The Daily Worker Newspaper, August 22, 1928, Page 4

4 a Page Four ~_) THE DAILY WORKER, NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1923. The International Situation and Tasks of Communist International ig Comrade Bukharin’s Report of the Executive Committee of the Communisi International | © This is the concluding instalment of Bukharin’s report, made to the Sixth Congress of the Communist Interna- | tional on July 18 and 19, the first half of which appeared in the Daily Worker last Saturday, August 18. The portion published Saturday consisted of: “I. A General Analysis of Modern Capitalism and the Special Forms of the Crisis of Capitalism,” and “II. Internal Political Processes in the Bourgeois Countries.” Ill. Our Line of Tactics. THE CHANGE IN TACTIC CORRESPONDS TO THE CHANGE IN THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION. The changes in the objective situation compelled us to change our tactics. It was a proper reaction to tho altered state of affairs. A clear example of this is afforded by Great Britain. The Labor Party, which at one time was a loose organization without party discipline is now becoming a real social democratic party on the model of the con- tinental parties. It has a program and party disciplina; it is striving to bind us politically by means of its influence in the trade unions. It expels us, it launches attacks against us. If we were to retain our former attitude at the present time and preserve our former relation- ship so as not to break the commbdn front of the organized proletariat, we would be doomed. We would lose our politica! independence and thereby our right to existence. The enemy would break us. It would | be silly not to draw the proper conclusions from such a state of affairs. The change in the attitude of our British party was determined by the change in the objective situation, by the new organizational methods of the labor party, by new relationships that arcse between our party and the labor party. These are all political factors of first rate im- portance. The same may be said about France. It is no accident that the contemporary representatives of social democracy in France are Paul | Boncour, with his military Jaw and Albert Thomas, who is boosting Mussolini. The Thomases and Roncours are not expelled. On the eon- | trary, the social democrats strive to justify their conduct. The “left”. | Fritz Adler writes a pitiful article in which he actually tries to defend | Thomas, the bard of fascism. Thas is how the most “left* elements of the II. International act, and that is how the man, who during the war assassinated a cabinet minister as a protest against the war, writes now! As far as the Communist Party of France is concerned, there were certain other considerations compelling us to change our tactics. It is IV. The Revolution in Colonial CORRECTNESS OF THE MAIN LINE AND BLUNDERS IN ITS APPLICATION TO CHID Before analyzing our fundamental task: in general, I should- like to deal with the question of the colonial movements. I will deal with China and India, but will limit myself merely to a few remarks, be- cause these questions will be dealt with partly in discussing the pro- gramme and, particularly, in discussing the colonial question. | On the questions of the Chinese revolution, we had an extensive discussion with our opposition on points of principle. Mere we can in retrospect deal once again with some of the major problems of the Chinese revolution. The Communist Party of China, as all of you know, has suffered a severe defeat. This is a fact. The question arises, was this defeat a result of the wrong tactics pursued by the Comintern in the Chinese revolution? Perhaps indeed, it was inexpedient to have entered into a bloc with the bourgeoisie; perhaps this was the original sin, the basic error, which determined all other errors, and, gradually, step by step, brought about the defeat of the Chinese proletariat? Most likely this question will be analyzed in great detail at this Con- ess when the colonial problem will be up for discussion in as muc a this in an extremely vital question which must be critically and scrupulously examined and analyzed. But I think, and the analyzis will bear me out in this, that the mistake does not lie here. On the whole, it is not the main line of tactics that was at fault, but the political actions and the practical application of the line ersued in China. Firstly, at the beginning of the -Chinese revolution, in the period of collaboration with the Kuomintang, our mistake was that we did not sufficiently criticize the Kuomintang. Instead of being an ally, our Party was at times an accessory of the Kuomintang. Secondly, the Communist Party of China failed to understand the change that took place in the objective situation, the transition from one stage to another. Thus, it was possible for a time to march together with the national bourgeoisie, but at a certain stage of development it was neces- Nery to foresee imminent changes. It was necessary to prepare for that. In concluding an alliance it is always necessary to bear in mind the possibility of changes and, consequently, to prepare for a ninieel On a critical analysis of all phases of the Chinese revolution we fin that the C. C. of the Chinese Party and partly also our representative in China commétted a grave blunder. They did not take this coming change into account, they did not foresee it and therefore did not effect a timely change when the former ally turned into a deadly foe. Thedy, our Party at times acted as a brake on the mass movement, a brake on the agrarian revolution, and a brake on the labor movement. ane were fatal blunders and, naturally, they helped to bring about the de- feat of the Communist Party and of the Chinese proletariat. After a whole series of defeats the Party set to work resolutely to rectify its opportunist blunders. But this time, as frequently happens, some ee | rades