The Daily Worker Newspaper, September 3, 1927, Page 12

POISON {Continued From Page Five). ' 15,000 poison gas candles were lighted by a single company of the Royal Engineers. Apart from the millions of gas shells used by the artillery, 763 gas operations (in addition to many smoke) were carried out by the Special (Gas) Com- panies of the Royal Engineers, 67,968 cylinders of gas were discharged, 196,940 projector drums, and 177,408 Stokes’ mortar bombs were fired. The Bri= tish Offensive (Gas) Companies had 258 officers and 5,832 men, and the Defenseive Company 222 officers and 1,020 men. The British troops had 150,- 000 casualties from mustard gas alone and although America came late into the war, her casualties were 72,056. BRITAIN’S GAS POLICY. What is Great Britain’s post war policy with re- gard to poison gas? The Hague Convention which was signed by Britain and other countries before the war expressly prohibited the use of poison gases in warfare. The Allies appeared to have forgotten this when the French attempted to use Turpinit. But when the Germans successfully used chlorine, the Allies suddenly remembered it, and loudly pro- tested against this form of frig¢htfulness— and then promptly proceeded to copy it. With the collapse of the German army, in Novem- ber, 1918,.the Allies obtained a much more sweep- ing victory than they had héped for and found them- selves in the position of dictators; with a disarmed Germany and no other country in the world strong enough to attack them. Some people thought this was a grand chance for disarmament, and most peo- ple believed that poison gas warfare was a thing of the past, and would remain like some horrible night- mare, a mere memory; now that the “war to end-~ war” has been won. The British government en- couraged this view, and at the Versailles Confer- ence the use of poisonous gases was loudly de- nounced. It was even prohibited by Article 171 of the Peace Treaty. : . The Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments met in 1921, and here again chemical warfare (as it was called when used by the Allies) was righteously denounced and the signatory powers assented to the probition of “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, and of analogous liquids, materials or devices which had been justly condemned throughout the -civilzed world.” On February 6th, 1922, the Washington Treaty was duly signed by the High Contracting Parties, with great publicity in the press throughout the world. Article 5 of this treaty reads: “The use in war of asphyxiating poisonous, or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices, having been justly condemned by the gen- eral opinion of the civikized world, and a prohibition of such having been declared in the treaties to which a majority of the civilized powers are parties, The signatory powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of interna- tional law, binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as, between themselves, and invite all other civilzed nations to adhere there- «to.” At the League of Nations, the question of the em- ployment of poisonous gases in time of war was first put to the Permanent Advisory Commission by the British delegation in October, 1920. The coun- cil also considered the problem at the same date and expressed the opinion “that the League of Nations could not authorize the employment of gases with- out being untrue to its pacifist and humanitarian aims. In a desire to minimize the havoc of future wars, it decided to propose to the various govern- ments, that they should consider the penalties to “be imposed upon any nation first infringing in this way the universal rules of humanity, and to seek with the help of the most competent scientists to discover the means of effectively preventing the manufacture of gases,” But side by side with this public policy for inter- national conferences the British government has a private policy of “the development to its utmost ex- tent of chemical warfare for offensive and defen- sive purposes.” All the righteous talk condemning chemiacl warfare was only eyewash; in practice the government ‘was making elaborate preparations to use chemical warfare all the time. The speech of the war secretary (Mr. Churchill) in introducing the army estimates in the house of commons in 1929, contained not the slightest refer- ence to chemical warfare. This, however, did not mean that signing international treaties prohibiting its use had any influence on the government’s chem- ical warfare activities. Shortly after the Washing- ton treaty had been signed, Mr. Morrison asked the secretary of state for war, “whether in view of the signature of the agreement at Washington, in which, ander Article 5, the use in war of asphyxiating gas is prohibited, it is proposed to close down. the experi- mental ground at Porton?” Sir R. Sanders, “The answer is in the negative. The government would be failing in its duty, if it failed to take all possible steps whichmight be necessary t2 protect the forces of the crown, and the inhabitants of the country against