, or by necessary im- plice t it ncither does nor attempts to 1 section 5186 is not as ve held, a statute of general the specified purposes designated in ns 5177, 5178, 5179, 5180, 5181 5187 of the General Statutes. These sections are in substance sim- ilar to Section 5178 which reads: y county may take any land commissioners deem neces- y for the site, or for the addition to the site, of any county building.” Given no procedure to follow and no method for determining the just compen:ation to be awarded for the land to be taken, the attorney ap- pointed to ry out the purp of this instituted this action app: ently upon the theory that he might adopt the procedure specified in tion 5186 but prayced, only, that amount to bz paid the owner: thi trial tion, leaving no doubt or uncer- tainty respecting such intent.” Boston L. R. R. Corp. S and Lowell R. Co. and other. (Mass.) 56, 37. The purpo Act before us th quiring by condemnation a defined tract of land for a state institution which is open to the public without diserim- ination. The intention of the Legis- lature to take this land and its in- tention that its legislative act should express the necessity for the taking eems to u neczssarily though they had been di- ed in suitable words. Authority to Condemn ay in the are plic rec expre These ble ap) conclusions make it impos- to hold this Act to be a mer2 opriation act ) other attacks are made dity of this Act a cise of the power of eminent domain. In taking these up we should of and might be determined. The court under this prayer and upon | no procedure ou in the Act rendered its judgment in the usual form when a proper procedure is outlined in the act of condemna- us certain principles v tion and appointed a committee to are applicable to all statutes in favor of the owners of the provide for the taking of land by |ang t ation for the t t compe right of eminent domain. “Wher SR the land ¢ idual is taken ir ther the attorney nor um { acted within their auth; ) d taking miner n by J purported nt of zuthorit) by condemnation pro d deccribed in the A L Its furt before to eding partic it of authority ¢ on Eminent Domain states the prineiple we believe which pro stion of private nd fail to provide compen- ametimes been bably of ex mply be the to oncernad, but 67, involved with accur when he says: “Statu vide for a conder property rtion the iken of vever, comy Wat ution by Pgnores Judicial 1% i"uherculosi re ith th ne to b2 paid him for property had authority unde J186 Lo refer its petiiton to the perior Court in the name of the State and have the matter determined in aceore ith the procedure out lined in section. We ere without hen 1pon the oy zmount Su ng land n Court of that vides no compens: Subse their de defendants plaintiff which ignores the time means for determining just ation for the property taken, quent to the overruling of murrer to the complaint the filed an answer. The filed its motion to strike out the allegations of the answer which were new matter, bacause ten of the bhs of the answer are legal or repetitions of aver- ments in the demurrer to the com- plaint, aph ind because eighteen p. a nd partof another pa s e irrelevant, immaterial and £ Thereafter the plaintiff filed a Ge rrer to the ten paragraphsaver- red in the motion to be legal conclu- ¢ | sions up: on the same ground and as to the other nincteen paragraphs of the answer ion as frivolous, referred to in the mo- elevant, immaterial and | it demurred because the | court had already decided that the Act under which these proceedings brought determined the neces nd direet that the damages | e for question the com the taking, leaving the sole for judicial determination pensation to be paid as to which these paragraphs of the an- ver have no bearing. The demurrer rig] pa which w eral defenses wh = rais defendants owned o since buildings of a Tuberculo: htly sustained as to para- , 4, the last half of no place in an answe: upon the demurrer to the ragraphs requires us to give of their allegations ¢ rogard as relevant to se h they apparently he petition alleses and the admit that the State n June 25, 19 and ever owned rin land and 5 in Bast Lyme as the site is Sanatarium, an institution used bencfit Th sought t of ahout 430 fect o lon the s ble ensa ment of element 1 feet cn th and cut ing propert stroy it 918 wooden hotel that sou; of tl er o be taken he state. the land a frontage of t he public lloges th hore of Long Island Sound, for a bathing beach and in- ble to the use and enjoy the property and the chief of its value. The taking of of the beach would greatl he value of the eatire tract off access from the remain- to the beach and de- value a property. the State aequired an old structure formerly used as located on land adjoining ght to be taken; these are used for the treatment of children afflicted * tubercul ith glandular and The land of the State 400 feet in depth and amply suf- icient to accommodate a proof sa et of bea large fire- nitarium building. It has 97 frontage on a broad sand ch and is adapted for a bathing ach and for other purposes of the anitarium and amply sufficient’ for all of it ing on a ts needs. For a long time the institution of this action in this vicinity front- bathine & available by