Evening Star Newspaper, February 21, 1932, Page 23

EDITORIAL SECTION he Sundoy Star. Part 2--8 Pages SELFISHNESS AT ARMS PARLEY BARED European Proposals Revealed as Effort to Exploit World Demand for Armament Reductions. BY FRANK H. SIMONDS. ENEVA —The flood of eloquence heads of delegations in the Disarmament Conference for three solid weeks having abated, fairly clear idea of the points of view contained in the proposals of respective powers. the statesmen of every country were consciously under the double necessity of convincing their own fellow coun- est possible effort to reduce armaments with the smallest conceivable sacrifice of their national security interests. cumstance that all statesmen have clearly pronounced for a reduction of armaments and at the same time all any actual decrease in the costs and numbers of their armed forces. In reality, three major proposals have Prench, German and Anglo-Saxon, al- though many variations of these theses are discoverable in the suggestions of should perhaps, for accuracy, note a fourth program, that of Soviet Russia. Which amounts to the idea of immediate gard to any other considerations. Secarity French Aim. The French proposal turns wholly es to establish, under the control of the League of Nations, an international force to carry out international superstate with the function of main- taining order is wholly the duty of our Federal Government jurisdiction: in other words, to be pro- Vided with the means of police power. In practice, the means are to be fur- member nations: aside from this, such air forces are to be restricted vigorously. If the Tardieu formula was applied. which has beaten upon devoted it is at last possible to arrive at som At the outset it was plain to all that trymen that they were making the larg- From this results the unmistakable cir- have attached impossible conditions for been laid before the conference, the statesmen from other countries. One end complete disarmament without re- upon the question of security. It pro- Por the League to be an international when State rights conflict with national nished by drafts upon the air forces of any nation undertaking by violence to upset the existing system founded upon | peace treaties would instantly be sub- Ject to sanctions. The status Quo Which satisfies France a would be insured implicitly. French proposal is founded upon the conception that when this system was accepted and established the reduction of armies and navies would naturally follow France, Poland and Czechoslovakia. for example, are fearful of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the Polish Corridor and of the eventual realization of the | Austro-German Anschluss. They rea- son that such a League of Nations force would protect them from further litical attacks such as Hitler has osed in Germany and would uphold their territorial inteerity. ‘The German proposal, by contrast, is | based upon the priciple of equality of armed forces with France, as a moral right and also as a legal right that is slleged to be implicit in the terms of | the Versailles treaty as to German dis- armament. The German demand in- volves no increase in German forces to the level of the French army. nor does it seek equal strength with the British navy: but, on the whole, it suggests a reduction of both to the limits of Ger- man armament fixed by the treaty. In a word, Germany would thus be freed of all military inequalities imposed by the treaty of Versailles. ‘Would Reduce Handicap. ‘The effect of the German proposal, however, would remove the present French military superiority and reduce the handicaps of a German attempt, at a later time, to recover her lost ter- ritories by a new war and to realize the Anschluss agreement with Austria. Since Germany exceeds France in pop- ulation and industrial resources—that is. in potentialities of war, such a basis of equality would actually spell periority in fact. Thus the equality of security demanded by Germany could prove a long step toward war revenge and recovery. Italy supports the German thesis of equality of armaments between the great powers because Italy, by reason of her poverty, cannot equal the Prench military strength save as the French power is reduced. The ultimate object of Italian policy is not a blind support of Germany. but a desire to hold & balance of power between law. | analagous to | nd her allies | ‘The | | disarmament su- | OF NATIONS France and Germany, and to exploit this situation. But this possibility is out of the question as long as France and her allies retain the present mili- | tary advantage. It is manifest, therefore, that German and Italian policies are concerned with ‘dlsarmxment, not primarily with the | idea of reducing their own armaments, | but bringing the French down to their | own