The Daily Worker Newspaper, June 26, 1926, Page 11

Page views left: 0

You have reached the hourly page view limit. Unlock higher limit to our entire archive!

Subscribers enjoy higher page view limit, downloads, and exclusive features.

Text content (automatically generated)

: LE. BOLSHEVIST REVOLUTION. ‘HE sitnation in the country became critical in ~ the fall of 1917. General Korniloy had Iready in August started a movement to seize _ ‘etersburg and establish a military dictatorship. ‘he capitalists shut down their factories in order > punish the workers “with the bony fist of hun- er.” The food crisis became alarming. The easants and the army unit revolted. Kerensky rganized constantly new governments, but they ad no authority.. He uses force against the easants who attempt to carry out their program gainst the nobility. The Bolsheviks can again ppear as a legal party and are gaining ground a the soviets and in the army. Lenin sends let- from Finland urging immediate prepafations om taking over power. In Qetober, he comes etly to Petrograd in order to push forward hé preparations. He writes letters, articles and vamphlets. In one of them: “Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?” he answefs the arguments nade by the opponents. As sonie of the papers nade the statement that the Bolsheviks do not lare to take power alone—they are only bluffing, venin refers to his statement in the first Soviet ‘ongress during the summer, that a party which vould not take power when it had an opportunity vould be a political zero, and would have no rea- son for existence. To the arguments that the so- viets, if they take power, could not keep the state nachinery going, Lenin answers that it might ve probable, if they tried to run the bourgeois state machinery. But if they establish a new, 2 soviet apparatus of power, they certainly can run it. The Soviet power will be the only solu- tion of the problems the country is confronted with. A fortnight before the October revolution, Lenin writes an article: “The Crisis Is Ripe,” in which he says that the decisive moment of the Russian and the world revolution has come. There are signs of disturbance in the warring na- tions. And,as the. Bolsheviks, have the advantage of an-unusualsamount of liberty-—they have mass papers, they have the majority of the soviets in the big cities, they have the support of the major- ty of the army—they must remember that “To hom much is given, of him much is demanded.” ere is a situation in the country that a gov- vent, which enjoys the support of the Men- she ks and the socialist-revolutionists, faces peasants’ revolts, and suppresses them. The gov- ernment has betrayed the democracy and appears more-and more imperialistic. Even the organ of the social-revolutionists has to admit that the old bureaucracy rules in the country. The peasants’ upheavals, the votes taken in the army units, the new elections to the soviets, the controversy be- tween the-government and the civil service—all this shows that the situation is ripe. The future of the Russian revolution is at stake. The future of the international revolution is at stake. But the central committee of the party was not convinced of the necessity of taking over power. Some members were doubtful. They were afraid that the party would isolate itself from the other socialist parties and did not have oad enough basis. Comrade Zinoviev charac- igzed his mistake well, when at the opening of '@ Fourth World Congress of the Communist International he explained that he had still re- garded the Mensheviks as the right wing of the proletariat, when they were already the left wing of the bourgeoisie. Comrade Trotsky has in his famous article about the German October hinted that Lenin had shown some impatience in de- manding the taking over of power beforé the Second Soviet Congress. It is true that Lenin regarded the situation as very critical, and he was afraid that the party would be late. The counter-revolutionaries were preparing and might take the initiative. He considered it as suf- ficient, that the Bolsheviks had the support of the soviets in the strategic centers and the sym- pathies of the soldier and peasant masses. The action was delayed by circumstances, so that it occurred the same day as the soviet congress met and sanctioned it. — Lenin was rigorous not only about the date but also about the technical preparations. He par- ticipated in the work of the military revolution- ary committee, and followed closely the move- ments. In several articles about the Art of Re- bellion, he had prepared the revolutionary work- ers for the fight. And ag the revolt was so well aoe ee eS 2S Ne Serqg ns owrro * Paxa rar.’ prepared, it happened with very little bloodshed. On November 7, (October 25, old-style) the power was taken and Lenin greeted the Soviet Congress with a short speech in which he explained. the immediate task; End the war, give the land to the peasants, and realize workers’ control in in- dustry. A Revolutionary Statesman. THE Marxian teacher, the director of the early fights, the creator of the army and the leader of the rebellion was now in’ power at the head of his victorious troops. The first Marxian as head of a government. The first task was to strengthen the power of the working masses. , Dif- ficulties arose, for some comrades hesitated, re- signed as people’s commissars. They did not ap- prove of the suppression of the bourgeois papers. New comrades were appointed. Then there were difficulties with the left socialist-revolutionaries, the allies of the government: they quit after the Brest-Litovsk treaty. And after that the govern- ment was stable—the most’ stable government in Europe during the past eight years. A new state apparatus had to be created from the very beginning. It was an enormous task. The workers were not used to administrative work. The specialists sabotaged. It was neces- sary to learn through experience, and pay dearly for the experience. Lenin was very attentive to every detail. He had continual conferences with comrades in responsible positions. The comrades tell how he helped them. Not that he gave them ready-made orders—although he could do even that when it was necessary, during the critical days of the civil war. But usually he helped everybody to find the solution himself. The comrades tell how some question was complicated and unclear to them when they went to Lenin with it, but when Lenin started to ask questions, the matter cleared itself up. And then it happen- ed that when some comrade went to Lenin with a complicated question, it became clear to him before he began to talk. He had learned Lenin’s method of putting questions. One“institition was necessary frometiée’very beginning—The Extraordinary Commisison for Fighting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (the Tcheka). There were counter-revolutionary plots everywhere. Many officials in the army and the soviet offices were sabotaging, either thru unfit- ness or unwillingness. A close watch was needed and swift pumishment of the offenders. It was necessary to have an institution which could de- cide without the delay of formalities. This fam- ous Tcheka has become the subject of innumer- able legends. The bourgeois and the socia]-demo- cratic papers spread fantastic stories about this “government within a government.” There is nothing mysterious about the Tcheka, and it has never intended to usurp power and place itself above the party. The most reliable comrades were placed there, because the work is exacting. And the Tcheka has always worked under the im- mediate direction of the party. There have oc- curred defects and evil practices in it,—for even the strongest nerves can collapse under the strain of such a heavy burden—but the party has swift- ly corected them. The discipline has been extra- ordinarily strict there. And Lenin often praised the work of the Tcheka. But a country cannot be governed with merely a good apparatus. A correct policy is needed. The government must show that it can meet the urgent questions of the people. The first task of the Lenin government was to send to all gov- ernments a message calling them to make peace. Of course the imperialists ignored it, but the people saw that someone had made an earnest effort to end the butchery. Soviet Russia has from the very beginning been the strongest advo- cate of peace among the peoples, and the bour- geois governments have been compelled by its ex- ample to come forward with schemes for peace— although these schemes have been fake. And every day that passes shows the toiling masses that peace cannot come through the imperialists, but only by their. overthrow. The land question had been the main problem of Russia for centuries. It could be solved only through revolutionary, “plebian,” methods—to use an expression of Marx. Lenin, in his book “The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade,” has explained how the solution of the land question, in particular, shows that the pol; icy of the Bolsheviks is not Blanquist and not adventurous, but a realization of the burning Si eens rma anna aes res ee needs of the people. The socialist-revolutionar- ies cried out that the Bolsheviks had stolen their ~ program, They were answered: Why, you were in power for over half a year and did not realize your program; why do you complain if someone else has realized it? But, someone may ask, why did the Bolsheviks take the socialist-revolutionary program and not their own? Lenin has given the answer many times. The S. R. program was the program. of the peasants themselves. It was the nationaliza tion of the land—as in the Bolshevik program. But a peculiar feature in the peasants’ program was the “equal use of the land,” that is, the land was to be distributed on the basis of the mem- bers of the family. It is a primitive method and does not adapt itself to the conditions of modern economy. But the peasants had to learn this through experience. A new land law was passed in 1922, on the basis of the experiences gained. In it is set forth how land. can. be acquired. First, the large soviet farms and the co-operative farms. Then the land of the peasants. The land departments of the soviets under the direction of the commissariat of agriculture solve the land problems, : : A correct approach to the peasants has beet’: the main problem of the soviet government. Phe” greatest crises of the revolution have arisen from it. But the Bolsheviks have solved them and maintained their unity with the peasants. Even the big peasants were in the beginning for the October revolution. They had been the leaders of the village from early times and hoped to get the best part of the estates of the nobility. And in many cases they took it, since they controlled many soviets. But soon the class struggle broke out in the country; the poor and middle peasants began to claim their rights. A decree authorized the committees of the poor to settle the land ques tion when the soviets of the rich peasants refused to carry out the land law. At the party con- vention of 1919, Lenin made his famous speech about the middle peasants, who had become the central figures in the country. The union be- ‘tween the workers and the peasants, “¢rédted” itr the fight against the old regime and strengthened in the civil war against the white armies, was again confirmed through the N. E. P.—The New Economic Policy, which gave the peasants a vast freedom of initiative. Their self-government through the soviets has since taken great strides forward. And again at the last convention the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had to face the peasant problem: how further to strengthen the alliance between the workers and the poor and middle peasantry, and what stand to take towards the growing up of wealthy farmers who, because of the rapid development of productive forces, are becoming eager to get the control in the soviets and in the co-operatives at the expense of the poor farmers. The immediate future will show that the party has succeeded in solving even this problem. . How about the realization of socialism? Was this not the immediate purpose of the soviet gov- ernment? No. Lenin had already, during the Kerensky regime, showed that the first question to be solved was the question of power. The ground must be cleared. Then it would be pos sible to start the building up of something new— socialism. Immediatély the banks were national- ized, centralized around a government bank. Great trusts and industrial enterprises were also nationalized. But in most cases only a workers’ control was established in private enterprises. The capitalists were asked to go ahead with pro- duction. But they were not willing to yield their power. Lenin tells how the soviet power took such moderate steps as to monopolize advertis- ing for the soviet papers (private papers were also allowed to be published). But the capital. ists refused to consider such petty things; they wanted to have ‘the question of power decided first, and they started civil war. And only after three or four years were they willing to live as disfranchised class aril recognize the control of the workers’ soviets which are successfully building a socialist economy. wi The Declaration of Independence. This document, the events of the revolutionary war and the famous constitutional convention that founded the United States will be put under the search-light of working-class writers in the next issue of the magazine. The “Fathers” of our country will also be examined for exactly what they were in the July 4th number. TEEN t. ee LENIN : - Short Stories of His Life ° ‘

Other pages from this issue: