The Daily Worker Newspaper, February 18, 1933, Page 4

Page F ‘our (Continued from Page Three) Party and the red unions more and more in this period sive incidents which are the forerunners of decisive revo~ evelopments of the masses. The united front tactic from below becomes, the center and over~ jvhelmingly the main form of action of the mass struggles of the Com- ? Anuhist Party in this period when the central task is to win the majority -;tarough g fase pi eenrsoecensased: “ot the working class which is now under the domination of social fascist agents of the bourgeoisie. “The mass influence of the social fascists has declined. For that very reason their maneuvers have become more energetic and varied (leading the strikes with the aim of throttling them, in some cases even demon- Strative declaration of general strike, sham fight against fascism, for speace, in defense of the USSR, etc.). In these’ maneuvers particular ‘geal is displayed by the ‘left’ social-democratic group, who simultaneously carry on a frenzied campaign of slander against the Communist Party and the U.S.S.R. Only by taking fully into account the variety of the forms of the policy and maneuvers of the social fascists in all their con- creteness will the Communists be able really to expose and isolate the Social fascists. Only by directing the main blows against social democ- facy, this so mainstay of the bourgeoisie—will it be possible to strike at and defeat the chief class enemy of the proletaria—the bourgeoisie. And only by strict differentiation between social-democratic leaders and workers will the Communists be able, by means of the united front from Below, to break down the wall which often separates. them from the social- democratic wo: The sectarian isolation of the Party, and the natrow “left” distortions of the concep’ of the united front, as well as the open right oppor- tunist conception (Lovestone, Cannon) of the united front in the form of capitulation to t social fascist bureaucracy, has placed tremendous Obstacles in the path of the development of struggles. In the case of the correct application of the united front tactic, to rally the masses of the workers into struggle he bureaucrats. and as a consequence succeeded in ne red trade union. But despite some recent im- ication of united front tactics in strike and unem-~- hrougl leadership; at Lawrence and Paterson the red etely isolated themselves from the workers under re- and were unable to effect the unity of the workers, the front consisting of the red trade union themselves. At ere are tendencies toward “unity at any price” (agree~- cist leaders in some of the local miners’ strikes in nt of outstanding bureaucrats in New York Painters’ of the “lesser evil”), and some manifestations of E toward these elements (Southern Ilinois). While > Lovestone renegades support the right wing bureaucrats in war against orkers in the needle trades and the Cannon-Trotzkyites support actionary and Musteite leadership of betrayal in the P. M. A., the have not sufficiently countered these treacherous ele- ciently clear and bold bolshevik approach to the masses ed front from below. Because of an underestimation of t of partial struggles as a means to develop the mass the capitalist offensive, we have failed to establish the orkers, in the first place inside the factories, for struggle for immediate demands. A narrow sec sonception of the united front (‘united front only on the ba is of th utionary program”) has rendered the application af this important form of mass activity null and void in many fields refo! ganized under trade un of te the successes which have invariably resulted whenever even pi y correct methods of united front have been applied. Objectively this “left” error amounts to an opportunist capitulation fiosthe reformist enemies of the masses. The united front isa form of action « 2 form of words; not a proclamation of principles but an aetion of he eneous masses under revolutionary leadership for con- ereté de! s which, at an early stage, are not by any means “revolu- tionary” which draw the masses into struggle and into the process “Oo? 4Volutionization in the course of this struggle. It is the most im- porémt form of the tactics by which the C. P. U. S. A. must lead non- ‘Communist masses, reformist workers, workers who express allegiance to eafiealis: F. of L. workers and the most backward Christian mall farmers, clerks and ruined petty-bourgeois ele- ainst the state of finance-capital which in the moment ne rily seeks a way out of the economic crisis by acks upon the standards of living of these masses. “oh in the reformist unions suffered for a period from an almost eomplete desertion of this highly important revolutionary task, zross misinterpretations that this task is in contradiction to the.task of b ‘ing the red trade unions and undertaking independent leadership of struggles. During the past year a partial correction and fome progress have begun, with election victories in a number of local t of the unemployed insurance movement by 800 locals, i Confe nee, ete. But such beginnings of a correction do eans correspond with the rapid development of radicaliza- ormist unions, their revolt against the bureaucracy and gle, so that a number of important and extremely g are led by reformists while we play only a minor challenging the betrayal policy of the bureaucrats who, aney of the workers, succeed in putting over worsened conditions (llinois