The Daily Worker Newspaper, August 16, 1924, Page 11

Bukharin’s Report on World Program FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL TO THE The DAILY WORKER today pub- lishes the third installment of the report given by Nicholas Bukharin on the question of the world Com- munist program at the Fifth World Congress of the Communist Inter- national. Another installment will appear in an early issue. 2s s NOW come to the question of the new economic policy which I con- sider to be the most important part of my report. ° First of all a few introductory re- marks. After the introduction of the new economic polfey, we, the Russian Communists, and also our friends, the foreign parties, almost without any exception, had a feeling that we had acted somewhat improperly, and that We ought to apoligize for the new economic policy. New. Economic Policy. In its most subtle form, this apolo- gist attitude consisted in our consid- ering the new economic policy ex- clusively from the standpoint of po- litical expediency, as a political con- session to the petty bourgeoisie, It means that we did not think the new economic policy to be expedient and rational in itself. This is what we thought then. Now however, we may quite consciencious- ly say the very opposite. The ques- tion of the new economic policy on the whole should be formulated by us in the folléwing manner (later on I will deal with it more exhaustively): The only correct economic policy for the proletariat, the policy which in- sures the growth of productive forces, is the policy which we described as the “new economic policy.” War-time Communism was nothing else but a corrective of this new economic poli- cy, the necessary corrective for the political expression of the direct class war against the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeois elements. I believe that we should state these ideas quite clearly, and for this reason, com- rades, I must ask to be excused if I shall deal with these ideas in some detail. ° Class Remnants Still Left. Comrades, the fundamental facts, the fundamental phenomenon which will confront the victorious prole- tariat after the conquest of political power, will be the variety of the forms of economy with which it will have to deal. In no country, not even in the most capitalistically developed, are the productive forces so highly developed as to have caused the dis- appearance of all the immediate strata. ‘, No Marxist will assert that the social revolution cannot come unless every petty bourgeois, every handi- craftsman, every small capitalist shall have disappeared. It would be a fool- ish exaggeration, of the kind contrived by our opponents to make a carica- ture of Marxism. We here spoke only about the tend- ency of the development. None of us thought that social revolution will only come when the last peasant will have disappeared, but knew that it will come when the contradictions of .the capitalist system will have pro- duced a situation on the social chess- board which will call forth revolu- tion thru the class interests. Thus in all countries without excep. tion (of course in some countries to a greater extent than in others) we shall have to deal with a great variety of economic forms. And that is the Main fact. With it are connected two other main facts of economic and po- litical life. Classes Reflect Class Economy. The second fact is as follows: There are as many different economic forms as there are classes or tather social strata. As long as we have small enterprises we shall have small producers, as long as there are small farms in the country side- we shall have peasants and as long as we have small capitalist enterprises, we shall have small capitalists and also handi- craftsmen, Thus we see that the various eco- nomic forms correspond with the various classes or strata of society. There is another main fact connected with this, which will play an impor’ tant part after the conquest of po- litical power. If we leave this third fact out of sight and out of account, we run the risk of adopting an errone- ous and even harmful policy. This third factor is as important as the above mentioned.two main facts, and consists in the heterogeneity of eco- nomic motives, of economic impulses. Thus, if we have different economic forms,. we also have different eco- nomic motives. The motives of the peasantry differ from these of big cap- italists. The economic motives of socialized enterprises differ from those of the big peasantry. Even the economic motives of the big peasantry differ from those of the small peasantry. What then is the main problem of our economic policy in the face of this basic problem? This main problem could be formulated as follows: it is the problem of co-ordinating and sub- ordinating firstly, economic stimuli. ‘Economic Hegemony Above All. In the face of such heterogeneity, we must of course consolidate the hege- mony of the ’*proletariat also on the economic field. What does this mean? It means that our socialized enter- prises must have the hegemony in our economic life, and that the other eco- nomic forms, consequently, all inter- mediate motives, must be subordinate to this economic hegemony. What makes the proletarian eco- nomic policy so complicated is—that it is not as clear and simple as Com- rade Boris’ conception of economic Policy. If, as he says, there were no differences and no variety of forms, it would be an easy matter to establish socialism. Thus, our highly esteemed opponent gets rid of the entire transi- tion period, for this period presup- poses heterogeneity of economit forms. The transition period is the period during which the most ad- }vanced economic forms squeeze out other forms by means of competition. Now it is clear to us that the main problem consists in subordinating ‘}economic forms and classes. This is @ complicated art. But this is the only right way to look at the eco- nomic policy of the victorious prole- tariat. It is not difficult to under- stand why we cannot except complete socialization a la Boris. It would be a-caricature. : Inkpot of Centralism. -I well rementber that Trotsky once said in arguing with extreme central- ists, that centralism consists in plac ing a big inkpot in the Red Sqnare into which all the writers from the various parts of the Soviet Union are to dip their pens. Why is it impos- sible to carry out this complete social- ization a la Boris? It is impossible because of the heterogeneity of the economic forms within our Soviet Union. We are unable to carry this thru for technical reasons.‘ We have not enuf organizational forces to socialize everything, even the peasant allot- ments. This is one of the reasons. Secondly, it is politically impossible, because, by attempting it, we would rouse the petty bourgeoisie and all the traders against the victorious pfole- tariat. Thirdly, because to attempt to socialize everything all at once such heterogenious enterprises would re- quire a gigantic administrative appa- ratus the cost of which would be higher than that of anarchic produc- tion. This played an important part during the period of military com- . munism, This excessively centralized form of government necessitated such a gigantic State apparatus that it con- sumed everything. We still feel the consequences of this disease. The problem of distribution between pro- ductive and unproductive consumption is one of the most important problems of the victorious proletariat, NEP Correct Policy. The New Economic Policy is the only correct and true proletarian economic policy. When I speak of the only correct economic policy of the proletariat, I mean a policy based on the growth of productive forces, and TEP trl sist SHS SSNS a eee ” European indebted- ness to America) to MacDonald and Herriott—I hope, gentlemen, | am not in your way. a policy which encourages this growth. When from this standpoint, we make a comparison between economic pol- icy, new economic policy, and military communism; when we compare the two forms of this policy, we come to a full understanding of the difference between them. What was military communism? It was rational con- sumption of existing food stores. It seized or requisitioned from every peasant and from every locality any- thing that was to be had, in order to provide for the army and for the ur- ban proletariat. At that time this was the only possible policy, the first strat- egical position which gave us a firm footing in the economic life of the country. We seized power in eco- nomic organization, we also partly destroyed them (this too was a good thing, it is in fact a justification of the policy of military communism). On the other hand we-established ra- tional consumption of the existing food stores. That we could not give encouragement to productive forces, is self-understood. How could we en- courage agriculture, if we took away all the surplus produce What mo- tive could the peasantry have for pro- duction? We have no economic sub- ordination of small farms, and there- fore no economic subordination of the peasant class, hence no subordination of the economic stimuli of this class— hence, from the standpoint of pro- ductive forces, we had to record not an advance, but a retreat. The peas- ants refused to produce, We Recognize Mistakes. There was a great conflict between our State policy and the economic motives and impulses of these strata of the population, which made the partial existence of these economic forms impossible and roused the in- dignation of these classes against this policy. It is a good thing that we adopted the new policy ourselves, in making a careful survey of this mat- ter, we recognize the economic mis- takes we made and we realize what real proletarian economic policy must be like. Apparent Radicalism of Boris. justification of the demand for com- plete socialization is—that every na- tional economy is a unity, and being a unity, requires just such a policy. This sounds very radical, but in real- ity it is theoretical opp rtunism. Why? Not only is there a unity, but there is also a unity of contradictions. To a certain extent, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is also a social unity. But there are contradictions within it, and the same may be said of all economic fotms. This, in fact, is the whole problem. The bourgeo- isie has co-ordinated these contradict- ing elements. We must have another kind of co-ordination. To deny this problem, one must assume that so- ciety represents an united whole, and not a unity in contradictions. Further, if we regard the varieties (Continued on page 8) On Factory Nuclei (Continued from page 2.) of activity, if the party forces will be distributed according to the impor- tance-of the various funetions, the party will be able to accomplish this tremendous task. The above description of our or ganizational method should by all means create the impression as tho these plans have alreaa.peen carried out in Germany Party. The ideologi- cal obstacles in the Party have been overcome, all the forces are now be- ing concentrated on the work in the factory nuclei, and the party is learning day by day to concentrate its forces on the most important tasks, which are of decisive impor tance to the organization of workers’ fights. This constitutes a tremen- dous step forward in comparison with the state of organization which pre- vailed at the time of the Fourth World Congress. May the decisions of the Fifth Congress, by taking stock of all the past organizational experiences, by elaborating the clear principles of bolshevist organizations, and by precise formulation of the im- mediate organizational tasks, help the Comrades, I should like to deal here | various sections in furthering the or- with an argument used by Boris. His' ganization of the revolution,