Evening Star Newspaper, December 24, 1921, Page 3

FRENCH AND ITALIAN SPOKESMEN| OPPOSE ABOLISHING SUBMARINES Admir;al de'Bon and Senator Schanzer Tell Naval C:)mmittee Wfly They Need Un- dersea Craft—Balfour Asks Ban. The following statement was is- sued last night after the meeting of the naval armament committees of the conterence: The third joint meeting of the com- mittee on limitation of Armament and the subcommittee on limitation of naval armament was held this| afternoon, December 1921, at 3 o'clock, in the Pan-American building. Admiral De Bon said that yester- day the conference had entered upon the consideration of the question of abolishing submarines. 1t had lis- tened to a remarkable statement and defense of the British point of view by Lord Lee of Fareham. 7The argu- | ment presented had been .very com- plete and very said that it favoring abolition of the submarine With the most forcible arguments that could be brought to bear upon this side of the question. Another consideration of this particularly remarkable and im- portant question was read by Chair- man Hughe: had the kindnes conference upon logic supported 1 and it may be the view enlighten the the distinguished of the members of committee, the incontes- of their arguments would zed their exceptional to ability The conel was the T cated by the n of this dissertation rse of the view adv Honorable Lord Lee of reham and w in favor of the preservation of the submarine. Differencex of Opinion. two declarations t have de had brought to light about guments that could be Accordingly, it would seem as if the debate might al- most be regarded a exhausted if there were not in the committee cer- tain differences of opinion regarding the various arguments which it would seem desirable to present to the conference. _He asked permission to review them Diiefly before the committee The been ma all the advanced. In the first place, it had been de- 7 s ; et and might be inadmissible. That torpedo Evidently. it use Died that the submatine was really an | e e e m;"}‘:“i:'fi Was 4 question of Taw which ousht {had been made of them as aritraril T honicl was an o8 |mate to do so. In fact, it had always | to be “settled by confning <ueh | qamage ciused by the torpe: e mitteds Tt Was “Obvious (hat |been one of the most effective means |zcticns to the cases where: It WS fiouts would perhaps have e, | there would be almost no reason for | Of seriously erivpling one’s adver- | A nE he would call their at- bDUl What was certain was that n | building submarines. sary. f tention to the ot that the cruel |Many respects the comditions sur- The submarine as a weapon against Aimed to Inwpire Terror. O A ich the Germans had put |rounding them were analogous to| ‘warships could not be considered use- less. If it was indeed true that the great fleet was able to remain at sea during several months in the midst ©f the submarines without any of its| ships being hit, it should be remem- bered that France lost three battle- ships and five cruisers and had sev eral other ships torpedoed—130,000 tons in all. To this list he could add @ certain number of battleships lost by Great Britain and by Italy. Not Useless for Defense. Finally, the offensive action of the submarines necessitated the construc- tion of a considerable defensive sys- tem, and this certainly had an influ- ence toward weakening the general forces of the nations engaged. As a means of defense the subma- rine had not been found useless. It could not. he thought, be denfed that. if Germany maintained her coast in- tact, it*was not solely because of the barrier of mines with which she had protected it. This could have been crossed by any force suitably provided with mine sweepers if a force of sub- marines, supplementary to the mine defenses, had not rendered the ap- proach to them really dangerous. * In the Adriatic the submarines also formed one of the most powerful means of action for the enemy. In whe Dardanelles the allies felt the effect of the use of submarines SPECIAL NOTICES. and, even if he had not; the | not only, duirng the major actions, but | 1so during the long months during | which they remained holding tight to the point of Gallipoli peninsula. The bombardments Svhich the allies were led to make against the Turkish posi- tion were alwayvs considerably hin- | dered by the means of protection of thé ships which they were compelled to take on account of the presence or | threat of submarines in those waters. |The allies had, moreover, paid for | their efforts with the loss of several ships. Good Observation Post. In fighting warships the submarine {could be employed as a scout or rather as an observation post. ery one knew the great extent which the submarine lends itself n wircless communications. It was »byious that this observation post, so diflicult to detect, could approach very near to the enemy. watch his opera- tions and carry either to the fleet whicn it is convoying or to its govern- ing authority, information which | could not otherwise be obtained, espe- !eially for navies which have no power- ful surface craft at their disposal. ships as in the protection of coasts. The submarine had shown especially eflicient against merchant for him to re- call the very considerable results ob- tained in “the submarine warfare waged by Germany against the com- mercial fleets of the world. The mind could not without horror return to this subject which had struck terror to_all peoples. But that which had caused this ter- ror was not the fact that the Ger- mans attacked the merchant vessels of their enemies, but that they had not respected cither the neutral flag, nor steamers loaded with non-bel- ligerents. nor even the transports for the wounded. which should have been protected by the Red Cross flag, which flag, however, even on land, they had often seen fit to violate. It had al- ways been admissible to attack tne If taking an extreme case one might consider it possible to bring one's adversary to the point of yielding, by this process, would it not be less cruel and less wasteful of human life than military operations which would arrive at the same result by direct application of force? One might