The Daily Worker Newspaper, June 6, 1930, Page 4

New York Cit and mail all ct erg ese ee Published by the Comprodaily Publish!n ent Sunday, at 26-28 8. Cable: “DAIW Union Square, New York z Co, Telephon v the Daily Worker Convention Problems of the Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union By ROSE WORTIS. RIDAY, JU} 6, will mark the second rank and file convention of th Needle Trades Workers I 1 Union, Unlike the pre-convention periods of the company unions, which are ¢ rized | intrigues, maneuvers and fra ween thi various cliques interested in sending their hand-picked supporters to the pre-arranged convent steam-rolled convei.tions, our period was a time during which of the union, as well as the e the membership, made a thorough revi the policies, tactics, achievements and comings of the past, and outlined a clear policy for the future. In the beginning of our pre-conyention di cussion an article appeared in the y Wo er and the Freiheit which critically analy the struggle in the needle trades for the p few years up to and after the formatic the Industrial Union, and the reasons why Industrial Union despite favorable conditions failed to crystallize its ideo} control over the needle trades work izationally. This article gave rise to widespread di sion and met with serious objections, par ularly on the part of the organized Lovestou group within the Industrial Union. What were the objections raised by the op- position? ke (1) That this article with its criticism of our mistakes will be taken advantage of by the enemy and will be used to discredit the union. (2) That the aim of the article is to injure the growth of the Industrial Union reduce it to a sectarian group. (3) of the oppositionists contended that the m takes alluded to in the article do not actually constitute mistakes in themselves; that incorrect policies indicated in the article were dictated by necessity and will have to be re- peated in the future. As far as the first argument is concerned namely, that the enemies will take advantage of this criticism, it is not new. Whenever any revolutionary organization has attempted to exercise self-criticism, those who lacked the courage inevitably raised this argument. The policies of a revolutionary organization are never dictated by what the enemy will say, but by what is correct and by what can best serve the interests of the movement. A speci- fie illustration of this is the recent discussion on the question of collectivization in the Soviet Union. No doubt many of those responsible for: the mistakes in the application of the collectivization policy were the very ones to oppose self-criticism on the ground that the enemy will interpret it as a retreat. Howeve the leaders of the Soviet Union knew that on through merciless seif-criticism can these shortcomings be corrected, and time itself h corroborated the truth of this contention. Th criticism of Stalin against those who misap- plied the correct policy has not meant a re- ‘treat for the Soviet Union, but on the con- trary has helped the success of the collectiv- ization policy. The second argument sounds strange in- deed, especially coming “rom those who have segregated themselves from the revolut: y movement, who are operating as an isola group, separate and apart, and are fast deg: erating from a left wing opposition in a right wing union to a right wing opposition in a left wing union. Now as to the political line of the article and the relation of the struggle in the needle trades to the general struggle of the labo: movement in the U. S.A. The main points of criticism raised in the article are as follows: (1) That we failed to properly understand the developments of the industry, and to shape our policies in accordance with the new de- velopments of the situation. (2) That we did not properly estimate the role of the fascist leadership of the A. F. of L. (3) That we carried over some of the ol practices of compromise with the police a in some respects (the dress strike) pursued policy of class-collaboration with the employ- ers. (4) That we failed to reorganize our unio: on the shop delegate system, and to develop mass activity of the workers in order to meet the problems confronting us. (5) That we continued functioning as an opposition even after the organization of the Industrial Union, and failed to give indepen- dent leadership to the workers’ struggles. Is there any truth in this criticism raised in the articles? Now, after several years of bitter struggle, when in a sober frame of mind we review our past struggles and activities and closely an- alyze the situation, we find that this criticism is correct and largely explains the reasons why the Industrial Union despite favorable objective conditions did not develop as a mass organization. ‘One of the most serious mistakes, in my «opinion, was our failure to understand the treacherous role of the trade union bureau- cracy. This was but the logical result of the general failure of the left wing and of the Communist Party (under the leadership of Lovestone) to properly understand and esti- mate the economic situation of the country, the strength of American capitaliam and its fascist agents in the labor movement. This was most glaringly illustrated in our tactics and policies after the struggle of the Joint Action Committee. As a consequence of this lack of proper evaluation, we did not recognize that the struggle of the Joint Ac- tion Committee was not a fight between two wings in the labor movement, but a class struggle fight in which the