level. leaving to the future the | question of the use of equal strength. | France and her allies, for their part, are interested in giving the League | superstate powers, not primarily in the interests of disarmament, but to co- ordinate the present situation chal- lenged by both Germany and Italy. Nominally, both Anglo-Saxon powers advoate disarmament without regard to political questions. Actually, the British proposals are limited to re- ductions of the kind of arms that are most dangerous to British security, and even to the nation’s actual existence: namely, the submarine and the air- plane. British Aims Explained. Similarly, the British concern for the abolition of the battleship is due | to the double fact that capital ships | are too costly for the British purse un- ‘d?r present conditions, and to the fre- | quency of naval bases which permit the | use of smaller ships with equal ef- fectiveness. Japan supports the aboli- tion of battleships and airplane carriers | by reason of the fact that the objective | of all Japanese policy is the supremacy | of Asiatic waters and the elimination of all craft permitting the approach of other sea powers. By contrast. the United States advo- cates retention of the capital ship of large tonnage becausse of her few wide- v scattered naval bases, and Japan in- sists upon the submarine as a defen- sive weapon best adapted to her own strategic problems. ‘Thus, in fact, all three projects for disarmament, when examined at close range, are not actual disarmament pro- grams at all, but are attempts to use the world demand for disarmament to reinforce the existing national situa- tion. The Russian project is the most trans- parent iilustration of this spirit, since the chief purpose of bolshevism is the overthrow of the existing order within other countries. The first step is the removal of armies and navies, which would leave only police barriers to the spread of Red revolution. It was the collapse of the Russian army which opened the way for the Red triumph in Russia. Only a similar elimination of the armed forces of capitalistic states can give the Communist masses a | chance to repeat the Soviet achievi ment everywhere |~ The sum total is that Americans must | perceive that ail of the humanitarian and lofty moral principles so far uttered at Geneva represent in fact no change in policies of countries represented there, but are attempts to realize the objectives of the several nations now based upon military or naval strength by means of | programs advantageous to themselves and restrictive to their | rivals or present enemies. | All Powers Determined. Great Britain does not even consider | resigning her claim to the two-power | naval standard in Europe. France does not accept any notion of the modifica- tion of existing frontiers. Nor is Ger- many less determined to attain treaty revision. So far the conference pro- grams are little more than a merry game of realizing by “reduction” what has been obtained or is still sought by arma- ments. Precisely as at Paris where the vic- torious nations employed the doctrine of self-determination for the partition of the defeated states, so all Euro- | pean powers now are seeking to exploit the doctrine of disarmament similarly to attain national ends. Meantime. there is a clear perception that actual achievement along this line is impos- sible, leading to a growing emphasis on humanizing the means of war. But this, as the speedy scrapping of | the restrictive Hague conventions dur- | ing the World War demonstrated, is ultimate futility. Thus. once the na- tional statements are all made a state of deadlock is bound to ensue. Artemus Ward's declaration that the “rebellion must be put down if it took all of his wife's relations” is paralleled by the determination of every European state to achieve disarmament if it takes the last gun or the last division of its neighbors. (Copyright, 1932.) Canad:;U. S. Trade Likely to Decrease In Move for Intraempire Commerce OTTAWA, Ontario.—The flow of trade between the United States and Cenada probably will be lessened as a result of the imperial economic confer- ence which will take place here next July and dhe objective of which will be the Tejuvenstion of commerce Within the British Empire. In Canada both major political par- ties—Conservatives and Liberals—are committed to measures for the develop- ment of the intraempire commerce, while in Britain there is a government which is prepared to go to the length of imposing taxes on foreign foodstuffs in order to give Canadian and empire commodities preference. In Australia a strong administration is assuming office with a declaration for “an effective British preference and interdominion reciprocity,” and for the Tullest obtainable measure of prefer- ential empire trade. Favor