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SAREE ASO TAT NANO RIS at ieee SRNR ARSC SONOS j { pritnecent Pt biicdieuias : ee THE DAIWY WORKER : , Page Three [ Our Party and the Communist International ) ferences between the former majority OMRADES from all sections of the, leading comrades’ Of our former group,| At the convention caucus our pity [be sentiment to drift in the party,|that he shall turn back if he has ab (Stenographic report of the speech { of James P, Cannon at the National f Oonvention of the Young Workers | League, Sunday, Oct. 4, 1925.) and the former minority. I want to country, the’ leading, most re-| especially Comrade Foster, because| was called a policy of responsibility. | because jt can drift only in one di- ready taken such steps. ; 4 testify here to the accuracy of this} sponsible and most influential com-| we held them to be responsible for|Now, what do we mean by responsi- | rectio We cannot permit ourselves We have some opinions in regare pe estimate, _ rades, took a decided stand against it; | having allowed sith a situation to] bility? We do not mean rah rt Hathgs a proms ini Atak beg outa sage ke Beloent teatices 7 7 and the final result was that a: ma-| prevail, n rades, that we shall accept party posi-jenly in a party meeting | of privately @ party. 2 e ' hails dial ieidiced Sad OdteckhGl? ON he a: ands won jority voted in favor of our proposal. held it to be a result of the pol-| tions and discharge the functions tg in berate? with icf me and lg pros oaaeies bee ae oe ae The youth league is meeting in| those between the two. former fac-| We Were then willing to consider the icy which they sponsored and we | these positions; altho this is eek esinighy es baat ies sr pin aie J pelo sp: Hehe ike eeasnolee: this national convention just at a time|tions, Differences arose at the con- difference which arose over the Com-| decided to take drastic action to|ant. What we mean by respons y |the Communist International decision, | against 5 of @ particularly serious crisis in the|vention and have been intensifying munist International decision as liqui-| check the tendency developing| Which must be taken Wa ia nad nue ronresae it as the result of false | bide thd baa pig svelte: party; and I am speaking here as|since the convention, But these aif.|(#ted on the basis of the adoption of| amongst our comrades as a result of | Tades of the bebe ede ys obra agentes! \‘thedeciaion of the Cominunist Inte one ‘of the party representatives} ferences which dame to the surface|¥" Policy, which was @ decisive pol-| the policy, to get themselves into con-| We must Mise een ni fy i 4 i DON'T thik it is necessary to ar) oo onay plenum ot laat April, and ~under circumstances which I‘think]in the convention crisis, and which ley of responsibility for the party, |tradiction with the decision of the|to help in retligik pape ee gue so much here as we did iD) Vi has not been fully carried: ul Melee ka Voowe: ta.vou eostades. have. intensified since ‘then, were| , But this policy of responsibility for} Communist International. That pol- eh the ps ie : e he eee Jin a | the Private discussions since the prob-| uigoutt src ‘As a result of the decision of the|themselves the outgrowth of old dif-| ‘He party did not develop as the pol-| icy proved itself t6 be completely} Pility to try to pu — lem has been liquidated for our com-|"” é icy 6f Comrade Foster after the con-| wrong, completely bankrupt, and|the crisis, to unify it, to complete Ltt Pro ac eiarepesihelly! vention, We were no sooner out of| very dangerous forthe party and for| the lMauidation of the sah Pobre differences have become synthesized this crisis than we immediately plung-| the movement, » within the party oa be ert peed and concentrated now into one, big ed into a new crisis in the group, We held a discussion with the com-|0" the path to oe evizat: x is Dieidmaintey question: : that is, amongst the comrades who|rades and presented to them in an ul-| 18 what responsibility means. Respon- think the crisis requires that es, especially leading com- ades, do not forget what the C. I. alled attention to in Germany: the ty for a real Bolshevist self- rades who are delegates. We have been fighting comrades adopting thes tactics, (and there were some com- rades, I am sorry to say, with whom I have long been associated, with} the {Communist International, the Cent: Executive Committee leader- sys represented by the group which} prior to the party” convention, last Joma and the decision of rs belonged to the former group. This | timative fashion demand that the | Sibility for us includes the criticism | . nf % .| eriticism which has not been practiced was the minority, and which, as you] ‘That question is this: The role of seeatee was pep paivatie, connected | appeal should pa eth an vier of the party’ in the proper time and ere iia Shi pede Lisl da up to how! We think it requires know, I do not belong ea So, in }the Communist international andthe| with the conflict at the convention.