The Daily Worker Newspaper, December 11, 1928, Page 3

, 4 i i } DAILY WORKER, NEW YORK, TUESVAY, DECEMBER 11, 1928 PARTY PRE-CON The main danger in the Ameri-!in connection with other inner con- can Party comes from the Right. This is due to the changing objective conditions of the class struggle in the United States and the oppor- tunist political line of the Lovestone group, which is the majority of the Central Committee. The maturing inher contradictions of American capitalism and the left- ward drift of the masses produce a turning point in the class struggle. From a long period of retreat be- fore the onslaught of capital the American workers are passing over into a period of defense and resist- ance preliminary to a higher phase of offensive and aggressive struggle | @eainst capitalist exploitation, In this period of increasing sharp- ess of class relations and class struggle in the United States, re- quiring @ reorientation of the Party’s perspectives to changing conditions and a reformulation of Party policy toward more aggres- siveness, initiative and militancy, we confront the danger of holding on to old perspectives, outworn policies and methods of work, which prevent the full unfolding of the Party’s leadership in the developing struggles. As analyzed and proven by Com- rade Stalin, in his two speeches in the ECCI in January, 1926, on “The Fight, Against the Right and Ultra- Left Deviations,” the danger in s1ch a period as we are entering in the United States comes from the Right. ‘This danger becomes real and actual because the Lovestone group, which constitutes the majority in the Cen- tral Committee, refuses to reorien- tate itself to the changing conditions of struggle and pursues an oppor- tunist line, as will be proven in the following points: tradictions of American capitalism. 9.—Failure to understand the | processes of rationalization, the |menacing nature of the movement | designated as capitalist-engineering- efficiency-socialism, and the inte- pai of the labor aristocracy and | q ureaucracy into the imperialist | crisis and more acute and aggres- machine of American capitalism. | sive policy on the part of Amabrican 10.--Failure to understand the full imperialism at home and abroad effects of the rationalization drive | (naval budget, persecution of the upon the workers particularly as workers thru injunctions, Nicara- “Amid an atmosphere of growing leep depression developing towards wage cuts, especially piece rates. /and under conditions of a rapidly 11.—Assuming that the course of growing participation of the work- American imperialism will proceed ers in mass struggles as shown by mainly along the lines of devclop- | the heroic struggles of the miners in ment of British capitalism and fail- Pennsylvania and Ohio, by the Pas- ure to understand the basically dif- saic textile workers’ strike, the fight |ferent present world situation? jin the needle trades, the historic The totality of these characteris- Sacco-Vanzetti agitation; the Work- tics make for a dangerously oppor- ¢Ts_ (Communist) Party of America, tunist conception of ‘present day Which has already played the lead- American capitalism and for a grave ing role in these struggles, and was overestimation of its reserve powers, | #ble also to take a prominent part in This tendency of the Lovestone | the Suir et Sy peg ee tes anc oumma group finds its expression in the |has how as its major task to mobil- original draft of the February |iz¢ and organize the workers under thesis, the CEC plenum resolution jits banner against the capitalist of- of May 1, 1927, and in the writings | fensive and against the reformist supporters of capitalism, namely, the Pee reife, Near ete on | American Federation of Labor, and , ete. ithe Socialist Party of America.” represented by the large extent of | gua, Philippines, Mexico and so on); | The Right Danger in the American Party ' ® EDITOR’ Communist International in Executive Committee of the of America. charge is absolutely untrue. of the Opposition, the Cent: tral Executive Committee. We herewith print the platform of the Opposition. It | | was first presented to the Sixth World Congress of the man, Manuel Gomez, Bill Dunne, Jack Johnstone, Wm. Z. | Foster, G. Siskind and Jas. P. Cannon against the Central Cannon's Trotskyist organ, “The Militant,” in print- ing this document in installments, has charged the Cen- tral Executive Committee with refusing to publish it. This structed the Daily Worker to print this document. herewith are complying with the instructions of the Cen- 'S NOTE paign to organize the unorganized in Western Pennsylvania prior to the calling of the April 6 strike and for the formation of a new union, VI. Insufficient Appreciation of Leading Role of Party and July, 1928, by Alex Bittel- Failure)to Build It. The political Secretariat of’ the ECCI found it necessary to state in its