endants wil tarium h both ab mark. Rej In 19 the General A priation was amr ing. granted The appropriation lling that the children in the sani- should vse their bathing nd the children have used it ove and below high water Bill on in asking ssembly for an appro- represented that its land ple for this fire-proof build- i was then but the building has never ect Condemnation 3 this comm! been begun. On June 14th, 1922, a member alf to one of of the commission wrote in he defendants if it were possible to purchase t of their propeity def mbl s intr application, but one applicable to /" me in ecting him to proceed in cectic utes and 0 much cquent ported t s d the ever coedi land un: 5186. T ing san mmiss the § ion frain fi condemr 1y of nt i March jonby i which the Me( sell to t their p & Mol Wa and in him their cndants notified y ale. At the s not for y in January, 1! oduced authorizing the com- 1l of the defendant'’s ble to agree with the hrough the condemn the the name of the state, and provided m 5186 of the General Stat- 1 appropriating $100,000 or ) thercof as may be neces- out the provisions of bill was rejected. Sub- ubstitute bill re o the House of Representa- irceting the commission to cse a part of defendants’ land, half of its arca and beach frontage; in nt that the commission should vith the owners, y the attorney- institute condemnation cquire the desceribed provisions of i titute bill {; to ng der he appropriation bill proved appropri- e purpose of ac- land adjoining the site of itarium and directing the ion to acquire in the name State such land as the com- may require for such pur- his bill neves been re- d is now in full force. Dur- ion of the General As- > comrssion mac vith defq dium o7 the t monctary v would dezd to th than sixty feet ought to be condemned, ress condition proposed ion that it w consid comr om t nation procec defendants’ embodied in a 10, 1923, from the ts chairman to the tate 1 dings to land. The agrec- letter of commis- Governor If the owners of at Niantic will e S small section of op sprozimately fifty adjoins the Seaside t of the ra property, they our planning truct’on ot the Hea I:noll of land has heer ted from the mair ) proj commait om attemnting by an; i yeoedin fc ecuring o other | property nied o Be ourselve con the of i yetion Unmolested ndants’ veply of April 16, ptad the proposal the ion and submitted a draft of a sandy beach | bone | | There setts in Boston and L. R. ‘juxlmial power to conclude that an ?a deed which the then executor stat-lp Salem and Lowell R. Co. et Act of condemnation can be legally , 37, expressed the con- | operative w i nciple in these terms: ““It | honored judicia! procedure for taking ppear that the government in- | property by eminent domain and pr« ed he was willing to execute for the | | benefit of the State, upon authoriza- Ition by the General Assembl . The deed grants a tract 60 feet in width linstead of 50 as proposed by the commission. The letter states: “We | |decline, however, to accept any monetary compensation, since from | the outset we have had just one pur- | pose—to defend ourselves from ag- gression . Finally, since it is nct a question of dollars and cents with us, let me point out that the only consideration for the deed i that embodied in the commission’s nroposal, namely freedom in future from molestation.” Tha above reply was transmitted to the commission hoze chairman and members were then and now are the same. The agreement was consummated before | the bill of June 2, 1923, was pasce and approved. In the latter part of 1924 the At- torney-General instituted in the name of the members of the com-| ission and the comptroller of the | as executor of the will of Bliza A. +McCook to condemn a portion of de- fendants’ land having a frontage on | the beach of about 200 feet. This ac- s withdrawn by the Attor- ieneral by direction of the com- ssion on Sentember 17th, the day before the nresent action was beeun. Prior to the action hegun n 1924 the commission voted in order to carrv out the nurposes of the Act of 1923. that the comwmission re- | ruired the Iand pronosed tn he ran- demred in the notion of 1024, Tl vote is till in effeet. Another Bill Rejected | At the on of the Genarol As- | sembly of 1 after th~ expiration of the time limited for the presenta- tion in the Fouse ~nd Sanate of bills ~nd resolntions. th> Committce on | | Humane Institutions, without notice {or hearing, orizinated and renorted ¢n the Honea of Renresentatives on May 14, 1925, a bill authorizing the | commis<ion to cmplov attorney under the Act of 192 land for the Tuberculosis nm ~nd making an snpror 000 to carry ont the nc < on June 2, 19 On May 7. 