New Britain Herald Newspaper, August 16, 1927, Page 16

Engineers, Studying Flood That Swept Over 20,000 Square Miles, Drowning Hundreds and Driving 500,000 People From Their Homes, Tell Just What Must Be Done to Prevent Another Such Catastrophe Scene at Mounds, lllinols, after the swirling tide " had battered down inadequate levees to spread i death and destruction over the countryside AN the Mismissippl River be tamed? Army engineers, facing the dis- couraging fact that the 1927 floods in the Mississippi Valley have been the worst since 1844, in spite of all the flood control work accomplished in the interim, say it can. Disagreeing on detalls, they agree on this—that it will take years and cost the country billions. It is unlikely that the engineers will find the American people stingy when the time comes to reckon the total cost, however, for the grim “American trag- edy” that rampant nature has been stag- ing in the lower reaches of the Miss- issippi this year has made a tremendous {mpression upon the average citizen. As these lines are written, and with the raging waters still battering away the levees and inundating countrysides, it seems probable that the 1927 flood loss will reach the staggering total of $300,000,000. Countless lives have been lost, 500,000 persons have been rendered homeless, the morale of whole communities has been destroyed. Better “billions for defense than millions and human lives for tribute and sacrifice.” Curbing the mighty stream is not as simple as it may look to the layman, and even the best of engineers, as has been intimated, do not agree on all the details. But most of them, particularly army engineers, who have been studying the problem for years, agree that an ade- quate levee system is the first bulwark of defense. Permanent spillways, emergency reservoirs and a reforesta- tion program may help, but in the end the people of the fertile valley must look to their levees for protection. The course of the river from St. Louis to the Gulf of Mexico is approximately 1170 miles, or, doubled, a riparian fron- tier of 2340 miles. Part of the land along this front is pitched so high it needs no artificial barrier against the waters. Elsewhere the land is protected now by dikes, or levees. There are 1815 miles of levee between St. Louis and the Gulf. The layman will wonder, of course, why the river was able to go on the rampage, when confined in such a strait-jacket. To which the engineers reply that the strait-jacket was not strong enough. In other words, the leeves were not continuous enough, thick enough or high enough. Arguing that the levees are the first- line trenches in the war on the Miss- issippi, the engineers want to study the records of the present flood, and then have the country build a rampart of dikes along the lower stretches of the river, strong anough and high enough to Flood victims at Little Rock, Arkansas, abandoning their home and saving some of their household goods from the rapidly rising waters A tragic incident during the Biblical deluge of Noah’s time, as imagined by the famous artist, Gustave Dore hold the water in check under any and all conditions. In New Orleans alone, such a project would cost unestimated millions, they admit. Railroad tracks and docks in that city were built with the present levee levels as the basic grade, and would have to be torn up and built over. Neverthe- less, such authorities as Major General Edgar Jadwin, chief of the army engi- neers, and commander of the forces fighting the flood of 1927, say that is what must be done. Other things be: es, but first of all, that. Major General Jadwin admits that cven high, strong levees, taken by them- selves, won't check the M: ppi if it ever goes amuck again as it has this vear. And there is no sensible reason for hoping that it won’t. He is studying a project for construct ing a series of permanent spillways along the Mississippi—drains similar to the temporary crevasse which was opened below New Orleans a few weeks ago. Jadwin has not dismissed the projec as impracticable, and other army engi- neers are enthusiastic about it. Com- pared with some other undertakings which have been suggested, it would be inexpensive. Another plan calls for the construc- tion of great emergency reservoirs in the upper reaches of the Ohio and Mis- souri Rivers. These reservoirs would permit the flood waters to be released «radually upon the lower bed of the Mississippi. About this proposal, Jadwin is not so enthusiastic. He believes it might give velief during local floods. To give relicf during great floods, such reservoirs would have to be constructed in the fer- tile valleys of the Mississippi itself, or its tributaries. Regardless of the build- ing cost, the land submerged would be equal in value to fhe land which would ordinarily be inundated in a flood year. Major General Jadwin thinks the res- ervoir plan as a solution of the