Canada on Wheat. R. B. Bennett, prime minister of Canada, upon his return recently from London, where he conferred with Pre- mier J. Ramsay MacDonald, J. H. Thomas, Stanley Baldwin and other leading members of the British govern- ment. said the sine qua non of the ap- proaching imperial economic _confer- ence was the wheat quota. He indi- cated that the tentative proposals under consideration allotted 70 per cent to the overseas empire, 15 per cent to home- grown wheat and only 15 per cent to foreign wheat. Of the 70 per cent, Canada’s share was to be 80 per cent or about 56 per cent of Britain’s entire requirements. This would mean a defl- nite and guaranteed mavket in the Unked Kingdom for sbout 100,000,000 Sushels annually at world prices. X is expected that Canada, in return for a preference in the British wheat ‘merket, will give Britain some special tariff preferences for goods not manu- factured in this country. The Bennett government, elected to office in July, 1930, on high-tariff policy, 1s giving Canadian manufacturers the atest protection possible from foreign petition. It would appear to be doubtful whether Premier Bennett will reduce the tariff generally to permit British manufacturers to compete suc against the Canadian cessfully mmu: facturers. g sl this country, and it will be up to the British manufacturer to conquer the geographical advantage enjoyed by the American manufacturer. The British manufacturer will have to learn to hustle and to advertise and must es- tablish warehouses for special parte and even branch factories. Favored Nations to Suffer. Canada recently gave notice that next June she would abrogate a trade treaty with France, which is the basis of all most-favored-nation clauses of com- mercial_treaties sanctioned by the Ca- nadian Parliament. Canada hasextended a reciprocal customs agreement to Argen- tina, Belgium, Colombia, Cuba, Czecho- slovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portu- gal, Rumania, Serb - Crost - Slovene Kingdom, Spein, Bweden, Switserland and Venezuela. All these coutries return to Canada’s general tariff next June, so that at the imperial eco‘%:mc conference new terms will be mi with Britain and the dominions for goods and produce which came into Canada formerly under the most-favored-nation treaties. (Copyright. 1932.) —e. Canadians Are Drinking Less and Smoking More however, | WASHINGTON, D. C, SUNDAY MORNING, FEBRUARY 21, 1932. Tackling Far East Problem League Commission BY GROVER CLARK. IVE men, one of them an Ameri- can, now are on the Pacific, steaming toward the Far East, on a mission which marks the beginning of a new era. Their trip is less spectacular but historically more important than Alexander’s march into India three centuries before Christ, or than many others of the long series of moves by which Westerners have penetrated into the East since that ime. In the past the people of the East and the West have felt that they were divided by a great gulf. Across that gulf of basic different-mindedness mil- itary or commercial or philanthropic bridges might be thrown, but the gulf remained to prevent anything of real association in the family of nations. Westerners might invite Easterners as guests, to be received in formal top hats and frock coats, or permit them to come as laborers to be exploited. Easterners might submit to Westerners or pay them elaborate courtesies. But neither felt toward the other the shirt- sleeve easiness of a family circle. Each has taken from or given to the other: there has been little real understand- ing or co-operation. These five men are going neither to take nor to give anything. Their im- mediate duty, as defined by the resolu- tion of the Council of the League of Nations of December 10, 1931, by which they are being sent. is “to study on the spot and report to the Council any circumstances which, affecting inter- national relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them on which peace depends.” Authority of Commission. ‘The commission thus has full author- ity not only to inquire into the situation in Manchuria and at Shanghai. but also | to study the anti-Japanese boycott in | China and all the rest of the large German Situation Grave Both French and Teutons Proerastinate as Conditions Within Nation Grow Worse. BY EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER. ERLIN —Relentlessly and, In German eyes, inevitably and Justifiably, paign for revising what are eon- sidered as the most Intolesmble features of the treaty of Vemsalles I going forward. Germany's proposal at the General Disarmament Conference in Geneva, with its leading idea of eliminating all those sorts of weapons which Germany is forbidden to possess by that treaty, is simply another step toward achieving “international equality,” whose justice