1 Anpropriations wa th~ Committee without notice. citation or hearing reported the hill vhich is the act upon which the ! | present action is based. The bill was prena outside of tha committer and was not introdue~d and refe red in the usual way. Tt passed both | houses on Jnne 1, 1925, cigred hy the governor befarve the final 2diournment of the (enernl Accombly on Wednesday, JTnne 3, 5, nor within three davs, Sunday xcented, after the fin adjourn- | ment thereof and rat until nincteen |days theveafter. No attemnt was |made by the attorney annointed un- |der this Act to agree with the de- |fendant owners as to any terms of nce or compensation, nor the commission communicated | with defendan xeept through th- | medium of compensaticn proceed- o lings since the making of the above | agreement. The defendants at a1l times have been and now are willing, have of- fered and now offer, to convey to the State in accordance with the terms of the agreement the sixty feet of ‘Izmrl referred to in the agreement. The court snstained the demurrer, holding that the sole question ~t is-| ue was the determination of the compensation to be paid and that the new matters allezed in these paragraphs have no bearing upon the determination of that. The defendants rerewed in their answer a ground of their demurrer to the complaint that the Act was nto signed by the Governor until nineteen days after the final ad- jowrnment of the General Assembly on June 3, 1925. The eour® was jus- tified in ignoring a defense which thad already bcen adjudicated on de- murrer. Defendants' Priy | The defendants also cla these allegations of the answer show that the taking is not in good faith and is an abuse of power and un- reasonable. They claim further in defense that the history of this mat- | ter discloses a line of pursuit which is mnothing le; than These claims are based upon a prin- | ciple of law which this court fully recogn We express in Water Commissioners v, Johnson, 86 Conn. 1By [ T the principle in these term any cases in other states have cxpressed this latter view, and held what we regard the better law, at the decision of the condemnor that a necessity exists for the taking of particular property is one open | udicial review to discover if it able, or in bad faith or he power conferred and the appropriation of the prop- y will be restrained if it be found that such was the character of the cision.” Id. W chester, 8) Conn, no occision to these defense: demur to unre: n abuse of th th: v. Man- 16 We find determine whether could withstand a | r to them. They have d their day in court.” The! filed by plaintiff to r did not attack these de- fences. The trial judge ing the dem tion to the ground of th which had no relation to the de- fenses the delendants attempted to plead. Judgment could not have been legally rendered until these de- fensc re legally disposed of. was, too, upen the allega- of the answer an opportunity to claim bad faith in these proceed- | ings because of the breach of a claimed legal agrcement by which the defendants agreed to give to the state a -trip of land sixty feet in width 1 of the depth of the tract claimed to have been taken upon consia ion of the agreement of the Commission to refrain from at- tempting by any co mnation pro- | ceedings to sccure for the State cither the sixty feet strip or ar other poition the fendan property. Again we find no occasion | at thi 12 to pas upon this ques- tion of good faith on the part of the State ‘ommission, but certainly 1 ave entitled to establish these fact: by proof, if they can, and then ta have the op- portunity of making all the reason- able claims of la the facts proven. never | demurror the an tion of upon | final 2 d | shall | which it originated, with his objec- but was rot |4 vexatious. | ¥ 1 of upon the grantng the relief nrayed for. ; As to the Signature There remains the constitutional | question raised by the defendants’| demurrer to the compl:int and re- newed in their answer, that the Act is void because not approved by the | Ccveraer until nincteen days after the final adjournment of the Gener- al Assembly. The provision of the constitution which defendants urge vas violated by the approval of this Act more tha journment mbly is Secti of the General embly, shall be presented to the Governor. If he ap- proves, he shall sign and transmit it to the Secrctary, but if not, hel return it to the House ‘in tions, which shall be entered on the journals of the house; who shall pro- | ceed to reconsider the bill. If after such ideration, that house 11 s it, it shall be sent to the other house, which shall reconsider it. If ap- proved, it shall become a law. “But in such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the names of the members voting for and against the bill, shall be entered on the journals of cach house respectively. If the bill shall not be returned by the Governor within three days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have Laen presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if h ned it; unless the General Acsembly, by their adjournment, prevents its return, in which case it shall not be a law.” It must be conceded that the con- struction of the las section present a di The Sf hat the practical construction accorded this language by all of the Governors since 1919 in signing both public and special Acts more than three da the final adjournment E indicative that this course w orrect one. It is true thaf ng settled and cstablished practice is a considera- | tion of great veight in a proper in- terpretation of ¢ 1 sions of the cha Indian Tribe et al vs. United States, decided by the Supreme Court of | the United States May 27, 1929. While such a pr: is not binding court it i 1y in State South Norwalk Conn. 2 ‘“cntitled to great regard nining the true construction