Sigman gang merely acted as an agency of the bosses. We continued to believe that there was a possibil- ity of working in unison with Sigman and failed to utilize the victorious struggle of the Joint Action Commitee in order to entrench ourselves for the coming sharper struggles. This belief was also shared by the leadershhip of the Communist Party. I clearly recall one pri obje and the when Ben Lifshitz, after listening at a strike meeting to one of the militant speeches made by Sigman (who was then secretly conspiring to sell out the strike), expressed the opinion that he really desired to see the strike won. Our belief that Sigman and his supporters the opening of typical instance during the cloakmakers strike, . that he believed Sigman to be sincere and | labor leaders i ed us to adopt the most glaring of which w strike in t the reac- at the same | we must defeat the bosses | take up the struggle against » machine, It was this inco: nding, these wrong policies that t Ninfo, who had openly be- strike, to remain on the strike com- perm This wrong policy was responsible that, while seeing clearly the activities of Halpern—that he hundreds of thous; of dol- 2 ke treasury to organize his | gainst the union and to } ikers—we still permitted him I in on the out-of-town committee and | voted the appropriation for his traitorous | based on the have been the nts of the id work out | of doing this | instances we did j in the indus- | z re needle industry, just was becoming cen- zed nce capital, de- | nee of decentral- not take note of the big | that were being made in the indus- | ances re we did take iled to adopt i f spite did the to the meet the new 1 to appreciate full te in prepared to combat the com- f the powerful enemies. are in respect led us into a helping to organize employers’ as- | th these asso- our strugel bined at Our f of th this ciations and maneuvering ciations in the hope of getting them to split with the company-union and to recognize our union. Subsequent events proved the incorrectness of otr policy and demonstrated very ¢ had we devoted ourselves to mobilizing | of the workers for struggle and-| s hope on maneuvers, our union would been in a much stronger position than it is tod f with this policy came also the policy of comp: e with the police, which brought untold inj to our struggle. The carrying | ¢ of these wrong practices from the old rupt unions has created illusions amongst he workers tha tthe police can be utilized in their struggles against the bosses. It has d the fighting energy of the workers led them to rely on forces outside for winning their struggle nst the bosses. same was also true in our methods of on work. While theor- ed thet the old methods ation work through small and in some ‘in- effort to conduct our am scale, neverthe- tent in developing of struggle. While necessity of mass or- continued to rely on the elves in developing amongst the ; hology that the organization their shops not their task; that they were merely to sit in the shop and wait for some outside union committee to come and bring them down to the office of the union. How often did we meet with a situation | where a large group of left wingers were working in an open shop and when asked | \ did not organize their shop they | ver that the union did not send a ent pre-convention discussion has | y a worker to recognize the truth of t riticism leveled against us by the Trade Union Unity League, and as a result of this diseussion the w 's are gradually begin- ng to recognize that the union will never be built by a small group of workers, but active participation of the of the workers in the organization as well as the other activities of the only through the mass union. Now as to the structure of our organization. From its very inception, the left wing in the needle trades recognized that the local* craft form of organization has outlived its usefulness. Some of the earliest struggles of the left wing were fought on the issue of re- organizing the union on a shop delegate basis. This issue was the cause of many expulsions. Yet, when the left wing gained control, and even after the organization of the Industrial Union, the recognizing the necessity for the shop delegate system, we hesitated to put it into effect. In 1925 our failure to establish the shop delegate system and carry through amalgamation was due to our wrong estima- ‘tion of the role of the Sigman machine and our desire to maintain peace at any price, even though it meant the sacrifice of one of the basic points of the left wing program. Our failure to properly analyze and cor- rect this grave error of 1925, led us to repeat the same mistake during the organization of the Needle Trades Workers’ Industrial Union, when we yielded to the pressure of the so- called middle group (Shelly, Horowitz, etc., who in reality had already directly aligned themselves with the Sigman machine), an! instead of launching our union from its very inception on the shop delegate systerh, we de- cided on a transition period, which weakened the strength of our organization and greatly hampered the successful development of the strikes, which came immediately after the or- ganization of the Industrial Union, Having started our Industrial Union on the wrong basis, with an,eye to retaining the middle groups, we naturally also continued many other wrong practices. Though affiliated with the R.LL,U., the comrades of the needle trades under the influence of the Lovestone leadership in the Communist Party continued a policy of exceptionalism, The