|in the party in any way. The com-|Place,and within mits of party dis) 1y jabor movement, and in constant| liquidation of the policy of refusing speaking here tonight I am. doing 50) relations of our party and our party|j: was over the ‘appeal to the Com-}rades finally agreed to this. cipline, as the conditions may make| oouaboration), and it is no pleasure| to admit) mistakes or of admitting mise aftet coniultation with the delegation |ieaders to the Communist Interna-| wrnist International. But in spite of the agreement the| !t ‘necessary. to be in such sharp conflict with| ‘Kes in such a way as to justify them, of the Central Executive Committee, | tional. It hag been stated here by Comrade| discussions we bad with the Y. W. L lon in{them. But we have reminded these| The party leaders have to begin to not aga direct representative of the} 1, the controversy in the group /Bedacht, and I think it is known to delegates seemed to center entirely Abe a taeNi aaah ey comrades and we want to remind|seak openly to the party and to the Central Executive Committee, but Tl over this question, a conflict has de-|overy Communist that it is not only| around the question of the appeal. See eee nee Ore nee | toe now before the party that every | ©. I. about everything that has been am speaking, by permission of the Cen-/veioped between Comrade Foster and|the right of a Commutist who dis-|'The whole discussion of the activi-| ture that it can be solved easily | "len now mintern-who wound wp i,|done wrongly in order that the party tral Executive Committee In my OWN | myseit. And in connection with the| agrees with a decision of the Com-| ties and the SaPNEE hs of the com-| S27. UNlONty=.: Tamarade. Bedacht, asi. camp of the iba ay alee ci and the C, I. can enable us to get name, and in the nagne of @ larg¢/+omarks I make on this I want to re-| munist International to appeal for a|rades seemed to hinge around this| ¥® *20W, is ® very Ree COMERS: gan his opposition to the Communist | Straight. nymber of comrades Whose Views ©O-!ming the comrades of my long yol-| reconsideration, but it is his duty to] question and proposals were made| 2° %Poke oe res, vipa International with statements suchas| ,. 0° ¢- 4. ety edhe incide with mine, fs: ise pitas laboration with Comrade Foster. / do so. It is the duty of any Commun-| that the comrades: of the Y. W. L. But I am afraid Comrade Beda ea ade. bent auacine: iaieie) OCH And; finally, our opinion o Some of the greatest torwarttsteps ist who thinks the Communist Inter-} should come into the convention of pasa oma vd es Salley Be rades, regardless of intentions, in poli- ‘ b the. patie. colic acu of the party have been brot about as| national needs more information on| the Y. W. L. and make a motion to| 2™e® the deep serio I inion | tics every action has its own logic; tia fii ok a sang fe ae sh : Com: the result of this collaboration, to-| any question to furnish this informa-| ondorse the appeal to the Communist | P'°blem in the party. In my opin Ares, ontabliahment of. tho Fass. 2m thing that is necessary for the liqui- pe situatio: very clear statements from us; and I propose here to make these state- every action has an objective result, st tions @: ments. I propose to give the, party} gether with some other comrades. As| tion. } International. it ts banca ‘ge to rosie pre ae Tit leads in a eae direction, | ™U"'** z ei ais Bascal ut te and the Comintern an answer to every |far back’as 1921 and 1922, this collab-| I-isagree totally with the impl'-| 77 was clearly dggbonstrated in these} at mechanics aeiuacisel ioothoae ; SS Ee i question, which they have a right tojoration made it possible simultane-| cations of Comrade Stachel’s state- iL dnensesbeaT ME 'the. soveptan nite limitations. Mec! oa me vi HE policy adopted in the conven-| the whole Gaditien wi _ a ask,,us in this. situation. ously to develop the trade union work| ments here that an appeal to the Com- ance {ot solving political problems have tion caucus by Comrade Foster | with the C, I.; a complete break w Iygaid the party is in a crisis, and ‘we. all know this, In my opinion, it is a crisis of Bolshevization. Our party is going thru the travail of ac- celerated development towards areal Bolshevist party. It is the process. of “The Birth of a Communist Party” of which Comrade Zinoviev once wrote. ‘The party appears to be torn into all kinds of groups, factions and. sub-fac- tions as a result of this process, The problem before the party, above all others, or, rather embracing all othes, is the problem of Bolsheviza- tion. And it is clear that the central question in the problem of Bolsheviza, tion is now the question of the re! tions of the party to the Communist International! f Bolshevization, without a correct es- timate of the relations of the party , and the party leaders to the Com- ‘ munist International, is merely an of our policy was only a formal) always to me appeared defective. I| which was adhered to even after it| the whole tendency to regard the C. acceptance. Comrade Foster and|have learned this by experience in| was formally defeated, led to making|!. as something outside the party, those who supported him continued| the party as well as by study. I do|the Communist International appeal] putting pressure on the party or the the attempt to have the essence of| not believe that the crisis can be liqui-| an issue. And this in turn led some| party leadership. We must develop their policy prevail. This made fur-| dated by persecution and terrorism of| comrades in the membership meet-|the understanding that the party and ther collaboration with them impos-| comrades. ing openly to criticize the decision of|the C. I. are one inseparable whole. baizeptte oa ‘We all-know there is a certain dis-}the Communist International. Each|We must have frank and open deal- one Collaboration is impos-| satisfaction amongst some comrades.| step led in the same direction and|ing with the executive of the C. L sible between those having our| But I say it is impermissible for} that direction is the wrong one. and with the party; comrades must standpoint towards the relations of | jeaders of the party, whether they be-| I think it is our duty now to come|say the same thing in the party as the party and its leaders to the Com-| jong to the present official leadership | out and say openly before the party|they say in Moscow, and vice versa. munist International, and comrades|or whether their leadership accrues | that we are going to strive with all] I, for one, and the comrades as- who persist in: this other policy. from their influence within the party | our power, and with all our energy to] sociated with me, and they are a After this, during the few days we|as the result of their past party work, | see to it, that not a single Commun-| considerable number, intend to follow have been here, we have had many| jt is impermissible for them to allow-| ist is led any longer in that direction; | this policy. . discussions with the youth. I person-| ———_____—_-—— ally attach tremendous importance to ? 5 the convention of the Y. W. L., and to the comrades “who are delegates ebC m 0S er a onven | here, So muck {mportance that: Ij i Ball LI a Gull sete biden _cadhenget bailed j ference and the handling of the J. 1. ytional the more effective will be our discussions with them and to attempts (OMRADE Chairman and Com-|&- Ww. besiege to paiva eee ee Liven pgs. to see to it that these comrades rades: I feel it is my duty to say|im New York—a very difficult hates a h % ekts of ‘oe Comintern and should not, under any circumstances, |at least a few things here tonight. If|!em—and I tried - put that into good bet . ve + he: ard dohig $8 our ane be placed in a position where they|it were any other meeting of the Par, ne oo Nagel pol a bates bia nf hi My th sheanitian. hevecet. tex would be forming « nolitical platform|ty except the Young Workers League, | 7b 2°) ttn Deven tock any |must put the Comintern decision fully on the basis of apposition to the de-| possibly I would not feel ‘the urge so] MuuatKs Mat they never took any | Mist vrect. In outlining the Party cision of the Communist International.| strongly. But particulatly the Young |*tock in Cannon's argument that 1|into e i ” of discipline} this right The comrades representing the view-| Workers League I believe’ I should | ¥®5 seeking to avoid responsibility in| conception o! vip! } i must be borne in mind. # Point of ComradeyFoster persisted day|speak to. I should like to refer to|the Party. : é : after day in. attorta-to-eonvince|some. of. the things that have..beén | It. was not with, a desire to.shirk |’ 1 nelieve .wehaver@bexed thé der the comrades of Y. W. L. of their|said by Comrades Bedacht* and Can-| responsibility that we made our propo- lon of the Comintern 100 per cent,/ position; and sd persistent have these|non. It is true, as Comrade, Cannon | sition, nor could it possibly be given] We have done the best we could Ym comrades been, that we.were obliged | has said, that sharp division has tak-|the sinister twist of being in oppos-|a difficult situation. I am sure we to spend this entire day-and all last|en place in the ranks. of the former|tion to the Comintern. On the con-|made the effort to act in the spirit of right discussing.the question with| majority. The division—I want to try| trary it was, we feel, the other sec-|the decision when we refused to con- these young comrades to beat down|to show you some of the implications tion of the group, that were shirking |tinue on as the majority of the Party. this propaganda and this attempt to/ of it if I can The division took place |Tesponsibility of the Party in spite of !Suppose we had tried to diplomatize get comrades agitated on this funda-| shortly after receipt of the cable-| their proposal. Why? Because these | with the CI and said, “Well, this de- mentally false basis. It was only at|gram from Moscow, upon a proposal| Comrades, notwithstanding all their|cision doesn’t say we shall take a five o'clock this..evening that we|of Comrade Bittelman and I that on|talk about sharing responsibility, | minority of the CEC, so we shall con- finally confirmed our victory in the Y.