The Daily Worker Newspaper, September 23, 1933, Page 4

t Page Four DAILY WORKER, NEW YORK, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER ‘23, 1933 HAIL THE 14th ANNIVERSARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S. A. Our Trade Union Work and the 14th Anniversary of the Party The Par y Always Carried on a Relentless Struggle Against Class Collaboration and Reformism By JACK STACHEL Communist Party of the U. 8. has entered the fifteenth year Of its existence. It is worth while to briefly review our trade union wo in the light of the exp s years. Of course, in this short ¢ we can touch only on the main poi) ‘The Communist Party has been tt devisive force in helping to deve the revolutionary trade ur ment.*All the achievement and weakn trade unio: identified wit Communist Party. From the very beg! istence the Commi carried on a sharp si the class collaboration Gompers, Green, Woll their supporters, the Hillquits. mans and Thomases. From th beginning the Communist. Per came a force mobilizing the worke in struggle for better c 2 clating the workers in t of these struggles of the nece: fight for the abolition of t capitalist system of exploitation while the Communist Party throug! out its existence has remained true to the policy of the class struggle and carried on a determined st: @gainst the A. F. of L. bureaucracy and. its class collaboration policy the ‘trade union policies and tactics have undergone a change throughout these years, on the basis of the changes in the labor movement as well as a re- sult of experiences gained in the struggle. ‘We can divide the trade union Policies and tactics of the Party into three main phases. The first, the period of main em- phasis on small “pure” revolutionary industrial unions and no work in the A. F, of L. organizations; the second period a swing to the other extreme namely work only in the A. F. of L. and neglect of the unorganized; the third, the present period of our trade union work which consists of both the building of new unions among the ‘norganized and especially in the basic iridustries, and at the same time work within the existing unions, the A. F. of L. and other reformist con- trolled organizations. i ‘The fight for a correct trade union policy was throughout the Party‘s ex- *istence also connected with the fac- tional struggles that mark the early history of our Party, and the process | that went on in the Party. of merging | into one united Party the elements; that came to the Party from the vari-} ous currents of the labor movement. | * The first orientation of the newly ized Communist Party in the, Main was to neglect the work in the| A. F. of L. unions. There was even| @ certain theoretical justification de- veloped for this. This tendency was not limited to the U.S. It was pre- Valent in most newly formed parties ‘throughout the world. It was this| condition that led Lenin to write his famous pamphlet “Should Commu- nists Work in the Reactionary) Unions?” in which Lenin sharply cri- ticized the leftist mistakes of aban- doning the workers in the reaction- ary unions to the bureaucrats. In the U. S. this policy had its counter- part in the main emphasis of the trade union work being laid upon the IWW, which was still at that time a fairly large organization, and also upon small groups of independent ‘unions that led a sectarian existence, | such as the Amalgamated tal Workers in New York and simil: ganizations. This was the hi the young Communist movement from the sectarianism of the S. L. P. and the I. W. W. Its positive side was the sharp struggle against the class collaboration policy of the A. F. of L. and the policy of the S. P. which was the same but cloaked in “neutrality” on the trade union field. intrusion of some native experi- enced trade union leaders into the Communist Party led by the pres- eht outstanding leader of our Party. ‘Wm. Z. Foster, made a turn to work among the millions of workers in the American Federation of Labor. Foster | already found a substantial element in the Party (Browder, Dunne, etc.) | who pressed for work in the mass re- formist trade unions, It must be re-| membered that at this time new mil-/} lions of workers from the basic in-| dustries had been brought into the A. F. of L. and that the A. F. L. had at this time the largest membership | in its entire history. Foster and others | of the experienced trade union lead- | ers, among them the present General! Secretary of the Party, Earl Browder, | Jack Johnstone, Bill Dunne, helped to, orientate the Communist Party to-| wards the millions of organized work- | ers in the American Federation of | Labor. Foster organized the left wing in the A. F. of L., the Trade Union Educational League, that became a) big force in the labor movement, re-| ceiving support for its policies from| @ large section of the membership of | the A. F. of L. and outstanding of-)| ficials who at that time professed to| support progressive policies. BY this period of our trade union work though marked by great for. ward strides towards the masses was without its mistakes. Especially the later stages