of titutional pro ology of which is in any doubtful meaning.” In this in, this consideration claimed in beha of the State is not applicable since the period of the practice relied upon has been only since 1919,—a | far too short period upon which to predicate 2 settled established practice. Especially is this true m the light of the fact that from 1877 to 1919 all public acts were signed by the Governor within three days rnment, except in when four were we the expiration of the three da; lowing the final adjournment, four in 1883, one in 1909 ! five in 1913, ten in all of this perigd. Precedent W Set Torty-two years v sufficient time for the growth .of that long | and established practice which en- titles it to great regard in deter- mining the construction of the ¢ stitutional provision before us. The e advances two other considera- | tions in support of its contention the Governor h; ign a bill after the expiration of the three day period. Its representatives asserts that, “this section of the con- stitution simply provides in effect that no bill shall become a less signed by the G vs fol- t 1 law witho ture if he ut the Governor’s s fails to return it to the General embly within three days after its presentment to him.” The State relics upon the fact that there is nothing in this constitutional pro- ision which provides that after the | expiration of the three-day period following the final adjournment of the General Assembly bills returned to the Governor shall not become a aw if approved by him. "his construction, the attorney for the State fran AVOWS in argument and brief, necessarily leads to the conclusion that there is no specified time in which the Governor must sign these bills in order to make them laws. That is, he may sign the bill at any time prior to the beginning of the sion of the next General Assembly. If he can sign the bill on the 1 ecular day preceding the next General Assembly he can on that day sign all bills returned to him on the final adjournment of the General Assembly. That situation would be intolerable ... “it is of the first importance that the people should know to what law they ar bject” State v. South Nor k, Conn. 257. Threatens to Void Many Acts No instance has been presented to , and we find none, where the ap- proval of laws is made subject as to the time of approval, to the ultimate discretion of vernor. No consti- tution of any of our states commits to the unlimited discretion of the Governor such a determination. Un- der a constitutional government the law of the land can never be depen- dent upon the unrestrictad discretion of a official, be the office he holds ever so high. The fact that no Gov- ernor has taken longer than sixty lays in which to perform his con- | stitutional duty in signing bills after the final adjournment of our General Assembly and that Connecticut peo- ple can trust to our Governors not to abuse their powers is 2 s of protection against abuse of power which neither our constitution nor our law can recognize. The final consideration which the State presses upon us is that if this constitutional provision i: so con- trued as to prevent the signing of bills by the Governor more than three days after the final adjourn- | ment of the ral Assembly very many spe ws under which pub- lic and private corporations and in- dividuals have trustfully acted will spec the power to S best thought to a matter of this char- acter. If the conclusion reached could not avoid these disastrous con- sequences it would but declare the | voice of the law, although it would have no part in the responsibility of | having aided in the creation of the situation which it would deeply de- plore. ; We turn now from a discussion of the claims of the State to a discus- sion of those of the defendants. O one point the pa every bill must be signed ernor before it becomes a la: constitutional _provisi ) doubtedly drafted from tnz similar provision found in Scction 7 of Arti- cle st of the Constitution of the United States. " The Characteristic difference in the two provisions are in the period provided for the return of bills, da; in the Federal Constitution gainst three in the State Constitu- tion, and in the provision requiring in the Federal Constitution two-thirds of each house to pass a bill which the President has returned for re- consideration, ile our State Con- stitution requires a majority only to pass a bill over the Governor's veto. Lack Federal Decision There is no federal decision of the ates Supreme Court upon point we are considering. been held that an Act of presented to the President ngress W sitting and him when Congress w in specified time, but with- , Sundays excepted, after t was presented to him, imme- cly upon its signing became a Laabra Silver Mining Company United States Co ct al v. United States, decided Supreme Court of the United | States May 27, 1929, that an interim adjournment of ~Congress having been taken at the end of the first session, 2s a result of which, al- thoueh the lezislative existence of the Houso in which the bill originated has not bzen terminated, prevents the President from returning it to uch House, and that in consequence the bill did not become a law. It was wso held t the same rule would apply in the