|the basis of the cablegram we should | Come forth with a proposition to send | tinue as a majority.” Suppose we had W. L, delegation... These comrades|take a minority of the CEC, It seems | all the leaders of their group off to|done that. Do you think the Party took their position definitely and cate.|to me necessary, comrades, in view of| the school in Moscow—Cannon, Dun: | would be in a healthy condition at the gorically, for our.,policy, the fact that I have been so closely |¢, Abern, Bell, Hathaway, Schacht: | present time if we insisted on cling- E came to the decision finally,| identified with such a very large sec-|™an and Williamson. We argued un-|ing on to the majority? I don't think Wine in view of the violation of|tion of the Party, that something | @Vallingly against this policy of theirs. |it would. I think we took the proper the prior agreement, iby dentine, should be said in addition to what | Comrade Bedacht in the committee al-/stand in taking a minority. I am who are delegates ahold not only| Comrade Cannon has said as to the | 80 impressed upon them that it was|sure the Comintern will endorse it. take ja position ‘in the caucus against| Motive behind that motion. impossible for all these leading com-|To call it opposition to the C. L is this ‘policy, but that they should take| Comrade Cannon has left the im- recede alg Bclly dag goed acd ridiculous. oe @ position openly in the convention | pression as tho this motion was de-| 10 ine work ths host i A rad condemning any attempts to agitate| signed to shirk responsibility of the wae shicktgg ievwren Aah cueaigicatl the party or the league on the ques-| Party. I want to correct that. I want rades who have tried to pacentn iin ten tion of the appeal, to discredit the de-| to say that to shirk responsibility was pression that we were avoiding Party cision of the Communist International,|the farthest thing from our minds. responsibility, and to make Aire : or to put up the appeal as a political) When Comrade Cannon put forth the desperate bares Shia waiter! 2 platform of opposition in the party; | idea of a fifty-fifty CEC, to me that don’t say that they shirked res aaa and thanks to Comrades Williamson | looked like a highly impractical propo- bility intentionally, but the can raed and Schachtman who fonght side by| sition. Comrades, as I read the de- deretedd % 0s avoiding Seupeniethitiy ingly and unequivocably. We have side with me from start to finish the| cision from the Comintern I under- and refused to let them jot ts sek done that, I think, And as far as an Y. W. L, comrades have been led away | stood it to mean this—that the Com- cow. 5 . organized campaign to develop the from this false path and have unani-|intern decision meant just.what it ‘ Party in support of the appeal is con- mously adopted what I think is the | said, “that the Ruthenberg group was cerned, the thing has been enormous- correct position on the question of the | Closer to the view of the Comintern, ly exaggerated, to say the very least; relations of the party to ‘the Com-| more loyal to its decisions.” In this The Party organizations all over the munist International. situation, to my understanding, there |!@te’ to my personal attitude I must| country that we were in control of, For us the question has come to| was nothing left to do except to turn|*?SWer it. His statement is correct| aia are still to a great extent, as well the point where wé could not be sat-|the control ‘of the CEC over to the|®24 @ fact. I can assure you that}as the mass membership meetings isfled any longer, in'view of our duties|former minority. I think that was a| Whe I read that decision I was not| recently held, have not gone on record to the party and to the Communist|100 per cent vorrect Communist deci-|* Pit Pleased. When I saw the state-|for the appeal, nor have we made any International, with” having a private|sion on our part. It-was and still is|™@9t “that the Ruthenberg group is| effort to have them do so. Comrade understanding within a private con-|my opinion that, in the face of the|™0F@ loyal to the decisions of the|Cannon’s charges of an organized ference. The question has come to| decision, to try to hold on to the ma-|CMintern” than our group, it went| campaign in support of the appeal is the point for us néW where we feel| jority of the CEC or even to set up pA **ight to my heart, because I want] incorrect. It is true that some com- ‘ obliged