protest against this in- terpretation, but such would be the result of a blockade, which is a legiti- mate practice, and its effects would not be peculiar to submarines. He understood quite well that this kind of war were allowed would have to be confined within certain limits to prevent it from vio- lating the laws of humanity. merec: in bringing without the Germans. had made use of. In order to impart to the war which they had decided on, the character which they thought would cause our energies ‘to vield the Ger- mans had purely and simply_sunk the boats which they stopped. It would be recalled that at the begin- ning of the submarine campaign, the Germans had aimed above all to in- spire terror and expected to obtain SPECIAL NOTICES. THE EVENING 'STAR WASHINGTON, D from it.a moral effect on 'which they based their hopes. In fact, nobody could have forgotten the propaghnda Jaunched at the beginning of §1915 with all the mighty and wily means of German propaganda. It aimed al- most exclusively at a_moral effect. 1t was only later on that they %ook into consideration the materidls re- sults which could be surely secured by submarine attacks against com- mercial fleets and that they enlarg- ed progressively their acts of piracy. If it was undeniable that Germany had misused the submarines against commercial fleets beyond all criti- cism, could one contend that it would have been impossible for her to act otherwise? All Weapons Misuxed. Moreover, had not the Germans mis- their othet weapons? In the first place one could not deny that they might have avoided attacks against neutral ships, and not have torpedoed passenger ships ®lthout warning, especlally hospital ships. used, and ‘to excess, practically alll |been tmbroiled in such circumstances it is difficult to appreclate the for- midable effort which was necessary to discover the indispensable means for destroying the submarine and to execute them in the midst of s0 Vio- lent a war, which had, up to that time, absorbed all the vital energies of the nations in the struggle upon land. Lack of Defensive Weapons. However it may be, if this small craft committed frightful depreda- tions, it was not alone because the use made of it was barbarous in the extreme, but largely because, during many long months, there was almost nothing with which it could be com- bated. At the end of the war the situa- tion was changed and when the armi- stice came the ravages of the sub- marine had been greatly lessened; the monthly destructton of merchant ships scarcely exceeded 60,000 tons and the methods then in preparation for coping with the danger would have considerably reduced this, while the number of submarines destroyed C., SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1921 of large sized submarines could not| were by nature, something that en- be dismissed. 1f you impose too nar- couraggd defense and discouraged at- row a limit on submarine tonnage, | tack. i8 nothing of the kind. A you will obstruct the progress of | state which is itself not dependent submarine science. Whav you would | upen seaborne commerce, but which accomplish on the one hand you |has some access to the sed, can, with- would undo on the other. out byHdding a battleship, without “To draw a conclusion from the| having' any great naval estimates, foregoing, I think that we cannot!|make itself one of the most formid- reasonably limit submarine tonnage | able of aggressive powers to its mari- since we have before us an entirely | time neighbors. Italy has five mari- new weapon concerning which no | time neighbors in the Mediterranean. one of us can foresee the possible | I hope and believe that peace, eternal transformation and growth, perhaps | peace, will reign in those waters and in_the near future. in those ancient homes of civilization. “If in spite of this idea—which i#| But we are considering these matters {a menace to no one, first, because I|from, as it were, the cold and calcu- ithink no one here can consider that lating point of view of a member of a general staff. He, looking at it without any political knowledge, any one of us could become the en- enemy of-any other, and, secondly, be- cause we can agree, in mutual con- | without any foresight as to the trend fidence, to keep each other informed | of opinion, and merely considering of our future constructions—you | how nations are situated, would say wish absolutely to fix a limit to|to Italy, ‘You have five neighbors, submarine tonnage, I -believe that|each one of which can, if it desires it, 90,000 tons is the absolute minimum | blockade your coast and make' your for all the navies who may want to | position untenable without having a have a submarine force single surface ship of war at their Mr. Balfour's Statement. disposal.” Mr. Balfour said: Takes Up Situation of France. The success of their fight might have been materially lessened; but they would certainly have gained from a moral viewpoint and the Ger- had been steadily increasing. To sum up, in judging the subma- rine, it should not be considered at’' the time of the war, and above all, at “Since the very remarkable state- ment of the anti-submarine case made by Lerd Lee there have been made two notable contributions to “Now I will take the case of France. France is nearly salf-supporting in point of food, and France has a great itself if it That was the precise point on which was based the charge that all had agreed against But the accusation was brought against the men and not against the instrument that they horribe man submarines would not have lost the respect of the civilized world. And then, was it not permissible to think that war against the enemy commercial ships_could have been waged differently? Suppose, for in- stance, that meefing a merchant ship a submarine advised her that she would be destroved as soon as Se- curity for the crew was assured either by proximity to the shore or by means of relief. It would pre- scribe a route to the ship and bring it to a safe place, where it would sink it after having moved the crew. That was merely a supposition and he would not attempt here to formu. late a doctrine, but the delegdte: In a word, as Admiral De Bon