The Daily Worker Newspaper, August 5, 1930, Page 4

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" the possibility of not only replacing kulak pro- > comrade. Published by the Comprodatly Publishing Co.. Inc., daily. except Sunday, at 26-28 unton Page Four squaic, New York City. N.Y Telephone nt 1696-7-8 Cable: “DAIWORK Addrecs and mail ali checks to the Paily Square New York. N. ¥ Daily aWorker By mat] everywhere: One year $6; six months $8; two mo! Manhattan and Bronx, New York City, and foreign, which are: SUBSCRIPTION RATES: nths $1; exeepting Boroughs of One yr. $8; six mons. $4.50 eee cee = = The Political Report of the Central Committee to the XVI. Party Congress Union of the Communist Party of the Soviet Ul. The Increasing Progress of the Building-Up of Socialisn and the Inner Situation of the Soviet Union. (Continued) | This is surely clear. The question is now: | Has the time already come for p ing forward to the offensive, the moment ripe for the offensive? In the zame year, Lenin spoke in anoiher place of the » “Joining the ranks with the masses of the peasants, with the working peasantry, and to begin the advance, essentially and in- finitely more slowly than we had intended, so that the whole mase actually moves with us. . .. Then when the kour comes there will be such aa accelerstion of this move- ment, as we do not even venture to dream of at this moment.” (Vol. XVLLL, second | part, pp 39-30. Russian.) It is always the same question: Has the | time already come for such an acceleration | of the movement, for the acceleration of the tempo of our movement: did we choose the right moment when we passed on a determined attack along the whole front in the second half of 19297 The Party has already given a clear and definite reply to this question. Yes, the moment has come. Yes. The Party chose the right moment to | pass forward to the attack along the whole front. This is shown by the growing activity of the working masses, and the hitherto unex- ampled growth of the authority of the Party among the million masses of the workers. This is shown by the growing activity of the poor and middle peasant masses and the determined turn taken by these masses towards the organization of collective farms. This is shown by our achievements both in the development of industry and in the de- | velopment of the Soviet farms and collectives. | This is shown by the fact that we have now duction of the Soviet and collective farms, but of widely exceeding kulak production. This is shown by the fact that we have es- sentially solved the grain problem and have accumulated certain grain reserves, by means of transferring the preponderance of the pro- duction of market grain from the sphere of individual production to that of the Soviet | and collective farms. We find here the proof that the Party chose the right moment to take up the offensive all along the line, and to advance the slogan of the liquidation of the kulak as class. What would have happened had we lent an ear to the Right opportunists of Comrade Buk- harin’s group, if we had renounced the offens- ive, throttled the speed of industrial develop- ment, hampered the development of the col- lective and Soviet farms, and depended on the individual peasant farm: Certainly we should have shattered our in- dustry, annihilated the socialist reconstruc- tion of agriculture; we should have remained without corn, and have smoothed the rule of the kulak. We should have been left with our hopes destroyed. if What would have happened if we had lent an ear to the “Left” opportunists of the Trot- ky-Zinoviev group, and had opened the of- fensive in 1926-27 at a time when we possessed no possibility of replacing kulak production by that of our Soviet and collective farms? Certainly we should have come to grief in this undertaking, we should have demonstrated our weakness, strengthened the position of the kulak and of all the capitalist elements, thrown the middle peasant into the arms of the kulak, destroyed our socialist structure, and found ourselves without grain. We should have been left with shattered hopes. The result would have been the same. Jt is not for nothing that our workers say: “If you go to the ‘Left’, you come to.the 2 Right.” (Applause.) Some comrades believe that in the offenvive of socialism the reprisals are of decisive im- portance, and that unless the reprisals in- crease there is no real offensive. Ig this right? Of course it is not. The reprisals are a necessary element of the offensive, but they are an auxiliary and not a leading element. Under our present con- ditions the most important point in the offen- sive of socialism is the acceleration of the rate of development of our industry, the accelera- tion of the rate of development ‘in our Soviet and collective farms, the acceleration of the rate of the economic supplanting of capitalist elements in town and country, of the mobiliza- tion of the masses against capitalism. It is possible to arrest and banish dozens and hun- dreds of thousands of kulaks, but if the neces- sary steps are not taken at the same time to accelerate the establishment of the new ones, and to uproot and liquidate the forms to which Reconstruction of the Party and Building of New Cadres (Continued) In the process of this development it is not difficult for district committees to find out which comrade is fitting to fill responsible position like section Agitprop director, section organizer, or to carry on T.U.U.L. work, or other important mass Party work on a section | scale. | Again, when a certain comrade has shown himself capable for the work and leadership in a section, he must be promoted to the dis- trict work, such as taking charge of a district department, a department of the T.U.U.L., or some other mass organization, and