letter of April 13th to our Party that it “deems it necessary to call attention to. . .the tasks of the Party in- the sphere of lead- ‘ership of the growing workers’ mass | movement”; the Secretariat further | stated that our Party “has now as its major task to mobilize and® to . organize the workers under its ban- Immediately, upon request | jer against the capitalist offensive ral Executive Committee in- . . .it is immediately necessary to We intensify the ideological and organi- | | zational preparations of the Party, | Workers (Communist) Party | | especially the local Party organiza- tions to enable it quickly to mobilize | |its forces and means and thus to © _4| make it ready for a leading role in pies II. Underestimation of the Leftward Drift of the Masses. The murderous effects of the ra- tionalization drive of American capi- talism upon the masses (4,000,000 unemployed, speed-up, wage cuts, jete.) the sharpening imperialist ag- \gression of the American ruling jelass (Nicaragua, China, Philippines ete.), the success of socialist con- | struction in the U. S. S. R. the sy: tematically breaking down the |fects of capitalist and reformist propaganda, are all producing a | | The correctness of this characteri- zation of a perspective of struggle} given by the Comintern in April has ‘been more than justified by develop-| ling class struggles -and increasing The line of the Lovestone group in its vital work is a right wing line which liquidates the Party’s efforts to organize the unorganized. The “| the developing class struggle.” | 8. Systematic factional discrimin-| The insufficient appreciation of |ation against comrades capable for|the leading role of she Party and |trade union work, Placing and dis-| the failure to build the Party which | placing of field and district organ-| this letter called attention to, is one | VENTION DISCUSSION SECTION | features of imperialist development. The Daily Worker has heen treated | frivolously by the Lo¥estone group both in the editorial and manage- ment departments (the appointment | of three separate business managers in less than two years—all of them incompetent and all appointed for factional reasons, and rejection of proposal to appoint Comrade Wag- enknecht, the most competent com- rade for the position. Building the prestige of the DW is a major task which now confronts our Party. Its editorial staff must be organized from among the best politically equippéd comrades. 15.—Failure to utilize the mass campaigns to strengthen the nuclei and build the Party, New York, ete allowing a gradual and growing integration of the nuclei in many centers to take place, are charac. teristics of the present leadership. 16.—Extravagant financial pro grams which place unduly heavy burdens upon the membership and make it difficult for the lower paid workers to join and remain in the paity and fulfill the demands made upen them. | VII. Opportunist Application of | United Front Policy. The CI line against the united front from the top with reactionary trade union, liberal and Socialist Party leaders, and for united front with the workers against them ap- I. Overestimation of the Reserve widespread Leftward drift of the! foment among the masses since |(New Bedford and Fall River strikes in textile, continuation of the desperate struggle of miners,| |Bayonne strike in oil, maturing struggle situation in automobile, | |meat packing, shoe, etc. foment \among the farmers, the intensifying |political situation, ete.) The perspective of the Lovestone | principal defects are: (a) resistance| izers and industrial organizers sole- of the main. characteristics of the! | to reorientating the Party decisively | ly with regard to factional interests, in the direction of the building of| with resultant damage to mags or- new unions and (b) dilettante ap-| ganization. proach to the mass organization) campaigns and failure to carry them | v. through with the vigor and persis- tence necessary to this success. The | whole American Party was slow in, orientating towards organizing new) Resistance to Orientation of Active Struggle Against Lewis Machine and for Building New Union in Mining Industry. Ree, a Thia is chown by |Blies. with special emphasis in Lovestone group. This is shown BY| Armerica. ‘The new objective factors F |making for the discontent of the | 1.