and duty-bound to take an| fifty-tifty CEC was a wrong policy, to be loyal to the Comintern and as|rades have made statements that ~ open stand before the party th repud-| I don’t think it can be held far as I understand its decisions I am | were improper, and for this these lation of the policy"ot Comrade Fos-|us that we were sabotaging the Party |/0¥@! to them. When the decision comrades must be corrected. I refer ter and to call openly on all com-| because of our interpretation of the |C#™e | said to myself “What value am | particularly. to the statements of rades in the party; who are willing|Comintern decision, namely, that it |/ 1 the movement if I am not loyal,—| Comrades Kraska of Boston and Aron to be influenced by us, to follow our| calls upon the minority to take charge |!‘ the Position is taken that I am not| berg in New York. I think these Policy and not allow themselves to|of the CEC. Our position was this, |!0¥#! to the Comintern? If that is the| ments were inadvisable. But T am be maneuvered or ptished or led into| that to take a fifty-fifty CEC was not |°#%* of what value am I in the CEC?"|sure these comrades had not the any other policy on the question of|going to facilitate matters. It would |/t tok me only an hour to get over| slightest intention of admonishing the tlie appeal to the Communist Inter-|put us in a false position and expose | ‘M8 Wrong, but excusable conclusion | Communist International. .I am sure national, 4 ( us to the charges that we were block- I think I recovered rapidly from that they are altogether loyal to the C. 1. HIS naturally beings about a very|ing the Party work. The decision said | *¥Jective reaction. If I have made any incorrect state- serious situation in the party on|the minority should control the Party,|/ Comrade Bedacht said much about {ments, I would want to be corrected the question of our relations to Com-| and we should accept it as such. We ae pcg I kn that he used the jut them also, * rade Foster. I personally hi that | had to get ourgelves in the proper po-}!/ustration of the army and general Comrade Foster will be oruyinnes and| sition in the Party, in the CHC of the | Staff constantly. In trying to picture Sit popes ear Riged pred gees that he will turn back from the path |Party, which in the face of the de-|Party discipline, he said when the ar-|Qomade Bedacht sail « fow things he has drifted into. cision, could only be done by our tak-|™Y staff gives the instructions the| 1, ihe eftect that some com ad id Comrade Foster has played an im-|ing a minority of the CEC. It is sig-}S0ldiers must obey, In a sense that’s |(\ comeades have aia Pcngignte san ry : ighting opinions portant role in the party, and he has/nificant that at the very first, meet-|(rue in our Party as it's true in an | o¢ the Comintern and the decisions tt given much to the party as we all|ing of the CRC, Comrade Greeh abol-|""™Y. But there is one important makes. I don't think h ers and more into a position of opposition, | rank and file of the party they criti-|know, and I am sute that now if|ished the fifty-tifty arrangement and | ‘lifference not mentioned by Comrade pang da ane eae abe one which would inevitably develop into| cized the decision of the Communiat|Comrade Foster wilf turn back from| gave the former minority a majority, |Bedacht. In our Party the-discipline |ioe ty put. on! shia ‘shoe ‘whos AMEE opposition the Communist Inter-| International.’ Also I read in the|this course he can‘lay the basis for| 1 repeat, the farthest thing from our |'# Selfmposed. The decisions are ar- find it i od fit. ei h ti rion int national. DAILY WORKER that similar occur-| still greater work inthe future, But | minds was to shirk responsibility, Our |1¥ed at by a common discussion of |. rcciation of the c La h ey or And it becauge we had such aj ences took place in Boston, The re-|on the other hand ifComrade Foster| comrades generally have not shirked |Policy with our hyeher officers, and tee rey to Mo ow. I rinse deep conviction that this line would] ports of theNew York m bership} persists in the ling,{hat he followed | responsibility. They have worked dil-|'he decisions, nm they come, are Sait dimer in 1991 pane odio: ee lead in this direction that we spoke| meeting greatly sharpened the crisié,|even up to today, ip my opinion, he|igently since this decision,” As for us like in @n army. !irne second time in 1924 I He ultimatively. mith great determination |!t showed clearly the’ dangerous line| Will lose his influence in the party.