miners, building trades, etc.). In many cases, com- rades at work in the reformist unions are too much steeped in legalism to be able to ¢ op the strike struggles and to give them independent 1 hip. Ins cient p of the problem of trade union unity and to expose the reformists as the splitters of the trade unions. (éspe- mong the miners) has severely handicapped the progress of the ‘red unio The task of exposure is now especially important as against the “left” maneuvers of the A. F. of L. bureaucracy, the increased activ- ftv of the Socialist Party bureaucracy in support of the A. F. of L, bureau- érats and the ground gained in the strategically important Illinois field by the “left” Musteite bureaucracy which protects the A. F. of L. bureau- eracy with left and demagogic phrases and even with the building of “new” unions (P. M.A) in order to keep the masses chained to reformism. In the organized unemployment movement more than elsewhere there has been an uninterrupted progress (even to overcoming seasonal slumps), the sporadic nature of the work has been considerably corrected, 28d in 1932 the unemploy ed councils were able in militant struggles to win . results for the unemployed masses not only on a small scale, but (Cook County, UL, $40,000,000; St. Louis, Birmingham). Eyen in s field the tempo of growth is all too slow. The overcoming of the worst forms of sectarianism and the conse- quent developing (even though slowly) of the united front from below with the masses of workers organized by the reformists has already. shown the possibility of winning the masses away from the treacherous influence of. the reformists (struggle against 50 per cent cut in relief in Chicago; sgainst “Borders”). The successful carrying through of the Second Na- tional Hunger March was a most important victory which helped to stimulate and strengthen the local struggles while at the same time rais- ng the whole struggle to a higher plane and leading it more directly against the capitalist state. “ The struggle against imperialist war and for the defense of the Soviet Gnion, despite grave weaknesses and glaring errors, has been advanced to the point of some considerable successes in bringing masses into actual struggle (demonstration before the Japanese Consulate, Chicago; picket demonstration at Japanese Embassy, Washington; demonstrations in New York, Seattle and San Francisco against specific shipments of munitions; partly satisfactory participation in Amsterdam Congress; successful tudents’ conference against war; raising struggle against imperialist war and for defense of the U.S.S.R. among new strata of the toiling popula- tions, e.g. Washington farmers’ conference, Cincinnati APL. rank and file conference; beginnings of building an F.S.U. and issuance of a special monthly organ; some systematic work begun in some sections of military forces; some attempts to turn the veterans’ movement into channels of truggle against war). However the struggle is hampered by @ great and tion in the rv sir mood fo: e mil cially : rous underestimation of the danger of war and intervention, ex- pre: at times in the theory that sharpening of imperialist contradic- ions Fs : 5 : ; : ys 3 a $ a a 4 & by comatically reduces the danger of war against the Soviet Union, -and‘at times expressed in concessions to pacifist ideas concerning the peace” and “non-aggression” pacts. ° ° . “QERIOUS neglect of struggle against the imperialist wars now raging in Latin America, instigated by U. 8. and British imperialism, and failure to support the revolutionary movements of those countries, is only now beginning to be corrected. ‘The chief weaknesses in the struggle against war, arising out of in- sufficient grounding of the Party in Marxist-Leninist teachings as well as-insizfficient connection with the masses, is to be found in the sporadic ‘and wnsustained character of our work, and. failure to penetrate the everyday activities of the trade unions, unemployed councils, etc., with the living issues of the struggle against war in vital connection with the struggle for the everyday needs of the workers. The most glaring exam~ ple of weaknesses is in the extremely meagre accomplishments in the struggle against the shipment of munitions. In the action of the Bonus March, our Party did not at first with full clarity perceive the objectively revolutionary character of the movement aseet whole in spite of the petty bourgeois indecision, reactionary pre- jodices and military patriotic expressions of this heterogeneous movement of the unemployed workers, ruined farmers and bankrupt petty business~- men who composed the Bonus March. It was for this reason that the Party (1) after having initiated the movement, shrank from supporting and stimulating it with all its power as a mass movement, and sought at first to restrict this movement to one of “mass delegations”; and (a at the most critical moment resolved to draw “class lines” within the movement, thus artificially to single out and separate the conscious re- volutionary elements, while being unwilling to approach the more back- ward ranks, ignoring these and relinquisHing the support of the move~ ment as a whole. Instead of developing this movement (which developed svontaneously despite the erroneous standpoint of the Party) drawing into more and more strata of veterans, the Politburo adopted at first the poeiiion of limiting the movement organizationally. Instead of organiz- “ing ana leading the struggles