—Overemphasis on labor party.) masses and strengthening their im- Slowness and delay in deciding upon | pulse and will to struggle create and announcing our own election increasingly favorable conditions campaign. (Lovestone article, April| for the application of the united | “Communist.” Delay in acting on frcnt tactics directly withthe work- |minority motion of February 29th} ers and leading them in the fight for mobilézation of Party for our) against the reactionary leaders and Power of American Imperialism. Two basic factors determine the condition of American capitalism in masses in the United States. | There is a general growth of dis- content, militancy and readiness to the present period. (1) The matur- struggle among the semi-skilled and |group is in opposition to that out- | ‘lined above. Its perspective is based | jupon an overestimation of the re- ‘serve powers of American capital- unions, but the Lovestone group is primarily responsible for this, be- cause it has resisted and is still re- sisting despite the pressure of the Comintern, the Profintern and the m and an underestimation of the | minority of the. CEC. The most important industrial own election campaign). Allowing | struggle ever carried through by our SP to enter field first. |Party and its biggest achievement) 9. The Panken, Bearak and Mil- | in trade union work is the left wing waukee cases (support of Socialist | struggle now being waged in the party candidates). |the capitalists. The firm adherence {to this basic conception is a prere- jquisite for the full utilization of the | possibilities to broaden and inten- |sify the fight of the workers and ing inner contradictions of Ameri can capitalism (disproportion be- tween the rate of expansion of pro- ductive capacity and rate of growth junskilled workers (the bulk of the | American proletariat). A process of widespread and general radicaliza- tion is taking place in all industries among the most exploited sections of \Leftward drift of the masses. It is iSiarnctecived! bys Principal causes of wrong Love- | stone policies in organizing the un- 1.—Overestimation of objective ' organized: difficulties and underestimation of 1. “Lack of faith in the possibility mining industry. The driving force |in the formulation and execution of | |correct policies and mobilization of ; puild the Party. The complete de- 8.—The tendency _to make our generation of the Socialist Party Party into a mere instrument for | and its incorporation into the capi- of volume of production, dispropor- tion between the growth of produc- the workers, | tion and consumption, unemploy- | This Leftward or radicalization ment, the contradictions of rational- drift of the masses came to most ac- ization, capital export, polarization tive expression in the struggles of of wealth and poverty. ete..) are be-|the mining, textile and needle trades the growing favorable opportunities for the proletarian class struggle. and smallness of the Party and un- for effective struggle of the masses resulting from the overestimation 2.—Overemphasis of the weakness | of the reserve powers of American capitalism and underestimation of deremphasis of its great task for the industrial depression, the capi-| ginning to produce QUALITATIVE CHANGES in the whole economic system. (2) These inner contradic. tions are maturing in the surround. ings of a declining world capitalism and the Socialist growth of the U. S. S. R., which sharpen, intensify and accelerate the development of the contradictions of American capi- talism, hastening the coming of its downfall. An analysis of the degree of ripe- ness of these contradictions will show that American capitalism is about to reach the apex of growth and that further expansion leads American capitalism to further and more drastic attacks upon the stan- dards of life of the American masses and to an attempt to an armed re- division of the world market and spheres of imperialist domination, both of which only further intensify these contradictions leading to the downfall of American imperialism. In the light of the above, the pres- ent economic depression must in- evitably become the forerunner of a deep-going crisis, even though Amer- ican capitalism may succeed in post- | poning its coming with the help. of the reserve powers which it still en- joys. This depression cannot be viewed merely as a “normal” cycli- cal depression having only slight and passing effects. On the con- trary. because of the qualitative changes which are taking place in| American capitalist economy, every such cyclical depression intensifies to the highest degree the contra- dictions of capitalism, undermine deeper the entire structure, eventu- | ally leading to deep-going crises. PS ne ener 3 The Lovestone group has an en- tirely different conception of the position and present phase of Amer- ican capitalism. This conception is marked by the following character- istics: 1.—The main emphasis upon the tendencies making for the growth and power of American capitalism. 2.—Totally inadequate emphasis upon the force and cumulative effect of the contradictions of American capitalism, which are already pro- ducing qualitative changes. 3.—The Lovestone group sees no qualitative changes taking place in American capitalism. 4.—Lack of proper evaluation of the inner contradictions of American capitalism as distinct from the un- dermining effects of the declining world capitalism and the growth of the U. S. S. R. 5.