is clear to virtually every German. This means the setting aside of large sections of the treaty of Versailles. To OTTAWA, Ontario—Cansadians are drinking less and smoking more, ®o- cording to official statistics, which show that 60 years ago the average Canadian | e 2 drank twice as much 1931, annual per head amounted to 4.02 pounds, the heaviest for any year recorded, while the lightest consumption occurred in 1879-80, when it totaled only 1.03 pounds per head. Revenue derived from excise and customs duties on to- bacco in the last fiscal year amounted to $4.31 a head. Revenue derived from duties on spirits reached its highest per capita mark in 1928-9, when it totaled $4.48. ht: fiscal year revenue derived on spiris amguiad o 840 ! Prance this process, if accomplished by s hostile Germany, means the loss of France’s political predominance and, in political decline, or war. the German cam-|3D, Marks Beginning of N accumulation of causes for the mutual dislike and distrust of the Chinese and Japanese for each other. The going of these five men is almost uniquely significant because the com- | mission which they form is the first | body of men to go from the West to the East not as Westerners, but as representatives of an organized world sepeifically delegated to co-operate Wwith the representatives of Eastern nations, who also belong to this organized | world. Western nations have taken a hand in Eastern aflairs before this, both individually and jointly. sentatives of the East have met Wwith those of the West in conferences which dealt with Eastern matters. But always, hitherto, East and West have been sep- arate, apart, reaching across to each other in enmity or friendship but not, in spirit or in fact. integral parts of a single whole. The dispatch of this commission by the League of Nations | shows that so many bridges of so many kinds have been built across the gulf | that the bridges have become more important than the gulf. The League of Nations was organ- ized on such a basis as to include the nations of the entire world, simply as nations, not as belonging to East or West. The crisis in Manchuria_raised no new issue as to whether the League of Nations as such should seek to pro- mote a peaceful solution. The League ‘was bound to do that by the very prin- ciples on which it rests. The real ques- tion was whether East and West had in fact been welded nearly enough into a single whole to make it possible to put these principles into effect. Many Americans are asking three special questions about this commis- sion. Why was it appointed? the American Government authorize an American member and suggest one of the most distinguished American Army officers for this position? How | lcng is the commission likely to be at ! work, and what may it be expected to can permanently guarantee European stability and peace. This outstanding dispute between France and Germany, therefore, is a matter of the terms of und “We shall sign a treaty with the French, but not yet—perhaps not this Repre- | Why did | Era—Gulf Between East accomplish? These questions can be answered briefly. | The League Council happened to be |in session when the Japanese made | their first military move. It Immediately | took the matter in hand. both on its | own initiative and at the request of China. Japan insisted that the dispute | was one which concerned China and | Japan alone. thereby in eflect asserting | the old doctrine of the separation of the East and West. The League and the American Government both thought | differently. ent that the explosion in Manchuria had grown out of long-standing con- | flicts of interests between Chinese and Japanese. and that a lasting settlement of these conflicts could come only through consideration of the entire and | confused mass of facts involved. There- | fore the council returned several times to the proposal which China had made soon after the start of the trouble: That a League commission of inquiry | be appointed to study the situation. | Finally when Japan had not carried | out the League instructions to withdraw | her troops by November 16. the council | became insistent. Japan was maneu- | vered into the position of agreeing |to a commission which simply would | study the facts and report. The League | did not get all it wanted. but it did secure Japan's acceptance of the prin- | ciple that the world as a whole was concerned with any dispute between any two nations from San_ Prancisco on February and will land at Yokohama on Feb- ruary 29. The commission has no specific pro- | gram laid out: its course wil depend upon circumstances. It was authorized | before the new crisis at Shanghai had | developed, and presumably. therefore, will concern itself first of all with the situation in Manchuria. But the reso- | lution which authorized it. either by | deliberate intent or by inadvertence, year, perhaps not next year, but surel: one of the highest German political authorities told me recently. “It is only a question of waiting until the creeping economic crisis has convinced the Prench that they cannot remain hale in the midst of a diseased world, Agitation Is Revived in France to End Execution of Criminals in Public Place PARIS.