fell into the other extreme. They did not prepare ai be sufficient care, they displayed glaring putschist Lagat ad- verturism of the worst type. The IX, Plenum of the C. I. calles fora change in the tactics of the Communist Party of China, but not in the same direction as that of the West European parties. By manipulating such terms as “Left,” “Right,” etc., we can say i ce and Great Britain a change has been effected towards Bien and in China towards the “Right.” However, I mane make a reservation: I am not in favor of such bidiee ald It ittle suits the occasion and explains nothing. The purpose of ana! vate Boy given situation is to discover whether certain tactics are sto fee not, suitable or unsuitable for the given situation and not whether the tactics are “Right” or “Left.” ‘ The report continues : a well-known fact that survivals of parliamentary illusions are still prevalent in the French Party. The recent elections marked a turning point for the Party, a turning point which must be regarded not only from the viewpoint of the elections, but also from the angle of the entire future policy of the French Communist Party. Having come to the conclusion that we were on the eve of great class conflicts in which parliamentarism, in the worst’ sense of the word, may play a very per- nicious role, we had to do everything in our power to break down this tradition. Thus the change in our tactics was bound up with the change in the objective situation and this was the signal for a change in the tac- tics in the larger of our Communist Parties. The political pivot of this change is our changed attitude towards the social democratic ‘ties, The question of our attitude towards the social democratic parties is a cardinal political question. Intensification of, the struggle against so- cial democracy— such is the political orientation of the Communist In- ternational, and I think that this slogan, this political orientation, will be adopted by the VI. Congress. At the samo time I must emphasize that the adoption of sharper methods of struggle against the social democratic parties is not in any way identical with the abandonment of the united front tactics, as some comrades are inclined to think. On the contrary, the more sharply we come out against social democracy and against its political line, the more determinedly must we take up the task of capturing the masses, including the mass of rank and file social democrats, including the mass of workers who follow the lead of social democracy, and the more strenuously must we fight to win these masses. But in order to conduct a successful struggle for the masses we must employ proper methods of ‘approaching them. Only those lacking intelligence would argue that since we are waging a desperate struggle against social democracy we must have no dealings with rank and file social demneratic workers. There are many comrades who still fail to appreciate this two-fold task. Many have not as yet given seri- ous thought to the matter. But the fact is that this is one of our most important and fundamental tasks, and Semi-Colonial Countries. THE RETURN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY TIDE IN CHINA IS INEVITABLE. We characterize the present period in the Chinese revolution as the culminating point of a great period when the revolutionary wave rose high and the beginning of a period in which the main task is to unite the masses and to rally the forces in preparation for a new great revo- lutionary upheaval. All objective symptoms show that another revolutionary upheaval is inevitable. The whole experience of the past struggle shows that with- out gigantic mass movements it will be impossible to solve the problem of the Chinese revolution and that the objective pre-requisites for its victorious completion exist. But this brings us against the main task of uniting the masses so as to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to gradually destroy our proletarian army unit by unit. Tron necessity detaaned that the Party abandon the position of immediate insurrec- tion and take up the position of preparation, mass preparation, for an uprising with & maximum chance of vietory. I think that the tesolu- tion adopted by the IX. Plenum on the Chinese question helped greatly to further the development of the Communist Party of China. I hope that the Congress decisions will be in keeping with the spirit of the resolution. NEW PROCESSES IN INDIA. The situation in India is shapiwg itself differently. There the situation and the correlation of forces are different from those in China, where in the course of an entire period, in the course of many years, the bourgeoisie conducted an armed struggle against the im- perialists. This is a fact. It is otherwise in India. There it is incon- ceivable that the bourgeoisie will play a revolutionary role for any length of time. This of course, does not apply to the various petty bourgeois parties or terroristic organizations now existing in Indi. I have in mind the principal cadres of the bourgeoisie, the Swart Party. , Tan not in a position to make an economic analysis of the situa- tion in India, but I should like to state that I do not share the opinion that India is ceasing to be a colonial country and that a process of decolonization is going on there. That theory is a one- sided one. On the contrary, recently, following the period of con- | cessions, British imperialism has increased its colonial oppression of | India in general and of the Indian bourgeoisie in particular. This compels the Swaraj Party once again to maneuver against British imperialism. It is maneuvering. But this is a far-cry from armed | struggle. At the very first outbreak of mass action the Swaraj Party will turn towards British imperialism and seek to compromise with it. I have in mind such mass action in which the masses will advance independent radical slogans such as a demand to confiscate the land or