of the veterans, the Daily Worker placed the Party as the “best friend” of the veterans, and a capitulatory atti- Seer __DAILY WORKER, new YORK, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1933 tude was shown by the error made by the Daily Worker of advising the veterans to “return home as soon as Congress adjourns.” The doctrinaire and sectarian weaknesses have not yet been com- pletely eliminated and were large! sponsible for the meagerness of the activity toward developing the second Bonus Action initiated by the W.E. S.L. in the Cleveland Bonus Conference. It is responsible for the failure to build a broad united front movement of veterans who are willing to struggle for the bonus and has continued our isolation from the rank and file of the American Legion, the V.F.W., etc. | naptaapinneate grave errors were committed by the Party when the rob- ber attack of the Japanese imperialist armies in Manchuria placed the question of war before the American Party in a sharper and more real form than ever before. Although the Party responded to this de- mand for leadership with considerable success and boldness, the line of the Party suffered from certain distortions and unclarity, by the failure to place sharply enough in the forefront of this struggle the fight against American imperialism. While the Party correctly perceived that the con- tradictions between rival imperialisms must be utilized to the utmost by the revolutionary party, yet an inexcusably incorrect application of the correct principle was made in adopting for a period a conciliatory attitude toward the speculations ve bourgeois correspondents about a possible “alliance” between the U. and U.S.S.R. against Japan (Daily Worker, April 12), and by failure oe distinguish between the correct Leninist utilization of antagonisms by a proletariat in possession of State power, and the different forms such utilization by Communist Parties in capit- alist countries must take (mechanical application to problems in U. S. of quotations from Lenin referring to problems of Soviet power at the 14th Plenum). The incorrect application of the utilization of the con- tradictions between the imperialist powers tended to weaken our struggle against American imperialism. The campaign suffered further from a certain narrowing down of the mass movement because the Party mis- takenly adopted as Party slogans those which were not the slogans of the conscious vanguard of the proletarian masses, but rather the slogans which express the unripe-revolutionary moods of the masses that are only now growing toward revolutionary consciousness, slogans to which the Party must give conditional support but not put forward in its own name. (“Expel the Japanese imperialist representatives,” etc.) This tendency of the Party to replace the masses by the Party itself is not unconnected with its sectarian background. After the sharp correction of these errors of the Party in the struggle against war, the Party tended dangerously to make the further and more serious “error” of “avoiding errors” through a tendency to decreased ac- tivity and over-cautiousness. vil. Work Among the Negro Masses The correct program of the Party on the Negro question and the development and leadership in the struggles for Negro rights (Scottsboro, election campaign, unemployed struggles, North and South, beginnings of organization among Negro share-croppers) has brought the Party in- creasingly forward before the broad masses of Negroes as the leader of their struggle for national liberation. These activities taking place on the background of the crisis and deepening discontent of the Negro Masses have brought the Negro question sharply to the fore as a question of major importance in the political life of the country as a whole. The actual significance of the Negro liberation movement as a powerful factor in the sharpening of the crisis of American imperialism has been tre- mendously increased. While the Party has been able to get the attention and interest of large masses in its program on the Negro question, this is not resulting sufficiently in mobilization for struggles to carry this program through according to the objective possibilities. This is due to the following main ‘weaknesses: a). The failure to conduct energetic, sustained and consistent local struggles in defense of the everyday economic and political demands of the Negro masses. b). Hesitation and timidity in the application of the united front tactic (Scottsboro, eléction, etc.) Mistakes in the application of the united front (failure to put forward at all times our independent line and main- tain at all times a critical attitude towards the Negro reformists). c). Insufficient struggle against and concrete exposure of the Negro reformists. qd). Lack of a real political struggle against white chauvinism among the masses and its reflection in the Party, due largely to a still existing unclarity with regard to the national revolutionary character of the Ne- gro question, which is at the bottom of many of the weaknesses of the whole work of the Party among the Negro masses. In the work of the red trade unions, and in the work among the un- employed councils, the lack of clarity on the Negro question is expressed by the leadership of a number of the unions in the failure to understand the necessity to put forward special demands for the Negro masses (right to all jobs, equal pay for equal work, admission of the Negro to the re- formist