when the mass, expulsion policy and decline of the A. F. of L. set in and large sections | of the masses that had flocked into| A. F. of L. during the war were iven out, the policy remained al- exclusively work in the A. F. of | no attempt to organize the) of the unorganized into new) _ unions when it became clear that the A. F. of L. bureaucracy was not in-| terested, and unwilling to organize millions of unorganized in the| industries. While the elements; around Foster were the ones in the early phases of this policy | mainly responsible for the fail-| « ditions made more headway. Fur- | thermore, it was inevitable that af- pelled, some leftist moods should be ntate on the organization | ns of the unorganized, | n at least there were | ibilities that the A. F. a time still some po: of L. could be used to organize the| anized, in the later stages fol- ne death of the founder of ty, Comrade Ruthenberg, the ‘Ss around Foster were already for the formation of the new while the group then led by gate Jay Lovestone stood to the formation of new Comintern and the 1 of Labor Unions in id down at the fourth RILU Congress and the Sixth Com- in Congress. This line was re- ed by the Lovestone group. The | lements around Foster and Browder fought for the without some s Party as a whole was slow in| ng the turn in events. Thus in 1926-27 the thousands of Passaic tex- | tile workers who were led by an in-| dependent union under the leader=-/| ship of the Party were turned over to} the A. F. of L. on the theory of “at-| hing them to the main stream of| the lak n Of course the} quickly liquidated the| entire ion. Similiarly we} missed the right moment in organ-/| izing the new unions in the mining4 and needle industry. After the bu-} reaucrats betrayed and split the] ranks of the workers, we waited until | the workers were defeated in struggle | by the employ nd only then in| 1928 and 1929 did we organize the) unions in these industries. | With the expulsion of the Lovestone and Cannon renegades from the Party, the Party was able to move more rapidly in the direction of the line laid down by the Red Interna- ine of thi Red Ih the U. 8S. tional of Labor Unions. The new policy took firm shape in the fall of 1929; with the transformation of the Trade | Union Educational League into the) Trade Union Unity League as the new/ center of revolutionary unions and} revolutionary oppositions in the re- formist unions. | ¥ | E did not entirely escape one-side- | e dness and sectarianism with the} adoption of the policy laid| by the Comintern and the} We again not in words so| much but in deeds swung to another| extreme. This resulted in serious) neglect in the work in the A. F. of L.| unions from which to this date we) have not completely recovered. But on} the whole we have not only a better! undestanding but a more correct prac- | tice. Now while we realize that our| main task is to organize thé unor- ganized in the basic industries into) the TUUL unions, we are at the same | time fully conscious of the necessity | to work atfiong the millions of work-| ers organized in the A. F. of L. and similar organizations. The question may be asked: If the present policy is correct, then are we not succeeding in * ganizing more workers into the T.U. U.L. unions, and more workers into the A. F. of L. oppositions? There are a number of reasons for this. The new unions were formed after | defeated struggles. The new un- | ions almost from the very beginning | of their existence were faced with the severe crisis and unemployment when all other unions were on the | decline. It took some time for the} workers who were under attack to reform their ranks and enter the fight for economic demands. | Were we more experienced in meeting such situations, we might | have even under these difficult con- | ter the sharp struggle against the opportunist elements that were ex- carried over in a mechanical way | into the unions. This, of course, | also militated against the rapid} growth of the unions. | But above all the main reason lies in the failure to master the new methods of work that were required to meet the new situation. We car- ried over the old methods of the | A. F. of L. into the work of the Red | Trade Unions. There was not the understanding on how to organize in the shops, how to carry through the policy of concentration, how to develop the united front. There was not a sufficient understanding how to win over or even approach the strata of unorganized workers, among them the Negro workers, the women and young workers, The mistakes were open right wing mistakes, the methods of the old A. F. of L. unions, but at the same time there were leftist mistakes, es- pecially in the questions of organi- zation, There was too much the tendeficy to make the union dupli- cates of the Communist Party. Now we are in the process of correcting these mistakes. And we already can see progress where the weaknesses mentioned above are being overcome. Finally we should not forget that our young and inexperienced organiza- tions from the very beginning had to face the combified attacks of the