—There is an outcry at pres- ent in France against public execu- tions. It is raised periodically and hitherto it has been unavailing. Con- sequently criminals sentenced to death continue to be guillotined “in a public place,” which in practice means in front of the jail gates. ‘The outcry comes on this occagion because it is becoming evident $hat President Paul Doumer is noz an op- " | ponent, to capital ‘Want Undesstanding. Curiously enough, although outwardly anti-French feeling in Germany has be- come so strong that for the first time since the end of the Ruhr occupation in 1923 Frenchmen are being publicly scowled at and their lives here are being made unhappy, all the German author- ities, actual and potential. including the national Socialist leader himself, Adolf Hitler, declare that they want nothing so much as an understanding with Pranee. he entered into office last June he has exercised ‘his prerogative of clemency on two occasions out of six, allowing the law to take its course in the four other cases. Of the two murderers reprieved one was French and the other Portuguese; of the four executed one was French, one Italian and two Arab. The foreign population of France is one in twenty. By law executions in PFrance must take place at dawn. On a recent oc- casion Anatole Deibler, the executioner —who succeeded his father and who will sucoeeded by a quarter of an hour. He did this to prevent incidents; at the same time he furnished opponents of public exe- cutions with a strong argument. The radio gave the word that the guillotine was being set up in front of the Sante Prison in Paris, with the consequence that patrons of night clubs hastened to the spot, together with keeping a variega of men in tuxedos and women in costly furs, shoulder to shoulder with men in caps and women of the streets. Many stood on the roofs of some 400 taxicabs. So that the execution became a kind of entertainment for those who do not believe in going early to bed. ‘The death penalty should be an ex- ample and not an entertainment, it is being pointed out, and it is urged that France should the American and w&’g From the start it had been appar- The commission sailed | 13, | in | his own fever. and West May End. made no direct reference to Manchuria, thus leaving the commission free to study the whole field of Chinese-Japa- nese relations. First-Hand Information. The commission was sent partly to give the organized world the chance to get direct and first-hand information | as to what was happening., and why, | and partly to drive home the lesson | that no nation could consider itself, superior to its obligations to the other | nations. | ‘The United States came into the pic- | ture not as a member of the League, but as & co-signer with Japan of the nine-power treaty of 1922 and the Kel- | logg pact of 1928. On this basis it| dealt directly with Japan and co-oper- | ated with the League in considering the Manchurian situation. When the question of a commission of inquiry | acting for the League specifically arose | the American Government was called | lon to choose between permitting an | American to serve as a member of the commission or definitely and emphati- cally repudiating the League as an agency for promoting peace—for a re-} fusal to permit American participation | would have been. in effect. such re- pudiation. The American Government | wisely chose to continue to co-operate with the League. Having so chosen. it proceeded to suggest as the American member of the ommission one of its highest ranking officers, one who had distinguished himself particularly by a long record of international service in helping to settle international disputes. This man, Gen. Frank R. McCoy. was not simply given leave of absence from the Army. All his Army connections were aefi- | nitely severed. so as to make it abso- | Jutely clear that he was serving as a private person and a civilian, |~ Gen. McCoy had his first experience in China in 1960. when he was sent, as T (Continued on Fourth Page.) | when their terms for an understanding | with us will become acceptable.” On the other hand, the pondered opinion of a highly placed French offi- cial is that “within three to six months the situation of Germany will be so catastrophic that the Germans will be happy to come to terms with us as the price of that aid which alone can save their country from complete