—Viewing the coming of deep-; going crises in America mainly as a result of the disintegrating influ- ences of declining world capitalism, relegating to the background the ef- fects of the inner contradictions o7 American capitalism. 6,—Following the lead of bour- geois economists in evaluating the present depression only as a “reces- sion.” On this the Lovestone group persisted as late as February, 1928. 7.—Accepting the “theory of spot- tiness” of the capitalist press and capitalist economists to explain the nature of the present depression and refusal to see its special characteris- tics as a forerunner of a deep-going crisis. 8.—Underestimation of the great significance of the imperialist epoch of the strikingly uneven development of industry (coal, oil, textiles, etc.) workers, and in the widespread fo- _ment and prospects for struggle in |automobile, shoe, oil, meat packing, rubber and other industries. The April letter of the ECCI to our Party characterises this general | Leftward drift as “a rapidly grow- ing participation of the workers in mass struggles.” Similar signs of foment and Left- the working farmers who continue to \suffer under the effects of the agri- ‘cultural crisis which though some- |what retarded, has not been liqui- | dated. |. This Leftward drift means a definite break in the mood of the American masses. A break from} |passivity and retreat to increasing | militancy and struggle. | The Lovestone group does not| |share this point of view. Its cdncep- | tion of the mood of the American | |masses is marked by the following | | characteristics: 1.—Failure to see the break in the mood of the American masses and the coming of a turning point in the) jclass struggle. i | 2.—Denial of the existence of a widespread and general Leftward or radicalization drift among the bulk) of the American workers, covering | it up with a demagogic and false | ‘charge against the minority that it! believes in a deep-going “revolu-| tionary” radicalization of the “en-_ \tire”? American working class. | 3.—Carrying over the question of ithe mood of the masses the bour- igeois “theory of spottiness,” insist-| ling upon the “spotty” nature of | through vigorously this basic task ‘radicalization in the sense that it is| of organization. With large masses ‘found only among the workers in) ‘ihe mining, textile and needle in-| movements of struggle, under the dustries. | _ward drift among the working farm- jers. Failing to develop an effective agrarian programme. Failure to treat the agricultural workers as part of the proletariat. 5.—Instead of taking advantage of the obvious manifestations of the radicalization drift of the masses, the Lovestone group underestimates jit, and continually and systematic- ‘ally (in speeches, articles, resolu- \tions, ete.) issues warnings and @n- jcentrates its attack against those |who are seeking to attract the Party’s attention and orientate its policy on the growing favorable con- dition for struggle resulting from this radicalization. The sum of these characteristic constitute a seri- ous underestimation of the Leftward drift of the American masses. ‘III, Lack of Prospectve of Struggle. The growing aggressiveness of American capitalism internally against the masses, externally against its imperialist rivals, chiefly England, and the Leftward drift of the masses constitutes the main basis of the perspectives of sharpening class struggle and an increasing de- gree of leadership of our Party in the struggles of the masses. This follows from a correct analysis of the diminishing reserve powers of American capitalism and the grow- ing Leftward drift of the masses, The ECCI letter to our Party of April 13, 1928, states in the follow- |ward development are shown among | talist offensive and the developing | Neadership in the development class take the solution of these tasks. 2a.—Failure to realize the seri-| 2. Tendency to orientate upon the jousness of the war danger and the organized skilled workers rather coming of serious struggles as is|}than upon the unorganized, semi- seen in the failure to build the un-| skilled and unskilled workers. derground apparatus. 3. Underestimation of the dimin- $.—Playing down the ‘systematic | ishing influence of the skilled work- \signifieance of such sporadic strug-| ers due to the mechanization of in- gles among the unorganized as the dustry and the growing gulf be- loil strike in Bayonne, automobile | tween ‘the skilled and unskilled. ers, struggles and its ability to under- mood of resistance among the work-| Party forces in this campaign was organizing a Labor Party (Minne-| |the Lovestone group dictated by an/Paign as an “organic part of the underestimation of the whole fight Labor Party campaign.” (Love- definitely militated against the de- Stone). | velopment of the aggressive action 4.