gas attacks in time of war.” Bypersistent qvestions in the house of commons Messrs. Amnion and Dunnico succeeded in extract- ing a few facts about the government’s chemical warfare activities, but the tongues of that great pacifist Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his Labor ex- ministers are tied, for they not only built the five cruisers, but they also had a private policy of “the development to its utmost extent of chemical war- fare for offensive and defensive purposes.” LABOR GOVERNMENT ABETS. The Labor government with its policy of “cone tinuity” did nothing. to warn the workers of the international capitalist plot to poison them by the million in the next war, nor did it ratify the Wash- ington treaty prohibiting the use of chemical war-, fare; what it did was to increase the grant to Por- ton, and spend more on chemical warfare research than the preceding capitalist government had ‘done. The estimates for Porton show a rapidly increasing expenditure:—1919-20, $0,000 ibs.; 1920-21, 54,690 Ibs.; 1921-22, 81,000 Ibs.; 1922-23, 87,000. Ibs.; 1923- 24, 103,000 Ibs.; 1924-25; 115,000 Ibs.; 1925-26, 132,- 000 Ibs. . ri The government’s secrecy was criticized in the chemical journals; the “Chemical Trade Journal” said: “If the government had openly proclaimed their policy. -we do not think that any protest would have been raised. The half-hearted and semi-secre- tive way in which they have commenced to work, in approaching the universities, and suggesting to them that they should undertake research into the develop- ment to its utmost extent of chemical warfare for offensive and defensive purposes, under an oath of sectecy, seems to have been designed to invite adverse criticism.” & Th secrecy was also criticized by the poison gas enthusiasts in the army, Captain S. J. M. Auld said: “Then there has been the secrecy maintained about the whole subject. This secrecy has had unfortunate results. It has caused the subject to be viewed even in the army in the light of the horrors of 1915, the only period at which considerable publicity was given to it in the press. . .it is a bald fact which can scarcely be questioned that the millions we spend annually on our armed forces is money wasted un- less ample provision is made for the/study and prac- tice of chemical warfare.” In the House of Commons. (November, 1920), Lieut.-Com. Hilton Young asked the prime minister (Lloyd George): ‘Whether a war office committee had“been established to promote the development of chemical warfare, and if so whether he will state the reasons for this, in view of the provision of Ar- ticle 171 of the Treaty of Versailles, by which the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other yas, and all analogous liquids, materials and devices is prohibited, as well as of materials intended for the manufac- ture, storage and use of the same?” Mr. Hogge also asked the prime minister “Whether the decision of the war office to set up a committee for the de- velopment to the utmost extent of both the offen- sive and defensive of chemical warfare was approved by the cabinet? And, if so, whether the cabinet de- cided that the investigations of the committee were to be governed by the declaration of the council of the League of Nations to which the right honorable gentleman, the president of the council assented that the council of the league could not legitimize the use of poison gas, and must seek means* to prevent its manufacture?” The prime minister replied: “The whole subject of chemical warfare yhas been under careful consideration by the cabinet during the past year. It as decided on March 4th that the - in the future, but also towards the protection against ail possible gases. -we were, and appear likely to be in future wars, faced¢with tremendous actuali-_ ties.” The fact is empha$ized, that no nation has renounced the use of poison gas as a result of the Peace Conferénce, and further that, “There are na- tions whose words we could not respect if they did renounce it.” According to this White paper, Great. Britain had to prepare to use chemical warfare because other nations had not renounced it, and if other nations did renounce it, Great Britain would. still prepare to use chemical warfare because she could not respect their word. Could other nations respect Great Bri- tain’s word when despite the prohibition by the Hague Convention and the Peace Treaty, she had already used poison gas in the war of intervention in Russia, a country upon which she had never de- clared war! : RACE IN CHEMICAL WARFARE. With Germany defeated .and disarmed, the ex- Allies entered upon a race of armaments not only in the pre-war 3¢i.ze, kmt also in‘a race in’ chemical warfare preparedne:« a>] they then. proceeded to solemnly sign the Wersa’ngton treaty, and later the League of Nations Pi.r-2c!; in both of which they ‘righteously denounce, an? y~ohiLit the use of chem- ical warfare. The Washinzton Conference set up a sub-committee on poicon gas, which detivered a unanimous report to the conference, but this report was instantly suppressed, and it was