sovernment, the. employers, the A: F. of L. bureaucrats, the Socialist mis- aders, the Musteites and the re- egade groups. Is our present policy correct in the face of the latest developments in the labor movement? Some would question this. The rene- gades are especially busy calling for the liquidation of the new unions and for work only in the A. F. of L. They would have us revert to the days of 1923-1928. We- must reject this position as most dangerous to the workers. Especially at this time is our policy correct. The doubters point to the growth of the A. F. of L. We do not deny this. We do not deny that we must increase and jits activity in the A. improve our work in the A. F. of L. But it must, of coursg be the work of revolutionary opposition. It can not be th® type of work carried on by the Lovestonites under the leadership of Zimmer- man in the ILGWU. Zimmerman has become part and parcel of the bosses-Whalen-Dubinsky combina- tion, Our main task still it to organize the millions of unorgan- ized into the TUUL unions. It would be a crime if we at this time were to slacken our work of build ing the revolutionary unions. Th A. F. of L. has not succeeded in recruiting more than 300,000 workers, despite the fact that it has the backing of the government and| a section of the employers. The TUUL unions at this time can al-; ready record that they have re- cruited nearly 75,000 new mem- bers during this same period. If we compare the strength of the A. F, of L. and the TUUL at the outset of this drive then we see that there are great possibilities for the red unions precisely at this ti ime. What are the perspectives? It is not yet clear to what extent the A. F. of L. will be able to enroll the mass of the workers. It is true that where the red unions make progress the bosses more and more call in the A. F. of L. leaders to organize the workers. But for what purpose? To organize the workers to fight for better conditions? Of course not. To prevent the fight of the workers for better condi- tions! And what will the workers | who have joined the A. F. of L. do? Will they follow the policies | of the bureaucrats? They will not. The restrike of the coal miners in| «pop, before all else, Marx was a Pennsylvania is a good indication. The strikes everywhere against the will of the A. F. of L. leaders show where the wind is blowing. We know that the existence of red unions, even though small, has been a force that has prevented the employers from driving down the workers to “even lower levels than they did during the crisis. We know that the workers need these unions. They are a force far out of proportion to their numerical strength. In certain industries, es- pecially in steel, the new union has more members and certainly plays a more important role than the A. F. of L. union. It is the only union leading the struggle of the workers. Our perspective must be that at present, while the A. F. of L. is gaining members and the work in the A. F. of L. must be better or- ganized, must receive more atten- tion, must be orientated on the more decisive strata rather than limited as until now almost exclu- sively to the building trades, be the same time the new unions ate being built and can be built espe- cially in the basic industries. This is, at preesnt, the main task of the revolutionary trade union move- ment, side by side with increasing F. of organization. A Good Ear for the Voice of the Masses “ ... The Party must have a good ear for the voice of the masses, must pay close attention to their revolutionary instinct, must study the actualities of their struggle, must carefully in- quire whether their policy is sound—and must, there- fore, be ready, not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from them. “This means in the second place, that the Party must from day to day win the confidence of the proletar- ian masses; that by its pol- icy and by its activities, themselves secure the sup- port of the masses, that it must not order, but per- suade, helping the masses to become aware of their own experience that the Party policy is right; that it must, therefore, be the guide, the leader, the ‘teacher of the proletariat.” —Stalin, ibe Sw ey “The attitude of a politi- cal party towards its errors is one of the most impor- tant and surest criterions of the seriousness of the Par- ty, and of how it fulfills in practice its obligations to- wards thé laboring masses. To admit a mistake openly, to disclose its reasons, to analyze the surroundings which created it, to study attentively the means of correcting this mistake, — these are the signs of a se- rious Party, this means a performance of its duties. This means educating and training the class and con- sequently the masses.” —Lenin. L, | of | | | Fourteen Years of Struggle! —By Burck Concessions to By EARL POUR TERY, years of our Party history is composed of the struggle against opportunism with- in the workers’ movement, against the treacherous policies of the Socialist Party and the A, F. of L. bureaucracy of collaboration with the capitalist class. struggle has its counterpart in the internal life