—Tendency to look upon our | necessitated in this crucial struggle own election campaign as of less and prevented this work making| importance than the Labor Party) | greater success, campaign. | With the coal industry in a deep) 5.—The tendency to look upon our jcrisis (due to over-development of| Party merely as the left wing in ‘the industry, use of substitutes for farmer-labor organization (running coal, etc.) and with the union, Party candidates in primary elec- |weakened by the heavy unemploy- tions without statement that they |ment and the shifting of industry 47¢ Communists). (Minnesota). |to the South, being rapidly torn in, 6.—-Resistance to Party leader- | pieces under the impact of the at- ship in trade union work. (Needle tacks of the employers and the trades). treachery of Lewis, our Party orien-| | tation should have been definitely jng role (Furriers’ Union and work- the CEC minority. The policies of Sota), describing our election cam-| 7.—Absolute denial of Party lead- talist A. F. of L. police machine, puts before the party as one of its essential tasks the smashing frontal attack against it and its entire lead- |ership all-along the line in order to destroy its influence over the work- ers. The Lovestone majority has not understood the CI policy on the united front and has applied it in an opportunistic manner. This is lemonstrated by a whole series of gross errors, many of which remain unacknowledged and uncorrected. | | Examples which illustrate the op- \portunist line in this respect may |he cited as follows: 1.—False estimation of the So: ist Party and calculation on a “left |Failure to publish the February | 4—Failure to, recognize a Lett-| fensive, the organization of the un- strike in Oshawa, ete. 4.—Seeing in the present political situation no signs or promise for) ‘political conflict and mass political | movements. | 5.—Revising the perspective for | struggle outlined in the February | lthesis which was forced upon the | maiority by the minority of the Cen- | tral Committee. This revision was) made in the policies of the Lovestone | group since February in articles by! Lovestone and Pepper, and in the May resolution of the CC Ple um.) thesis. These characteristics of the per- spectives of the Lovestone group lack the outlook for struggle and| orientation towards it. IV. Failure to Orientate Towards New Unions and the Organization | of the Unorganized. | To organize the many millions of unorganized workers is the major task of the Party. The building of the Party as the leader of the work- ers in all phases of their struggle against American imperialism de- pends. largely upon its carrying of workers developing moods and pressure of the industrial depression, rationalization and the capitalist of- organized becomes now the more urgent and possible. The old craft unions, which are chiefly based upon the skilled and privileged workers, are controlled by ultra-reactionary leaders, and fol- lowing a class collaboration policy, and which have been undermined and driven out of the basic industries by the employers’ offensive, will not organize the great unorganized masses. This can be accomplished only through new unions, militant jn character and based upon indus- trial instead of craft lines. It is ‘fundamentally necessary that our Party aggressively take the lead in the formation of these new industrial unions. At the same time the Party shall continue and extend, through the trade union fractions, the TUEL, its revolutionary work in the old unions. In the organization of the unor- ganized, the Party must base its orientation upon the unskilled and. semi-skilled masses in the basic in- dustries, the most exploited and de- cisive sections of the working class. Trustified American capital, with all its economic strength and with all the powers of governmental rep- ression at its disposal, will violently resist the organization of the work- ers in basic industries, The new unionism will be established only by 4. Tendency to orientate upon al-| in-the direction of an poen struggle leged differences in the upper strata) against the Lewis machine and for of the labor bureaucracy. |the formation of a new union. The policy of the Lovestone CEC majo: ity placed many obstacles in the of developing the execution of such a policy. Among these are: 5. Underestimation of the crisis| in the trade unions, and a tendency to minimize the necessity for new unions. Illusions regarding possibi-| lities of organizing the masses into) 1. Rejection of the open confer- the AFL unions: Articles and| ence proposed by the CEC minor speeches by Comrades Pepper and| This action checked the Party orien- Lovestone. | tation towards a new union and con- fused and demoralized the miner: left wing and left the miners’ mov: ment without a definite perspective and disconnected our Party from the discontented masses of miners who wanted to struggle against 6. Constant practice of placing the interests of the Lovestone fraction ahead of those of the Party, and the sacrifices of mass campaigns for factional advantage. ganization campaigns instead of| eral months later by the CEC min- pushing them through aggressively.