case of a final adjourn- ment. Only ore P: t, so far as we are informad, has signed bills after the adjournment of Congress but within ten days after the return of the bills to him. President Wilson did this on the advice of the Attor- ney-Gene: His innovation ap- proved of in an article in 30 Yale Law Journal, page 1, entitled “The 1¢ | Power of the President to Sign Bills after Congress Has Adjourncd.” b; Professor Linsley Rogers. The practical construction placed upon the federal constitution corre- sponds with that which was ac- cepted and followed unquestioned, a: to our related constitutional provi- sion, certainly up to 1919, In view of the language of Okanagan Indian Tribe ct al v. United States, surpa, it may well the Supreme Court of the United States will give its approval to the practice inaugurated by President Wilson. However, it cannot, we think, be doubted that it will not construe this section of the Federal Constitution so that it may grant to | the President the power to sign bill: more than ten day adjournment of the Congress. Other State Constitutions The provisions of the constitutions of three of the states are so similar to the provision of our own constitu- tion under consideration as to make thereunder of pertinent ity. In Illinois the provi- s: “Unlecs the Gen- by their ad- its return, in d bill shall be re- day of the meet- ment prey: which case the s: turned on the fi ing of the Gene pivation of sai Ellery ed to B S rewurn the Governor after the legislature had adjourned but within 10 days after its return to him. ‘“The single question we have now to consider is whether a bill passed by both Houses, and pre- sented to the Governor before the legislature adjourns, bec a law when signed by the Governor after the session of the legislature has been terminated by an adjournment; but within 10 days from its presen- tation to him. We have no hesitation in saying it does. There is certainly no express provision in the Constitu- tion to the cont All that insoru- ment requires at, before any bill, which has passed the two Houses, can become a law, it shail be presented to the Governor. “If he approves it, he may sign it within the time, the bill becomes a aw. That is not said in so many words, but is manifestly implied. After a bill has been signed, the legislature has nothing more to do with it.” The provision in the New York constitution adopted in 1822, followed in its related provision in substance the latter part of the lan- ize in our section 7 of Article ourth—*“in which case it shall be a unless returned on the first day of their next meeting.” In his opinion in People v. Bowen 21, N. Y. 577, Judge Denio wrote, “I think that he (the Governor) would not be justified in acting upon a bill fter ten d: had elapsed whether the session continued or not. “In Solomon vs. Commissi of Car- tersville, 41, Ga., 1 a bill signed by the Governor two months after the adjournment of the legisiature did not become a law. The language, “Unless the General sembly, by “their adjournment, pre- vents its return, in which case it shall not be a law” in th light of the practical construction accorded this language from 1877 to 1919, may be construed, by implication, as if containing the additional words, ‘unless it be signed within the above three day: excepted, period.’ It has been so construed in most of the cases which have expressed an opinion on this point as to similar constitution=l provisions in other states. In Hartne Black, 95 Vt. 201, the court said: We come to the question whether the Constitution permits the Govar- nor to give his assent to a bill which is presented to him after the Legis- lature has adjourned. The question has not often arisen, and there is The history surrounding this mat- | be voided. No court could fail to rea- | not entire harmony in the decisions. an extraordinary situation which struction would involve, and that be against public policy to permit thi the trial court ought to have dis- | realization would lead it to give lhc‘lo be done, as there would be no limit It | be questioned whether | after the final | by him | before | most caveful investigation and its [to time within which such bills would | become laws, resulting in serious | constitution limits the time within which the Governor may give valid- ity to a bill by signing it to a period of five days (Sundays excepted) from the time it is presented to him.” Note 37 L. R. A. 39. In Constitutional Convention The reading of the uebates of the Connecticut Constitutional Conven- tion of 1902 page 2283 et seq. fairly indicates that neither that body nor the eminent lawyers and distinguish- ed publicists among its membership cntertained the idea that the Gover- nor had power to sign bills more than three days (Sundays excepted) after.the final adjournment of the General Assembly. It is interesting to note that Attorney-Generai Phelps failed in his attempt to substitute for ‘‘days” in this provision legisla- tive da; Later this court by its construction gave to “days” in the case then before it the meaning leg= islative days. State vs. South Nor- walk, 77 Conn. 257. As the debate progressed Delegate Brown of Nor- wich offered a motion originally suggested by Governor Waller and approved by