said,| Would find in it a thought similar the submarine had proven its worth | 0 that which guided the sailors of as a means of attack asainst war- |other days, when they were making a_prize and taking it to port, or un- til it had been taken from them by the enemy. Question of Law. It might be said that the submarine was cxposed to great risks, but were not the frigates and the corsaires of other days exposed to great risks in similar operations? How many of them had perished either in the de fense of their capture or because they had been unable to escape the at- tacks of their enemies in the course of the coyage? Certainly the fruits of submarine warfare would have been smaller if they had been obliged to confine themselves to the limits of honorable ship even while saving the lives of those on bcard was a questionable their submarines was not confined to this type of vessel. Merchant ves- sels had been scized and, in order to turn them into cruisers, they had been immediately armed. Their crews were retained aboard and forced to take part' in naval actlo This practice. while less inhuman than that inflicted on the crews that were abandoned on the high seas, was nevertheless indefensible. Propoxes Set of Rules, It followed from this that the ac- tivities of submarines against mer- chant vessels should be confined within limits that would render their use legitimate. A proper set of rules ougkt to be drawn up with this ob- ject in view. They should be adopted Wwhenever they effective. No one had been able to guidance of affairs during the war had known and lived through. when Great Britain, together at times with France, was threatened with being deprived of the supplies which were indispensable, not merely for con- WASHINGTON, D. C., DECEMBER 5, 1921.— The anuual meeting of the stockholders of the Real Estate Title Insurance Company of the District of Columbia, for the purpose of elect- ing fifteen trustees of the company for the en- suing year, is to be held at the office of the Company, 5th st. p.w., on Tuesda, January 10, 1922 Polls will be opened at = o'clock and closed at § o'clock p.m. Books for the transfer of stock will be cloxed from De- cember 31, 1921, to January 10, 1922, both tes inclusive. GEORGE G. McELWEE, Sec- B I THE ANNUAL MEETING etary. holders of the American National Bapk of Washington, Washington, D. C.. will be held at its banking house, 1315-1317 F st. n.w., on Tuesday, January 10, 1922, from 12 noon until 1 pm., for the election of directors for the ensuing year and the transaction of such other business as may come before suid meeting. . J. WALLER. Caslier. ilders of th al Capital Bank of Wash- ington, D. C. the election of directors and the transiction of any other busin may be brought to the attention of U 10 will be held at the bank Tuesd 0, 2 nuary noon THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SHARE- lers of the Departmental Bank will be at its banking house in Wi ington. D. o'elock noon, for the ensuing year and fo €. on Tuesday. January 10, 1922, at 13 e election of directors for such other business a8 may proper Defore said meeting. LOUIS OTTENRERG, President. L. A. ROSAFY. Secretary. NATIONAT, for the electio be held at the Junuary 10, 1922, in_the afternoon. CORSON, Cashier. THE ANNUAL MEETING OF hoiders of the Chas. 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Better let our experts look it over. IRON Roofing. 1416 F st. a.w. Company. Phone Maln 14 8o We mod- Bank of Washington, D. C.. held De- tinuing the struggle, but to keep the nation alive : That was the consecration of | the c 1 can be carried on simultaneously und. { cember 22.°1921. a dividend of 83 per share on [ power of the submarine when ex- |3 simultaneously under | the Capital xtock of the bank was declared, Prted to the full extent of its de-[Waler: on the surface and in tae air. Payable Januars 2. 1922 to stockholders of | o yctive possibilities, without re- | Thil s to say, we must, for the moment | rcord at’ close of business, December 27, 1921. s Tmposed by the |consider the naval war of the future Transfer books will not be clued. sard for ébee‘x:l'"‘r“? principles of |{rom this angle, if this greatest of mi: | E. 3. McQUA! «hier. | most rudimentary fortunes should. contrary to the wishes humanity and respect for internation- al law. Submarine activity, within the limits fixed by these considera- tions which should remain sacred to be leld at the principal office of the_ corpora- & ’ s to stop the progress of human in- [ Fion.“caruer of 13th and 15 ate. aow . Wanning. | transports and convoys could still be|gonuity. It has taken possession of [ ton,” D ¢, “Thursday, January o6, 1952, at |Of great importance. It could be in-{the submarine domain. This is a 3:29 pum. €. 'E. GALLIHER, Jr. cluded among the legitimate meth-|fact which we are unable to prevent. ods of warfare as a useful factor,! It is very cértain that the Sub- have a powerful navy. Weapon for Small Navy. In this connection another consid- eration occurred to him. It was said that the submarine could never be kept from bursting through the moral barrier which should limit its activi- ties. It would always yield to the temptation to make unrestricted use of all its powers. Lord Lee had kind- Iy paid the submarine officers and crews of all navies the compliment of stating that he believed them in- capable of the acts imputed to the German submarines. All naval men would be grateful to him. But the honorable first lord feared that offi- cers and men might be confronted by formal orders from their govern- ments, which might be driven by danger into the weakness of issuing such orders. He did not think any government would risk hereafter | employed in fixing the number ‘of | incurring such a responsibility. | these little boats that it is thought He though. besides that if ever|necessary to use. a nation were to again be ca- pable of making such an error, it would not hesitate to commit ana- logous excesses with other means, for example, with air forces which could fill the world with even greater horrors. Against the possibility of a govern- ment erring to such a point, all meas. ures taken by the conference would be in