| myself, I feel there is at: least one ult of @ common un-| hen pe A mig in the caucus. The tendency represent. | that was' being followed. We did not| Comrade Foster find that he is|thing | am grateful to the:minority | 4 intelligent co-opera- think air Pail se nae uae po ed by Comrade Foster met the most] react, so much in antagonism to the| more and more in ict with all the| for, that is, the present majority of sor ag Mbt yes See | us phases of the Par- powerful oppositieg; tt pposi-| comrades in New York and Boston | best Communist element ih the party the CEO, that they entrusted me with | tY: rs we must obey the question of the third party alliance, (we are, confident they will quickly up| particularly 1 t wor! ; ree of discipline || “™ convinced that the leaders q oars or oat See ee Paka call ak eo ifs SckiaSGtSt| “gga : on a broad scale and to organize the} munist International is in itself in legal party. These achievements jany si a violation of Communist jaid the basis for the party to be- rent However, there are two sides come a factor in the‘labor movement.|to this‘question of appealing to the Comrade Foster played a tremendous | Communist.International. role in all of this; and I collaborated N the one hand 4 it ig the duty, not with him and with other comrades. O merely the right, of comrades to rine see ihe Pinan He ae tna sae to the Communist Internation- that there appears to be no possibil-|*/ On the other hand it is imper- ity to reconcile them—and we are at eenase, ey beg Oa mia eae oe cc aoa mie wane gait or iea tional, to appeal, at the same time to collaboration : the party, because that negates the ree whole principle involved in the appeal N receipt of the Communist Inter-|to the Communist International. An national telegram, a profound cri-| appeal to the party on the basis of sis was immediately precipitated in|an appeal to the Communist Interna- he group of the former majority at/ tional is nothing less than an attempt tthe party convention. The immedi-|to put the party in a position of oppo- ate difference appeared to arlse over | sition to,the decision of the Commun- two separate propositions put before | ist International. No matter what is the caucus: one by Comrade Foster |one’s intention, this is the objective and one by Comrade Dunne and |effect. Therefore we opposed the nye Pn uae Soto. myself. Comrade Foster’s original|tendency that developed within our that do not take into account the full proposition, was that we should group to Present resolutions to the significance of the fact that we are |2ccePt only a minority of the party organizations endorsigg the ap- members of the world Communist| Cetra! Executive Committee, and | peal: of the former majo to ‘the party, with international leadership, that he should not participate; and | Communist. International, j “ not ousihta the sesh: eeueete ot that the organization of the new Cen-| What* was this cond! ed upon? Bolshevization. tral Executive Committee in fact |To us it; was very clear, after a little Bevsuve $F the: peculiar nature of | Should be carried out by the repre-| consideration, that if the group of the the present’ situatiorf, "and because of | Semt#tive of thé Communist Interna. | former majority would present such the rapid changes which have taken tional, and not by us who were the|a motion ,to a meeting of the party. place in the party leadership, it is|™#ority at the convention. Our|it could pnly be adopted on the con- manifestly the duty of those com-|°°W2ter-Proposition was that we, the/ dition. that the comrades present i : : fades: who prior to the convention majority, should organize the Central| would be convinced that the appeal composed the majority group, to make il Executive Committee. At first I pro-| was aan and valid. ‘In other posed an even division, half and half; ; words, théy would have to be con- beard gia Bolin pew i and later it was modified to include| vinced’ thatthe decision was an er- solutes % the representative of the Communist|ror. In order to accomplish this it J International, on his suggestion. The| would be necessary, and would fol- I THINK it is known to nearly alf| ditterence was not technical but po-| low, in’ spite of all intentions, that comrades in the party, as it has} tical. It was a difference in attitude| Propaganda and agitation would be been known for some time to the} towards the decision aig towards the| made to.convince party comrades that members of the former majority, that | situation created by ity) 1 considered | the decision of the Communist Inter- the former majority group is itself in']that Comrade Fost¥'s proposition | national is wrong. This is not permis- the process of the deepest crisis./had serious objective consequences. | sible, because this is appealing in the This crisis within the group of the'|1 considered that if we, as a majority | party to the opinion and view-point former majority is a part of the eri-|of the convention, should refuse to or-| that the Communist International de- sis in the party, For that reason it} ganize the new Central Executive | cision was made with snap judgment, is the Concern of the party, and| Committee, or that in any eventCom-|or made without due consi eration. should be made known to it. Factions|rage Foster should not go into the| This in itself has an inevitable tend- can have no interests of their own in| new Central Executive Committee, it|ency to ‘discredit the Communist In- a Communist party. They have to be} could not be interpreted in any other| ternational before the party com- related to the interests of the party.