experiences of the revolutionary movement throughout the t Onion ORK" NYY: “Central Organ of the Comm Ry m unist Party of the 11, S. A. Workers Will End Company Unions and Slave Contracts TH (From “The Communist International,” No. 6, 1930): N examining the campaign for the Inter- national Day of Fight Against Unemploy- ent (March 6th), conducted by the Commu- varity, we must start by examining the condition of the Party press before the E.C.C.I. and R.LL.U. had arrived at the decision con- cerning March 6th. The following fact must be recognized: Although the unemployment problem has for a long time been very acute, the army of workless having grown to enor- mous dimensions, no systematic, prolonged and gradually intensified campaign was conducted in the majority of Party papers. It is true that as far as quantity ‘is concerned, Communist newspapers, particularly in Germany and America, devoted much space to the unemploy- ment question, but the main problems were treated in a very unsystematic manner. The idea of the joint struggle of the unemployed and the employed workers was not sufficiently sharply brought out, and was not applied along with all the principal conclusions to be deducted therefrom, to all important topical questions. The Berlin Rote Fahne, as also the German provincial press, in an agitational respect treated brilliantly the most urgent current topics, particularly the police terror against unemployed demonstrations. l’Humanite ig- nored the unemployment question. The Lon- don Daily Worker dealt with the unemploye1 movement quite unsystematically and did not treat it as the key problem in the present day economic and political struggles. +The March 6th campaign undoubtedly did cause a stir in all the papers. In dealing with the unemployed problem the field of visior widened, the international significance of un employment began to be brought out, the or- ganizational aspect of the March 6th campaign was given an agitational basis, the narrow parochial viewpoint which has often prevailec when examining problems of unemployment now gave place to a broader outlook. In this article it is our object briefly tc describe the campaign conducted by the Part; press of Germany, France, Great Britain anc America. On our analysis we will distinguish between three phases of the campaign: (1) The campaign preceding March 6th, (2) the direc: preparation (March 5th to 6th) and (3) the utilization of the March 6th experience. During the first weeks of the campaign, no substantial change took place in the position of the pres. Except for the publication of the Communist International manifesto and the | treatment of everyday questions, the press still bore no imprint of a campaign. It was only in the last two weeks that a real concentration on the unemployed movement or the prepara- tion for March 6th was to be noted. The conducting of the campaign must be estimated from the following aspects: (1) the linking up of current campaigns (March 6th, the anti-Soviet crusade, International Women’s Day); (2) the line of campaign, the putting forward of basic viewpoints, the united front of employed and unemployed workers; (3) the movement in the factories; (4) the internation- al character of the campaign; (5) methods of mass mobilization with the aid of the press; (6) the elucidation of main problems (world econ- omie crisis, legality and illegality, social-fas- cism); information on the U.S.S.R. It is from those aspects that we shall ex- amine the most important Party papers. On the eve of the March 6th campaign, the Berlin Rote Fahne, in accord with the situation in Germany, gave a prominent place to prob- lems of unemployment and during the final weeks intensifed the campaign. For example, the Rote Fahne devoted big top-of-the-page ar- ticles to mass unemployment and the struggle on February 25th, February 26th, February 28th, March 2nd, March 4th and March 5th. The most important central problems were dealt with in leading articles—it is true only nartially (a leader on March 2nd on the ques- tion of the joint struggle of employed and un- employed workers, on March 6th concerning the fight for the streets, etc.). The strength of these articles lay in their live agitational treatment and correct emphasis of the signifi- cence of the struggle for the streets and also of the united front of employed and unemploy- ed workers. The campaign in the Rote Fahne, however, when examined from the aspects outlined above, discloses quite a number of defects and weak points, which can in no way be justified by referring to the pressure from many other campaigns, lack of space or other technical factors. : The first substantial defect in the campaign was that on the eve of March 6th the idea of the broad united front from below was not suf- ficiently used for propaganda by the press. This defect was noted by the recent Plenum of the C.C., C.P.G., as applying to many Party organizations as a whole. It is true, the neces- sity for a united front of employed and un- employed workers was constantly emphasized, | but very little was said on the eve of March | 6th of the necessity also to bring the social- | democratic workers into this united front. Di- Mave A Big Industrial Union Winning Conditions for the Needle E INTERNATIONAL COM. MUNIST PRESS AND MARCH 6 SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 everywhere: One year $0; six months $3; two months $1; excepting Boroughs of tian and Bronx, New York City, and foreign, which are: One year $8; six months $4.50 rectly prior to and following March 