ruin.” Question of Nerves. Both sides obviously want an under- standing. The situation is_fantastic, terrible and slightly comic. Imagine a burning city. The owners of the two most important blocks of buildings are at fued. Instead of turning to putting out the fire, they refuse to co-operate. Each of them spies over the fence of his neighbor's property, avidly calculat- ing just when the flames will burst from the other's window and fear will drive him to cry for aid. The fire in his own house is meanwhile forgotten. Oor two sick men avidly scanning each other’s face for symptoms of advancing disease, the while ignoring Obviously it is a question of nerves. Objective observers note, however, that both sides may be mistaken. An economic catastrophe in Germany may, for instance, occasion not a collapse of German resistance to the treaty of Ver- sailles, but an accession of hysterical nationalism. Spread of the world crisis to France may cause not a softening, but a hard- ening of the French determination to scotch treaty revision in the bud. If SMITH-ROOSEVELT SPLIT TRACED TO 1928 ELECTION Il Feeling Engefidered by Fact Governor Far Outran Presidential Aspirant in New York. BY MARK SULLIVAN, HE tension between Gov. Roose- velt of New York and ex-Gov. Smith began on election day, 1928. It began in the fact that Roosevelt, as candidate for Gov- ernor, carried the State, while Smith, as candidate for President, lost it. Out of that incident and that comparison arose a feeling on the part of Roose- velt's friends—some of them more loyal than wise—that he was the rising star; Smith the declining one. was accentuated by the election two years later, in 1930, when Roosevelt again carried New York State by a ma- jority never before equaled. With that triumph, Gov. Roosevelt's filends took it completely for granted that Roosevelt had become the certain leader of the Democratic party, its cer- tain candidate for President in 1932. In much of their hope they were justi- fied, for ordinarily a Democratic Gov- ernor of New York who carries the State by so large a majority as Roose: velt did in 1930 is almost automat cally certain to be made the party’s nominee for the presidency. Roosevelt’s friends, as they began to | organize and promote his fortunes for the elevation they felt he was destined for, made a natural but serious mis- take. It is always risky to impute mo- fives to men, yet in reviewing what Roosevelt's friends €id, it is impossible to escape an inference as to what their motives were. Roosevelt's friends must have felt that the association between him and ex-Gov. Smith gave Roosevelt certain political assets and certain lia bilities. The assets they felt sure they could keep; the liabilities they under- took to get rid of. Smith Kept in Background. With an eye on the South and West, | Roosevelt's friends and those who now ook charge of his political fortunes began tactics designed to dissociate Roosevelt from Smith. Smith was kept | at elbow's length. This effort came to climax at the meeting of the Demo- tic National Committee in March, 1931, in the struggle which took place over a policy about prohibition. Smith and his friend, Chairman Raskob, fa- vored a certain wet policy. Near everybody assumed that whatever w Smith's policy about prohibition would also be the policy of the New York State democracy. Roosevelt's friends, having control of the New York State organization, took, to everybody's sur- prise, a position opposed to Smith's. This, with the other efforts that had been made to dissociate Rooseveit from Smith in the public mind, was suc- cessful. The mark of its success is that Roosevelt became, and remains today, the favored candidate of precisely those sections that most oppose Smith— the West and South. But by the time the process had been ul. Roosevelt's friends and man- ere dismayed to discover that in getting rid of the liabilities of associa- tion with Smith, they had also lost some of the assets. During the last few months, until Smith’s recent statement made the clefvage clear. the managers | of Gov. Roosevelt's campaign were most earnest and energetic in their efforts to Testore in the public eye the picure of close political and personal association between Gov. Roosevelt and Smith. With the South and West largely “in the bag.” the Roosevelt managers turned to garnering the North and East, and in this part of their campaign sought zealously to make it appear that there was nothing but intimacy and palship between “Frank” and “Al” By this time, however. Smith was ready to do some dissociating on his own ac- count. His statement on February 8, that he would be willing to take the nomination if the convention should give it to him. not only differentiated him from Roosevelt's candidacy. but in effect made him a rival to Roosevelt. Smith’s Friends Offended. Throughout the process of parting, incidents arose of a kind to accentuate the separation. Some things done—if not by Roosevelt himself, then in quar- ters close to him—gave justified offense to Smith's friends. The atmosphere of the Roosevelt camp seemed one of self- conscious _superiority—"'snooty” is & modern slang ‘word for it—toward Smith. There have been published statements that Roosevel. made a re- mark about Smith’s record as Governor which, when transmitted to Smith’s ears through two intervening persons. had the effect of criticizing the thing of which Smith is most justly proud. (It is fair to add that when publica- tion was made that Roosevelt had be- littled Smith's record as Governor, Roosevelt energetically denied he had made that remark or anything like it.) Smith’s friends tell of incidents, in- cluding newspaper stories, alleged to have been inspired in the Roosevelt camp. which had the effect of detrac- tion of Smith, as well as of Raskob and of other friends of Smith. No doubt the original substance of these inci- dents may have been magnified in pub- lication. Newspapers prefer drama to calm, and controversy to peace; and it is in the nature of things for newspa- pers to emphasize separation between two important public men. ‘That Roosevelt should give offense to Smith, or_permit any one in his circle to give offense, was politically unwise. Nevertheless, the fact that Alfred E. Smith has cause to feel offended in a personal sense at Franklin D. Roosevelt does not of itself necessarily make Roosevelt a less desirable candidate for the presidency, or a less competent President if elected. In no public state- ment made by Smith has he ever given any reason for feeling that Roosevelt would not be the best nominee. About Roosevelt's qualities, Smith has made no public statement whatever, neither for mor against. If Smith has ever made any such statement privately, the v&!fllter of this article knows nothing of it. ‘Backbone of Opposition. It is a fact, however, that other Democratic leaders, some of them prac- tically equal rank with Smith, have grave doubts, on wholly public grounds, whether Roosevelt would be the best nominee, or even the second or third best. These leaders do not have Smith's personal reason for disapproving of Roosevelt. They have no personal feel- ing of any sort about Roosevelt. They have, as a matter of party and public policy, convictions that Roosevelt would not meke the best nominee, nor, if elected, the best President. This’ conviction, entertained by party leaders dissoclated from the tension between Roosevelt and Smith, constitutes the backbone of the so- called Roosevelt” movement. ‘These leaders think it would be dan- gerous to have the party committed, four months in advance of the conven- tion, to nominating one whom these leaders regard as not the best. Those leaders who hold this conviction, with the aid now given them by Smith's at- titude, will be able to keep Roosevelt from rolling up two-thirds of the dele- 80? If so, the Disarmament Conference | B B e ks gates, or even a majority. [ e ‘The nomi- en n- The notion | Roosevelt have it, or deny it to him. The present strong probability is they will deny it to him. 1f the people are to be well informed, they should know the reasons why most of the national leaders of the party hesitate to permit Roosevelt’s nomina~ tion to become an accomplished thing. ‘The leaders hesitate to speak publicly of these reasons. They hesitate partly because their reasons are vague and not very specific. Their reasons are not so much that Roosevelt would make a poor nominee and a poor President as that other men would make better ones. Fear to Express Doubts. ‘They hesitate because they have friendly feeling for Roosevelt person- |ally: there 1s, indeed, a sort of kindly compact of silence about Roosevelt's equipment for the nomination and the presidency. They hesitate because, after all, Roosevelt may get the nomination, in which event national Democratic leaders do not wish to have given pub- lic expression to doubts about his being the best nominee. They hesitate be- cause one of the reasons i their minds is the state of Roosevelt’s health, a doubt whether Roosevelt could stand the strain of the man-killing job the presidency has come to be, and leaders as well as every one else have a natural distaste about suggesting that any man’s health may be a handicap to his fitness for an office to which he aspires. As to all these arguments against Roosevelt's availability, put forward by | Democratic leaders, the energetic and certainly partially convincing answer |made by Roosevelt's friends is that for three years he has been Governor of |New York, and that he has been @ | satisfactory Governor—so satisfactory |that at the end of two years he wa$ | re-elected by the greatest majority ever | received by a candidate for Governor of New York. Roosevelt's friends say that if his health were a real handicap, he could hardly have carried the bur- den of New York's governorship as he has. They insist, indeed, that Roose- velt has been exceptionally energetic in ims attention to the dutles of his office, that he has visited a larger number of | counties 'in the State than any other ‘n‘cem Governor, that in all respects his work has reflected, if anythinng, un- usual vigor. Voices Other Objections. The other reasons adverse to nomi- | nating Roosevelt have been put in words by Walter Lippmann, in a ‘passage in which fairness and gener- osity toward Roosevelt are as conspicu- |ous as the argument against his avail- | ability: “Among the national Democrats, that is to say, among the men who ha held high office or have been influen- tial in the councils of their party, belief is widespread and strong r.‘c | election of Franklin D. Roosevelt w | bring to the office of President & man |of only modefate capacity. . . . It |would not be denied that men less fitted than he have served acceptably ias President of the United States. Nev- ertheless, the judgment exists, and has grown more firm, that he has not the grasp of the issues or the disinterest- edness or the resolution that a Presi- dent must have in time of great emer- gency. No mathematical proof in sup- port of such a judgment can be offered. But that it is the judgment of ob- servers who have no axes to grind, that it is the judgment of men who have very considerable personal liking for | him, is certain. “All the appearances of the fit candidate he possesses. All the insMinctive prejudices run in his favor, It is in spite of his attractive- Tess, in spite of his unquestioned per- sonal integrity, in spite of his generous sympathies, that this judgment has formed itself among large numbers of discerning people that here is a man who has made a good Governor, who might make a good cabinet officer, but who simply does not measure up to the tremendous demands of the (presiden- tial) office. It is this judgment which is cutting deeply into his candidacy, for it is held by men and women whose opinion carries great weight throughout the Nation.” | To all of which Rooseveit's friends | reply: “He carried New York for re- election as Governor by the biggest ma- jority ever given any candidate of either party, and if he's good enough to be so satisfactory a Governor of New York he's good enough to be President.” It isn't quite true that the governor= ship of New York is necessarily a com= plete equipment for the presidency. The political part of tha srgument, however—Roosevelt's record #8 a vote- getter in the largest and most decisive State—will weigh much, even with Roosevelt's critics, when the convention meets. But the time has gone by, if it ever was, when Roosevelt could have been assured of the nomination in ad- vance. The decision will be in the hands of the leaders and delegates, and the nomination may go to any one of three or four. Bulgarian Movement Seeks U. S. Friendship SOFIA.—In the Bulgarian capital there has been founded an American Bulgarian association which will unite all factors working here to bring the two countries into closer relation. Hitherto this object was pursued by the Society of Friends of the United States, the aims of which were mainly social and cultural, and by the Society for Economical and Financial Rapproche- ment between the United States and Bulgaria, created last Summer at Sofia at the instigation of Prof. Arthur I. An- drews of the University of Boston, then trave in Bulgaria, who has assumed of founding in the United States a sister organization %o the American _Bulgarian of Sofia, which is absorbing the two other societies. ‘The honorary presidency has been ac- cepted by Col. Henry Wharton Shoe- maker, American Minister; Nicholas Mushanoff, Bulgarian premier and min- ister of forelgn affairs, and by Simeon Radeff, Bulgarian Minister in Wash= ington. The president is Illa Yanuloff, for- mer deputy, well known Sofia lawyer and professor of sociology at Sofla State g‘r’lliversity. He is also a prominent so- Members of the committee are promi- nent men of Sofia, Bulgarian and American, such as Dobri Bojuloff, di- rector of the Bulgarian State Bank; Dr. M. Sakharoff, governor of the Bulgaria; Agricultural Bank; Pastor M. A president of the Bulgarian Teetotalers’ Federation; P. Mishkoff, leader of the Bulgarian Protestants; Lewis Owen, di- rector of the Sofia branch of the Stand- ard Oil Co, and M. Black." director of the American College at Simeonovo. Needs to Study Cases. Prom the Davton Daily News. It's too bad that scientist who fears the younger generation is % muoch education dfl““l m‘m ':