difficulty would be impracticable anyway, because of the expense, and he points out that 832,000,000 was spent making head- water reservoirs in the Dayton flood con- trol district some years ago. And there is no comparison between that little district and the thou- sands of square miles of land in the Mississippi Valley area. Fig- ures compiled by his subordinates convince him that to be effective, the reservoirs would have to oc- cupy a great deal more territory than that occupied by the Great Lakes. “Higher levees, spillways and reservoirs are the three main sug- gestions made by those interesting themselves in flood control,” Jad- win is quoted as saying. And he added that a few enthusiasts are still crusading for a reforestation policy, on the premise that it would be a major factor ih influencing rainfall and keeping the river within bounds. Yet the greatest flood on rec- ord, back in 1844, came while the north- west was covered with primeval forests. So it all gets back to the levees; big- ger and better levees. And they will cost millions. Between 1844 and 1879, the people of the Mississippi Valley spent about $100,000,000 building leeves, which were, naturally, not built according to a very coherent plan. In 1879 the United States government took a hand, and be- tween that year and 1922 $90,000,000 was spent ngthening and extending the levee system. In 1922 the floods reached a high water mark that terrified the inhabitants of the valley, and convinced the army engineers that something really drastic must be done. Studying the records of 1922, the engineers decided that the levees along the lower reaches of the river ought to be raised three feet. Con- gress voted $60,000,000 to do it, and when the 1927 floods began, $30,000,000 Copyright, 1927, by Johnson Features, Inc. had been spent. The records of 1922 have been surpassed in this vear of disaster, and the estimate of three feet add- ed to the levees is recognized as no longer adequate. As this story is written engi- neers themselves do not know what the new estimate will be. But they mean to make it high enough this time. Certain facts confront them, and will not change. One is that floods result from heavy rains in the spring, and you can’t stop that. Levees already built must in some in- stances be strengthened as well as heightened. ~Cities other than New Or- leans will be hard hit by the proposed program, having to raise their railroad tracks, docks and other waterfront facili- ties to conform. When the engineers say it will cost billions to put “ole Debil Miss- issip” back in a strait-jacket that will hold, they mean billions, and not maybe. The indirect expense of a levee-heighten- ing program will reach hundreds of mil- lions. Probably it will be $100,000,000 in New Orleans and a few other Louisi- ana towns alone. Few Americans, even in the devas- tated area, have any idea of the magni- tude of the 1927 floods, or the havoc they have wrought. Close to 20,000 square miles of land—most of it fertile and due to yield—are under water as these lines are written. Crops, buildings, railroad beds, livestock have been de- stroyed. The cost of rehabilitation will be great. The indirect loss to business will be greater. The damage to public confidence is not easy to estimate in dollars and cents. The loss of life can- not be estimated in money at all. A remarkable airplane photograph of McGehee, Arkansas, that gives a graphic picture of what the flood did to hun- dreds of towns in the Mississippi Valley Train running on flooded rails at Ensby, Tenn., carrying refugees to one of the many emergency camps established on ground above the angry water’s reach City people always find it difficult to understand why others continue to dwell in regions continually exposed to such menaces as blizzards, floods, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tornadoes. Anyone who knows anything about land, however, understands that valleys through which broad rivers run are dis- proportionately productive of the things that go to sustain life. “One ¢an’t have everything,” says the farmer of the Miss- issippi Valley, calling his family together after the flood subsides, and plodding back to the old homestead, or what there may be left of it. The plot of ground is the farmer’s busi- ness as well as his home. He has taken root there. The ground has given him a good living. Better than he could make in the comparative security of a hillside farm, So he goes back. Floods come only every once in so often, he figures. Be- fore the next one comes, he may have made enough to take his family to the city. And, too, there may not be an- other one. Hope is what keeps people alive. Hope is what sends them back to the farms below Vesuvius after an erup- tion; to the Galveston waterfront after a tidal wave; to the Florida beaches after a storm; to the pleasant valleys of the Mississippi when the waters go down.