vain. A submarine was useful for fighting war feets. It was useful for fighting merchant marines. The opinion of the French delegation was that it was especially the weapon of nations not having a large navy. It was, in fact, an element in naval war- fare compartively cheap which could be procured in large numbers at a cost far below that of capital ships. It was certain that in order to pro- tect itself against submarines, a naval power was obliged to provide impor- tant means in the way of units for patrolling, searching and attacking them. Auxiliaries Are Available. . At the time when the committee was occupied above all with economic questions, to the point that it was willing to give them precedence over the matter of the satety of nations, this seemed at first an argument worth remembering. Ongp should no- tice, however, that in je formation of a counter submari:¢ fleet the ex- perience of the past war had brought out the fact that France could utilize a considerable number of ele- ments drawn from both the merchant marine and Rshing vessels. In consideration of this fact the de* fensive measures necessary to provide against submarine attack might be notably reduced. Moreover, thisewas an argument of | | | am and_other | & Eeneral nature and applied to-every]] ‘| other naval weapon, fram which, in his opinion, the submarine, as we view it now, did not greatly iffer. It seemed, in fact. that the subm rine had henceforth the right to figé ure as an integral part of naval forces. When it first made its appearnace no one knew to what precise use it might be put. Even the Germans themselves, who in 1914 were several years in ad- vance of other navies, as regard submarines, did not fully realize what use they would make of them. Almost two years of war went by before they definitely decided upon their plan of ‘actton, because their submarines had not. yet been .per- fected. . : = If it was not possible at that time to determine the use which might be made of the submarine, the' means for combating its activity were still more completely unknown., Unless one has warfare. But it was impossible to s claim that there would have been(While. The people in France who fa- ono vored this decision formed a large Mo knew very well that to sink a(and ‘influential ‘group. What would undertook a revision of the rules for applying interna- |that they will be capable not only of at- tional law. which it was imperative |(acks on land, at present almost irre- should be revised not only as ap- {sistible, but also of formidable under- plied to submarines, but with re- |takings far out at sea. In the course of gard to all life at sea in time of |these struggles the airship can spread war. 2 ¢ gas over a considerable area of tie se: Submarine _activity against the | paralyzing large ships, possibly Squad enemy’s merchant fleet might be very lrons. Then will we not look forward listen without great emotion as Lord | inarine which, supp'ied with ; ) powerful Lee recalled the hours of anguish {means against airciaft, may ci that all those who had held the laround and guard the fleet? The cac honorable opponents, against enemy especially for nations which did not that precise moment of the war when | it was at the height of its effective- ness, but more in perspective and looking somewhat toward the future. As is the case with every new weapon, it first came upon its adversaries When they were without sufficicnt de- fense and caused vast damage. Yet! frgm now on, as Lord Lee emphasized. | it# power would be greatly limited; the risks of destruction which it must run have become very numerous. Without going as far as the First Lord in feeling that the submarine bas become ineffective agalnst its foes, it is possible to think that the struggle against the submarine may now be carried on under conditions comparable to that i any uction Le- tween warships. , Compared to Torpedo Boat. A new phase has peen reached in the life of the submarine; it wiil 1ot ! be_the last; there is no doubt that! fufther great progress will be made in two direetions; in the power of attack of the submarine, and in the efficiency of methods for combating its ape- rations. In order to establish certainty upon this point. it is enough to recall the case of the torpedo boat. Upon its appearance, this little craft was con- sidered an instrument of such power of destruction, that in the view of {many distinguished naval men and writers upon maritime subjects, the hour of great battleships had struck: to build ‘them’ was no longer worth ave occurred if war had broken out at the moment of this fever in favor of boats? those affecting submarines, “However, the search for means tc pose the torpedo boat was undertaken. And now, not only had this small craft ceased to be an ohject of special dread, but it had developed into the destroyer or flotilla leader, and had been found to be the greatest engine of war against the submarine. In this way the instru- ment of terror of forty years ago had shown itself to be an especially effi- cacious defender of humanity. Pointx to Powerful Afrcraft. “Whe says that tie same thing will not come to pass in the case of the submarine? We note as a menace which impresses itself greatly upon our minds the advent of powerful airships, whose appearance each day strikes us as more real and more imposing. We foresee 0 u izing the protection of the sub- pacity of submerging would enable these guardians temporarily to escape the blaws of tie adversary in the air. Tais vyou will say today is fanciful. Perhaps the future will show what the result will be. “Be that as it may, the last war has shown that hereafier the naval warfare l | of all, some day occur. “These are actual facts, from which there is no possible escape. None of you would know how to undertake marine, the only device by which man has succeeded in_navigating under water, cannot serve any industrial purpose or peaceful aim. This char- acteristic it shares with the torpedo boat and with most other weapon: Figures as Baxis. “I have set forth the views of the Irench navy relative to the suppres. sion of submarines. 