unions, fight against discrimination of the Negroes in layoffs, giving of relief, against high rents, etc.). The events of December 19 in Tallapoosa County, in which the at- tempt to expropriate the live stock of the Negro farmers led to armed resistance by the share-croppers, shows clearly that at the present time the Negro question in the South constitutes one of the most sensitive sectors In the home front of American imperialism—a point where re- volutionary explosions are most imminent. “Every act of national op- pression calls forth resistance on the part of the masses of the popula- tion, and the tendency of every act of resistance on the part of the op- pressed peoples is the national uprising.” This situation clearly indicates that while strengthening and developing the work among the Negro masses in the North, the center of gravity of the Party’s work among the Negro masses must be in the South. This requires the full unfolding of the Communist program, especialiy in relation to the agrarian revo- lution and self-determination. Vint, Work Among the Farmers The agrarian crisis and the wholesale expropriation of the farmers proceeding therefrom is already giving rise to a whole series of mass struggles of an objectively revolutionary character (farmers strike move- ment, Pennsylvania anti-eviction fights, North and South Dakota resist- ance to forced sales, Tallapoosa County struggle, etc.) Through the pro- gressive clarification of the Party on the agrarian question that has been proceeding since the 7th Convention, the Party was prepared to partici- pate effectively in this rising movement. The Party unhesitatingly par- ticipated in the farmers’ strike movement, on the basis of the unity of farmers and workers for joint struggle against monopoly-capital, against high prices in the city and low prices to the farmers. The Party raised the question of a struggle against evictions and through the leadership of the movement led by the U.F.L. stimulated such struggles in many farming communities. The Party was able to initiate and develop a broad farmers national relief conference and through this to unify and poli- ticalize the farmers’ struggles on a national seale; to bring together Ne~ gro and white farmers for joint struggle; to expose not only the false promises of the agrarian bloc of Republican and Democratic parties and especially the Roosevelt allotment schemes, but also the leadership of the established farmers organizations as mere attachments to the old parties. This conference also was able to develop to a higher stage the ‘work begun in the localities of bringing the farmers in closer alliance to the workers’ movement. The great weakness of the agrarian work is still that it is largely detached from the everyday work of the district and section organizations, especially of those districts which are centers of industry and that completely neglect a large surrounding farm popula- tion. ‘This was reflected in the insufficient development of the election campaign among the farmers. Work among the agrarian masses—among the white and Negro farmers, must not remain the work of certain special districts or of selected comrades. It must become the work of the entire Party. = Penetration of the Shops Backwardness of the Party !n penetration of the shops, {.c., building the basic units of the Party within the factories, conducting real work of organizing and leading the struggles of the workers inside of the fac- tories, and the concentration of this process upon well selected large establishments of basic industry—this alarming weakness of the Party has persisted throughout our Party life, bub its continuation cannot be tolerated in the present moment of rapid development toward higher forms of decisive struggle, without disastrous results to the Party and to the working class. The 8th Convention of the Party must win the entire membership both ideologically and in practice to lock upon this funda- mental task as the main lever for the winning of the majority of the working class. This will require the overcoming of the most deep-rooted weaknesses which have placed the Party during the period since the ‘ith Convention, in a position of having lost ground in shop work for the most part, with only small gains in the face of unprecedented oppor- tunities. A decided step in advance toward the serious beginning of systernatic penetration of the factories was shown in the two shop conferences held December 31-January 1. But a large part of the service of these shop conferences consisted in precisely showing up of the appalling weak- nesses and the nature of these weaknesses. ‘The penetration of large chemical plants, munition factories, ete., prerequisites for serious struggle against war, has remained a resolution on paper. The ,enetration of the steel mills, while resulting in splendid success on @ relatively small scale, where even the slightest serious work has been done (Warren, ©.), has hardly gone beyond the slightest be- ginnings. In the machine industry, with small exceptions (Detroit, New Jersey) very little has been accomplished, while in the railroad industry the beginning has been negligible and in coal mining distinct losses have been suffered. In light industries some progress is to be noted in needle and textile. ‘The concentration program has only been applied in a most formal and mechanical mannes In most cases, hampered by bureaucratic methods | | in those places where