radical slogans for the defense of working class interests. It seems to me that in the event of independent mass action and the advance- ment of more or less revolutionary slogans the Swaraj bourgeoisie will very rapidly come to an agreement and compromise with British imperialism, Now it maneuvers. At some points, it maj. play even an objectively revolutionary role, but it is inconceivable that it will play a revloutionary role for any length of time. There is no doubt, and | this must be emphasized, that thé bourgeoisie will desert to the camp of counter-revolution at the first manifestation of a mass movement. | The Communist Party must from the very outset expose the half- | | heartedness of the bourgeoisie, accentuate the slogans, from the very beginning come out against the bourgeoisie and open the eyes of the masses of the workers to the future behavior of the Indian Swarajist bourgeoisie. A mechanical application of Chinese tactics to India is fraught with great danger. A special analysis and special tactics based on the particular conditions prevailing in India are necessary. ‘ VY. Our Main Tasks and Our Shortcomings. 4 MORE INTERNATIONALISM! Comrades, I now come to our main tasks and our shortcomings. , i ituati i lusions follow From is of the world situation, certain concl enge tation in the sphere of tactical problems. basic orient: t ce at 1 will deal with the question of the international character ‘our movement. It stands to reason that in the present roe vie it political questions occupy the center of attention of the som- Parties, when the war problem is the main problem, the activi- i $ of the Communist International must be chiefly based on interna- : 1 training and on the tasks of the Communist Parties arising from them. Regarding our Party activity from this viewpoint, it reust be stated that notwithstanding the relative numerical weakness of our nmunist Parties, we have achieved fairly great successes in regard the Bolshevization of our Parties: we have quite considerable gains, “increase in influence to record, we have ideologically gained new ories for Communism, etc. Nevertheless, the degree of interna- lism of the Communist Parties is still very small compared with ks confronting the Communist International and its Sections, nce of recent years has revealed these shortcomings and I think | that it is our duty to speak of them openly. A frank admission of these i mings is an important prerequisite for their elimination. “During the strike in Great Britain many Parties inadequately sup- ied the British working class and this we have stated in the resolu- | of Enlarged Plenums of the Communist International. With the saption of a few Parties, and particularly the Communist Party of tt Union, the Parties rendered very meagre help to the British < satiy the same thing was manifested in connection with the events. The magnitude of the ipternational campaign in defense Revolytion did not fully, correspond to the objects and re quirements of the period and the revolutionary duty fo the Parties. Interest in the Chinese Revolution was not sufficiently sustained. Nor did the Party press deal adequately with the Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China and the Bolshevization of the labor and peasant movement in China. Thoroughgoing and systematic work in this sphere was not observed. Sufficiently broad political campaigns corresponding to the requirements were not conducted. Sporadic at- tempts were made to remove these shortcomings, but persistent sys- tematic work was not undertaken and as a result, the Parties were not always able to cope with the tasks that confronted them in the period | of big campaigns. Take the question of Fascism, I have in mind not only Italian Fascism; I want to deal with this question on somewhat broader lines, | I want to take up the question of Fascism in Italy, in Poland and Fascism in general, The Communist Parties’ struggle against Fascism and the attention they paid to this question was totally inadequate. Events like the United States incursion in Nicaragua have not been sufficiently counteracted, particularly by the American Party. Even the American Party, for which this question should have been the Central Question in all its activity, was not in a position to develop a sufficiently broad campaign. This is no less true of the other Parties. Nicaragua is far away from Europe, but geographical conditions should not so seriously affect the work of Communist Parties. In some Parties, particularly in Europe, both small and large, certain survivals of provincialism are to be observed; a lack of understanding of the significance of international high politics. If we are to prepare seri- ously for world historical events like imminent war, we must now | stress the problems of high international politics, for otherwise, we | will be unable to prepare seriously for the outbreak of war. It stands to reason that in order to launch this campaign properly, in order to carry it on with the necessary energy, we must link up questions of international high politics with questions of daily life and reyolutionary activity in the respective countries. Here again the problem of war comes to the fore. Almost all internal political questions, including questions of the labor movement of each country, encounter this prob- lem. The capitalist offensive is bound up with the bourgeois prepara- tions for war and is called forth by the necessity to strengthen the positions of the bourgeoisie, to establish civil peace, to organize pro- tection against the workers, ete. Generally speaking, this is a very complicated problem. While handling day to day questions it is neces- sary at the same time to make them the basis for the further develop- ment of our more general slogans and tasks. A certain politico-tactical art is involved in this. But this is an argument in favor of taking up big political questions, and it is precisely here