6th, a man- | ifesto was printed in bold type appealing to the social-democratie workers to join in the protest against the bloody social-fascist terror, but that correct appeal was not properly linked up with references to the common interests of the workers in the struggle for work or wages, as the material basis for the united front from below. q The second important defect of the campaign | was the fact that the Rote Fahne, while dealing excellently with the ideological role of the C.P. | in the fight against unemployment, ignoted its | organizational role. Throughout the whole campaign there was not a single article about the role of the factory cells. The page devoted daily to factory life, did not bear any imprint of the factory movement and devoted still less space to the united front from below. In gen- eral one finds in the Communist press, too many di ‘tractions and too few live accounts as to how the definite campaign in the factories has actually been prepared and conducted. The third defect was the inadequate utiliza- tion of material on the U. S. S. R. The anti- Soviet chmpaign of the churches was not suf- ficiently linked up with questions of March 6th. Once (February 26th, but unfortunately, only once, information on socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. was given a prominent place —on the front page. The most important In- precorr article on the fight against unemploy- ment in the U.S.S.R. appeared after March 6th. In general the utilization of material on the tremendous successes of socialist construc- tion is still quite inadequate, whereas the bour- | geois press prints its false and sensational in- formation abbut the U.S.S.R. on the first or second pages. The Rote Fahne has the bad habit of tucking away current news about the U.S.S.R. on the so-called third political page, where it does not sufficiently strike the. eye. In that and certain other respects, we must point out the excellent way the campaign was conducted by the “Hamburger Volkszeitung.” With regard to illustrations (pictures, car- toons, etc.), this campaign was very weak. From the ideological standpoint it should be observed that such an important organ as the Rote Fahne should have given more attention also to the theoretical questions arising in con- nection with mass unemployment. As far as l’Humanite is concerned, this paper, in the final weeks, devoted leading and top articles to the March 6th campaign almost every day. The international nature of the campaign was very well brought out. A politi- cally weak point in the campaign, at the time | of the French governmental crisis, was that in dealing with this crisis, the questions of the un- employed movement were relegated to the background. °l’Humanite paid more attention than Rote Fahne did to the particular cate- gories of workers. It appealed to civil servants and soldiers to take part in the March 6th dem- onstrations. The weakest point of the cam- paign in l’Humanite was also the treatment of the movement in the fattories. We only found one small article on how the March 6th cam- | paign was prepared in the factories. The edit- | orial did not supply such articles with the prop- | | er commentary, calling upon other factories to follow the example set. Information on the U.S.S.R. in the pages of | YHumanite throughout the whole campaign was | dst as inadequate as formerly. The daily | publication of two or three telegrams on the | U.S.S.R. for the information of the French | workers was totally inadequate in view of the | frantic anti-Soviet campaign going on in the | whole French bourgeois press. On March 5th | VHumanite devoted a whole page to the U.S. | S.R..and the material on unemployment was very well arranged, but this material was quite out of date. The very important new material | on this question, however, the fact of the con- | siderable decrease of unemployment in the U.S. | S.R., was not utilized. This was a serious omis- sion! The l’Humanite leading articles in a suc- cinct. and intelligible manner expounded the main ideas of the campaign and correctly ad- vocated the E.C.C.I. slogans. The paper was very weak, however, in the way it dealt with the purely agitational treatment of the prob- | lems. Instead of making the paper an organiz- | ing factor in the factory campaign, I'Humanite © restricted itself to agitation and propaganda. As far as quantity is concerned the Daily Worker (London) contained a great deal of ma- terial on the question of unemployment and the March 6th campaign, but unfortunately, here quantity surpassed quality. Dull and boring treatment impaired or weakened even the best articles, The day-to-day slogans were mono- tonous and vapid. Such slogans as Fight against unemployment across a whole page, were not capable of setting the masses going and mobilizing them for the struggle. The big- | gest defect of the Daily Worker was that: ; *the campaign was inadequately utilized to ex- pose and pillory the treacherous character of the Labor government.