concentration formally occurred; scores of com- rades sent from the outside, but the-actual training of Communists and sympathetic workers already working inside was in most cases not seri- ously undertaken. HE increased activity of the workers in the shops, therefore, must be attributed in.a large degree to spontaneous causes and not as yet to our organized guidance and initiative. Our work has mainly been limited to small and medium sized plants and light industry. ‘During 1932, when the strongest incentive was given to the Party through the 14th Plenum Resolution, we failed to lead any strikes in the large factories and plants in the concentration districts, with the exception of the Warren steel strike and the Detroit auto workers’ strikes. The fundamental causes of weakness are, first, the neglect of the concentration problem, and then habitual isolation of Party members "in the factories from intimate association, from “mixing” with non-Com- munist and reformist workers, and consequent lack of sensitiveness to | the daily and hourly frictions and issues growing up in the factories; therefore a failure to take up the most elementary and petty grievances, to expose concretely the employers and social-fascist leaders, to develop partial struggles towards strikes and higher forms of struggle with. sys- tematic agitation and organization, learning the workers’ own ideas as to their needs and concretizing these through our shop papers. The failure of district and section committees a5 well as the central committee to give systematic guidance to comrades working in factory nuclei and trade union groups, the failure of these leading organs of the Party to help develop new cadres within the factories and to solve the many and in~ finite problems in the factory regarding methods of work and the safe- guarding of our. units from company spies, has greatly retarded the growth of our factory units. Even where units. are established it partly accounts for their failure to become leaders of the workers in the given factory. Our shop papers and leafiets have until now been weak through their failure concretely to seize upon the burning issues in the shops and-to link these issues with the general political situation and position of the working class as a whole as a result of the economic crisis and the offen- sive of the capitalist class generally (with notable exceptions, Trenton Doll strike, etc.) eo et le (IN our penetration of the factories a genuine bolshevik understanding of the tactics of the united front becomes imperative, and weaknesses of such an understanding, arising out of the traditional isolation and sec- tarianism of the Party, are inseparable from the failure of the Party thus far to root itself in the factories. A necessity is to unite all workers organized and unorganized, white and Negro, native and foreign born, women and youth, on specific concrete issues arising out of the daily life of the shops, taking up specific grievances of each group to win it over to struggle; this objectively revolutionary task is too often sacrificed to abstract issues, formal “revolutionary programs”, third-rate issues (re- ligion, etc.) which the workers as a whole do not feel to be expressions of their own grievances. To attain this unity it is necessary to destroy or weaken the influence of the social-fascist and company union agents of the employers inside the factories and also those influences exercised upon the workers from the outside. The hesitation and sectarian timidity about proposing concrete meas- ures for uniting the members of reformist organizations together with the revolutionary and unorganized workers for joint struggles against specific grievances on the basis of the united front from below, and with- out mechanically placing the joining of revolutionary organizations, as conditions for unity, is a handicap without the overcoming of which it would be impossible for the Party to penetrate the basic industries of the country, and equally impossible to build the revolutionary trade unions. The establishment of the most comradely relations with the rank and file workers of social-fascist organizations, is not opposed to, but on the contrary, is the other half of the same action as the merciless exposure of the social-fascist leaders—necessary to win these workers from their influence to struggles and to the revolutionary unions and Party. leader- ship. : . ITHIN the factories the abstract nature of our work has resulted in an almost complete overlooking of the necessity to take up all griev- ances arising out of the oppression of national groups, ie., Negro work- ers, Mexican workers, Philippine, Japanese, Chinese and other foreign born workers. The Party groups must specifically organize women work- ers fighting against violation of factory laws,. against insults and per- secution by foremen, for equal pay for equal work, special rest periods, etc., and must win the organized support of these struggles by the men workers; calling special meetings and delegate conferences periodically to discuss grievances and work out the demands arising out of the dis- cussions of the workers themselves. Every shop nucleus of the Party is responsible for the most sys- tematic and tireless efforts, in cooperation with the Y.C.L. to establish nuclei of the Y.C.L. within the same factory, while special attention must be paid to the demands of the young workers in the factory. The unemployment struggle