that the art of Bolshe- vik tactics comes in, namely, to start out with minor questions and to lead them up to big questions. If we fail to acquire this art, if we fail to react sufficiently to great international problems it will signify that we will fail to carry on systematic work in preparation for a struggle against war. This we must understand and state in our resolu- tion. The question of war, the question of defending the revolution in the U. S. 8. R. and in China—are questions of central and decisive significance. Systematic work in this direction is the fundamental task of all Parties, of all Sections of the Gommunist International The question of the general line of the Communist Parties is a question of attitude towards the present form of capitalism and to the capitalist state. In this sphere, minor questions imperceptibly grow into big political problems. If, for example, we take the tactical orientation of the Social Democratic Parties—I have already referred to that in passing—we find a fully consistent line. It is a line of unity with the employers’ organizations. It passes on from the individual factory to the League of Nations. The social democrats advocate “industrial peace” and the so-called “American” method of collaboration between labor and capital. ‘Such is the main line of contemporary social democ- racy. This main policy finds its reflection also in the sphere of foreign affairs, But we also meet with it in dealing with questions of home affairs, in the question of relations with the state, the question of coalitions, the attitude towards the so-called employers’ organizations, viz., the magnates of Trust Capital.. The social democratic slogan is a slogan of unity with trust capital. The question of the class struggle no longer exists as far as they are concerned. In the economic sphere they are opposed to strikes, they are opposed to the industrial struggle. They stand for industrial peace. Instead of extension of strikes, they stand. for compulsory arbitration, To them it is not a question of the dependence or independence of the labor organizations, they stand for collaboration between the labor organizations and the employers’ organizations, This is an integral system of tactics, From | the reformist viewpoint the labor organizations must abandon their class independence. Class struggle has become “obsolete” in the eyes of these gentlemen. The Social Democratic line is a line of grafting the reformist labor organizationswith the organizations of monopolist capital and the monopolist capitalist state. We see these consistent Social Democratic tactics operating all along the line, UNITED FRONT TACTICS ONLY FROM BELOW. What is our tactical orientation? Our tactical orientation in all these questions, from the factory nucleus to the League of Nations is diametrically opposite to that of the social democrats. Not industrial peace, but class struggle, not arbitration, but struggle against com- | pulsory arbitration; exposure of all’ the trays which the capitalist or- ganizations or the capitalist state are laying down for the working class; fight against every attempt to fetter the strike movement, etc. This is our basic tactical orientation. We have discussed these questions on many occasions already and our answer to them in my opinion was absolutely clear. The final conclusion to be drawn from this tactical line is, that we must steer a course for the overthrow of the bourgeois ~state power—for revolution. This does not in the least imply that we must abandon the tactics of the united front. But, regarding the sharpening of our struggle against social democracy, certain changes must be made in the conduct of that struggle. United front tactics must, in most cases, now be applied only from below. No appeals to the central committee of the social democratic parties. In rare cases appeals may be made to local social democratic committees. In the main, we must appeal only to the social democratic masses, to the rank and file social democratic workers. The united front tactie is closely bound up with the questions of our systematic work. TRADE UNION WORK.—A VITAL PROBLEM. We are not concerned here with the various campaigns conducted from time to time. All these tactical questions first and foremost concern systematic work. You are all aware of the theses laid down in numerous resolutions of the Communist International to the effect that in this domain the most important problem is trade union work. We have already pointed to many of the shortcomings of our Parties in this respect. The trade union’ problem must be taken up also at this Congress. We will put the experience of our Parties under the micro- scope and search carefully for the causes of our defects in this sphere. If there is a section of our work that stands in need of thorough self- criticism it is these very sections of our work in the trade union. Our ideological influence is growing in the trade unions as in other spheres, but as trade unonists the authority of our comrades is still negligible. The authority of our comrades as political leaders, as initiators of big political campaigns, fighters in the revolutionary class front of the proletariat, as defenders of its great historical interests, is growing. But their specific authority as trade unionists, is not great enough. The disproportion between the authority of our comrades as political leaders and their authority as trade unionists is_very big and this is due to the various shorteomings of our work in the trade unions, I would like to give a few illustrations. Take France for example: here, the Communists in the trade union movement have committed a series of errors. The relations between the Communists and the non-Party trade union members are not what they should be. The Communists have got into the habit of commanding, they do not exercise their in- fluence by persuasion, they do not work systematically enough. Many