1 have still a word to say on the importance of the number of submariis.” “The figures which have heen laid before the committee have empha- sized the paramount consideration which must guide it in forming an opinion. “Lord Lee has stated that the Ger- mans constructed 320 submarines and that generally they had only ten of them in active service at seq at any one time. This would indicate that the proposals for submarines to be constructed must be estimated on a basis considerably larger than that “In truth, we have not quite the same figures. We have estimated that on an average one can figure that the Germans had possessed eighty to one hundred completed sub- marines which are still in existence. Of this number they were able to keep about fifteen or twenty at sea at_once. And the reduction thus noted from the number of existing submarines to the number in condi tion to use was due to two causes: the need to allow the crews to rest, and the need of maintenance of these small boats on which the wear and tear was terrific, making constant repairs necessar: Sees Uneless Force. “The advisory committee, whose perfectly clear, exact and precise re- port could be considered as an ex- cellent base for estimating, had cal- culated 90,000 tons to be the tonnage necessary for the United States and Great Britain. No doubt that had been the li of reduction which those wise men had considered rea- sonable. Taking it that one of the present submarines and a foptiori a submarine of n future type—an im- provement on its predecessors—should have a tonnage of about 1,000 tons, the figures proposed by the Ameri- can committee represent ninety sub- marines of recent type; that is to T elie i e el T SR e e A G L it o R L D O P PG A UL say, fifteen or twenty capable of si- muitaneous action. - This seems indeed . thé .minimum submarine strength a power desirous of making use of this contrivance should have. t is proposed, however, to re- duce this already very small number. If “we fall below this limit we will .end by having a force of no use what- soever, and this measure will be nearly equivalent to abolishing the submarine. I think that in this con- ferente we should at all costs ab- stain from making decisions which may not be practicable and which, even before our thoughts are on the way to realization, may weaken these to the point that, instead of being an element of moral strength and confidence to the warld, these ~de- cisions of the conference might be a cause of doubt and anxiety. “My obgervation on the decrease of the tonnage-seems to me all the bet- ter founded, in that it applies more foreibly in the case of the construe- tion of submarines of a greater ton- age, the freedom to build which has been asked by most-of us. Larger Sizes Predicted. “Never has the program of navies fone forward more rapidly than now. t will lead us before long to increase the size of the submarine. “We are convinced that the idea !committee of the advisory committee i knows what occurred in the land frontier which gives her access, directly and indirectly, to all the great markets of the world. She has a position of great security from the side of the sea. M. Briand assured us In very excellent terms that she this debate. One was the document which you, Mr. Chairman, read out vesterd: composed by the sub- and passed by them. The other was the speech of the gallant admiral A Who has just sat dewn 1. rather |i8 in a position of very great inse- wish that the advisory committeeCUrity by the side of the land, and could have heard that speech before (he certainly indicated to an atten- they drew up their report, They had | tive world ‘that France not only re- reached the conclusion that the de- |[duired a large .army now. but as struction of commerce by submarines | events develop she might again re- \as not the proper business or the |duire assistance from overseas, across main business of submarines, as they | the Atlantic or across the channel. were under the impression that reg- | This encouragement of submarines, ulations could prevent wi they | this passionate declaration that it considered and what anybody must|would be almost criminal to inter- consider, the most inhumane employ- |fere with the growth of this promis- ment of this particular weapon of |ing, though at present, infantile war: but had they heard the speech |Weapon of war—how is that going to to which we have just listened they |be met? Here 1 must call atention would have seen, 1 think, that while |to a fact which has hardly been Admiral De Bon condemned, as we [touched upon or noticed in the course should all expect him to condemn,{of this debute. The only notice the inhumane use of the submarine | laken of it, 5o far as 1 know, was in against defenseless mefchant ships, | Admiral De Bon’s speech which we it was the action of submarines upon | heard just now, in which he said that merchant ships which he regards as |of course it was true that the case on the whole the most important use [of navies would be increased by the to which that weapon of maritime |fact that you had to find small craft rfare can be put. - to deal with subwarines. if sub- 1 admit that there are other pur-|marines were allowed. But, he sald, poses to which he alluded, and I|you could get those small craft from will come to them in a moment. Let|merchant ships and from your fishing me ask upon this question of the|population, Now can Egance and truction of commerce on the high | jtaly get these people irom their seas by means of submarines. I8 |merchant ships and their fishing pop- there any man who has listened to|yjation? Allow me to read the fig- this dehate. is there any man wholures. The whole war turned upon late war. }the possibility of keeping open com- knows what |, unications between Europe and the of any¥|United States of America, Great Bub- | Britain and France and on supplying man_who in the course who doubts that sent on their dangerous is there any must oceur future war. marines a litslor : Italy with the absolute requisites of oMyl e n rlv'\’:-ln:;lfl‘it&“t;ll ".