| ority for an open conference and a The majority leadership of the direct struggle against Lewis, and YWL, which is an organic part of| its acceptance by the Poleom re- the Lovestone faction in the Party,| established our leadership over the follows the same opportunist line in Masses who were in grave danger its industrial work: Typical exam- of being demoralized by the IWW. ples of these wrong tendencies and; 9 Failure of the CEC to vigo’ policies are: ously combat the deep-seated pes- 1, Rejected as dual unionism the simism and systematic resistance proposal made by the CEC minority, against the application of the policy in May, 1927, for the calling of an|of open struggle, after this policy, open conference of the left wing) upon motion of the minority, had and progressives in the coal industry | been formally adopted by the CEC. to wage direct struggle against the| The task of breaking down the re- Lewis machine. sistance of these Lovestone group 2. Condemned as dual unionism by| district organizers fell chiefly upon a campaign throughout the whole the CEC minority who were sharply Party the proposal of the CEC min-, criticised by the Lovestone majority ority in its thesis of May, 1927, for these actions. The right wing that the Party should “unhesitat-| tendencies of these organizers sig- ingly” establish new unions wher-|nalized by reluctance to fight the ever the old unions are decrepit or| Lewis bureaucracy and by a general 7. Tendency to toy with mass or- Lewis. Renewal of the motion sev-| | ers’ delegation to the USSR). | 8 —Failure to carry on genuine Communist education and training —opportunist confusing of mass | workers’ education and the educa-! tion of the Party membership and \training of Communist cadres. (Workers’ Schools). 9.—Failure to build Party in cam- paign. 10.—Failure to create Party ap- | | paratus for women’s work and per- mitting foreign language organiza- tions, consisting mostly of house- ves, to take the leading role de- spite repeated demands of the In- | ternational Women’s Secretariat. 11.—Refusal to print Swabeck’: pamphlet on internal Party organi- | | zation and Party building. 12.—Sectarian approach to Party | building (Bedacht—separation of Party building work from mass | work). 13.—Non-recognition of Party in Women’s Work. “The working | women will march to power through trade unions, through clubs, house- | wives’ organizations, through coop- | erative leagues, and through a labor party.” (First issue New York “Working Women,” 1928). 14.—The official organ of th Party, the Daily Worker, affords a a devastating example of the under-| |the provision that our party should | | estimation of the role of the Com- _munist press as “the collective or- | ganizer of the Party and the mass- jes” as described by Lenin. As an organ of a Communist Party the non-existent. underestimation of the 8. In the February, 1928, thesis, the Lovestone group simply repeated the year-old Comintern decision re- garding new unions, although the Cgmintern was then in the process of developing another resolution, which on the bassi of the industrial depression and the deepening crisis er emphasis on the formation of new unions, : . 4, Resistance to the introduction of the slogan “Organize New Unions in Unorganized Industries” into the Party national election platform. 5. Failure to push forward vigor- ously for new unions in the needle industry. In this industry the Love- stone leadership has a craft union ideology and is afflicted with Right wing theories that the workers can- not fight the employers and the union bureaucrats at the same time, that the police can be bought, into the service of the workers and that the unions must cooperate in build- fighting DW is seriously deficient. There spirit of the miners, were most|has been a systematic liquidation of clearly exemplified by the letters of Communist political writing in the Comrade Bedacht, district organizer, DW to the point where its Com in the the old unions, laid far great-| of Illinois, to the CEC. 8. From December, 1926, till De- cember, 1927, including nine months of the miners’ strike, the Lovestone majority failed to publish a left wing miners’ organ. This was due |on the one hand to the underestima- tion of the struggle and on the other to yielding to the demand of the so- called progressives (Brophy, Hap- good, etc.) that no criticism of Lew- is should be made during the strike. 4, For six months no efforts were put forth to establish a left wing miners’ relief organization and re- lief campaign, which offered excep- tionally favorable meanss for the left wing, to establish mass contacts. This relief organization could only have been built by an open fight against the Lewis machine and the AFL bureaucracy. 