must. be carried into the basic masses of employed workers through systematic agitation in the factories for the demands of the unemployed and of part time workers for unempl ent relief and for social insurance. Within the factory the Party units must take the initiative in organizing struggle against mass dismissals, and for compensation when such dismissals take place. Of great importance is struggle against over time work, for.a union wage Scale with compensa- tion for waiting time (steel mills, etc.), against forced contributions to fake insurance schemes and community funds, against eviction from company houses of workers formerly employed by the company, for ele- mentary demands of the unemployed, i.e., water, heating, free coal, etc., thus uniting the employed and unemployed in partial struggles. The training of the smallest groups and even of individual com- rades to be able skillfully to carry on Bolshevik work inside the factories in heavy and trustified industry must be regarded not only as a task of a few comrades but as a task of all the leading and experienced com- tades and those who cannot undertake patiently this work cannot be considered worthy of leadership in the Communist Party. District and section buros must frequently hold meetIngs with comrades working in concentration factories, or in any other factories, and together examine the work and develop through personal and political guidance, new and fresh cadres, while all our training schools must particularly devote special courses to factory work. x. ; Bolshevization of the Party =~ The problem of Bolshevization of the Party, ie., the problem of strengthening and qualifying the Party to take over the leadership of great mass movements, to lead the working class and exploited masses in the course of economic and political struggles, to the impending fight for power, for the dictatorship of the proletariat—is placed sharply be- | fore the Eighth Convention of the Party by the end of capitalist stabil- ization. ‘The problem of Bolshevization can be solved only by ruthless struggle | on two fronts: against open opportunism, the right danger, the main danger, and against opportunism covered by “left” phrases. The chief common basis for both the main right danger and “leftism” is thé sec- tarianism and isolation of our Party from the masses in spite of the response of these masses to revolutionary struggles. ‘That this sectarianism appears at this time as the chief obstacle of the Party is not accidental. The unprecedented vidience of the eco- nomic crisis which has dislocated whole sections of the population, throw- ing millions of the working class, farmers and ex-soldiers of mixed class composition into direct mass activity—has suddenly placed before the C.P.U'S.A. unprecedented demands for leadership of masses never be- fore led by our Party, “old American” Kentucky miners, impoverished Towa farmers, ex-soldiers of only partly working class character, Alabama. Negroes, share-croppers, farm laborers and small landowners, etc., in mass actions of a size and character never before undertaken by our Party. ° ° . UR relatively small Party, which is just emerging in the course of these same struggles from its original character as a Party composed mainly of immigrant workers isolated from the native masses and consequently of extremely sectarian ideology and’ party life --experienced a severe strain of its organizational and political’ capacities as a result of these new | demands for leadership The narrow sectarianism, carried over into this moment of rapidly rising mass struggles, inevitably becomes the chief source of hesitation and vacillation in the face of these mass struggles and at the same time of a series of “left” errors of equally opportunist character. This gives the most serious warning of the need of a funda- mental change in our Party life, of relentless war against sectarianism, and struggle to root our Party in the work shops and factories, to estab- lish the most intimate connection with the basic American proletariat and exploited masses, with the ideological preparation of our Party nnhesi- tatingly to seize the leadership of the rising mass struggles and to develop these jnto higher political forms. The bolshevization of the Party is inseparably bound up with the transformation of the Patty into a mass Party through the drawing into its ranks of the vast numbers of new native American as well as foreign-born workers who are rising in the course of the present increasing struggles and the multiplication of its cadres with worker “actives” drawn from the mass struggle itself. ‘The problem of bolshevization cannot be solved alone by pee pe means; the bolshevization of the Party includes first. of all the the Party deep into the great masses of the proletariat in the worl mills, mines and factories of the basic industries of the country. It is absolutely essential in this moment of transition to a new round of wars between capitalist states and of revolutions, to penetrate with the actual basic organizations of the Party the large steel plants, mines, railroad shops, ship building, munition factories, etc., to make each of these estab- lishments the stronghold of the revolutionary party, to make these Party nuclei in the basic industries the fundamental core of the Party itself. Only inthis way can the Party establish the extensive and firm connec- tions with the working class, with the decisive sections of the