‘fig national life. That was the most B s Uome™of | diMficull problem of the war. Before T O e ble tashs which | LU&L You had Lo develop to the ut- most your auxiliary craft which deal with submarines. "Every one of the tiree countries had to do everything cin bo imposed upon a sailor—it is for something more important than { the remot: chanee of dre(roving SOMe | ies” Know Lo carry out their object war. and that if they are once let ;\‘:Sfixu&:; their comparative contri- loose to deal with merchantment | PUUORS to 1t S it Is incredible that in the stress of | . Wrance 207 ships: Italy, 288 ships; war thelr powers will not be abused [ ain, 3,676 ships. in the future as they have been A en Protection for Coasts. so grossly abused in the past? “If that war had been f vith- is vain to dwell upon the fact. an |out Sy Great Eboonitory, undeniable fact, that.the | merchant shios and wrece o e Submarine isia useful scout, that the | sailors. where are the fishing folk submarines, especially. if not solely, | that would have manned the only pro- in the early stages of war. did de- |tection you had or would have had stroy a few unguarded and careless | against the absolute blocade of your ships of war, and that the submarine | coast? will undoubtedly impose upon any | “The blocade in the case of Italy attackir ¢ forces a degree of caution |of all the necessities of life, the and a. amount of precaution which |blocade in the case of France of all no douot the attacking forces would | the allied soldiers that came to her gladly welcome. assistance and all the munitions of Destroyers of Commerce. an Wmllm;t whlitclh she c?uld m,); p N ‘e is|have carried on the struggle wou The N oD ey e Swa | have succeeded—if it had ot been for Coear oL gl the fishing population and the mer- speech—the destruction of commerce cantil 1 | and 1 cannot doubt, speaking. for | Cantile population of Greet Britain, ettt was thoroughly con- {8nd for these innumerable trawlers ered by the advisory committee, the | that sailed on SESiyseatiul tasitne g 4 id it. nol nclusion_they did ‘come to would | [ 2\, o' French eraft. We will < not be so very remote from that which has impressed itself Lpon the British e ot in the | SuDPOSing that the situation in the ?::.;f.mo:nr \?l'r:duly d‘;ni:imlze the | late, war reproduced itself, as M utility ¢f submarines for genuine war Bridnd fears that it may, and suppos- ing that France's ancient allies come to her assistance, as 1 hope they will. they will be dependent for. the very o Bupposing that the immunity | Possibility of giving the smallest as- T P uved by the German | sistance tq France or keeping Italy ccasts was, in the least degree, due |alive, upon-that organization of anti- to their submarines. 1 speak with |submarine . craft which Italy and lnowledige and authority upon that{France at this moment are among subject and I can assure him that in |those Wwho are compelling Great that respect he is under some misap- | Britain to build. I cannot conceive prehension. Neither do I believe that | that that is a situation which on re- You will find that submarines on the | flection will commend itself to any of ghole are any defense against a sud- [ my colleagues. Admiral De Bon ob- den attack by a ship of war upon an |served just now that the submarine undetended coast town—that is, I be- {must develop. ‘You could not, he lieve, Ttalian delegation think can be per-|I confess that insofar as the progress formed by submarines, but I Very |of humanity consists in inventing new greatly doubt it. The Germans were [ metliods of warfare I would stop it &ble from time to time, without much | tomorrow if I could, and this con- Qifficulty, to send a swift ship over the | ference cannot set itself to a better North #ea to throw a few shells into { work than to stop it so far as it can ar undefended port and seek safety {be stopped. I believe it can be purposes, but I cannot help thinking that Admiral De Bon has exaggerated it. 1 can assure him that he is in in flight. . stopped in the matter of submarines “That cost some suffering and de-{ir we all decide to do it. struction, but upon the question Relies on Consclence. “I believe the conscience of mankind would help us. I believe the public opinion of the world would be on our side. But if we cannot do it. then let us thoroughly realize that permis- sion for submarines is not only an increase to the burdens of the tax- o an open town on the east | PaYIng world, it not only adds to the submarine: but it takes some time Crefll"?- ut H K"’QI;Y‘ o the for a submarine to get ready, it takes | €St OT navies e L conns The time for it to submerge, it|tries which are threatened by other fokex some time to get up to a much | Peoples submarines: it adds greatl Savifter surface vessel, and, though |0 the cost of those navies by the non the submarine did its best, the ag- military organization, so to speak, gressor was far away safely over the | Which it requires to have ready, and horizon before anything could be it adas largely to the mumber of 4 4 4 states which can potentlally and ggnreé‘g:zfir in the way of protection | FHRFS any cost in battleships and Minimized ax Weapon. “Is it not in the minds of all of us who followed the course of naval warfare that the British ships bom- barded hour after hoyr the Flemish coast at Zeebrugge, which was full of submarines, if 1 remember right- Iy The British ships bombarded Zeebrugge and not on one single oc- casion did a single submarine destroy or injure a single Brisish ship. Take the case of the Dardanelles. We lay opposite the Dardanelles, in the most perilous circumstances you could well conceive, month after month, - with submarines prowling around, seek- ing wha® they could destroy. What they destroyed was quite insignifi- cant, it/ I remember rightly. If sub- marines could not render it impos- sible for ships to lie more or less in the open opposite the Dardanelles against a well-guarded fleet, it is very difficult for me to believe that they are going to prove, unless changes occur, a very efficient weapon in maritime warfare. «I do not wish ‘to dwell upon that. becaus€ 1 do not think, as I have al ready indicated, that it is the purely warlike use of the submarine which is really before us now. The question before us now is whether you are go- ing to encourage an instrument of war which, if it be encouraged, if in- deed it be permitted at all, will un- doubtedly be used in the illegitimate destruction of commerce. Now, whom is that going to injure? There are two of the powers represented here who, I think, have little or nothing to fear or to_consider in such a connec- tion, and I do not think either Japan or- the United States have anything whatever to fear from that kind of blockade. In the casé of the United States they are self-contained and in- dependent of imports, and the fact that they are very remoté from any rossible aggressor would make me, if I were a citizen of either of those two great and friendly states, very calm and easy upon the subject of subma- rines. That is two out of the five powers here represented. How.about he other three? Take the case of taly. Italy is not an island. but for the purposes of this debate she almost counts as an istand. I remember the extreme difficulty we had in supplying her even with the minimum of coal recessury to- keep her arsenals and manufactories going during the war. I doubt whether she could feed heérself or supply herself or continue as gn eficlent _fighting unit if she were really blockaded, if her commerce were cut off, which, please God, will never be! I am comsidering the effect of blockade. g New Aggression Foreseen, “The fact that you are going to al- low and give your general blessing to submarines—at least 80 1 gather— puts it in the power of every State that has a seabeard at all to make it<elf a formidable, aggressive enemy. “You talk of the submarine as if it whether the cost of the damage done by a shell against an undefended town is greater than the cost of a shell itself, I have heard some high authorities throw doubt. I can tell my colleagues around this table that I remember one particular case in which an attack of that kind was \ . BYRON S. ADAMS _ ALBERT E. BERRY THOMAS BONES % ALEXANDER_ BRITTON WALTER A. BROWN JOHN H. CLAPP MYER COHEN — . A Monthly Statement to Every Depositor N then see how the situation develops. ! one of the objects which the {said, ‘stop the progress of humanity.’} | ! 1in that respect. without any huge estimates, add themselves not to the list of nations anxious merely for self-defense, but to the list of those nations who wish to supplement their desire for an aggressive policy upon land by adding to their power on the sea. “These considerations I very earn- estly press upon my colleagues. 1 do not believe that any of them can have faced the facts which have to be con- sidered in this connection, though after the expression of opinion given yesterday, and after the speech after speech round this table, the British empire has no hope of getting any impprtant support in the course of this conference, I do earnestly trust that our debates may go beyond the 1imits of this room or even of a public session. “Here 1 must make a parenthesis and say something 1 meant to say before. People are apt to think that it is Great Britain who is likely to suffer most by the continuation of submarine warfare They look upon the map and they see that Great Britain is an island, that she is surrounded by other states, that there are multitudes of harbors over which she has no control in her immediate reighborhood, and they see on any map of commerce in the world the long lines indicating her commercial connections with either distant parts of her own empire or the markets which she serves, or with countries from which she draws her raw material, and they say, ‘Here is a state which really is exposed in the utmost degree to the peril of subma- rines.” I do not deny that, our position is a dificult one, but we have had to face the difficulty and we know that we can overcome it. Critical Moment of Wa “Lord Lee mentioned vesterday the critical moment of the war. It was in the beginning of 1917, when 1 was com- i ing over to this country and during the ! earlier part of my stay here. During those weeks undoubtedly we had only to add up the tonnag? of destruction and subtract it from the tonnage of the world to sec that if things went on as they were going on then the war could have but one end. “Yes. it was a struggle. you will re- member. between the attacking fo of the submarine and the defeusive forces that were brougat against it Like all these struggles between offense and defense, it had its oscillations. Taat was the very nadir of our fortunes. But it brought its own remedy ; organization invention and the number of auxiliary ships gradually diminished the-peril un- til at the end of the war evervbody felt secure, not indeed against cruel loss ‘but_against destruction through losses And 80 it will be again, because we have this great population, tais great naval population, this great fishing population. innumerable craft, and admirable F who_showed on every occasion that when their country requived it of them, cr their country’s ailies required it of them. there was no danger or peril of battie which they were not prepared to face. No other country in Europe has that popuiation. No other country can vrovide that defense against subma- rines. It i< not there W ad 1o pro- vide it for Prav =nd for Italy, and if the s Statoes came agair we shou o provide it Therefore ‘body sup- | the our colleague: are bourni Yoo vontroversy, that we are th- + will suffer most if you dect seem ready 1o de- cide, that s b are o receive the | sanction of U ference. Do not sup- not so. . for it The fate of country 1 look to with serenity 1 admit it may increase our difficulties: T know it will increase our cost and will increase it enormousiy. because we sholild have to egganize all the auxiliary craft azainst it. But that it will imperil our sccurity 1 do not be- lieve. 