when a comrade has had sufficient training in district work, he will become material for district or- ganization anc for national work. In order that this promotion from below may be systematically carried out, lower Party organizations must systematically recommend | comrades to the higher Party committees for P¥oniction. Theoretical Training. Of course, it is necessary that in develop- new forces, we give them not only training in practical Party work and work in the mass organizations, but we must also help them to acquire theoretical and litical knowledge. This can be dene by organizing collective study in’all nuclei for every important Party and C. I. decision, establishing a regular study course in nucivi and section centers, organizing district schools and sending the comrades to the National Training School and Lenin School. Building of an Apparatus. | We have before us, not only the question | of creating new cadres but also the question | of how to use them, and how to build effective well functioning and responsible apparatus in | every Party center. Learning this art is very | important, because only a well functioning ap- paratus will give us the guarantee that the campaigns of our Party are successfully carried out. Withou functioning apparatus in the districts, sections and units even the best plan ned campaig ill become failures. Collective Work. Comrades must realize that no individual, no matter how effectively he or she may work, can carry on Party work. Our work in every field, in every department must be organized upon a collective basis. Every comrade in charge of mass work or some department of the Party shall organize not only committees around himself, but a sufficient number of | comrades who will carry out work in that par- ticular field. Upon the basis of collective work of a group of comrades under the leadership of responsible committees, there is guarantee of | success but this, also, is one way of training further groups of comrades to the various fields of Party work. | Let us take, for instance, organization work in the districts. District committees have an organization department. This mean that some responsible comrade is assigned as organizing secretary of the district. But no matter how good one comrade is for this work, he cannot successfully carry out organization work of the district, because the job is too hig for one Therefore there must be an organ- ization committee of the district. In the com- mittee, organization work must be divided amongst the comrades, but the committee shall not limit the division of work only to the com- mittee members, but shall select a list of com- Tades throughout the district, mainly to carry out this particular work. Something should be done as regards: Agit+ | also. prop work. The district agitprop director*shall gather and develop a group of comrades not only in the district center but in every section and in every locality. In the T.U.U.L. work and in every other field the same method m' be followed, and particularly districts must initiate this policy in the T.U.U.L., because this important work of building the revolutionary unions, can- not be carried vut without creating a whole army of proletarian functionaries, who are fitted for organizing workers into new unions and leading them in the struggles. The Question of Paid Functionaries. There is a very bad tendency in our Party to put a full time functionary-in charge of work whenever some new work is to be ini- tiated. While the Party must have a required number of paid functionaries in every district and in every field, the habir of creating un- limited jobs of full time functionaries often kills the initiative and activity of the rank and file members, besides starving out comrades who cannot be paid. By this method, we will not create ne » forces nor are we able to build the Party apparatus upon the basis of col- lective work. Often the question of adding a full time functionary can be solved by dividing the work among variou: comrades and thereby we will develop comrades, not one comrade but a group of comrades. Division of work must be ar- ranged also from the point of view that when one comrade attempts to do everything, he cannot successfully perform any of his or her duties, and consequently Party work suffers. However, this is one of the shortcomings in our Party. We must adopt a new policy in this respect Well planned division of work is one of the requirements of building a functioning Party organization. Full time functionaries should be added only when the particular work requires the whole time of our comrade to di- rect the work but then district committees must see that they can provide that function ary with the necessary livelihood. Supervision of Work by District Committees. District committees must not only initiate this new pol of creating uew cadres and building the Party apparatus, but must sys- tematically se work of every department and every responsible comrade in this district, and keep close records of their activities, Dis- | rict committees must rethove without hesita- tion those who are irresponsible about their duties, and have shown themselves incapable for their particular work after sufficient time has been given them. Comrades, if we proceed in this manner in finding and developing new forces and building the Party ar aratus, then the question of “shortage of forces” can easily be disposed of. In this way we also remove one of the main obstables in the way of reconstructing our Par- ty upon the basis of shop nuclei, and we make it possible for our Party to extend its influ- ence among the masses and mobilize them for struggle against capitalism. The Detly Werker is the Varty’s best instr nt te mabe contacts yiveng che masses of workers, to