proletariat, without whose mobilization in active struggle the Loder revolution will be impossible Draft Resolution for the Eighth Convention of the CPUS The Eighth Conyention of the Communist Party of the United States declares the most relentless warfare against sectarianism in the Party and in the mais organizations (in the first place in the trade unions) which alone can give the Party the necessary rapid advance toward “bol- shevization which is the imperative demand of this moment anti ofthe end of capitalist stabilization and of unprecedented calls upon our-revo- lutionary Party to lead great struggles of the American masses. xI Problems of Party Growth 2 While the political influence of the Party is steadily increasing ahd @ considerable number of workers are joining the Party, the actual continues at an extremely slow pace. The Seventh Convention recorded an approximate registered membership of 15,000, with an actual dues payment of 8,200, Since then 36,000 joined the Party. The influx 6f new elements into the Party during the past two years emphasizes the powerful attraction of the Party to large masses of toilers. Today there are an actual 19,000 members in the Party, while the year 1932 showed an average dues payment of 15,000. For seven years the membership of the. did not exceed 10,000 dues paying members. This is the first” ite increase to be recorded in the membership since 1924. But at tHe same time, the constant tremendous turnover sharply exposes the inabi -or the Party to maintain its full gains. This situation is greatly accent uated by ‘the: fact that even older members are constantly leaving the ‘Party (3,000 of those who were members prior to 1930 are in’ the Party Furthermore, 80 per cent of the new recruits during the last. period’ ‘come fromthe ranks of the unemployed, while there exists an almost Cofiplete stagnation in the growth of the membership in the shop nuclei. ‘Today, only 4 per cent of the membership is employed in industrial enterprises. ~ While ‘at the Seventh Convention we had approximately 200 Negro members, .at least 10 per cent of the membership are Negro workers today, with almost half of this number in Chicago. A definite but. in most'Dis- tricts insufficient improvement can therefore be recorded in the winning of. Negroes. for the Party. However, the proportion of fluctuation-of Negroes is much greater ‘than among other sections recruited inta:: ‘the Party. ° ‘The conception of “special recruiting drives” replacing the daity’ \BYS~ tematic: building of the Party in the course of the mass activity, is-one ‘of the main factors causing the fluctuation. The recruiting drives in the past were completely divorced from the mass work of the Party, limited to internal directives on how to carry through the recruiting drive; with no mass appeal to the workers to join the Party. The bureaucratic setting of quotas by’ the center and district without a concrete analysis. of’ the particular situation resulted in insufficient recruitment from the factories, trade /unions and. other mass organizations. An improvement in: the methods‘and planned regulation of recruitment would curtail to.a large extent the present fluctuation. But this alone will not solve the problem. A fundamental change in the activity of our Party units is the’key to overcoming the very~serious fluctuation. The directives of the 14th Plenum Resolution that “nine-tenths of all the work of the lower organi- zations’ must be concentrated directly on the work among the masses, and “not, as-at present, in countless inner meetings,” still holds’ good today. To fulfill this task, the Party units must be basically transformed from narrow inner circles into live political bodies, alert and sensitive tothe needs of the workers, discussing their. grievances and how thé unit can initiate, develop and lead the struggles of the workers around: these grievances.” This necessitates, furthermore, the broad application of: inner democracy in our Party. units, involving the entire membership in’ the gollective working out of the tasks and laying the basis for the individual responsibility in carrying them out instead of the present. mechantical‘and arbitrary. assignment. of work which stifies the initiative of the units. ‘The preyajjing situation in many organizations in the Party whereby’the higher committees. appoint the leadership of the lower organs, is to’ be replaced by the democratic elections of the leadership. oe ; ee Mat 5 hss units are involved in performing many intricate and diverse tasks -which-in reality are tasks of the various mass organizations arqund the Party. ‘To shift the burden from the unit membership of these activ- ities ‘requires the proper mobilization of the non-Party workers in the mass organizations around their specific tasks. The Party membets -in the organizations should be the driving force in the activization ef Rese non-Party masses. Thus, the units cannot underestimate the very.im- portant work ‘conducted by these comrades and should help to properly guide their work and coordinate it with the unit activities. ‘The Party is faced sharply with the problem of raising the political level and understanding not only of the new members but of the entire membership, since 80 per cent of those in the Party today have come in during the last two years. This necessitates aside from the political education of the entire membership, a careful distribution of work in the units, comradely