of our Party in the struggle against deviations from the correct Marxist-Leninist line. These deviations have shown them- selves at all times and in different forms. They represent the in- fluence of our enemies extending into our own ranks. Their exist- ence reflects the insufficient edu: in the principles of Boishevism, their insufficient steeling in the fires of struggle. Deviations are always conces- sions or surrenders to opportunism. Sometimes they show themselves openly as capitulation; sometimes they mask themselves as “ultra- radicalism,” as “extreme left.” In our battle of, today to carry out the Open Letter, in our struggles against the NRA and the “New Deal,” we constantly find these old deviations popping up again in new dresses. Proposals of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin on the By V. J. JEROME. revolutionist.” ‘These memorable words uttered by Engels at the grave- side of his comrade and co-worker, Karl Marx, hold the full content of Marx’ life-work—his revolutionary teachings as a guide to revolutionary action. Marx’ work as organizer went hand lin hand with his work as theoretician. In 1847 he and Engels founded the first international Com- munist Party—the Communist League, whose Rules and Constitution opened significantly with the article: | “The aim of the League is the overthrsw of the bourgeoisie, the establishment. of the rule of the proletariat, the abolition of the bourgeois social order founded upon class antagonisms, and the inauga- ration of a new social order wherein there shall be neither classes nor private property.” It was for this League that Marx and Engels wrote the famous Mani- festo of the Communist Party, known popularly as the Communist Mani- festo. The Manifesto embodied their revolutionary theory in progammatic form. Adopted as the program of action by the revolutionary party which Marx and Engels organized and led, the Communist Manifesto has remained the classic guide to revolutionary action for the workers all countries. The program adopted by the Communist Interna- tional, which was founded by Lenin in 1918, is its direct continuation and further development in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolu- tions. i Marx pointed out that the emanci- pation of the working class is the historic task of the working class it~ self. But this does not mean that the proletariat can liberate itself from capitalism in the course of spontaneous action. The class army of the workers can engage in effect- ive warfare, can achieve victory only if it produces from its ranks the revolutionary vanguard, the Party, to give to the class struggle leadership and direction, to unify all the other working class organizations in the struggle for one common _ objective. In the words of the Communist Manifesto: “Thus, -in actual practice, Coth- munists form the most resolute and persistently progressive sec- tion of the working class parties of all lands, whilst, as far as theory is concerned, being in advance of the general mass of the proletariat, they have come to understand the determinants of the proletarian movement and how to foresee its course and its general aims.” The role of the Party is therefore to win the majority of the working class for revolutionary struggle against capitalism, to bring forward in alliance with that class and under its leadership all the toiling masses of the countryside and the city in common struggle for the overthrow of capitalism. It was the Manifesto of the Com- munist Party which sounded the slogan: “Workers of all lands unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains. You have a world to win!” oes |ARX and Engels guarded zealously the integrity of the revolutionary party. Throughout the period of the First International, and after it had ceased to exist, they struggled against the sectarian and reformist elements, against the petty-bourgeois anarchism of the Bakouninists, against the rank opportunism of the Lassalleans, against reformist British trade union- ism. When the opportunists, those who paved the way for the present- day social-fascists, began to rear their heads, Marx and Engels lashed them with merciless criticism, The Critique of the Gotha Progr-m, Engels criticism of the Erfurt Pro- gram, as well as numerous articles and letters by Marx and Engels, are devoted to correcting the failure of the Party to live up to its role of vanguard. It was his keen insight into the logical consequences of op- portunism that enabled Engels, as far back as 1882, to make the power- ful prediction that in the event of a European war, “our party in Ger- many would be swept and split by a stream of chauvinism, and the same would happen in France.” Dad eC REn iRrraaT | The Struggle Between the Revolutionists and the Opportunists Was Irreconcilable Marx and Engels predicted the eventual split of the revolutionary Party from the opportunist elements. They knew that such a break was inevitable. For the integrity of the Party, to save the Party from being turned into an instrument in the ed it desirable. gels wrote to Bebel in 1882 in f of himself