Delegate Lewis Sperry, substituting ten days for three days in the provision now under discus- sion. The definitely expressed reason given for this action was to give the Governor time to pass on bills re- turned to him before or at the time of the final adjournment. In State v. South Norwalk, Conn. 257, a bill which originated in the House was passed by the General Assembly and returned to the Gov- ernor. The House adjourned for | more than three calendar days (Sun- | days excepted) after its presentation to the Governor, so that he was un- able to return it within three calen- Under these conditions we held that the term “three days” as used in Section 12 of Article Fourth of the constitution must be read with due reference to the con- text and “cannot have been employ- ed to denote in all cases three cal- |endar days,” but means “three days during each of which there is an op- portunity to return a bill to the house in which it originated while |in actual session.” Three legislative days might necessarily mean a per od longer than three calendar days, but must include the three calendar days. The General Assembly by its final adjournment ended all legisla- tive days but it left a part of the three legislative days operative, namely the three calendar days. Un- der the construction outlined the in- tention of the framers of this sec- tion will be carried out and the vio- lation of constitutional principle avoided by requiring that bills pre- ented to the Governor may not be i 77 § excepted, after the final ad- Jjournment of the General Assembly. Grave Abuse Might Arise We leave the discussion of the con- stitutional point involved bricf presentation of two considera- tions which are of most serious im- port. If the Governor has power un- der the constitution to determine the precice moment when each and every Act, returned to him and un- signed by him within three days of the final adjournment of the Gener- al Assembly, shall become effective as a law, grave public abuse might follow the possession and use of this extraordinary power. T'rom 1850 down to the present time the General Assembly las des- {ignated the day when public acts shall not become laws. Its power so to act has never been, as far as we can discover, publicly challenged. If the Governor can determine -by his won will when public acts shall be- come laws his will will override the long-exercised power of the General Assembly. Their exercise since 1850 of this power is compellinglv sug- gestive of a legislative construction as denying to the Governor the pow- - |er to sign Acts of the Legislature at any time at his discretion and as censtruing the constitution as deny- ing him the right to sign legislatve acts more than three days after the adjournment of the General Assem- bly. The construction accorded this provision of the constitution, in |conformity with the long settled practice of the executive and legis- lative departments of our govern- ment, is not only convincingly per- suasive, but almost controlling upon ‘the’ construction to be given the same | constitutional provision by the judi- cial department. Acts Are Vold We have thus considered the chief arguments in favor of the construc- tion giving to the Governor the power to sign bills presented to him, tafter the three day period, and those |opposed to according him this power. We recognize the gravity of the public situation if the Governor is denied this power, but wec are (nbhged to hold, for the reasons stat- ed, that acts signed after the three |day period, whether public or pri- vate, are void. The burden imposed upon the Governor of having a very consider- |able percentage of all bills passed at 1the session of the General Assembly |returned to him after its final ad- Journment—many of these the most |important of the se: ion—literally ! prevents his fair consideration of the merits of this mass of legislation within the constitutional tlree day ‘pm'md. If he sign all of these bills the people may be deprived of the |overnor’s considered view of these measures and the constitutional check upon hasty, ill-considered and | publicly inimical legislation removed by the pressure of the burden placed upon the Governor. On the other hand, bills which the Governor does not sign, however meritorious they may be, will fail to become laws. The avoidance of this untoward pub- lic situation is neither hard to see nor difficult to enforce. | A better distribution and a prompt- er disposition of the business of the General Assembly and the avoidance of leaving the most important bills to the closing days of the session [will not only relieve the Governor from the burden of a duty which is impossible of proper performance, cept under the most except.onal ircumstan but will also tend to yive tho General Assembly the op- Jortunity for more extended consid ition of important measure. vecess taken by the General Assem- after it is through with its bus- of ten days, would give the Governor the opportunity of fairly considering bills returned to him, ter presents a very unusual and even |lize the consequences such a con- | The petitioner argues that it would |and gice the General Assembly the (Continued On Page 28)

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