other shortcomings can be mentioned. On the other hand there are trade unionists who do their trade union work “well.” But this trade union work is almost social democratic work. It almost entirely lacks the specifically Bolshevik formulation of trade union problems, speci- fically Communist problems. Such trade unionists may have a very good reputation among the trade union masses, but their work can- not be approved of from the Communist viewpoint. Experience in Germany shows that some comrades have become so accustomed to social democratic methods of work that they do not carry out Party instructions; during elections they refuse to publish our Party appeals, ete. They have submitted to general reformist trade union discipline in order to become “good” trade union workers. This is another un- satisfactory side of Communist work in the trade unions. We have also observed blunders committed by our trade unionist Comrades during strike movements—a very serious aspect of our trade union work. In some cases we meet with what is known as khvostism, i. e. the lack of initiative and inability to play a leading role. In time of strikes we are carried along by the masses instead of leading them. In the past period, in France for example, there have been cases where strikes have taken place without participation. On the other. hand, very often we play with revolutionary phrases in time of strikes, but do not devote sufficient attention to the solid prenaration of campaigns connected with such strikes, we do not sufficiently take into account the objective situation and all the pos- sibilities, of the strikes; we are unable to choose the proper moment for declaring strikes or for calling them off and we are unable to lead them properly, etc. But all these qualities of leadership rre absolutely essen- tial precisely at the present time, because the situation as far as strike leadership is concerned, is a very s*rioug one. Potentially, almost every strike has the more or less marked tendency to grow into a big political event. It is possible to lead strikes under such conditions only if one has a good knowledge of the situation and is able to take into account all phases of the movement. Revolutionary enthusiasm is necessary, of course, but that alone is not enough. A knowledge of the economic and political conditions of the struggle is essential. Never have questions of strike struggles been so involved ag they are now. At the bottom of this complex problem lies partly the correlation be- tweeen the forces of capitalism and the united forces of the working class. But, comrades, the situation is that these specific circumstances have not yet been realized. For instance, the problem of uniting the factory committees on the lines of the organization of has | | point out, to carry our influence to all organizations where young work- yet remained unsolved and it is still insufficiently advocated in the Communist Parties even of the most developed capitalist countries. | Howeer, this propaganda in favor of unification, this centralization of the struggle, must be our reply to the merging of trustified capital. In | the trade union domain we are now waging a struggle not so much | against individual employers as against capitalist trusts. The word trust must be emphasized, it must be accentuated. It is the specific feature of the situation with which we now have to deal. THE YOUTH PROBLEM—ONE OF OUR MAJOR TASKS. | Comrades, there are shortcomings that I want to wafer to, short- comings in our mass organizations, although we have made great progress in this sphere. For example, our Young Communist move- ment. In this sphere, we have certain considerable achievements to record, particularly in our anti-militarist struggle and in the various military campaigns. Take the French youth organization during the Morocco war and the work of our Young Communists in the struggle against the war danger in general. Nevertheless, we have great short- ¢ comings. The number of organized young comrades is either declining or stationary. There is no doubt that the youth movement suffers from excessive ‘sectarianism; our Youth International is unable to penetrate \all the organizations where masses of young workers are } to be found and to influence them. Our tactical, orientation in the youth organizations is still distinguished by a ‘%ertain narrowness. These short-comings have lately become even more marked. This is one of the most dangerous spots in our ‘activit;. Some comrades, realizing that great blunders have been committed, that we suffer from great defects in this respect, seek to remedy it by doses of medicine, so big that we run the risk of the Young Communist League’s losing their specific political and Communist features. I think that this is @ mistake, The youth organization must be a Com- munist organization, Of course, it must not duplicate the Party, but the general Communist orientation in tho struggle must be the basis of Young Communist development in the future. Te OD wre Oe MAXIMUM OF VARIETY AND FLEXIBILITY IN THE METHODS OF WORK. What we lack, and what we must acquire, is diversified methods of work. We must endeavor to bring about a situation in which the youth organizat'on will react, not only to questions of high politics and to big political campaigns, but also to political and cultural questions, to all questions of interest to the youth. Our young comrades must have their say in al! spheres, from sport to the Chinese revolution; they must react organizationally and politically, as the instructions a ers are tc be found. We must abandon sectarianism and restricted methods of work, the general effect of which is to nullify united front tactics in the sphere of the youth movement. Comrades, the youth problem is one of the most vital problems of our time, In Western Europe, in America and in other countries, this problem is an exceedingly grave one for us. The bourgeoisie