build a mass Communis Party. he kulak owes his existence, then the kulak system will arise and grow once more, Others believe that the offensive is a blind advance without proper preparatioy, without regroupings of forces during the offensive, without a consolidation of the positions already won, without a utilisation of the reserves for the development of the successes; and when | 1 Knock Hard With Your Fists, Workers! symptoms are observable, for instance, of « return current of a part of the peasants out 0: the collectives, then this means that we have the “ebbtide” of the revolution, the decline of the movement, a stagnation of the offensive. Is this, right? Of course it is not right. In the first place no offensive can be con- ducted, even the most successful one, without « .,and Link This Up...” By HARRISON GEORGE I a previous article the writer dealt with part of the mystery involved on how to “link up” concrete tasks of our Party in the shops with the general aims and broad cam- paigns of our Party, in a hope that the earnest and loyal individual members would be clarified on what often seems a puzzle of how this “link ing up” is done. But what is to be done when we encounter a seeming inability higher up, in leading com- | mittees and functionaries? An inability to grasp what appears to be and is, the simplest idea of “linking up” one campaign with an- other. For example: In a certain district some com- rades, and very good comrades, too, in a gen- eral way, when it came to the specific task of | organizing ‘shop committees, and doing it speelily, said that’ they would like to very | much, but that they were so terribly busy or- ganizing for the demonstration against war on August 1 that it simply isn’t possible. | Now this is a million miles from being cor- | rect. Evidently, these comrades have the idea still lingering in their heads that what we did on March 6 can be endlessly repeated without | the awful bother of real, genuine and concrete | organization permanently established in the shops. This is practicing exactly what was most sharply condemned by our Seventh Con- vention: Reliance on the spontaneity of the masses; that when we want a demonstration we just “call for it” ani the masses flock around “automatically.” Our Seventh Convention quite sharply laid down the line of no demonstrations “for the record”; that the sources of mass action are in the formation of shop committees, however dif- | ficult it may seem, is the sole guarantee of all our major aims; that it alone will make our Party a mass Party of action; that shop or- ganization is one of the prerequisites to what- ever organizational results we hope to gain by holding demonstrations, Those comrades who think that organizing » shop committees is impossible as an essential preparation for August 1, apparently believe that because August 1 is Anti-War Day, that either. there is no connection between the war danger and the workers’ conditions, or that the two issues cannot be “linked up” in the under- standing of the workers. Either way, it is an opportunist mistake; for only very had Communists cannot see the con- nection between imperialist war preparations : the shops and that organization in the shops, | | | | | | | \ and the speed-up in the shops. Those who think that the workers “can’t understand” this when properly approached are denying the rad- icalization of the working class. Another example: A very good comrade writes in that a great trouble in that agricul- tural region is that the Party is carrying on the election campaign, and there simply aren’t any forces that can be spared to help the United Farmers’ League to organize the tremendous discontent among the poor farmers. Thi up” two tasks of our Party. But we are really puzzle} how they can fail to be “linked up.” How in the world can any Communist Party election campaign speaker, talking to an audi- ence of farmers anywhere, fail to talk about these farmers’ conditions and how. they should go about it to better such conditions ? our comrades talk about if it isn’t precisely these things? Now then, in talking about all this, what should our comrade speaker propose the farm- ers should do? ‘poor farmers to vote for the Farm Bloc crooks who are agents of finance capital. Undoubt- edly they are aske! to vote for the Communist Party. But if they are given to understand that’ by so doing and without their own per- sonal and ,physical participation in struggle that Comniunist candidates if elected will be able to better their conditions without the poor farmers solidly organized to defend their in- terests in struggle, tenants’ strikes, strikes against high taxes, wholesale refusal to pay mortgages and a physical fight against evic- tions, then these poor farmers are being given a new dose of an olJ illusion in parliamentary action, Just as naturally, our Party says that it supports the United Farmers League, and it helps to organize the United Farmers League right on the spot, exactly the same as any Communist speaker aids the T.U.U.L, and for the same reason—these both are mass organ- izations of struggle, which, while they give mutual support to our Party and are schools for all who are not yet Communists, are,organ- | izing poor farmers in one case, and wage Worn: ers in another case, for the concrete aims that all agree with, whether they are Communists or not. And we conclude that if these comrades, in the splendid election campaign they are just beginning, do not see to it that the United Farmers League has a firm foundation in omrade clearly is puzzled how to “link | Of course they don’t tell the | Comrade J. Stalin’s What do | Address on J une Zi, 1930 ome breaches or too hasty actions at some ctions of the front. To use such factors in upport of the assertion that the