1 do not know whether all my fiierds round this table can spesk with cqual confidence of their position Semntor Schanzer's Statement. Mr. Schanzer said “We have listened with the greatest attention to Mr. Balfour's impoy speech. “Mr. Balfour { recalled Eng efficient aid for Italy's supplies during | the war. 1 wish. in the first pla 10 express 1o the British delegate. who represents his country with sueh a great authority. Ttaly's sincere grati- tude. We shall never forget what England has done. and Mr. Balfour knows the cordial friendship for England. which is traditional among the Italian people and constitutes one of the surest bases of all Italian policy. *I wish furthérmore to express to Mr. Balfour my thanks also for the important remarks he made on the particular conditions of Italy, who de- pends completely on the sea for her supplies, who can be blocked with the greatest facility owing to the fact that the Mediterranean is like a lake, and who can be exposed to an offen- sive action on the part of as many as five maritime neighbors. His ob- servations are such as to justify bet- ter than I could ever have done my self the position that the Italian dele- gation has assumed in the present de- bate. Expert Opinion Differ: “Mr. Balfour has contested the utility of the submarine for coast de- fense. He maintains that submarines are of no help for guaranteeing the supplies of a_country which is de- pendent on the sea, and holds, on the other hand, that they are a men- ace to these supplies. He has sai that submarines are a danger. espe- | cially for italy, whose coasts can be ! easily blockaded and whose maritime neighbors might make use of sub- marines as an_offensive weapon. We | are confronted by a substantially | technical difference of opinion. Your | authority and that of Lord Lee's are no doubt very great, but there are lemerged? i LS. NOWISSUING RUSSIA PASSPORTS BY JUNIUS B. WOOD. American passports are now being issued for Russia, according to a re- cent ruling of the State Department modifying the restrictions which have been in force for more than a year. Until this month not only were no passports issued to enter the soviet territory but Americans authorized by the State Department to enter other countries were required to deposit their passport with the American con- sul at the last stop outside of Russia and call for it again when the The same restrictions i plied to the territory of the Far East- ern Republic in Siberia, except to the limited area around Vladivostok which is under the control of the Japanese army with a nominal local Russian government. Frequent Protests Made. No obstacles were placed in the wa of citizens of other countries entering Russia or Siberia, and freq T pre tests reachced the State Department from Americans who were required to travel without the document which identified their citizenship. 1n order to sccure a passport for the present time it is the upplicant satisfy the partment t substantial reasons requ his presence in the country. or that he is going there in connection with the bolshevik gov- ernment. «Each appiicatic must be specially passed upon Rus- stan affairs bureau. The same ruling Ar n diplomatic ficers abroad 1o amend passporis wiiich have been without 1n- cluding Russia so that the holder can enter the country. Personal Surveys Made. Immediately after the present ad- ministration was inaugurated, the State Department ordered Lieut. Col, William J. Davis, assistant military attache ai the Tokio emba and James F. Abbott, commercial attache in Tokio, 10 make a otial survey of the KFar Eastern they returned to ment ordered John sul at Kobe iness also authorizes id consular of issiie Bdward M and nsul at Harbi eed to Chita. The where the poj ana are sched- h the winicr. 19210 Thomas, vice « churia w0 pro now there. s in session aining submarines as a d This opinion aval csperts and by still mi sive red Weaporn our zovernment Wo are disposed, however, 10 pur- together with you the study ¢ this problem: only we must poin out that does not seem possib 1o us today to decide on the supnres- sion of submarines, hecause many e states that could avail th selves of this dangerous weapon are it represented this conference today the sup we would ey “Were we to d sion of subn T iy be plac arselves in a dan- rous condition of manifest infe in respect to those whici represe he which and submari ity e might contipue 1o use pe The ltalian delegation believ dher-- fore, that this problem must be exam ined subsequently in a wider confes ence For the present. however, ons point ix clear in our minds and that i~ jat the best course would be to fo low even in this case the spirit of the Proposal and consequently submarines the ssary for the ensive naval policy American it ure strictly a purely defd Admiral de Bon Replies. In reply to Mr. Balfour, Admiral de Bon insisted that he had never wishe ned ends of 1to support the theory. which was neither his government's nor his ows that submerines had the right 1o - stroy merchant Vessels after havins To be vonvines t fer the written text of his statement Mr, Balfour said that the last th he had lnleudht} was. L Admiral de Bon. He was certain ! if the admiral ever had control of - navy in time of war he would conduc! the operations in accordance with the dictates of humanity and the fine tra Qitions of the grent service to which he belonged. Wha. he had attempted to show, however. was that. if the submarine was to play the great rol in future wars which Admiral de Bo had suggested in his speech, it could only do S0 by resort to extreme meth- ods, for it was futile to suppose that submarines would make a practice of Stopping merchant ships and placing prize crews on board to take them into nort saved the ¢ wisrepresent Rent a Ford or Dodge Drive it yourself North 122 _u.';"&.%'n".fw%.v. HOUSES JOHN W. THOMPSON & CO., —IN technical experts of great authority who insist upon the necessity af JOHN POOLE, WM. JOHN EYNON, Vice President CHAS. B. LYDDANE, Cashicr FRANK J. STRYKER, Assistant Cashier CHAS. D. BOYER, Assistant Cashier INCommm 821 15th St Maln 1477 THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF THE FEDERAL NATIONAL BANK A Bank With Old-Fashioned Notions of Integrity — Combined With the Most Modern Methods of Doing Business, EXTENDS THE SEASON’S GREETINGS AND SINCERE GOOD WISHES TO ALL ITS FRIENDS. President WM. C. JOHNSON, Assistant to the President —And the Board of Directors— WM. KNOWLES COOPER JOHN DOLPH HARRY KING JAMES BROWN SCOTT LEON RALPH W. LEE LOUIS MACKALL ARTHUR D. MARKS JOHN L. NEWBOLD FRANK B. NOYES JOHN POOLE E. D. RHEEM TOBRINER Paying and Receiving at the Same Window