5. Factional jugglery in the an- | munist character has been weak: |ened. Comrade Minor, the editor, | made a motion in the Political Com- | mittee on April 19th, 1928, to per- mit the publication of articles ‘on both sides df the controversy” with the IWW and against the establish- ment of an anti-war department in the paper April 1st. Instructed to publish articles against Shipstead, Comrade Minor was obliged to make a motion to turn over to the Agit- prop on the ground “of the almost total deprivation of the Daily Work- er of all political writers at the present time. . .” One of the chief for the last five months has been Comrade Nearing, whose articles, almost without exception, contain gross reformist and petty bourgeois errors. There has been a systematic liqui- political writers of the Daily Worker | wing” within it which would work wth us for a labor party. This 15 indicated by the motion of Lovestcne to send a number of comrades into | the socialist party “for the purpose of working for our lsbor party pol- in the Socialist Party” and the rejection of the motion of the min- ority declaring such tactics to be false and calling for a policy of frontal attack against the Socialist Party all along the line. (Poleom minutes, Dec. 14, 1927). The same policy was executed in the support in the elections of the Sccialist Judge Panken, an agent of the black gang in the needle trades who was likewise supported y the republican party and the New York World and the New York Times. The majority stubbornly de- |fended this decision in spite of the | most energetic protest of the min- ority; the support of the Socialist Bearak in Boston; and the proposals |to support ‘Berger, the national |chairman of the Socialist Party in | Milwaukee; (criticized in the letter of the ECCI). The policy in the Panken case was not an incidental error; it pro- |eeeded from the false conception of | the Lovestone group. . .It was pro- posed as a national policy in a pro- {gram submitted to the Poleom by Comrade Lovestone, which contained | run candidates on its own ticket only |in those cases where it can be done 1 out endangering the election of | candidates running locally on the tickets of other working class par- ties.” (Point 22 of Lovestone’s pro- posals on the Labor Party campaign, Poleom Minutes, Oct. 7, 1927). 2—The Open Letter to the So- cialist Party, an error of the Pol- |com as a whole, which was pointed out in the letter of the ECCI. | 8—The united front made by the Party leaders of the Furriers’ Union, members of the Lovestone group in the Party, with the so- \ealled middle group in the union, lunder conditions which surrender the leadership to the latter and on the basis of a written agreement containing the unheard of provision that “there shall be no Party or ‘clique control of the union.” 4.—Building united front, in anti- imperialist work too much on top ‘and with liberals and not from be- low among the workers. Conceal- ving the role and face of the Party lin anti-imperialist work. Removal ‘of Comrade Gomez as secretary of |the Anti-Imperialist League in or- ing up associations of employers. @ Resistance to open struggle against the Lewis machine and building a new union in mining in- dustry. thracite districts, This was based up- on the established principle of the Lovestone group of keeping minority comrades from key positions. By placing incompetent orgahizers in dation of tried Communist journal-| der to secure as secretary a “non- [ment by elements whose training | as a Communist.” (Polcom minutes, |has been acquired on the capitalist ' Dec, 21, 1927-—reconsidered at a sub- press, The line has been to try to|sequent meeting under pressure of make Communists out of journalists | minority). Failure to do serious ists on the staff and their replace- Gommunist or someone not known | 7. Failure to concentrate Party forces for determined or organizing campaign: example, total lack of determined struggle. Hence the Par- ty, in its great task of organizing the unorganized, must undertake its work with firm determination and ing way this perspective of struggles in Americas preliminary work in New England with a thoro-going mobilization of all available sidan textile industry prior to New Bed- ford strike, charge of the Party apparatus and by carrying on a sharp factional) war, the whole campaign in the} anthracite was gravely injured. rather than to train Communists as journalists. anti-imperialist work as shown by [refusal to send workers into the The Daily Worker today gives American forces in China and Nica- neither a picture of the class strug-|ragua on the ground that it was 6. Failure to initiate in time and gle in the U. S. A. nor ‘any Com- necessary to proceed slowly and con- to prosecute vigorously the cam, | munist analysis of even the main’ centrate on the work at home, | 5.