only after four years of efforts than an American journal succeeded in obtaining a copy from.a foreign source. This suppressed report states that, “owing to the enor- mous use of potential warfare gases in peace, it is impossible to take effective steps to restrict produc- tion of such gases by a universal international regu- lation of chemical industry and commerce; giving to each and all nations the means tc provide for its own needs, but ng more.” This, however, was the last thing that the High Contracting Parties wanted, fér they were all try- ing to build up large chemical industries as poten- tial poison gas arsenals; so they suppressed the re- port and signed the treaty. The League of Nations .. sub-committee on chemical warfare later came to the same conclusion, and in 1926 reported “complete agreement on chemical warfare.” “Strict” control by the league over the world’s chemical industry, and an ertente of manufacturers in order.to elim= inate the nossibility of poison gas or bacteriological warfare in the future, are unanimously recommend- ed. Now, “before the treaties drawn at the Limitation of Armaments Conference in Washington were to become binding, they were to be ratified by the various signatory powers, and certified copies of the, ratification “deposited in Washington.” Four years after the signing of the treaties it was re- ported that “none! of the ratifications had been de- posited in. Washington, and the treaties respecting submarines! and chemical warfare have not been ratified by one of the powers participating in the conference.” The same farce was repeated at the League of Nations, here again “the present proto- col will come into force for each signatory power as from the date of deposit of its ratification.” nation has ratified the protocol. A “FARMED-OUT” INDUSTRY. Today in Great Britain the chemical warfare ma- chine has grown to enormous dimensions. Not only is scientific research being conducted in the uni- versities, etc., for the Chemical Warfare Committee, but the whole output of scientific research is care- ; fully watched for possible applications to chemical warfare. “The policy of the war department is to ‘farm out’ to civil scientific institutions, such as the universities, the National Physical Laboratory, Impeiral Céllege of Science and Technology, etc., all spare research than can profitably. be farmed question should be raised at the League of Na out, and generally speaking to restrict military in- tions. It is, I am sure, obvious to the house that stitutions to applied research, and the this is a question in which our action must depend on that of other nations. It was realized, therefore, that as other nations have been continuing to de- velop this method of warfare, the safety of our fighting services would be jeopardized by lack \of similar development in this country, an it was de- cided on May 12th that pending a pronouncement on the subject by the league, the fighting services should continue their researehes and experiments. The War Office Committee referred to has been constituted as part of the organization necessary for the continuation of these studies. The whole sub- ject will, of course, have to-be reconsidered when the council of the League of Nations has made its pronouncement.” , Now while Lloyd George was trying to excuse relimi design of apparatus.” ‘ on The Department of Scientific and Industrial Re- search is also used, and sends representatives to the Chemical Warfare Committee. After the war scholar- ships for research were awarded by the Department of Scientifie and Industrial Research, and some of the successful candidates were sent to work under poison gas chemists. How far research is quietly carried out, with money obtained from civil govern- ment departments, is-illustrated: by the following example. A chemist obtained~a grant. from the Board’ of Scientifie and Industrial Research, and went to work at Oxford*University. In due course he published a paper entitled “Synthetical Experiments with bb Dichloroethylsulphide:” | : - if they read the = paper: would not See anything the government’s duplicity and to shelter behind. sinister in it, until they were told that the gommon the League of Nations, the war office had decided its plans, and was pushing ahead with the work. Although Mr. Churchill avoided all reference to chemical warfare, a White paper issued in amplifi- cation of his speech, definitely stated that: “So long as there is any danger of other nations con- tinuing these methods of warfare, research in chem- ical warfare must be pursued, directed not only to- wards the gases, and apparatus likely to be employed ae Enis name for bb Dichloroethylsulphide is Mustard Gas. A single post war volume of one chemical journal contains 17 papers on poisons or explosives; the sting ofthese papers is in the tail, where some authors conclude by thanking the Chemical Warfare Department, others the Director of Artillery for permission to publish, and some acknowledg@ grants from the Department of Scientific and Industria Research, No . Most people even. | (Orem,