and Marx: “That sooner or later it will come to a clash with the bourgeois elements in the Party, and to a split into a right and left wing, hands of the class-enemy, they deem- | | I haven't had the slightest illu- sions for a long time, and in a | Jahrbuch I bluntly said that I con- | sidered it desirable. ... One thing | you can be entirely sure of: If it | will come to a clash with these gentlemen, and the left wing of | the Party will open its cards, we | will, under all circumstances, go with you—and actively, with the visors up.” Lenin deepened and rendered more concrete Marx’ teaching on the Patty into a plan for a fighting party of From Fede A Central By MAX IRGANIZATIONALLY and _politi- cally our American Comunist Party carried on its back for some years after its birth, the eggshells of its earlier development. Lack of theoreti- cal clarity had developed in the left wing of the Socialist Party a strong anti-parliamentiarism, as against the pure and simple bourgeois par- liamentarism of Hilquit and ,Berger. Tt had developed opposition to work within the reformist trade unions as against the subordination to reform- ist trade unionism by Hilquit and Berger, It had developed a theory for federationism as a “principle” because the federation form of organization in the S.P. had facilitated the organi- zation and maintenance of the left ‘This federationism, before the birth of our Party a contribution to its incubation, became an obstacle to its bolshevization after its birth. If the Party were to become a Party of revolutionary leadership and action, the federationism had to be liquid- ated. ‘The federationism was based on the maintenance of practically indepen- dent national language organizations within our Party. These various fed- erations hd their own conventions; they elected their own executive com- mittees and maintained their own secretaries. a Instead of being directed from the Party center, the federations exer- ¢ized pressure on the center. Instead of the center being the dominant lead- ership, the component parts of the center were dominated by the various federation, in which the members of the National Executive Committee held leading positions. Such Jack of centralization is al- ways a seribus obstacle to discipline stance it was especially harmful. The \language Federations resisted Amori- canization of the Party in two re- spects. 1, They lived in, and their political life reflected mostly only the develop- ments and struggles in their home countries. Therefore, the manifesta- tions of the political life of our could appeal little to the Am an worker. 2. Its practical aloofness from con- crete issucs of the class struggle in America forced our Party into the position of a propagandist. rather then an agitator for and a leader in work- ers action. y Aside from thus being the seat of leftist sectarianism, the Federations naturally also were the plefground of the reformist, of the 2!% Interna- tionalists of those days. In the Ger- man Federation Lore held forth with a program of friendship toward S, P. reformism and opposition to Com- munist International bolshevism. Lore in the German Federation .was as- sisted by Askéli in the Finnish Fed- eration. After the fourth Congress of the and united action; but in this in- | rationism to ized Party BEDACHT Communist International, in Novem- ber, 1923, our international leadership pressed for the more’ rapid bolshevi- zation of the Communist Parties, For our American Communist Party this meant, first of all, the reorganization into a centralized body. It meant a |determined struggle against elements foreign to bolshevist policies, the re- formist elements which still had hid- ing places in the Federated Party; it meant an effort to make the Party jone of action and of leadership for the workers rather than one of mere propaganda among the workers. This reorganization was decided upon at the Fourth Convention of the |Party in 1925. | . 'E required reorganization was not merely the problem of regrouping the Party membership; it was rather a most important political reorienta- tion and change in policies. It was one of the weaknesses ofthe carried through too much as a mere regrouping of the Party membership. This mechanical effort could not re- sult in the full realization of the de- |sired aim: bolshevization. For this mechanical conception the major responsibility rested with fac- tionalism within the Party. Although there were no differences between the factions on bolshevization, yet the factional approach to the problem it- self on the part of both existing fac- tions blinded the comrades consider- ably to the real problem and interests of the Party. . * tne in spite of these shortcomings the, recrganization of our Party in 1925 and 1926 advanced in its revolu- tionary qualities. The most imvortant conditinns were created for the Party for its becoming a revolutionary Party the life of which was derived from the issues and from activities in the | American class struggle. The reorganization abolished fed- erationism; it defeated Lore-ism; it cleansed itself from the