offensive is ecoming stronger, or is a failure, shows a ack of comprehension of the nature of the offensive. In the second place, there can be no success- ful offensive without regroupings of forces during the attack itself, without the firmer es- tablishment of the positions won, without the utilization of the reserves fo rthe development of the successes gained and for the completion of the offensive—without this there never has been a successful offensive. A blind assault, ignoring these conditions, must inevitably drive the offensive into empty space, and condemn it to failure. The blind assault is the death of the offensive. The many lessons taught by our civil war are ample proof of this. In the third place, how can an analogy be drawn between an “ebbtide of revolution”, gen- erally originating in the decline of the move- ment, and the return current of a section of the peasantry out of the collective farms, an occurence originating on the basis of the steady advance of the movement, of the steady ad- vance of our whole work of building up social- ism, both in industry and agriculture, and on the basis of the steady advance of our revolu- tion? What can these two absolutely different phenomena have in common? c) Of what does the essential character of the Bolshevist offensive consist under present conditions ? The essential character of the Bolshevist of- fensive consists, above all, in the mobilization of the class conscious watchfulness and the revolutionary activity of the masses against capitalist elements of our country, in the mobil- ization of the creative initiative and energy of the masses against ‘he bureaucracy in our in- stitutions and organizations, against that bureaucracy which causes the enormous re- serves contained in our structure to lie idle and unutilized, and in the organization of the com- petitions among the workers, the upsurge of labor energy among the masses, for the in- crease of the productivity of labor, and for the advancement of the work of socialist recon- struction. Secondly, the essential character of the Bol- shevist offensive lies in the organization of the adaptation of the whole practical work of the trwle unionist, co-operative, Soviet, and other mass organizations, to the needs of the period of reconstruction, in the formation of cadres in these of the most active and revolutionary co-workers, in the isolation and setting aside of opportunist, narrow trade unionist, and bureau- cratic elements, in the elimination of all for- eign and degenerate elements, and their re placement by new workers from below. Further, the essential character of the Bol- shevist offensive lies in the mobilization of the maximum of our means for the financing of our industry, our Soviet and collective farms, and in the participation of the most capable elements in our Party in the work of promot ing this cause. Finally, the essential character of the Bol- shevist offensive lies in the mobilization of the Party itself for the organization of the whole cause of the offensive, in the consolidation an intensification of the Party organizations by means of the elimination of the bureaucratic ani degenerate elements, in the isolation and pushing aside of the representatives of the Right and “Left” deviations from the Lenin- ist party, and the placing in the foreground of the real and steadfast Leninists, These are the bases of the Bolshevist of- fensive at the present moment. How is the Party realizing this plan of the offensive? We know that the Party is carrying out plan consistently. The fi step taken by the Party was tc undertake selfcriticism on a brad scale, and tc concentrate the attention of the masses on the faults of our constructive work, on the faults of our organizations and institutions. As early as the XV. Party Congress the necessity of intensified self criticism was recognized. ‘lhe Schakhty affair and the sabotage committed in our various industries, revealing the lack of revolutionary instinct in some of the sections of the Party, gave fresh impetus to self-crit- icism on the one hand, whilst on the other this impetus was supplied by our struggle against the kulaks and the deficiencis of our village organization thereby incurred. ‘The C.C., in its appeal of 2nd June 1928, laid down thé final lines of the campaign of selfcriticism, calling upon all the forces of the Party and the work- ing class to exercise self-criticism, “from top to bottom and from bottom to top,” “without respect of persons.” The Party, drawing in a line of demarcation between itself and the Trotzkyist “criticism” coming from the other side of the barricade, and aiming at the dis- crediting and weakening of the Soviet power, declared that the task of self-criticism is the ruthless exposure of the faults of our work, to the end that our work of building up socialism may be improved and the Soviet power more firmly established. It is a well-known fact that the appeal of the Party roused a far- reaching echo in the masses of the working class and peasantry. (To Be Continued.) Organize Worker Correspondents Movement By B. SKLAR ips importance of the workers correspondents movement has long been recognized by our Party (theoretically). Our Party has now ar- rived at a stage in its development when it must and will take serious steps in order to crystallize this movement organizationally. The worker correspondents movement is a powerful instrument for developing our Party press into mass papers The worker correspondents movement, if properly developed, will become a powerful vehicle for popularizing the campaigns, the slogans of the Party among the broad magses of workers, Last but not least this movenient is a power- ful weapon for exposing and correcting the shortcomings of our movement and of oppor- tunist deviations from the correct Party line. The guiding center of the movement must be the Daily Worker worker correspondents movement. The first organizational step toward the building up of the worker correspondents move- ment must be the creation of a Central Work ers Correspondence Bureau (connected with the Daily Worker and under its guidance), This bureau will have the important tasks: 1.