supervision and guidance to the new members by the higher committees, developing these new members step by step into conscious revolutionists. There exists the erroneous conception that’the new members are full-fledged Communists as soon as they enter ‘the Party. This expresses itself in over-burdening the new members pe too many tasks, tearing them away from their former environment, tacts and organization in which they were active. When such drop out ‘of the Party this does not result in a serious examination i part of the units of the causes which lead to members dropping out, ‘but in condemnations of those workers as “no good elements.” The Party units should carefully follow up all workers who have left the Party and win them back by exterminating the causes which have driven these workers from our ranks. Eight years after the historic decision of the Comintern to traristér ¢ the organizational base of the Party to the shops, after innumerable and documents of our own Party on this question, we can register only slight beginnings in the carrying out of this most important task. ‘The fact.that-scores of shop nuclei were built up during this ‘period. ai nd have now entirely. disappeared is not only due to the lay-offs and shutd infaatbwles tat in thermain to the-lack ct day’ to day guldench etthe higher committees to the existing shop units. This failure of the leader- ship to supervise’ the work of the shop units, to aid them in Sepeloping proper ‘conspiratorial methods of work, has resulted in premature -and unnecessary exposures of the individual members and whole coe tions, or complete passivity of many shop units. ' Our street units have been involved in important actions primarily. amouria section, district and national campaigns. ‘The units have developed:many struggles in thé neighborhoods around the grievances of the unemployed, but we have not yet succeeded to rally large masses around these issues in the: ‘neighborhoods and particularly for broader political issues. ‘Thu: the Party organizations have not yet become the recognized leaders. of: the ‘masses in the neighborhoods and towns. Furthermore, our bet units have not been instrumental through careful supervision of the work of individual members. in the shop and through concentration on impor- tant factories, to root the Party in the shop, These weaknesses ‘in’ the units can be overcome by our Party only if (a) a stable leadership ‘is developed in each unit instead of constantly shifting-and removing jead- ing «unit functionaries; (b) if the higher committees will give’ major attention through systematic contact and guidance in developing the initiative of the lower organizations; (c) by surrounding the Party unit with a wide strata of non-Party actives who should be systematically drawn into the activities in the neighborhood and shop. ‘The Leninist conception of Party cadres: “The Communist Party worke-, must not be siinilar to a social democratic ‘ functionary and official, the Communist Organizer must lead and | among the masses in the factory, in the shop, in the mine.”: Plenum of the E. C. C. I), has not as yet permeated our Party. the result that little attention is given to the development of new fortes that have arisen in the recent struggles (miners, textiles, veterans’ march, unemployed struggles, etc.), who have intimate contact with the masses and are known by them. 4 Since the. Seventh Convention the Party cadres have nob-been sufficiently enlarged by the drawing in of new proletarian elements. ‘Thus the leadership in the districts, while participating more-or- Jegs’in the local struggles, did not arise and grow out of these es but in most cases consist of outside forces. At the same time, the lead of the sections and districts are not connected with the decisive: set of the proletariat, but are composed in the main of full time fi who have been divorced from the masses of workers in factories in whiol they were employed in the past. The ©. C. which today consists arin: riiy of functionaries faces the task at the coming convention of drawing in fresh proletarian forces from the factories, 5 * * * * gysteMaric ‘selection of the best militant elements from the’ factories, mines, from the struggles of the employed and unemployed; training; correct policy in the assignment of work; systematic follow “u ogee help ahd guidance of these forces will forge the 1 cadres. This necessitates first of all: a) break with aap and constant reshifting of Party forces; b) ¢otistant and aid to these comrades, to avoid demoralization ahd loss ni forces; c) the establishment of district, section, and regular functionaries conferences for the training: of d) the systematic selection of students for these training carefully choosing Party members from the most important : Party work - concentration factories, unions, cities and sections, sending these comrades back to the places from which further development of the older cadres by enabling them ve Cae certain amount of time for rad as an important The Most Urgent "Tasks of the Party ‘The immediate tasks of the Party as formulated in the adie of the 14th CC Plenum and of the 12th Plenum of the EB. C. ©. I, gave the direction for the Party's work in the whole next, period. Neder at of | these tasks have yet been accomplished, and in most of aaah, pul barest beginnings have as yet been made. anf ‘The chief obstacle in the way of unfolding a correct mass voltoy (Continued on Page Six) “ oe ive ea