—Failure to publicly criticize Brophy and other progressives in |the Mine Workers’ Union united front despite numerous record mo- tions to that effect passed under pressure of the minorit; 6.—Wrong form of united front with so-called “tolerance group” an Schley group in the fncernatiws-. Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union; failure to criticize them, failure in the united front with them to build our own strength and forces in th IL, G. W. U. 7.—United front with Brennan ix the Miners’ Union under conditions which rehabilitated the prestige of the faker and brought discredit on the party*and weakened its forces in the anthracite. 8.—Liberal, legislative, constitu tional and vulgarly “American line in the Council for the Protection of the Foreign Born.” 9.—Opposition to leading role of Negro proletariat in united front Negro movement by Comrade Moore, Party leader of Negro work, cor- rected by Polcom on the initiative of the minority. 10.—Persistence in organizing workers and farmers in one Party (Farmer-Labor Party) contrary to CI decision. 11.—Wrong “orientation In wom- en’s work, basing it on housewives instead of devoting main attention to women in industry despite re- peated letters from the Internation- al Women’s Secretariat on this point. Failure to draw women industrial workers into leading activities; the entirg leading committee for wom- en’s work in New York is composed of school teachers, with the excep- tion of Comrade Wortis, a leading right winger in the needle trades. VIII. Opnortunist Mistakes in the Election Campaign. In line with the general right wing tendencies, the lLovestone group have made several serious opportun- ist errors, in the national election campaign of which the three follow- ing are the most outstanding: 1—In the national election pro- gram of our party occurs the fol- lowing demand: “Abolition of the senate, of the supreme court and of the veto power of the president.” This opportunistic proposal cre- ates illusions regarding the reform of the capitalist state. It cultivates the false notion that the workers can escape the pressure of the capi- talist government, much of which is exerted through the senate, the su- preme court, and the. president’s veto power, by liquidating these in- stitutions within the frame-work of capitalist society. 2.—Illustrative .of the right wing tendencies of the Lovestone group is the letter officially sent to the party units to direct the securing of signatures to put our party candi- dates on the election ballot. The following quotations indicate the corrupting methods used in this work. “Remember that you are out to wet signatures and not converts. This means no argument of any kind.” “Don’t ask for signatures in the name of Communism.” “Tf necessary you can explain that the signature is not an obligation to vote for this party.” “Never state your mission to any- one but the person whose signature you wish to get, because if you give them time to think you will get too many questions.” “See how many more tricks you can work out for yourself and write your experiences to the National Office.” This grossly opportunistic letter was condemned, by the Comintern. 8.—The general use of profes- sional signature gatherers, and the buying of signatures, and the fail- ure to mobilize the party forces for these campaigns. IX. Opportunist Mistakes in Labor Party Work. The Party needs a fresh and clear formulation of policy in the labor party question based upon the changed conditions and new perspec- tives. The following is proposed as a main outline for our perspective and policy on the labor party ques- tion. 1.—The developing depression and coming crisis will create favorable conditions for mass break-away movements from the capitalist par- |ties which our Party must antici- pate and utilize to “mobilize and to organize the workers under its ban- ner against the capitalist offensive and against the reformist support- ers of capitalism, namely, the American Federation of Labor and the Socialist Party of America.” (CI letter, April). 2.—It is not the task of our party in the present period to carry on ‘ agitation camphigns and struggles for the organization of a labor party. In view of the changed conditions (integration of labor bureaucracy and aristocracy into capitalist ma-_ chine, narrowing base of A. F. of L. and restriction to skilled work-— ers, the organization of new unions as main task of our party, left-ward drift of masses, etc.) and the above opportunist errors, the labor party slogan in this period has only a gen- eral propaganda value. | 8.—Our Party must fight reso. lutely against the. tendencies for a third capitalist party (Norris, La- Follette, Berger, Thomas, ete.) and fs strive to establish itself as the po- | ontinued on Next Page