is waging a feverish and strenuous struggle for the youth and is waging it with great skill, much more skilfully than we are waging it. All the big sport organizations, which some regard as a method of fostering bour- geois, culture, are, in general, of very great political significance, The importance of sport organizations is closely related with the central problems of politics, first and foremost with the question of war. Through these organizations the imperialist bourgeoisie provide mili- tary training for the youth in a form which appears innocent and non- political, but which, if regarded in the light of the general process of development, and not as an isolated fact—plays a great political role in these days. The young worker beconies absorbed in and enthusiastic } over football, but imperceptibly he is caught in the web of bourgeois organization. Various military gymnastic stunts take the place of mili- tary training, not only from the technical viewpoint, but also from the viewpoint of polities, from the problem of war. And if we devote our attention mainly to great political problems without at the same time trying to penetrate all mass organizations—I do not speak directly of organizational penetration, I have in mind our influence and our polit- ical authoritv—the great masses of the young human material will be lost to our cause. Why do I say that the youth problem is one of our central prob- Jems? Firstly, because, whiie we have devoted considerable attention to the trade union problem, for example, we have paid very little at- tention iately to the youth movement, What is the situation in the youth movement? The youth are now much worse orgenized than the j adult proletariat. This is as true cf the social democratic youth as of | our youth. One of the most striking historical paradoxes of the present day } is that the post-war generation, the generation born during the war, is ) worse organized than the preceding generation. What does this sig- nify? think, partly, this means that large sections of the youth have either directly or jndirectly been neutralized by the bourgeoisie, or that 4 the youth has. become non-political. This, too, is to be explained by the } influence of the imperialist bourgecisie, because the bourgeoisie is quite satisfied if it succeeds merely in neutralizing the youth. It does not require more than that. An improvement of our work in the youth organizations is there- fore absolutely necessary. We inust say this definitely and the con- gress must give corresponding instructions to the Young Communist International. a ae ay ee MORE ATTENTION TO THE PEASANT PROBLEM. Further, there is the question of sympathizing organizations. If it is correct to say that we are approaching catastrophic events, al- though we cannot tell exactly when they will occur, in what year and on what day—it would he absurd to predict dates, we must understand that it is precisely because of such perspectives that the question of auxiliary organizations play a very important role. In the near future we shall have to take up the question of the peasant movement and of the Farmers’ and Peasants’ International and analyze it separately. The election results in Germany and France have shown that our influ- ence in the rural districts in those countries has not increased; on the contrary it has somewhat diminished. This is an important symptom. Of course, our work among the peasants in many advanced capitalist countries is not easy, but it must be borne in mind that it is the masses of the peasantry that are hurled against us ir the struggle and we must not forget that the bourgeoisie is working feverishly in this domain, The bourgecisie does its utmost to win over the masses of peasants whereas the Communist Parties have forgotten about their work among the peasants. In some countries we have allowed opportunities to slip by—recall the greet peasant movement in Rumania. True, the Com- munist Party of Rumania was smashed, but.no one uttered the warn- ing that great events were approaching in Rumania. Neither the Comintern as a whole nor the executive committee foresaw them. nor did they take timely measures to meet them. This was a great over- sight, even if we admit that the situation was a very difficult one and that we had almost no connection with Rumania. These events oc- curred without our Party exercising hardly any influence upon them. Therefore we mnst draw certain conclusions regarding the peasant movement in all Balkan countries, not only in Rumania, but also in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, etc., and even in Poland. . We must devote more attention to the peasant question and from this viewpoint we must help the Farmers and Peasants International to become a real live organization. I eannct give you a report on the activities of that organization, but I must say that they are more or less of a propagandist character, that its work consists chiefly in pub- lishing various material. Its organizational connections are exceedingly meagre, The numerical strength of the organization is negligible, al- though it has certain successes to its record. I think that in this the Farmers’ and Peasants’ International is not alone to blame; the fault rests also on the Comintern. We have not appropriated sufficient forces for that organization, we have not devoted sufficient attention to its work. This is clearly borne out by the Rumanian events and the elec- tion results in France and Germany. We must tako this question up in the immediate future and do everything we can to remedy the defects. I think we are not giving enough support to the Anti-Imperialist League. Some comrades think that, in general, this league is not worth maintaining. In reality, experience has shown something quite er- ent. Experience has shown that this organization has great powers and chances of development and that we. to help to release the ential of the league