|way than that we were rejecting re-|rades, to break down faith in the Within the group of the former ma-| sponsibility for the Central Executive| Communist International decisions. jority there has been in recent times}Cémmittee. This would mean that|It is a step away from the Commun. a very thorogoing discussion. Very|the party would be thrown into a cri-| ist International. This was the posi- strong pressure has been put upon one} sis in which the Central Executive| tion we took, section by another “section. This| Committee would be deprived of the } Pressure has had certain effects. But || these effects have not been suffici- assistance and support which it would juire fr ently decisive. Therefore it s neces- ity the pid ee spd ch en ate gin 0 gary’for the group of the former ma-|: Jority to have more pressure put upon _ |, 1t, from the outside, directly before the whole party. My speech here to- \night has this purpose, ' 2g O Iam going to discuss the ques- ‘tién before the Young Workers ague convention, not merely for the r,W..L,, but for the party, since this vention is a forum ‘before the ‘party, I am going .to speak jout the situation which has de- loped . within. the ranks of the er majority. When I. say :this, 1 Now about the organized campaigt! in support of the appeal that is charg- ed against us. It is true we have ask- ed the Comintern to review the \de- cision, which is a legitimate and pro- per thing to do. But with one pro- vision: that in the meantime we put the decision into effect unquestion- T is significant, in confirmation of my statements that this conflict er the question of the appeal had an organic connection with the con- vention conflict, that the alignment of comrades on this question was identi- cally thé same as the one in the con- vention caucus, with only a change here and there by comrades who had not understood the real question in- | ] | | Our proposition was based on the opinion that the situation was such in the party, precipitated by the decision, that we were obliged if we wish to save the party from demoral- ization, to ‘take responsibility to’ the full limit of the possibilities under the volved wisions of the decision, A -very severe crisis developed B held a discussion in the caucus| which, made it impossible to agree to for two days, and in this discus-|a unified policy., I am sorry to say on I pointed out, together with] that comrades in several parts of the other comrades, the objective conse-| country, under influence of the policy eters of the attitude shown by; which was sponsored and given sup- ‘omrade Foster, ° port by Comrade Foster were mis- ppadig he 8 ecb We stated there that Comrade Fos-| led into taking what I consider some Labs «aie ctiliaetAcdib Ta Welibatltis ter’s proposition would create a con-| false steps. These comrades who had “georets,’ scandals, or petty gossip,| 10" making. it impossible for the|a certain resentment against the Com- onjranything: of this sort, he-wil be| P&’tY to work, or for the Central Hx-|munist International decision began 4 dgeppointed... I-will confine-my. re-| *cttive Co! e to lead it or con-|to speak quite openly against it, ie een i sag which | 2! iti amd that this would*bring us| Efforts within the group to compel 1 Comrade Cannon szid that after the decision came I refused to participate in the CEC. Altho that charge re- dn inevitably, not only into conflict with|the comrades to abandon this policy hi Lape 3 poem gary and) a; the Central Executive Committee, but| were not successful, In the New York 4 loamtenty known to all} into conflict with the Communist In- membership meeting as was reported ternational since the decision of the|in the DAILY WORKER, and as I Communist ‘International was the|have been informed by personal let- main factor; that consequently, re-|ters, some comrades of the former gardless of the intention of the com-| majority, who have been members of rades, the whole objective tendency| the party for many years, and who would be for all elements in the party| surely know the fundamental basis who are in any degree actively or| of our relations to the Communist In- passively in opposition to tke Com-| ternational, altowed themselves to be munist International to rally around| Placed in an impossible position, Be- our standpoint, and enmesh us more|fore a membership meeting of the ' the Jeading comrades of the group and which are of concern to the party. i Comrade Green in his article in the _ DAILY WORKER the other day mad the statement that the difference: within the group of the former major- ity are not less serious than the dif- i “eg