conscious so- cial-demecratic elements like Lore and Askeli; it made the first bogin- rings of establishing basic units of the Parfy in the shops; it made the Central Committee of the Party its real leader. In spite of the handicars jof existing factionalism the Pariy | started on the road to bolshovization, The job which confronts the Party Jat this moment, in 1933, is the com- |pletion of tie task which the reor- ganization of 1925-26 began; it 4s the completion of the political task of bolshevization; it is the breaking down of the last remnants of the walls of isolation through sectarian- ism; it is the carrying out of the tasks of the Open Letter; it is the rooting of the Party in the mills, mines and factories of the country; it is the establishment of the Paziy as the organizer and leader of the American workers in thelr daily struggle for existence and in their final struggle for emancipation. s * A reorganiation of 1925-26 that it was! Role of the Communist Party ¥ the proletarian revolution, The open- ing of this century ushered in the his- toric period of proletarian revelutions, | following the thirty years of “quiet” Commune, The forces were gathered | autocracy. But was this bourgeois- democratic revolution to be a mere repetition of the revolution of 1843? Was it to end in entrenching capi- talism in Russia? Against the affirmative answer of the opportunists, the Russian mem- sheviks, Lenin declared that in the epoch of imperialism the proletariat is ripe to push the revolution forward from its bourgeois-democratic to its socialist stage. The question resolved itself into this: Shall the impending revolution establish the complete dic- tatorship ‘of~ capitalism or shell it expropriate the capitalist class and set up the dictatorship of the pro- letariat? Around this question developed the struggle over the function and the structure of the party. The men- sheviks were content with a loose, shapeless, ill-disciplined party. They wanted to open the doors of the Party to all comers, to infest its rank with bourgeois elements, to ne- gate its role as vanguard. Lenin stressed the need for a party of a new type, a monolithic, fighting or- ganization with its strength in qual- ity, in centralism, in disciplined methods of work —the party that shall be in the real sense the van- guard marching at the head of the working class movement toward seiz- ure of power. The issue was clear: the struggle | between the revolutionists and the opportunists was irreconciliable. In: 1903, at the second congress of the | Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, the majority, the proletarians, the Marxists, went to the side of Lenin, shortly afterward forming the Bolshevik (Majority) Party, The minority, the opportunists, the petty- bourgeois elements, the pseudo-Marx- ists, took the side of menshevism. eventually degenerating into. social patriotism and counter-revolution, * * * j Ppser= has demonstrated the | correctness of Leninism, It was through the establishment of the Russian Bolshevik Party under the leadership of Lenin that the Russian workers and peasants were able to overthrow the capitalist oppressors and to estabish the. Soviet system. It is under the guidance of the Bolshe- vik Party, led by Comrade Stalin, Lenin’s foremost disciple, that the workers and peasants of the Soviet Union have succeeded in laying the foundation of socialist economy and aré now roceeding to fulfill the Sec- ond, Five-Year Plan |for the estab- lishment of the classless society. . * * ENIN stressed the need of keeping the Party cleansed from all op- portunist elements, from all carriers of bourgeois teachings. Lenin stressed the need on the part of the Party for being thoroughly self-critical in order to be thoroughly self-corrective. Above all, he stressed the need for iron discipline in the Party, for co- ordinating the activity and the re- volutionary will of the Party mem- bershin on the prinicinte of democra- tic centralism, Lenin mode it clear that bolshevik discinline is not ‘blind | obedience to dogma, as the enemies of the working class would have it believed. Such discipline is valuetess, nay: harmfu!, to the* Revolutionary ‘Party: The tiscipline of the Com- munist Party is resoluteness sprinc- int from a cle: understending of the reletionship of the Party proqram to the basic theory upon which the Party formu'stes its strategy and tac- tics. Oniy throuth preserving its dis- cipline, through guarding it zealously against all enemies from within and witout, can the Party be the solidi- fled vancuand levding the struvc'ss of the workin#’ class, The teackirgs of Marx and Lenin on the Party are being carried out and further develoned by Comrade Stalin.' “The proletariat needs the Party.” declares Comrade StnJin, “for (Continued on Page Five) Party’s History and Struggle Against Opportunism| Right and “Left” Deviations Are Always This | cation of our members and leaders , | subsequent to the defeat of the Paris} | note regarding the article in the | for the bourgeois-demotratic revolu- | | tion that was to overthrow czarist) Opportunism BROWDER | a hundred forms are made, in the | direction of softening down our struggle aaginst NRA, of making concessions to it, of letting up in our struggle against opportunism and social-fascism. Others hide the same tendency behind “left” »pro- posals to “boycott” the struggles around the codes of the NRA, to | avoid the sharp confrontation of our position against the oppor- tunists before the masses, in the name of preserving our “revolu- tionary purity,” proposals which, if adopted, would have the same result as the open surrender to the | NRA. oUF party has developed and grown strong in a constant fight against both forms of deviation, a fight on two fronts, against open right deviations and against “left” distortions. Only our inner strength in overcoming deviations gives our Party and the revolutionary move- ment its outer strength, as the firm and courageous leader of the |movement of the masses. Any |inner looseness, laxness, or toler- ance of. deviations, would imme- diately reflect itself among the masses in the loss of our influence, of our position of leader and edu- eator of the mass movement. That is the chief lesson of the history of fourteen years of our Party. i When, immediately after its formation, our Party was driven underground by the Palmer raids and wholesale deportation and im- prisonments, its whole history for several years was dominated by this inner struggle on two fron-s: First, the fight against those ten- dencies to surrender our revo'u- tionary program in order to come out into the open as a “legal” Party which would be tolerated because it abandoned the revolu- tion; second, the fight against the ; tendency to refuse to come into the open at all, to make the un’ | grund existence of our Party into a “principle” to condemn the Party to the miserable existence of 2 secret sect. We fought against and defeated both) tendencies; unlecs we had done so, our Party would | have been destroyed. : HE relative | stabilization of world capitalism which followed the temporary decline of the post- war revolutionary wave, was the basis of the rise of bourgeois il- lusions and prejudices among cer- tain opportunist elements in our | Party. One of the expressions of this influence was the platform, draped in concealing phrases, of turning the Communist Party (then the Workers Party) from leader of the American working class into the tail-end of the Liberal-bour- geois labor movement of the Amal- gamated Clothing Workers stamp. The exponent of this tendency was Salutsky (now J. B. S. Hardman). Salutsky was expelled from our Party in 1922. Another example that arose shortly after that was the effort of Ludwig Lore to raise the banner of Trotskyism as the rallying center for all opportunist elements to control the Party and break it away from the Communist International. Instead of follow- ing the line of the Party toward Americanization through sinking its roots among the basic Am- erican workers in the key indus- tries, by organizing and feading their struggles, this opportunist at- tempted to establish a patriotic, Monroe-doctrine American Party— a political counterpart of the re- actionary American Federation of Labor. ‘The Party Convention of 1924 unanimousy expelled this renegade from the ranks of the revolutionary. Party. : Ix the period before(the outbreak of the world economic crisis and the consequent shattering of cap- italism’s partial stabilization, our Party went through another period of inner crisis. Preparing for the great class battles to come, our Party, together with the whole In- ternational, found forces within itself resisting these preparations. Inner struggles ensued, around the decisions of the Sixth World Con- gress of the Comintern. In the United States we had the arising of a Trotskyist faction in the Party, led by Cannon, which tried by “left” phrases to lead the Party into the swamps of opportunism. The Lovestone faztion carried the a banner of capitalism to the Second International and the trade union bureaucracy. Both factions had the same practical program behind their differences in abstract phrases. Only by defeating and driving out both, was our Party able to emerge as the organizer and leader of the masses on the issues of strugg'es arising from the crisis, and prepare the masses for the revolutionary way out of the er's's. Today our Party is again going through a critical period of testing. Today it is no longer a struggle over the programmatic problems of determining the direction in which we want to go. But it is the hun- dred-fo'd more difficult strugg'e to find >the concrete steps along the path which we unanimously adopted. It is the struggle to trans- late our resolutions into mass ac- tions, actions in which the Party marches forward not alone but at the head of a gathering army of hundreds of thousands and millions of American workers. In ordor to most effectively carry out th? Open Letter of our Party, it should be ‘studied in the light of the whole fourteen years history of the Communist Party of the U. S. A. the whole experience in the fight against right and “left” deviations, Sa ” -