*Throughout the whole | campaign quotations from the promises made to the unemployed by MacDonald and the Labor Party, on the eve of their entering the government, should have been printed in big type. The latest unemployment figures should have been constantly made to shout out from j the columns, to make a striking impression. They should have been accompanied by iJlustra- | tions and diagrams, but there was nothing of | the sort. A great deal of material was pub- | lished on the U.S.S.R., some of which was | useful, but specific material on unemployment | was not utilized. There was no distinction be- | tween the various categories of workers. The Daily Worker (New York) really did carry out the campaign excellently. For sev- eral weeks the front page was entirely devoted to this campaign with excellently arranged material. The paper used impassioned and moving language. Good impressionable illus- trations were printed every day and the churches’ anti-Soviet campaign was handled in a more outstanding manner than in the European Communist press. The paper pub- lished very striking material on the com- bined activity of the big trusts and the church- es. It also paid the necessary attention to propagandist problems—the crisis and the question of reli ing slogans were at the top of’every page. In general, it may be said that while ignoring all other questions (including International Women’s Day, March 8th), the paper concen- trated undivided attention on March 6th. One must admit that whereas, on the one hand, the excellent conducting of the American Daily Worker campaign is a reflection of the inten- sity of the unemployed movement, on the other hand, the paper itself, by its striking agita- tion, greatly furthered the tremendous success of March 6th in the U.S.A. and provided an example worthy of imitation by the European Communist press. It must be recorded that on March 5 and 6 the Communist press brought the campaign to culmination point, but considerably waned in the process of utilizing the experience of the campaign, with the exception of the New York 7 Daily Worker. Close examination of the issues for March 5 and March 6 reveal that the press saw the significance of March 6 mainly in the actual fact of demonstrations and not in the fighting program, which laid its own special imprint on these demonstrations. In this res- pect the Rote Fahne headings are typical. On March 5 a heading ran: “The streets must be free” and.on March 6: “The world offensive of the hunger army.” On March 6, in an issue which otherwise was excellently made up, there was not even any boldly printed treatment of the March 6 slogans, although, we assume there would be a bigger print of the Rote Fahne on that day. The same can be said of the main March 6 slogan in l’Humanité: “There will be demonstrations in the factories and streets.” Demonstrations, yes—but under what banner? It was essential to indicate this. This once again reflects the one-sided appreciation of the significance and tasks of March 6 by the Communist newspapers. In regard to utilization of the experiences of the campaign, the main defect is the abso- lute absence in the press of any critical survey of the campaign. In our view, besides noting the achievements of the March 6 campaign, which is a further step forward as compared with August 1, the defects of the campaign should also have been quite impartially sub- mitted to self-criticism. In making use of the March 6 campaign, Rote Fahne restricts itself exclusively to de- scribing the significance of the sanguinary social-fascist terror. On the other hand, the campaign was wound up prematurely, and not succeeded by a transition into the prepa- ratory campaign for May First. L’Humanité, while also omitting all criticism of the weak points of the campaign, emphas- ized in excellent leading articles after March 6, the role of the Comintern and the great international significance of the campaign. The British Daily Worker after March 6 displayed an inadequate understanding of the new factors in the situation in. England, as signalized by March 6—the significance of social-fascist terror in relation to the demon- strators. The role of the Party in utilizing the experiences of the campaign was not clearly brought out.. Things were improved by the linking up of the campaign with subsequent campaigns (hunger march and First of May). In utilizing the March 6 experience, the esti- mation of the various demonstrations by the press also deserves atention. Rote Fahne im- mediately understood the great importance of the powerful demonstrations in America, and, except for certain exaggerations, gave a cor- rect appreciation of their significance. L’Humanité and Daily Worker (London), however, although on that occasion well sup- plied with information at first absolutely failed to realize the importance of the New York demonstration on March 6. The Daily Worker devoted a small part, to the New York dem- onstration. These errors were only rectified afterwards. ‘In summing up we must say that the util- ization of the March 6 experiences by the en- tire Communist press was much feebler than the preparation for this campaign. Thig defect deserves special attention as it reflects one of the typical weaknesses of our press. What the last Plenum of the presidium of the ECCI said about the sections in general, is equally correct when applied to the Communist press: in all the work undertaken, agitation and pro- paganda outweighs the organization of the struggle. This by no means signifies that in agitation and particularly in propaganda, spe- cial efforts are not required. However, the process of the March 6 campaign undoubtedly has shown that the role of the Bolshevist press; as an organizing factor in the movement must certainly be strengthened, We have left untouched here a whole number of typical weaknesses and burning, unsolved problems of the Communist Party press, since they can only be elucidated by a detailed analysis of the general condition of our press. This is to be the subject of a special article. Vy A world, the