—To foster the organization of worker correspondents groups in the most industrial centers of the United States. 2.—To maintain contacts with these groups territory when the election is over, then the election campaign will be a failure. Since we have spoken of the. T.U.U.L., it might be well to cite another example the inability to “link up” various phases of the work. This is not because there is any lack of talk about “linking up,” there is lots of that. But not.so much “linking up.” Not a soul in the T.U.U.L, will deny, in fact they will stoutly assert, that every task of practical work must be “linked up” with self- criticism, For example, the building of the “Labor Unity” is and must be “linked up” with self-criticis But there is a notable absence of self-criticism by the T.U.U.L. of its own work in Labor Unity. But the worst of it seems that our comrades in the T.U.U.L. either do not hear the warning voice or think that this can be remedied by some formal or mechanical sleight of hand. It is not sufficient to dress the paper up with nice pictures, snappy headlines and lots of worker correspondence. Self-Criticism Too Mechanical. In the issue of July 9,,however, the Labor Unity publishes a cable from the Red Interna- tional proposing that the T.U.U.L. “Develop energetic self-criticism at meetings an] espe- cially in the press.” The Red International of Labor Unions preluded this by “recognizing” that self-criticism hitherto was “insufficient.” Following this is some rather empty breast- beating admissions that self-criticism is ter- ribly lacking, that the “self-criticism must be applied to some of our districts” (‘applied” apparently like liniment to a sore leg) and then a list of numbered “instructions” to the erring comrades how to “apply” it: No. 1, so and so. No. 2, certain things must be “taken up,” and after the list is exhausted and all is “applied” or “taken up”—a resounding order is given: “We, therefore, demand that the Na- tional Office be informed by return mail,” ete. With our trade union work full of oppoztun- ist errors, with our Party calling on the work- Township Committees of poor farmers in their ers who are not Party members, but who are in order to guide them in their work. 3.—To develop international exchange of workers’ correspondence between the workers of the U. S. and the workers of the Soviet Union, between the American workers and the workers of Western Europe, between the work- ers of the U. S. and the workers of Latin America, of the colonies of the American im- perialists and the workers of other imperial- ist coloni _ Contact of the American workers (through international workers correspondence) with the workers of the Soviet Union and the workers of American colonies is of especial importance. The Central Worker Correspondence Bureau must create a department for this work, Similarly in each district a responsible Worker Correspondence Bureau should be set up with the inclusion of the best of non-Party workers, The main task of this bureau will be to develop local worker correspondents circles in the industrial centers of the district. In developing local groups of worker cor- respondents our orientation must be towards the building up of shop worker correspondents groups wherever possible, Local conferances of the worker correspon- dents must be called from time to time in order to clarify the campaigns of the Party and to broaden and improve the movement, General local conferences of the language paper. correspondents groups with the Daily Worker correspondent groups must be held from time to time. Such conferences will give the correct orien- tation to the work of the language groups and will result in the exchange of very valuable information which will permit the extension of shop activities of the Party and recruit new members. Provision must be n.ade for the transmission to the Daily Worker of the :ost important correspondence received by the language press. All of this will show the necessity of and halt ee econes a better co-ordination of the activi\'es of the various language groups with the Pa: nb Be The international xchange of worker corres- r “ence must be de° loped through various channels, Throveh .op groups, through in- dust-iel unions, throu. “reternal organizations, throvh in lividuel workers, etc. A Worker Correspondence Bulletin should be issued monthly in order to guide, coordinate and develop the workers correspondents move- ment, loyally anxious to build the T.U.U.L, revolu- tionary unions, to help the Party correct its line and fight the Right Danger in practice— there should be much of the space of Labor Unity filled with splendid and helpful criticism of concrete onportunist errors, workers. But one can not find such a thing in Labor Unity, It seems that there is insufficient compre- hension of the necessity of this among, our comrades leading the T.U.U.L. work. We must vevelop that ability to “link up” self-criticism with practical work, of making Labor Unity the’ voice of the workers’ complaints against our mistakes as well as of complaints against capitalist exploitation. The fight against the Right Danger is not limited to Party members, nor to the columns of the Daily Worker. It must be encouraged among the masses, and find a place in what the Labor Unity ought to be—the organ of | mass expression, written by / \

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