crystallization of the policy with re- gard to strike strategy, was regarded by us as something foreign to our movement. policies, we thought, may be applicable to Eu- ropean countries, but.as far as we were con- cerned, we continued along the old lines and | our strategy in the recent strike struggles, particularly in the dress strike, did not differ very much from the strike strategy of the old nions, with the exception that the leadership _ of our union had earnestly and sincerely hoped to bring about real improvements in the condi- ‘ons of the workers through these strikes. In the first place we hesitated to organize cur new union, fearing that the workers, whom we considered to be in an exceptional position in the U.S.A, would not follow us. This hes- ney dissipated the enthusiasm of the masses and created a feeling of pessimism, which we now struggle hard to overcome, After our - union was organized, our tactics were based too much on the activities of the enemy, instead of giving independent leadership to the workers in their struggle against the speed-up, long hours and gweat-shop conditions, Despite these shortcomings in the course of our struggle, several very important achieve- ments have been made, One of these was the mass defiance of injunctions, which had a far- reaching effect. The second was our ability, despite our shortcomings, to withstand the con- These | | centrated attack of the combined forces of the | enemy and to retain our ideological control over the workers. It was these achievements that created a base for the revival of our struggle in the needle trades. now, when in self-criticism we are reviewing our shortcomings of the past and are laying down the correct policy for the development of our struggle. The prospective for the struggle in the needle trades. is good. The conditions of the workers are becoming more deplorable from day to day. | The earnings of the workers in some sections of the industry have been reduced as muchas’ 50 to 60 per cent. The 40-hour week has been abolished. Reorganizations are the order of the day. The full burden of the economic crisis in the industry has been placed on the shoulders of the workers. This is being done with the direct aid and support of the company unions. The illusions that many of the workers en- tertained with regard to the company union . have been destroyed as a result of their exper- | iences in the fake strikes. The company unions | now stand exposed as the open fascist agents | of the bosses. The company unions are main- i tained solely by the support of’ the bosses. The i workers in ever larger numbers are beginning | to recognize that only thru militant struggle ‘ under the leadership of the Needle Trades ! Workers Industrial Union will they be in a , Position to fight their most powerful enemies and win union conditions, it The main task of the union today is to | crystallize our ideological control over the workers organizationally. Many important steps in this direction have already been taken by the union, with good results. The workers who in the past have regarded even the In- dustrial Union as something apart from them- selves, are beginning to recognize that they alone through their own activities will make the Industrial Union the fighting weapon of the needle trades workers, i The organization of block and building com- mittees will be the instrument for the develop- ment of the mass struggle. It is true that to- day only a small percentage of the workers are as yet taking an active part in these ac- tivities; but 4 start has already been made and with the proper following up of this work there is no doubt that before long the workers will recognize this fundamental change that has been made, and will come to look upon the Industrial Union as the organization that will lead them not only in their daily struggles but in the general struggles of the working class, ‘ The drive for 10,000 new members launched by the Industrial Union though as yet not de- veloped with the necessary impetus, is never- theless an encouraging beginning of the ca paign to strengthen and spread out the Indus- trial Union. The purpose of this drive is not merely to. get. individual members into the | union, but to establish contact with the work- ers of the open shops, use these contacts for the purpose of organizing shop committees to develop the struggle under the leadership of the Industrial Union. The attitude of the Lovestone group toward this drive, their attempt to ridicule it by com- paring it with the 1926 drive of the Sigman ma- chine, shows that already they are reaching @ stage where they make no distinctions between. the Industrial Union and the company union and see no difference between Sigman’s drive to fool the workers into the company union and the drive of the Industrial Union to widen its base and draw in the unorganized into its fighting ranks. The Trade Union Unity League, as the revo- lutionary center of the U.S.A., has asserted itself and performed its revolutionary duty toward the needle trades workers by calling the attention of the union to some of its short- comings and by assisting with its guidance in leacing the union on the proper revolutionary cond convention of the Industrial | mark a turning point in the strug- gl. of the needle trades workers. At this con- vention we will throw off the old outlived pol- icies that have interfered with the growth and development of our union, and will go forth with greater determination to build a real revo- lutionary union of needle trades workers,